The London School of Economics and Political Science

Elite Bargains and the Politics of War and Peace in Uganda and Zambia

Stefan Lindemann

A thesis submitted to the Department of International Development of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, August 2010

ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor, James Putzel, who was helpful at all stages of my research. He not only gave me continuous intellectual guidance but also – in his capacity of Director of the DFID-sponsored Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC) – provided me with generous financial support during my fieldwork and the writing-up phase. Without this support, my research would not have been possible.

At DESTIN, I owe thanks to Stephanie Davies for her friendly administrative help with all PhD-related problems. I would also like to thank the Department for additional financial support through the LSE Research Studentship Scheme. A special thanks goes to my friends and fellow LSE PhD students Sean Fox and Tom Goodfellow who not only provided useful comments on my research but were also very supportive during several 'PhD crises'.

In Zambia and Uganda, I owe thanks to all of my 103 interview partners who offered extremely valuable first-hand insights into the political life of the two countries. I am also very grateful to all those Zambians and Ugandans who helped me to identify the tribal, linguistic, regional or religious affiliation of their ministers, party officials, permanent secretaries, army officers, parastatal directors, etc. In Zambia, I received help from Benson Musuku, Dr. Patrick Manda, Hector Sando, Dr. Siteke Mwale, Dr. Gilbert Mudenda, Haswell Mwale, Dr. Godfrey H. Haantobolo, Gen. Malimba Masheke, Mr. Mwanza, Dr. Fred Mutesa and Wilcliff Sakala. In Uganda, I got support from Kasirye Mayanja, Mwambutsya Ndebesa, Yonasani Kanyomozi, Timothy Kalyegira, Kintu Musoke, Dr. Fredrick Golooba-Mutebi, Steven 'Hippo' Twebaze, Andrew Mwenda and Dr. Sallie Simba Kayunga. Without this patient support, my research project would not have been possible.

In Zambia, I am especially thankful to Simone Klawitter who hosted me with the warmest hospitality at her house in Lusaka. I would also like to thank Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika who put me in touch with a great number of interesting people. Also, I should not forget to mention Clifford who not only took me about everywhere in Lusaka in his taxi but also taught me a great deal about Zambia and its people. In Uganda, I thank Fred Golooba-Mutebi who provided me with many useful contacts in

Kampala and also made helpful comments on my research. I am also grateful to the staff of the Makerere Institute of Social Research (MISR), especially to George Owor, who helped me to make my stay in Kampala as pleasant as it could be. On campus of Makerere University, I particularly enjoyed regular conversations with Mwambutsya Ndebesa who provided many insights into Ugandan politics.

Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Ulla and Heiner, who have never hesitated to support me as much as they could. And last, but certainly not least, I owe my largest amount of thanks to my wife Sirka who not only patiently endured my months-long absence but also provided critical comments and invaluable emotional support. Without her loving support, my 'PhD journey' would have been a more difficult one.

Abstract

This PhD thesis starts from the puzzle of striking differences in civil war occurrence across Sub-Saharan Africa, exemplified by the two countries of Uganda and Zambia. While post-colonial Uganda has experienced no less than 15 cases of civil war, Zambia has been able to avoid civil war since independence in 1964. To explain this extreme variation in the two countries' vulnerability to civil war, I first review the five most influential theoretical approaches in the civil war literature. While most of these approaches fall short of resolving my puzzle, several arguments that emphasise the need for elite power-sharing offer a promising starting point. Against this backdrop, I go on to develop a theoretical approach that focuses on the inclusiveness of elite politics. I argue that a country's propensity for war or peace is determined by the inclusiveness of the 'elite bargain', i.e. the distribution of access to positions of state power (political, military, economic and territorial) between contending social groups. This hypothesis is confirmed by my empirical findings, which are based on 103 interviews, a comprehensive set of original data on the inter-group distribution of political, military, economic and territorial posts, and in-depth historical analysis. In Uganda, I trace recurrent civil war back to the persistence of exclusionary elite bargains. By contrast, Zambia has been able to contain the spectre of civil war by forging and maintaining inclusive elite bargains. My detailed two-country comparison reveals that differences in civil war occurrence reflect variation in the relative trend, depth, scope, authenticity and perception of the elite bargain. There is also evidence for the relevance of several complementary explanatory factors, including violent state repression, socioeconomic inter-group inequalities, political leadership, levels of urbanisation, and regional spillover effects.

Contents

Maps

Tables

Figures

1 Introduction

1.1 The Puzzle

Sub-Saharan Africa is commonly associated with images of violence and war. Such perceptions have spiralled since the early 1980s, greatly reinforced by Western journalists who have tended to paint the continent in gloomy terms.[1] More recently, Robert Kaplan described Africa as littered with tribalism, failed states and endemic civil war.[2] Similarly, *The Economist* decried a 'hopeless continent' where 'wars rage from north to south and east to west' and the 'few candles of hope are flickering weakly'.[3] Even respected Africanists such as Jean-Francois Bayart or Patrick Chabal & Jean-Pascal Daloz seem to suggest that the entire continent is plagued by violent disorder and state breakdown.[4]

Figure 1: Civil wars, 1945-1999[5]



At first sight, such unchecked pessimism seems justified. Along with Asia, Africa has been the world's most civil war prone region since the end of World War II (see figure 1). Significantly, no less than 24 out of 48 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have

[1] Marnham 1979; Lamb 1982; Harden 1990.
[2] Kaplan 1994.
[3] 'The Hopeless Continent', *The Economist*, 13-19 May 2000.
[4] Bayart et al. 1999; Chabal & Daloz 1999.
[5] Compiled based on a civil war dataset by Sambanis 2004a, available at http://pantheon.yale.edu/~ns237/index/research/CivilWarList.xls. For the underlying definition of civil war see chapter 2.1.

experienced at least one period of civil war over the past 50 years (see table 1). This is not to deny that there are important differences between these 24 civil war countries. Some countries have been affected by recurrent civil war that has covered much of their territory, including – among others – the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Chad, Burundi and Sudan. Others such as Senegal or Mali have suffered from only one, more regionally confined conflict. Nevertheless, civil war has been present in all parts of the continent with no discernible pattern of sub-regional concentration.

Table 1: Civil war in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1945-2008[6]

Countries having experienced civil war (24)	Countries having avoided civil war (22)
Angola (4 civil wars), Burundi (4), Central African Republic (2), Chad (4), Congo-Brazzaville (2), Côte d'Ivoire (1), Democratic Republic of Congo (5), Djibouti (1), Ethiopia (3), Guinea Bissau (1), Kenya (2), Liberia (3), Mali (1), Mozambique (1), Namibia (1), Nigeria (2), Rwanda (3), Senegal (1), Sierra Leone (2), Somalia (2), South Africa (1), Sudan (3), Uganda (5), Zimbabwe (2).	Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Zambia.

The pervasiveness of violent conflict notwithstanding, one should however not lose sight of the fact that almost half of Africa's countries have so far been able to avoid civil war (see table 1). This is very significant and shows that many states have proved remarkably immune to the allegedly inescapable 'civil war epidemic' for almost five decades of independent statehood. Such resilient states can be found across the entire continent, even in the midst of sub-regional instability. Examples include Botswana in the South, Tanzania in the East, Benin in the West, and Cameroon in the Centre.

Uganda and Zambia are two countries that exemplify these striking differences in civil war occurrence across Sub-Saharan Africa. As shown in figure 2, Uganda has witnessed a total of 15 civil wars since its independence in 1962 – a figure that makes it one of the most conflict-intensive countries on the African continent.[7] The current government by Yoweri Museveni has faced the highest number of armed insurrections (7), followed by the Obote II government (5), the Amin military dictatorship (2) and the Obote I

[6] Sambanis 2004a. As Sambanis's list ends in 1999, I have added new cases of civil war for the period between 2000 and 2008, including recent civil wars in Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Sudan.

[7] In contrast to Sambanis (2004a) who amalgamates different instances of civil war during one period into one (and thereby underestimates the actual number of wars), I treat every rebellion as separate as long as it fulfils my definition of civil war (see chapter 2.1). This explains why I count 15 cases of civil war in post-colonial Uganda (see figure 2), whereas Sambanis counts only five (see table 1).

government (1). Only 17 out of the 47 years of independent Uganda have been entirely civil war free. Zambia, by contrast, has not experienced civil war since its independence in 1964.

Figure 2: Civil war onset and avoidance in Uganda and Zambia, 1962-2008[8]



FRONASA = Front of Salvation; UNLA = Uganda National Liberation Army; UNRF = Uganda National Rescue Front; FUNA = Former Uganda National Army; UFM = Uganda Freedom Movement; NRA = National Resistance Army; Federal Democratic Movement (FEDEMO); UPDA = Uganda People's Democratic Army; HSM = Holy Spirit Movement; UPA = Uganda People's Army; LRA = Lord's Resistance Army; WNBF = West Nile Bank Front; ADF = Allied Democratic Forces.

The puzzling contrast between recurrent civil war onset in Uganda and enduring civil war avoidance in Zambia raises the following research question:

Why has Uganda experienced recurrent civil war, while Zambia has managed to hold together?

1.2 Pre-existing Theories of Civil War Onset

Theories on the causes of civil war are abundant.[9] In what follows, I will review what I consider the five most influential theoretical schools of thought in the study of civil war, including arguments focused on (1) natural resources; (2) economic performance; (3) inequality; (4) ethnicity; and (5) political institutions. While most of these approaches

[8] Own compilation.
[9] Useful recent literature reviews include Kalyvas 2007; Collier & Hoeffler 2007; Bussmann et al. 2009; Fearon 2010; Blattman & Miguel 2010.

fall short of resolving my puzzle, several arguments that emphasise the need for elite power-sharing offer a promising starting point.

CIVIL WAR AND NATURAL RESSOURCES

Since the early 1990s, there has been a flood of research on the relationship between a country's natural resource endowment and its vulnerability to violent conflict. While early research focused on the impact of natural resource scarcity, the more recent debate has centred on the effects of natural resource abundance.

Resource scarcity: As early as in 1803, Thomas Malthus expected that food production would grow arithmetically, while the human population would grow exponentially, eventually causing serious food shortages and conflict.[10] Drawing on this argument, 'Neo-Malthusian' scholars generally assume that violent conflict is driven by the scarcity of environmental resources. Most prominently, Kaplan interpreted the West African civil wars of the early 1990s as clear evidence of Africa's gathering environmental crisis.[11] More systematic research was done by the 'Toronto group' around Thomas Homer-Dixon[12] and the 'Zurich group' around Günther Baechler[13]. Both groups conducted a considerable number of case studies but found no evidence for a direct connection between environmental scarcity and violent conflict. They conclude that environmentally-induced scarcity can contribute to a dynamic of violent conflict, albeit only indirectly in combination with a broad range of political, economic, social and cultural factors.[14] Corresponding quantitative research also shows that there is little evidence for a direct link between natural resource scarcity and civil war. Hauge & Ellingsen, for example, conclude that while deforestation, land degradation and low freshwater availability are positively correlated with the incidence of civil war, the magnitude of their effects is minimal.[15] De Soysa finds no direct links from renewable resource scarcity, measured by the per capita stock of total renewable resources, to violent conflict.[16] And Urdal reports that high population growth is not associated with armed conflict, while land scarcity – measured by population density – is mostly

[10] Malthus 1803/ 1992.
[11] Kaplan 1994. For an excellent critique see Richards 1996.
[12] Homer-Dixon 1994, 1999.
[13] Baechler et al. 1996.
[14] Case studies confirming these results for Sub-Saharan Africa include Rwanda, Sudan and Mali.
[15] Hauge & Ellingsen 1998.
[16] De Soysa 2002a.

negatively associated with civil war.[17] However, where land scarcity combines with high population growth, there is generally a positive and significant association with violent conflict.

Can 'Neo-Malthusian' approaches explain differences in civil war occurrence in Uganda and Zambia? Uganda is clearly the more resource-scarce country, evident in the fact that it exhibits higher population pressure and lower arable land per capita than Zambia and the Sub-Saharan African average (see figures 3a and 3b). Moreover, its renewable internal freshwater resources per capita (1498m^3 in 2002) are smaller than those of Zambia (7309 m^3) and the Sub-Saharan African average (5468m^3).[18] Yet, both the literature and my own interviews in Uganda reveal that there is no evidence that these scarcities were directly behind any of Uganda's 15 civil wars since independence. This is not to deny that there is currently growing competition over land and water in the context of global climate change, especially among the Karamajong in the north-eastern parts of the country.[19] While this has occasionally caused low-level conflict at the local level, it has so far not led to civil war. Is the relative abundance of natural resources in Zambia part of the reason why the country has been able to avoid civil war? Some insiders seem to think so and argue that it is especially the country's extremely low population density that make the mobilisation of violence difficult to achieve.[20] While this cannot be entirely discounted, it is generally difficult to see why and how the absence of resource scarcity by itself would prevent violent conflict. If abundant resources are distributed inequitably between competing social groups, alienation and violent conflict is a plausible scenario. This draws attention to the fact that – in line with the findings of the above-cited research – the ultimate effects of the given degree of natural resource availability depend heavily on a wide range of socioeconomic and especially political factors. But then why not invert the argument and take differences in political organisation as a starting point?

[17] Urdal 2005.
[18] World Bank 2009.
[19] USAID 2005.
[20] Interview, Guy Scott.

Figure 3: Resource scarcity in Uganda and Zambia[21]



Resource abundance: Research on the relationship between natural resource wealth and civil war onset has been extremely influential. While the 'resource curse' argument comes in many different variants, the following two can be identified as predominant.[22]

(1) The 'honey pot' variant: Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler hypothesise that natural resources constitute a 'honey pot' that generates violent forms of rent seeking.[23] It is suggested that resource-rich countries are more prone to civil war by providing insurgent groups with the opportunity to use the 'looting' of natural resources as a means to finance the 'start-up costs' of rebellion. This argument implies that natural resources to which rebel groups can gain access should be robustly associated with civil war. This is however not the case. First, there is no robust association between primary commodities – a broad category including both mineral wealth and agricultural goods – and civil war. While Collier & Hoeffler find that a country's dependence on primary commodities – measured as the ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP – is strongly correlated with the risk of civil war, other scholars disprove such association.[24] Second, and this is a particularly severe blow to the 'honey pot' hypothesis, there is also no robust association between civil war and more easily lootable commodities (e.g.

---

[21] World Bank 2009.
[22] Ross 2004a, b, 2006. A third influential argument focuses on the relationship between resource wealth and secessionist civil wars. This is however of limited relevance for my study since separatist conflicts are the great exception rather than the norm on the African continent (see Englebert 2007).
[23] Collier & Hoeffler 2002, 2004.
[24] Elbadawi & Sambanis 2002; Fearon & Laitin 2003; Fearon 2005; De Soysa & Neumayer 2007.

gemstones, drugs or timber).[25] Significantly, both Lujala et al. and Ross find little evidence for the often-assumed link between secondary (i.e. lootable) diamonds and civil war.[26] Third, case-study research provides no support for the 'Collier-Hoeffler argument'. Sambanis, for instance, summarises a series of case studies (including eight for Sub-Saharan Africa) meant to refine the Collier-Hoeffler model of civil war and finds no evidence for the 'looting mechanism'.[27] Similarly, Ross examines 13 cases of civil war (including six civil wars in Africa) and concludes that

> 'nascent rebel groups never gained funding before the war broke out from the extraction or sale of natural resources, or from the extortion of others who extract, transport, or market resources'.[28]

(2) *The 'political Dutch disease' variant*: A second argument links the 'resource-civil war nexus' to the phenomenon of the 'rentier state'.[29] Rentier states are late-developers that live largely off unearned income (natural resource rents and foreign aid), which relieves them from the need to raise revenue through domestic taxation.[30] This is said to favour the emergence of certain 'political pathologies', including – among others – the absence of developmental ambitions, weak bureaucratic structures, and vulnerability to violence.[31] James Fearon & David Laitin have introduced this line of reasoning into the quantitative civil war literature arguing that resource wealth – in particular oil – causes weak and non-responsive state structures, which in turn increases the probability of civil war.[32] If they are right, oil and other resources that generate large and secure government revenue (i.e. non-lootable resources) should be robustly associated with civil war. At first sight, this seems to be the case as many studies find that oil wealth increases the risk of civil war.[33] Also, Ross comes to the conclusion that 'rents from fuel minerals' (oil, gas, hard coal, lignite) are robustly associated with the onset of civil war, especially when located onshore.[34] On the downside, Sambanis reports that oil exports

---

[25] Ross 2004a.
[26] Lujala et al. (2005) find that secondary diamonds are only associated with lower-scale ethnic conflict, while Ross (2006) shows that secondary diamonds are only linked with separatist conflict.
[27] Sambanis 2005.
[28] Ross 2004b: 50.
[29] Beblawi 1990; Karl 1997; Moore 2004.
[30] The post-1945 international system has created opportunities for elites in developing countries to 'garner very large economic surpluses (rents) from controlling or managing economic and political relations with the core' (Moore 2004: 305). This contrasts sharply with state formation processes in Europe where a hostile external environment forced state-builders into alliances and bargains with interest groups (see Tilly 1990).
[31] Moore 2004.
[32] Fearon & Laitin 2003.
[33] De Soysa 2002b; Fearon & Laitin 2003; Humphreys 2005; Fearon 2005.
[34] Ross 2006.

are not robust to different civil war models,[35] while Hegre & Sambanis conclude that dependence on oil exports may be considered at best marginally robust.[36] Smith even finds that oil wealth is robustly linked with *lower* likelihoods of civil war.[37] Also, there is no robust association between primary diamonds and civil war onset.[38] Finally, the causal mechanisms that may link natural resource rents to state weakness and, even more problematically, state weakness to conflict remain diffuse and subtle.

The 'resource curse' argument also fails to explain differences in civil war occurrence in Uganda and Zambia. According to the 'honey pot' hypothesis, we should expect no civil war in Uganda and Zambia since both countries are characterised by the absence of 'lootable' natural resources. Uganda is an agrarian economy with coffee, cotton and tea among its main exports. Yet, the missing opportunity to use the 'looting' of natural resources as a means to finance armed insurgency has not prevented Uganda from becoming one of the most conflict-prone countries on the African continent. In the case of Zambia, the 'honey pot' argument seems to be more relevant. Whereas the country is abundant in copper (a non-lootable resource whose exploitation requires high investments in capital and technology), it lacks – a least until recently – lootable natural resources. Against this backdrop some might be tempted to argue that the absence of lootable resources has prevented potential rebels from launching armed insurgency against the government. If this was true, we should expect violent conflict once lootable resources become available. Yet, the recent discovery of alluvial (i.e. lootable) diamonds in Western Zambia is said to have inspired secessionists[39] but has by no means led to civil war. The 'Political Dutch disease' hypothesis has even less explanatory power. Zambia can be considered a 'rentier state' that lives largely off unearned income from copper, whereas Uganda faces the need to raise revenue by taxing its farmers. Accordingly, one should expect civil war in Zambia and peace in Uganda – a prediction that is in sharp contradiction with the real world.

Altogether, the influential 'resource curse' thesis turns out to be remarkably inconclusive.[40] This suggests that there is something fundamentally wrong with deterministic models of violent rent seeking. Significantly, almost all contributions fail

---

[35] Sambanis 2004a.
[36] Hegre & Sambanis 2006.
[37] Smith 2004.
[38] While Ross (2006) discovers such association, Lujala et al. (2005) come to the opposite conclusion.
[39] 'Diamonds Inspire Lozi Secessionists', *The Post*, 12 October 1999.
[40] Ron (2005) has therefore labelled the resource curse thesis 'a paradigm in distress'.

to answer why natural resource rents are associated with war and collapse in some countries and stability and development in others. Interestingly, the few contributions that try to resolve this puzzle can only do so by taking account of the political processes that govern the extraction and distribution of natural resources rents.[41] This draws attention to a fundamental point. Natural resource rents are not damaging *per se*,[42] and instability and violent conflict are by no means inevitable. Instead, it is equally plausible to assume that natural resource rents are used by state leaders to co-opt political opposition through patronage-based networks. What matters most in explaining differences in civil war occurrence is therefore the *political* use and distribution of natural resource rents. In the end, 'resource curse' theorists fail to understand that politics is decisive to the trajectory of natural-resource rich countries – 'the nature of conflicts in mineral-dominant economies does not exist prior to politics'.[43]

CIVIL WAR AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

A second school of thought assumes that a country's vulnerability to civil war onset depends on its economic performance. The two most commonly discussed factors to assess the impact of economic performance are income levels and economic growth.

Income levels: A first hypothesis holds that civil war is related to economic poverty; i.e. low levels of income measured by GDP per capita. There is strong support for this hypothesis as a large number of quantitative studies – both cross-regional ones[44] and those that focus on Africa[45] – find that lower income levels are significantly associated with higher civil war risks. This finding is robust to different sets of countries and time periods, as well as to different measures of civil war onset.[46] Also, case study evidence suggests that many countries had low and declining per capita income in the years preceding the start of their civil wars.[47] On the downside, income per capita (just as economic growth) may be partially endogenous to civil war:

---

[41] E.g. Snyder & Bhavnani 2005; Snyder 2006.
[42] See Khan 2000a, b.
[43] DiJohn 2002: 13.
[44] Hauge & Ellingsen 1998; Fearon & Laitin 2003; Collier & Hoeffler 2004.
[45] Elbadawi & Sambanis 2000; Collier & Hoeffler 2002.
[46] Sambanis 2004a; Hegre & Sambanis 2006.
[47] Sambanis 2004b: 186.

> 'Something that all quantitative studies miss is that low-level violence precedes civil war and this should reduce both income and growing by reducing investment and encouraging capital flight.'[48]

It may therefore well be that the correlation between income and civil war onset runs in the opposite direction.[49] Moreover, the causal mechanisms remain unclear. The observed correlation could in principal support the two predominant models in the literature, namely the 'state-weakness hypothesis'[50] where low income encourages violent conflict by increasing state weakness, and the 'opportunity cost hypothesis'[51] where low income encourages civil war by decreasing the opportunity cost of rebellion. Unfortunately, existing case-study evidence offers little, if any support that such causal relationships are really at work.[52] While still poorly understood, the link between low per capita incomes and higher propensities for internal war is however clearly one of the most robust empirical relationships in the civil war literature.[53]

Economic growth: A second hypothesis assumes a link between a country's economic growth rate and civil war onset. Here most scholars expect a negative linear relationship whereby low economic growth makes a country more prone to civil war. The empirical support is however more contradictory than in the case of per capita income. Hegre & Sambanis find that low rates of economic growth are robustly associated with civil war onset[54] – a relationship that also holds for Sub-Saharan Africa.[55] An earlier study by Sambanis, by contrast, comes to the conclusion that economic growth is not robust to different civil war models.[56] Case-study evidence is subject to similar contradictions. While many countries experienced negative economic growth in the years preceding the start of their civil wars (e.g. Senegal, Mali and Sierra Leone), there is also evidence that rapid growth may actually increase the risk of large-scale violent conflict.[57]

While arguments focused on economic performance help to identify general dispositions for civil war, they cannot explain differences in civil war occurrence in Uganda and Zambia. In Uganda, economic performance has been extremely poor, especially until the 1990s (see figures 4a and 4b). Yet, this poor economic record can

---

[48] Sambanis 2005: 307.
[49] See Stewart & Fitzgerald 2001.
[50] Fearon & Laitin 2003.
[51] Collier & Hoeffler 2004.
[52] Collier & Sambanis 2005.
[53] See also Blattman & Miguel 2010.
[54] Hegre & Sambanis 2006.
[55] Collier & Hoeffler 2002.
[56] Sambanis 2004a.
[57] Sambanis 2004b, 2005.

hardly be considered the main driver behind recurrent civil war onset. During the first administration of Milton Obote (1962-1971), Uganda experienced slowly rising GDP per capita and positive, albeit erratic growth rates. In this sense, it would be difficult to link the 1966 'Battle of Mengo' to poor economic performance. Similarly, the insurgencies against the second Obote administration (1981-1985) can hardly be explained by economic decline since the early 1980s were characterised by positive economic developments, including growing GDP per capita, positive economic growth rates of about 5%, falling inflation and growing prices for cash crop producers.[58] The reign of Idi Amin, by contrast, gave rise to a disastrous economic performance with sharply declining GDP per capita and negative growth rates, especially in the late 1970s. Particularly ruinous was the expulsion of the Asian community in the early 1970s, which resulted in a dramatic reduction in skilled human resources and highly unproductive forms of rent-seeking. Under 'Operation Mafutamingi' (Operation Get-Rich-Quick), the new owners typically showed little interest in the acquired Asian properties and preferred conspicuous consumption over productive investment – a situation that resulted in a tremendous destruction of wealth.[59] Against this background, scholars have argued that economic crisis and the corresponding decline in distributable wealth ultimately caused the violent overthrow of Amin's regime.[60] Even though this seems plausible at first sight, there is reason to argue that economic decline during the 1970s was largely endogenous to Amin's extreme minority regime.[61] Finally, if low economic performance was really the main driver of conflict in Uganda, why would most of the country's civil wars occur in the 1980s and 1990s when per capita income and economic growth were on the rise?[62]

---

[58] ACR 1981/82: B299p.; Tindigarukayo 1988: 615p.
[59] Jorgenson 1981: 283; Mamdani 1983: 53; Mutibwa 1992: 117.
[60] Kasozi 1994: 116pp.; Brett 1995; 137p.
[61] As shown in chapter 4, Amin established a minority regime based on tribal groups from West Nile, his home area. Since his regime had only a very limited stake in Ugandan society, it lacked an 'encompassing interest' and thereby resembled Olson's (1993) roving bandit who prefers predation and consumption over public goods provision and productive investment – a constellation that is prone to economic decline. While economic decline did weaken the financial and repressive capacity of the regime and made it more vulnerable to violent challenge, the origins of economic ruin arguably go back to Amin's exclusionary policies.
[62] On post-1986 economic recovery in Uganda see Reinikka & Collier 2001.

Figure 4: Economic performance in Uganda and Zambia, 1962-2008[63]





In Zambia, civil war avoidance was achieved *despite* persistently poor economic performance. After a brief copper-based economic boom during the late 1960s, the Zambian economy declined due to a number of external shocks.[64] Oil prices increased threefold, while the reduced demand for copper resulted in a price drop of 40% in 1975. The shocks led to rising trade deficits, escalating inflation and mounting foreign debt. In 1978, Zambia entered into a conflict-ridden relationship with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) but subsequent rounds of structural adjustment could not halt the continued economic decline. As a consequence, the country experienced below African average growth rates and one of the worst declines in per capita income in the history of post-

[63] Calculated based on data by Angus Maddison, available at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/.
[64] See Andersson et al. 2000; Chisala et al. 2006.

colonial Africa (see figures 4a and 4b). After the transition to multi-party rule in 1991, the new government engaged in a new round of IMF-sponsored structural adjustment, which aimed at macroeconomic stabilisation, trade liberalisation and public sector reform. Economic performance continued however to be undermined by the enduring decline of the mining sector that suffered from another collapse of world copper prices. The result was low economic growth and declining GDP per capita throughout the 1990s. It is only more recently that the copper boom has helped to slowly reverse Zambia's long-standing economic stagnation.

CIVIL WAR AND INEQUALITY

One of the oldest and most intuitive ideas about violent conflict is that it stems from the existence of inequalities. This 'inequality-civil war hypothesis' comes in two variants. The dominant variant focuses on the impact of inter-personal inequalities, while the minority variant points to the significance of inter-group inequalities.

Inter-personal inequalities: Inter-personal inequalities relate to the distribution of income across the whole population of individuals from richest to poorest, typically measured through Gini coefficients. It is assumed that the existence of such 'vertical inequalities' constitutes an important source of grievance and thereby encourages violent conflict. However, this hypothesis receives only limited empirical support as there is no robust statistical relationship between income inequality and civil war onset. Whereas Nafziger & Auvinen find that 'objectives grievances' of income inequality contribute to civil war and humanitarian emergencies,[65] Fearon & Laitin and Collier & Hoeffler come to the opposite conclusion.[66] Cramer, finally, establishes that neither bivariate nor multivariate analysis produces generally accepted patterns between income distribution and civil war onset.[67]

With respect to Uganda and Zambia, the 'vertical inequality-civil war hypothesis' is similarly inconclusive. If vertical inequality was a key driver of civil war, we should expect high income inequality in Uganda and low income inequality in Zambia. Yet, as shown in table 2, the reverse is true. With an average Gini coefficient of 0.552 since the

[65] Nafziger & Auvinen 2002.
[66] Fearon & Laitin 2003; Collier & Hoeffler 2004.
[67] Cramer 2006.

1960s, Zambia has been among the countries with the highest degree of inequality on the African continent. Uganda, by contrast, exhibits lower degrees of income inequality even though its Gini coefficient has been on the rise since the 1990s.

Table 2: Gini coefficients in Uganda and Zambia[68]

Country	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	Total
Uganda	No data	0,345 (5)	0,361 (4)	0,432 (6)	0,491 (3)	0,408 (18)
Zambia	0,476 (3)	0,569 (5)	No data	0,578 (12)	0,464 (2)	0,552 (22)

All this does not necessarily dismiss inequality as an explanatory factor. Instead, the lack of a statistically significant association may be due to the extremely poor quality of the inequality data.[69] Gini coefficients are often either very poorly measured or entirely missing, not least in Sub-Saharan Africa. This makes claims based on large samples of countries extremely unreliable. One way to further explore the role of inequalities in large-scale violent conflict could therefore be to improve the data quality.[70] But there is a second, arguably more promising option. Significantly, the main problem may not be data quality as such but rather that Gini coefficients simply do not measure the kind of inequality that is relevant to civil war onset. From a theoretical point of view, this is a plausible possibility since it is by no means clear why and how inter-personal inequality – that involves important collective action problems – would encourage the ability to organise a civil war. As a consequence, other scholars have proposed to consider the impact of a different kind of inequality, namely inequality between social groups.

Inter-group inequalities: A second hypothesis relates the onset of civil war to the existence of severe inter-group inequalities. Frances Stewart argues that violent conflict is not 'exclusively a matter of individuals randomly committing violence against others'.[71] Instead, civil wars normally occur when 'culturally defined groups' – i.e. ethnic and religious groups – mobilise against each other. The material basis for such violent group conflicts are 'horizontal inequalities', which are defined as inequalities in political participation, economic assets, social services and cultural status. It is suggested that violent political mobilisation is especially likely when there are consistent horizontal inequalities, i.e. when political inequalities at the leadership level

---

[68] UNU-WIDER 2008. The numbers in brackets indicate the number of surveys that were available to calculate the Gini averages.
[69] Cramer 2005: 11pp.
[70] See Milanovic 2005.
71 Stewart 2000: 246. See also Stewart 2008.

and socioeconomic inequalities at the mass level run in the same direction. The 'horizontal inequality' hypothesis is supported by considerable case study evidence, including a number of African case studies.[72] Large-N research by Gudrun Østby finds that horizontal economic and social inequality between ethnic, religious and regional groups in 55 developing countries has a positive significant effect on violent conflict.[73] Similarly, a quantitative study by Cederman et al. shows that economic horizontal inequalities between ethnic groups increase the risk of violent conflict.[74] Both Østby and Cederman et al. demonstrate that violent conflict is especially likely when there are also political horizontal inequalities.

The 'horizontal inequalities approach' is also promising when trying to explain differences in civil war occurrence in Uganda and Zambia. I argue however that there is reason to mainly focus on the role of horizontal inequalities at the elite level. Stewart and colleagues maintain that violent conflict requires horizontal inequalities not only at the elite level but also at the mass level since only the latter will enable leaders to recruit followers.[75] While I agree that situations where elite and mass level inequalities run in the same direction greatly facilitate violent mobilisation, I do not think that horizontal inequalities at the mass level are a necessary condition for violent conflict. Instead, I expect that group leaders can mobilise their groups even in the absence of mass-level horizontal inequalities, not least since the 'masses' tend to expect that they will be worse-off if their leaders do not have access to positions of state power. This expectation is confirmed in the cases of Uganda and Zambia. Even though horizontal inequalities at the mass level have mattered, horizontal inequalities at the elite level were arguably the main driver behind patterns of war and peace in the two countries (see chapters 4-7).

---

72 Stewart 2002, 2010; Langer 2005, 2009; Langer et al. 2007; Caumartin et al. 2008; Brown 2008; Murshed & Gates 2005.

73 Østby 2008a. A different study finds that horizontal social inequality between ethnic groups has a positive significant effect on violent conflict, while a measure for horizontal economic inequality turns out to be insignificant (see Østby 2008b). A separate study for Sub-Saharan Africa concludes that both economic and social inequalities between regional groups increase the likelihood of violent conflict (see Østby et al. 2009).

74 Cederman et al. 2010a.

75 Stewart 2008: 12.

CIVIL WAR AND ETHNICITY

A fourth school of thought has sought to establish a link between civil war onset and ethnicity. This argument comes in two variants, one focusing on a country's degree of ethnic fractionalisation/polarisation and one privileging patterns of ethnic exclusion.

Ethnic fractionalisation/ polarisation: A first hypothesis holds that high degrees of ethnic fractionalisation make a country more prone to civil war. While perennialists stress the primordial nature of conflict between ethnic groups,[76] modernists attribute ethnic violence to the politicisation of cultural difference in the context of the modern nation state.[77] The basic idea that ethnic diversity breeds conflict has been taken up in the quantitative civil war literature by testing for the effects of demographic proxies such as the 'ethno-linguistic fractionalisation' (ELF) index.[78] However, there is no evidence for a positive association between high ethnic fractionalisation as measured by the ELF index and civil war.[79] For Sub-Saharan Africa, ethnic fractionalisation is even *negatively* associated with civil war, which may indicate that the continent's high levels of ethnic diversity act as a source of safety for the most heterogeneous countries.[80] A second hypothesis holds that the relationship between ethnic diversity and conflict is non-monotonic, with less violence for highly homogeneous and highly heterogeneous countries. Most influentially, Donald Horowitz has argued that the most severe ethnic conflicts tend to arise in countries where a significant ethnic minority faces the dominance of an ethnic majority.[81] This claim has also been taken up in quantitative models by testing for the effects of ethnic polarisation – again with inconclusive findings. This is true for both Montalvo & Reynal-Querol's 'index of polarisation'[82] and Collier & Hoeffler's measure of 'ethnic dominance'[83]. For Sub-Saharan Africa, Collier & Hoeffler find 'ethnic dominance' to be unrelated to civil war onset.[84]

---

[76] Smith 1986; Huntington 1996.
[77] Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983.
[78] ELF measures the probability that two randomly selected persons from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group (Taylor & Hudson 1972).
[79] Fearon & Laitin 2003; Collier & Hoeffler 2004. The same is true for fractionalisation indices constructed by Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2005) and Fearon (2003, cited in Sambanis 2004a).
[80] Elbadawi & Sambanis 2000; Collier & Hoeffler 2002.
[81] Horowitz 1985.
[82] Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2005) find that ethnic polarisation does indeed increase the likelihood of civil war – a finding that has however been challenged by Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2006).
[83] While Collier & Hoeffler (2004) and Hegre & Sambanis (2006) find this measure to be positively related with civil war, others come to the opposite conclusion (Fearon & Laitin 2003; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 2005).
[84] Collier & Hoeffler 2002.

Degrees of ethnic fractionalisation and ethnic polarisation *per se* are also of little relevance when trying to understand differences in civil war occurrence in Uganda and Zambia. As shown in table 3, ethnic fractionalisation can hardly be behind these differences as both countries exhibit similarly high levels of fractionalisation. Given that Uganda exhibits considerably lower degrees of ethnic polarisation, the latter has even less explanatory power. At the same time, the polarisation data illustrate the limited usefulness of macro-level indices describing a country's demography. Based on population statistics, Zambia may be relatively polarised, with Bemba-speakers (about 40%) opposing other larger groups such as Nyanja-speakers (about 25%) and Tonga-speakers (about 15%). Yet, as I will show below, this polarisation has been *politically* accommodated. Uganda, by contrast, is formally less polarised but suffers from the historically grown political polarisation between the Baganda on the one hand, and the other ethnic groups on the other[85]. This underlines that ethnic cleavages are never static conditions but always subject to complex processes of political bargaining – a complexity that single fractionalisation or polarisation indices simply cannot meaningfully capture.[86] In this sense, the indeterminate relationship between demographic indices of ethnic diversity and civil war is everything but surprising.

Table 3: Indices of ethnic fractionalisation and polarisation in Uganda and Zambia

Country	Ethno-linguistic fractionalisation (ELF) (Taylor & Hudson 1972)	Ethnic fractionalisation (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 2005)	Ethnic fractionalisation (Fearon 2003)	Ethnic polarisation (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 2005)	Ethnic dominance (Collier & Hoeffler 2004)
Uganda	0,909	0,932	0,93	0,279	0
Zambia	0,818	0,787	0,726	0,606	0

Ethnic discrimination/exclusion: A third hypothesis by the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project relates violent conflict to political discrimination against ethnic minority groups.[87] The empirical findings are however again inconclusive. While some find strong evidence that ethnic discrimination increases the likelihood of civil war,[88] others

[85] See Mutibwa 2008.
[86] This is confirmed in case studies meant to refine the 'Collier-Hoeffler model of civil war'. Domestic political institutions are identified as an important variable to consider in interaction with ethnic fractionalisation or ethnic dominance (Sambanis 2005: 313).
[87] Gurr 1993a, 2000.
[88] Regan & Norton 2005.

come to the opposite conclusion.[89] Moreover, the MAR approach is undermined by its focus on disadvantaged minority groups only, which prevents it from fully capturing the dynamics of political exclusion at the level of the state. The latter dynamics take centre stage in a fourth approach that was recently put forward by Andreas Wimmer and colleagues.[90] Here, the focus is on the state as an organisation that is captured to different degrees by representatives of particular ethnic groups whereby civil wars become the result of competing ethno-nationalist claims to state power. This hypothesis is tested based on the new Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data set, which identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups around the world and measures access to executive-level state power for members of these ethnic categories in all years from 1946 to 2005. The finding is that exclusion and competition along ethnic lines are strongly and robustly associated with civil war, with rebellions in the name of excluded ethnic groups being much more likely than violent conflict in the name of included groups.

How does the 'ethnic exclusion' hypothesis fare in resolving my puzzle?[91] As for Zambia, the EPR data provide no evidence for ethnic exclusion from executive-level state power.[92] Uganda, by contrast, is coded as having suffered from enduringly high levels of ethnic exclusion.[93] It may therefore well be that differences in civil war occurrence in Zambia and Uganda reflect varying degrees of ethnic inclusion in the two countries. On the downside, the EPR dataset relies solely on expert estimates of ethnic inclusiveness rather than on primary data detailing the actual distribution of access to state power. This raises some questions about the accuracy of the EPR data. Moreover, due to the quantitative nature of the project, Wimmer et al. cannot distinguish between degrees of representativity of leaders who claim to speak for an ethnic group. Finally, it

---

[89] Gurr 1993b. Olzak (2006) reports the contradictory finding that both ethnic discrimination and the granting of ethnic group rights are associated with ethnic rebellion.

[90] Wimmer et al 2009; Cederman et al. 2010b.

[91] Note that the following paragraph focuses on the explanatory power of the EPR approach only. While the MAR coding of ethnic exclusion in Zambia and Uganda is similar to the EPR coding, it focuses on selected 'minorities at risk' only and is therefore less useful when trying to understand ethnic competition over the state as a whole.

[92] While the country's four major ethno-linguistic groups (Bemba-, Nyanja-, Tonga, and Lozi-speakers) are coded as senior partners in government between 1964 and 2005, the North-Western groups are consistently identified as junior partners.

[93] Some of the ethnic groups who are coded as 'excluded' or 'discriminated' against have indeed been behind the Uganda's civil wars. Examples include the Langi/Acholi in the early 1970s, the Baganda and West Nilers during the early 1980s and the Iteso during the late 1980s. Yet, the EPR data also raise many questions. If the Baganda were a senior partner in government between 1962 and 1966, how can we then explain the 'Battle of Mengo' in 1966? If the Basoga were discriminated against during the 1980s, why didn't they take up arms against the Obote II government? And if the West Nile groups were really politically irrelevant between 1990 and 2005, why did the region witness two insurgencies against the Museveni government from the mid-1990s?

is important to keep in mind that ethnicity is only one source of *social* fragmentation along with religious, regional or class cleavages. All this means that I will further explore the 'ethnic exclusion' hypothesis from a broader political organisation perspective and in the context of a small-N study based on primary data.

CIVIL WAR AND POLITICAL INSTIUTIONS

A final school of thought in the study of civil war tries to account for the effects of political institutions. Here one can broadly distinguish between arguments focusing on formal regime type on the one hand, and hybrid neo-patrimonial rule on the other.

Regime type: Many scholars assume a link between regime type and a country's vulnerability to civil war. Here, the most common distinction is between 'democracies', 'semi-democracies' (or anocracies) and 'autocracies', typically measured by relying on the well-known 'Polity score'. The latter is an index composed of five variables, which focus on constraints on the chief executive, the competitiveness of executive recruitment, the openness of executive recruitment, the competitiveness of political participation, and the regulation of political participation.[94] A first hypothesis holds that the more democratic a country, the less likely it is to experience civil war. The underlying rationale is that only democracies permit the expression of opposition and thereby facilitate the non-violent resolution of conflicts. However, this hypothesis receives no support as most quantitative studies find the 'level of democracy' measure to be insignificant.[95]

A second hypothesis holds that civil war risks are highest not among democracies or autocracies, but among intermediary regimes. The idea is that anocracies neither permit the expression of opposition (like democracies) nor are they in a position to suppress dissidents effectively (like autocracies) – a situation that makes them especially prone to civil war. This assumption receives strong empirical backing: Many studies find a significant association between anocracies and civil war onset,[96] which seems to be

---

[94] Marshall & Jaggers 2005. The 'Polity Score' captures the regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The Polity scores are usually converted to regime categories, including 'autocracies' (-10 to -6), 'anocracies' (-5 to +5), and 'democracies' (+6 to +10).

[95] Fearon & Laitin 2003; Collier & Hoeffler 2004; Hegre & Sambanis 2006.

[96] Hegre et al. 2001; Elbadawi & Sambanis 2002; Fearon & Laitin 2003.

robust to different civil war models.[97] Moreover, recent work by Goldstone et al. shows that the predictive power of the 'anocracy favours civil war' argument can be significantly increased by further distinguishing among partial democracies according to the presence or absence of 'factionalism'.[98] The worst situation in terms of risks of instability is a political landscape that combines factionalism with a relatively high level of open competition for office (i.e. a partial democracy with factionalism). Vreeland argues the observed link between anocracies and civil war onset is undermined by endogeneity concerns.[99] Most problematic within the Polity index is the factional category, where political competition is defined as

> 'intense, hostile, and frequently violent. Extreme factionalism may be manifested in the establishment of rival governments and a civil war'.[100]

In the light of this definition, Vreeland finds it almost tautological that the factional component exhibits a strong relationship with the onset of civil war. He demonstrates that once the factional component is removed from the Polity index, the original relationship between anocracies and civil war onset disappears.[101] Goldstone and colleagues, by contrast, show that the association between anocracies and civil war persists even after accounting for the endogenous coding of the Polity IV data.[102]

With respect to Uganda and Zambia, there is no clear relationship between the given level of democracy and differences in civil war occurrence. If democracy was the key driver behind civil war, we should expect consistently high levels of democracy in Zambia and low levels of democracy in Uganda. This is however only partially the case (see figure 5). In Uganda, democracy levels have indeed been low since the mid-1960s.[103] Accordingly, political insiders locate the beginnings of recurrent war in the 1966 abrogation of the Independence Constitution, which set a bad precedent and

---

[97] Hegre & Sambanis 2006. Evidence on the robustness of this association is however contradictory. While the anocracy measure is not robust to different civil war models for the period between 1960 and 1993, it becomes more robust for the period from 1945 to 1999 (Sambanis 2004a).

[98] Goldstone et al. 2010. As measured by Polity, factionalism occurs when political competition is dominated by ethnic or other parochial groups that regularly compete for political influence in order to promote particularist agendas and favour group members to the detriment of common, secular or cross-cutting agendas.

[99] Vreeland 2008. See also Hegre & Sambanis 2006: 527.

[100] Gurr 1989, cited after Vreeland 2008: 401.

[101] Vreeland 2008: 407pp. Further endogeneity concerns arise due to the fact that '[p]olity IV coders sometimes code the democracy and autocracy variables, the difference of which is polity2, as missing when a war is ongoing, and missing values of polity2 are then either interpolated or coded as '0'. This makes it likely for a country at war to be coded as an anocracy' (Sambanis 2004b: 178).

[102] Goldstone et al. 2010.

[103] Note that even the improved Polity IV score during the early 1980s (see figure 5) is somewhat deceiving in that this period was characterised by intense controversies over the allegedly rigged 1980s elections that brought the country's first Prime Minister Milton Obote back to power (ACR 1980/81: B370; Mutibwa 1992: 138pp.).

deprived the country of an 'institutionalised mechanism for peaceful and democratic change of government'.[104] Similarly, Yoweri Museveni – the current President – claims that the successful insurgency by his National Resistance Army (NRA) was motivated by the absence of democracy, evident in the rigged elections of 1980.[105] Yet, as I will show below, the various civil wars in Uganda originated precisely among those tribal groups that were denied access to the structures of the post-colonial state. In this sense, it seems more plausible to argue that recurrent civil war goes back to the exclusionary nature of the post-colonial regimes rather than to the absence of democracy per se.[106] The case for democracy as a driver of peace and stability is further undermined when looking at Zambia – a country that has been able to maintain peace despite high levels of autocracy during the one-party state of the Second Republic (1971-1991) (see figure 5). Moreover, in contrast to claims by Burnell, improved levels of democracy during the Third Republic (1991-2008) have hardly yielded a 'democratic domestic peace'.[107] Instead, the return to multi-party competition in 1991 – and more specifically the option of defection into the opposition – favoured political fragmentation along tribal lines, which has arguably made Zambia's stability more fragile (see chapter 7).

If anocracy was the main driving force behind differences in civil war occurrence, only Uganda should be coded as a partial democracy. But again, this is not the case as Zambia has been able to avoid civil war despite displaying all signs of an anocracy during the First (1964-1972) and Third Republic (1991-today) (see figure 6). Moreover, Uganda has experienced violent conflict even during the extremely autocratic military regime of Idi Amin (1971-1979), which shows that even full-developed autocracies are not always able to effectively suppress political challenges to the state.

---

[104] Interview, Paul Ssemogerere.
[105] Museveni 1997.
[106] This is underlined by an NRA insider who reveals that most combatants were motivated not by 'idealistic notions such as democracy' but rather by patterns of self-experienced discrimination and repression along tribal lines (Amaza 1998: xiv).
[107] Burnell (2005: 122pp.) argues that Zambia's 'democratic domestic peace' goes back to regular multi-party elections since the early 1990s, declining levels of political repression, a burgeoning civil society, and an independent media. However, as Burnell himself recognises, several elections were deemed unsatisfactory by observer organisations. In 1996, the elections were overshadowed by constitutional changes that made the former President Kenneth Kaunda ineligible and prompted an electoral boycott by the former ruling party (Baylies & Szeftel 1997). In 2001, the elections were undermined by irregularities whose significance was heightened by the closeness of the declared result (Burnell 2002, 2003).

Figure 5: Democracy in Uganda and Zambia, 1962-2008[108]



All this does however not necessarily dismiss democracy as an explanatory factor. Instead, the problem may just be Polity's five component definition of democracy, which arguably misses what is a key aspect of democracy, namely the existing degree of institutional inclusion. As a consequence, a country may be regarded as democratic, while majorities actively discriminate against minorities. This is especially likely in divided societies – a problem that became the starting point of Arendt Lijphart's consociational theory.[109] Consociationalism is a group-based form of democracy where elite power-sharing prevents deep social divisions from destabilising democracy. Drawing on case studies of both European and non-European countries, Lijphart was able to show that consociational arrangements – including the four elements of grand coalition, mutual veto, proportionality and segmental autonomy – make peaceful democracy possible even in sharply divided societies. Further evidence for the peace enhancing role of elite power-sharing can be found in the work of Arthur Lewis[110], Gerhard Lehmbruch[111], Eric Nordlinger[112], Michal Burton & John Higley[113], Donald Horowitz[114], Donald Rothchild[115], and John McGary & Brendan O'Leary[116]. In the

---

[108] Compiled based on the Polity IV Annual Time-Series 1800-2008, available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4v2008.xls.
[109] Lijphart 1977, 2008.
[110] Lewis 1965.
[111] Lehmbruch 1967.
[112] Nordlinger 1972.
[113] Burton & Higley 1987, 1998, Higley & Burton 2006.
[114] Horowitz 1985. Note however that Horowitz advocates an 'integrative approach' to power-sharing that eschews ethnic groups as the main organising principle for democracy and instead favours incentives for moderation and cooperation across ethnic divides, mainly by means of 'electoral engineering'.

burgeoning postconflict power-sharing literature, by contrast, the evidence is more ambiguous. First, quantitative studies come to contradictory conclusions on whether political, military, economic and territorial power-sharing leads to lasting peace in the wake of violent conflict.[117] Second, case study evidence shows that experiments with postconflict power-sharing have so far had at best mixed outcomes.[118] On the whole, however, most theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that elite power-sharing is likely to favour peace and stability. Moreover, the power-sharing lens is also very useful when trying to explain differences in civil war occurrence in Uganda and Zambia. As I will show below, conflict-ridden Uganda has been characterised by enduringly low levels of elite power-sharing, while the reverse is true for peaceful Zambia.

Neo-patrimonial rule: A second influential argument relates civil war to the neo-patrimonial character of the African state. The concept of neo-patrimonialism is derived from one of Max Weber's historical types of rule – patrimonial domination. While 'the patrimonial office lacks above all the bureaucratic separation of the 'private' and 'official' sphere (...) and political administration, too, is treated as a purely personal affair',[119] neo-patrimonialism involves the co-existence of patrimonial and legal-rational domination. Neo-patrimonial rule is therefore

> 'a form of organisation in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines. Officials hold positions in bureaucratic organisations with powers which are formally defined, but exercise those powers, so far as they can, as a form not of public service but of private property'.[120]

Such forms of political rule are often identified as a quasi-universal feature of African politics making neo-patrimonialism the main concept in Africanist political science.[121]

The main argument is that neo-patrimonialism favours economic mismanagement and is therefore prone to crisis and breakdown, especially if combined with a deteriorating external environment. Most prominently, Chabal & Daloz portray African states as 'vacuous and ineffectual' shells that were never properly institutionalised and function through a 'political instrumentalization of disorder'. As internal and external resources to lubricate the neo-patrimonial system decline, 'there is inevitably a tendency to link

---

[115] Rothchild & Foley 1988; Rothchild 1997.
[116] McGary & O'Leary 2004; O'Leary 2005.
[117] See Walter 2002; Hoddie & Hartzell 2003; Hartzell & Hoddie 2005; Jarstad & Nilsson 2008.
[118] See, for example, Spears 2002; Rothchild 2005; Tull & Mehler 2005; Sriram 2008; Mehler 2009.
[119] Weber 1978: 1028p.
[120] Clapham 1985: 48.
[121] Influential 'neo-patrimonialists' include, among others, Médard (1982), Clapham (1985) and van de Walle (2001). See Erdmann & Engel (2006) for a literature review.

politics to realms of increased disorder, be it war or crime'.[122] In a similar vein, Bayart et al. suggest the emergence of a 'new form of la politique du ventre' whereby the combined effects of economic crisis, neo-liberal structural adjustment and globalisation favour the implosion and criminalisation of the state in Africa.[123] Unfortunately, 'neo-patrimonialists' remain highly unspecific about why only some neo-patrimonial states experience war and collapse. If neo-patrimonial rule is a quasi-universal feature of African politics, why have some neo-patrimonial states managed to hold together? Given that both Uganda and Zambia are regularly described as neo-patrimonial states[124], why has only Uganda experienced recurrent civil war? In the end, neo-patrimonialists fail to recognise that rent seeking along patron-client ties is common to all developing countries and can have both positive and negative effects depending on the 'configuration of political forces'.[125] Seen from this perspective, general concepts of 'disorder as a political instrument' or 'the criminalisation of the state in Africa' explain little, if anything. In this simplistic version, neo-patrimonialism remains little more than an undifferentiated 'catch-all variable'.[126]

But even more differentiated versions of the neo-patrimonial argument remain insufficient. William Reno, for instance, seeks to explain the 'distinct political logic of weak states' that he distinguishes from 'stronger bureaucratic states'. [127] He claims that the end of the Cold War and the imposition of structural adjustment led to the disruption of state-based patronage politics and made conventional state-building strategies highly dangerous for weak states' rulers. The latter reacted by setting up a violent 'shadow state', whereby they intentionally weakened or even destroyed state institutions to retain control over markets and discipline rivals. Reno traces why some African states have experienced war and collapse but largely avoids the question of why others have not. In doing so, he remains vague about what exactly makes a state 'weak' or 'strong' and how the stronger states manage to accommodate internal and external shocks. Is Uganda really a weaker and less bureaucratic state than Zambia? And if so, how does this – by itself – explain differences in civil war occurrence?

---

[122] Chabal & Daloz 1999: 162.
[123] Bayart et al. 1999.
[124] On neo-patrimonialism in Uganda see Barkan et al. 2005; Rubogoya 2007; Cammack et al. 2007. On neo-patrimonial rule in Zambia see Rakner 2003; Erdmann & Simutanyi 2003; von Soest 2007.
[125] Khan 2000a: 39.
[126] Mkandawire 2001: 299.
[127] Reno 1998.

Chris Allen's approach is more promising in that he distinguishes between two types of neo-patrimonial politics in Africa.[128] Faced with the instability of clientelism after decolonisation, some countries are said to have introduced 'centralised-bureaucratic politics' whereby clientelist resources were distributed through a bureaucracy directly answerable to the President (e.g. Senegal, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Tanzania, Zambia). Others are said to have continued to rely on 'spoils politics', characterised by 'winner-takes all' clientelism, pervasive corruption, economic crisis, lack of political mediation and violent repression (e.g. Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia, Uganda). Allen considers these differences as key to understanding differences in civil war occurrence. This is however only partially convincing as it does not become clear why and how more centralised clientelist systems are able to avoid violent disintegration. In general, it may well be that control over patronage in Uganda has been less centralised than in Zambia. But how can this – by itself – causally explain recurrent civil war in Uganda and persistent peace and stability in Zambia? This is not to deny that hierarchical and firmly rooted organisational structures may be important for maintaining political unity. But it seems more plausible to focus on the inclusiveness of the clientelist system. What matters most in the end is not *how* patronage is distributed but to *whom*.

SUMMARY

My literature review reveals that most of the dominant explanations of civil war fall short of resolving my puzzle. Some theories are inconclusive both in general and for Uganda and Zambia in particular. This concerns arguments on natural resources, income inequality, ethnic fractionalisation, and neo-patrimonial rule. Other explanatory factors such as income per capita, economic growth and anocracy are robustly related to civil war onset and therefore help to identify general dispositions for violent conflict. Yet, they cannot account for differences in civil war occurrence in Uganda and Zambia. By contrast, some approaches seem to be promising both in general and for Uganda and Zambia in particular. This is true for Frances Stewart's 'horizontal inequalities' hypothesis, Andreas Wimmer's work on ethnic power relations and power-sharing theories as advocated by Arendt Lijphart and others. Significantly, all of these approaches point to the need for inclusive political arrangements at the level of elites.

---

[128] Allen 1995.

1.3 The Argument

Against this backdrop, my own theoretical approach to the study of civil war focuses on the inclusiveness of elite politics. I argue that a country's propensity for conflict or peace is determined by the inclusiveness of the '*elite bargain*', which I define as the distribution of access to positions of state power (political, military, economic and territorial) between contending social groups. I hypothesise that inclusive elite bargains facilitate civil war avoidance, whereas exclusionary elite bargains favour the onset of civil war.

This theoretical approach helps to resolve my puzzle of striking differences in civil war occurrence in Uganda and Zambia. In Uganda, I trace recurrent civil war back to the persistence of exclusionary elite bargains. By contrast, Zambia has been able to contain the spectre of civil war by forging and maintaining inclusive elite bargains. My research reveals that the two countries' varying vulnerability to civil war reflects differences in the relative trend, depth, scope, authenticity and perception of the elite bargain. There is also evidence for the relevance of several complementary explanatory factors, including violent state repression, socioeconomic inter-group inequalities, political leadership, levels of urbanisation, and regional spillover effects.

1.4 Originality of the argument

My theoretical approach draws on pre-existing arguments on horizontal inequalities, ethnic power relations and power-sharing, which have all pointed to the need of inclusive political arrangements at the level of elites. As a consequence, the theoretical contribution of my argument may be modest. However, my use of the concept of 'elite bargain' not only integrates existing work on inclusive elite politics but also goes beyond it by including the distribution of economic privileges and sources of rent within a political inclusiveness framework.

The main contribution this thesis makes is the collection and analysis of extensive primary data on the inter-group distribution of political, military, economic and territorial posts in Uganda and Zambia. Significantly, my dataset is – at least to my knowledge – a lot more comprehensive than any comparable data not only for Uganda and Zambia but also for the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, my data are

complemented by a total of 103 interviews, which provide original insights into Ugandan and Zambian politics, and in-depth historical analysis.

1.5 Structure of the PhD

Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical and methodological framework of the PhD. I begin by defining what I understand by civil war onset, the dependent variable of my research (section 2.1). Then I go on to lay out my own theory of civil war, which focuses on the inclusiveness of the 'elite bargain', my independent variable (section 2.2). To develop my argument, I first establish that colonial rule left Sub-Saharan Africa with a legacy of high social fragmentation. Then I argue that African leaders responded to this challenge in distinct ways, namely by forging inclusive vs. exclusionary elite bargains. I hypothesise that exclusionary elite bargains lead to civil war, whereas inclusive elite bargains facilitate civil war avoidance. In a third step, I provide details on research methods and data sources (section 2.3).

Chapter 3 provides the historical background to my two case studies by tracing the genesis of social fragmentation in Uganda and Zambia and identifying the dominant social cleavages that structure political competition in both countries. I show that colonial rule left both Uganda and Zambia with high levels of social fragmentation. In Uganda, the main sources of social cleavage are tribe, region and – albeit to a declining extent – religion (section 3.1). In Zambia, the most salient social dividing lines include language, tribe and – albeit to a lesser extent – class (section 3.2). Even though the legacy of high social fragmentation represented an important challenge for post-colonial governments in both countries, social divisions in Uganda were clearly more pronounced than in Zambia.

Chapter 4 includes the first part of the Uganda case study. I begin by showing that the country experienced a total of eight civil wars between 1962 and 1986 (section 4.1). Trying to explain this recurrent violence, I first demonstrate that Uganda's first post-colonial governments all failed, albeit to different degrees, to overcome the colonial legacy of high ethno-regional fragmentation. This became evident in low levels of political, economic, military and territorial power-sharing under Obote I, Amin, the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) and Obote II (section 4.2). Then I go on to argue that the failure to forge and maintain more inclusive elite bargains became a key

driver behind the various insurgencies that ravaged the country during its first two and a half decades of independence (section 4.3). At the same time, I find that the seemingly never-ending cycles of civil war in Uganda were not only caused by patterns of tribal exclusion but also by concurrent violent repression against the marginalised groups (section 4.4).

Chapter 5 consists of the second part of the Uganda case study. I begin by showing that the country has experienced a total of seven civil wars since 1986 but seems to have become more peaceful recently (Section 5.1). Trying to explain these developments, I first demonstrate that the distribution of political, military and economic power under Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) has been heavily biased in favour of Southern and Western Uganda, whereas territorial power has been shared more equitably, evident in the country's comprehensive decentralisation policy (see section 5.2). Then I go on to argue that the enduring absence of an inclusive elite bargain at the centre has become a key driving force behind the various anti-NRM insurgencies since 1986 (section 5.3). At the same time, some of these tensions have been eased by increased territorial power-sharing since the mid-1990s, which has provided the local leadership in all parts of the country with access to jobs and resources and thereby integrated them into the elite bargain. Finally, I show that recurrent civil war since 1986 is again also due to violent repression against the excluded groupings (section 5.4). Altogether, the story of Uganda's post-independence instability is therefore a story of exclusion and repression along tribal lines.

Chapter 6 lays out the first part of the Zambia case study. I begin by showing that Zambia managed to maintain peace and stability throughout its First and Second Republic (1994-1991) (section 6.1). To explain civil war avoidance, I first demonstrate that the country's first President Kaunda and his United National Independence Party (UNIP) forged and maintained an inclusive elite bargain under the motto of 'One Zambia, One Nation', which manifested itself in high degrees of political, economic and military power-sharing between the country's major linguistic and tribal groups (section 6.2). Then I argue that this practise of 'tribal balancing' has helped to accommodate the colonial legacy of social fragmentation, prevented the emergence of cohesive group grievances and thereby laid the foundations for Zambia's lasting peace (section 6.3.). In a last step, I find that Zambia's national unity was also facilitated by a number of other factors, including Kaunda's role as an effective 'mediator above tribe', the existence of

an external threat in the form of regional instability, high levels of urbanisation, and one-party rule during the Second Republic (section 6.4).

Chapter 7 provides the second part of my Zambia case study. As in the previous chapter, I start by showing that Zambia continued to enjoy peace and stability after the return to multi-party politics in 1991 (section 7.1). To make sense of this lasting peace, I first illustrate that both the Chiluba and Mwanawasa governments made a continued attempt to maintain an inclusive elite bargain, evident in the largely inclusive distribution of access to positions of political, economic and military power (section 7.2). Afterwards, I suggest that this has again helped to prevent the emergence of cohesive group grievances and thereby cemented Zambia's lasting peace (section 7.3). At the same time, the decline of socioeconomic inter-group inequalities as well as high levels of urbanisation have made violent conflict even less likely (section 7.4).

Chapter 8 summarises the argument and outlines avenues for future research. Trying to refine my initial hypothesis, I first argue that Uganda and Zambia's varying vulnerability to civil war reflects differences in the relative trend, depth, scope, authenticity and perception of the elite bargain (section 8.1). Then I show that the observed differences in civil war occurrence also depend on a number of other factors, including violent state repression, socioeconomic inter-group inequalities, political leadership, levels of urbanisation, and regional spillover effects.. I conclude by outlining three different avenues for future research, which focus on extending the number of cases, explaining the inclusiveness of the elite bargain and theorising the link between the elite bargain and economic development (section 8.2).

The eight main chapters are followed by the **bibliography** (section 9), a detailed **list of interview partners** (section 10) and the **annex** (section 11). The latter includes my dataset on the inter-group distribution of political, military and economic posts in Uganda and Zambia (section 11.1) and my interview guidelines (section 11.2).

2 Theoretical and methodological framework

This chapter develops the theoretical and methodological framework of my PhD thesis. First, I briefly define the concept of civil war onset, the dependent variable of my research (section 2.1). Then I lay out my own theory on the causes of civil war, which focuses on the inclusiveness of the 'elite bargain', my independent variable (section 2.2). In a third step, I provide details on research methods and data sources (section 2.3).

2.1 Defining civil war onset

'How would we know a civil war if we saw one?'[129]

The search for a definition of civil war is fraught with contradictions and problems. There are many other types of political violence, including assassinations, terrorism, communal violence, riots, state-led massacres, military coups and interstate wars. But what exactly distinguishes a civil war from these phenomena?

The first point of reference when looking for a definition of civil war is typically the seminal Correlates of War (COW) project, which defines civil war as

> 'any armed conflict that involves (a) military action internal to the metropole, (b) the active participation of the national government, and (c) effective resistance by both sides'.[130]

This definition clarifies that the distinction between a civil and an international war concerns the internality of the war to the territory of a sovereign state. Moreover, the requirement that the government needs to actively participate as a combatant and that violence should be reciprocated distinguishes civil war from other types of political violence such as communal violence and state-led massacres. Finally, the specification that civil wars need to exceed a certain threshold of deaths – by introducing the by now infamous criterion of at least 1000 battle-related deaths per year[131] – sets them apart from riots, terrorism and most coups.

[129] Sambanis 2004a: 816.
[130] Small & Singer 1982: 210.
[131] Ibid.: 213.

While the COW definition of civil war seems relatively straightforward at first sight, it nonetheless raises a number of questions.[132] To begin with, the boundary between civil and international war is often more blurred than it seems since many of the recent civil wars were internationalised in their origins and conduct. Among the most obvious examples are the civil wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone and Liberia, which were all characterised by heavy regional involvement and spillovers.[133] Moreover, the government may sometimes not be a formal combatant but still be fighting a war using militias as proxies. To give only one of many possible examples, this is precisely what happened recently in the Sudanese region of Darfur.[134] Finally, and arguably most importantly, the battle-related death threshold is problematic for a number of reasons. First, the choice to set a threshold of deaths with a single cut-off point is arbitrary, especially given the poor quality of data on battle-related deaths. Second, an absolute threshold does not reflect a civil war's intensity as well as a relative (per capita) measure would. As the 1000-deaths criterion does not show whether the given number of deaths reflect a small or big share of the population, any dataset will be skewed towards larger population counties such as India or Nigeria where insurgencies with high levels of deaths are more likely. Third, it is simply not plausible why a death threshold would include only battle-related deaths and exclude civilian deaths.

To address some these problems, scholars have subsequently proposed alternative definitions of civil war, the majority of which are modifications of the original COW definition. One of the more original and most influential contenders has been the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which defines violent conflict as

> 'a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths'.[135]

However, this definition does not resolve most of the problems underlying the COW definition and even introduces a 25 battle-related deaths criterion, which blurs the dividing line between civil war as a phenomenon involving large-scale destruction and more low-intensity conflicts. Accordingly, a close look at the UCDP dataset reveals that a non-negligible number of the recorded violent conflicts are in fact military coups – a problem that seems particularly pronounced in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa. Altogether, there has been a proliferation of competing war lists that exhibit similar

---

[132] Sambanis 2004a: 816pp.; Cramer 2006: 49pp.
[133] Prunier 2009; Marchal 2002.
[134] Flint & De Waal 2008.
[135] UCDP 2009.

conceptual problems but show substantial variation in the coding of civil war.[136] This makes accurate and robust predictions of civil war onset extremely difficult – a problem that has become strikingly evident in my review of the quantitative civil war literature in chapter 1.

In the light of these shortcomings, I rely on a comprehensive definition of civil war that was put forward by Nicholas Sambanis.[137] The main criteria of this definition can be summarised as follows:[138]

An armed conflict is classified as a civil war if

- the parties are politically and militarily organised, and they have publicly stated political objectives;
- the government (through its military or militias) is a principal combatant;
- the main insurgent organisation(s) are locally represented and recruit locally, though there may be additional external involvement and recruitment;
- the conflict causes at least 500 to 1000 deaths (civilian and battle deaths combined) during the first year or at least 1000 cumulative deaths in the next three years;
- the conflict is characterised by sustained violence, with no three-year period having less than 500 deaths; and
- the weaker party is able to mount effective resistance, measured by at least 100 deaths inflicted on the stronger party.

Even Sambanis's careful and nuanced effort cannot resolve all problems and contradictions surrounding the definition of civil war. On the one hand, he is unable to introduce a relative (per capita) measure of the death threshold, the creation of which is said to be too 'difficult and labor intensive'.[139] On the other hand, he does not allow for the possibility of several instances of civil war during one period – an approach that amalgamates separate cases into one and thereby underestimates the actual number of wars.[140] Yet, Sambanis's definition has arguably become the benchmark in that it

---

[136] See Sambanis 2004a: 831pp.
[137] Ibid.: 829pp.
[138] Note that I have shortened Sambanis's extremely long definition of civil war (especially the detailed statistical coding rules), while preserving its substance.
[139] Ibid.: 822.
[140] Note that only the UCDP (2009) dataset contains information on the conflict behaviour involving the government and each of the different rebel groups.

addresses many of the key problems underlying the COW definition, including the inclusion of civilian deaths, a more flexible threshold of deaths, the problem of proxy wars using militias and a clear definition of effective resistance.

2.2 Explaining civil war onset: The inclusiveness of the elite bargain matters

What drives civil war onset and avoidance in Uganda and Zambia? My review of the civil war literature in chapter 1 has shown that while most of the dominant theoretical approaches fall short of resolving my puzzle, several arguments that emphasise the need for elite power-sharing offer a promising starting point. In what follows, I will therefore build on this pre-existing work and propose a civil war theory, which focuses on the inclusiveness of what I label the 'elite bargain'. To develop my argument, I will first establish that colonial rule left Sub-Saharan Africa with a legacy of high social fragmentation. Then I will go on to argue that African leaders responded to this challenge in distinct ways, namely by forging inclusive vs. exclusionary elite bargains. I hypothesise that exclusionary elite bargains lead to civil war, whereas inclusive elite bargains facilitate civil war avoidance.

COLONIAL RULE AND THE LEGACY OF HIGH SOCIAL FRAGMENTATION[141]

Pre-colonial Africa evolved a large variety of traditional political structures.[142] Most of the continent was dominated by stateless societies, usually composed of small, autonomous communities of cultivators or pastoralists organised at the village or kin-group level. Where state-like political systems existed, they typically consisted in a core whose control over the peripheries fluctuated depending on internal stability and military strength. Pre-colonial boundaries were generally characterised by fuzziness and flexibility, with Africans living in the reality of multiple and often overlapping collective identities.[143] Politics was more about the control of people than of territory and functioned through the personalised hierarchies of chiefly power. In this context, the advent of colonial rule represented an important, albeit partial, break with the past.

---

[141] I acknowledge that Africa's colonial history is extremely diverse. This section merely attempts to sketch the dominant pattern of African colonialism without pretending to capture the latter's full diversity.
[142] Sandbrook 1985: 42pp.; Clapham 1996: 29pp.
[143] Southall 1979; Berry 1993.

The break with the pre-colonial past was important in that

> 'previously fuzzy borderlands between indigenous centres of government, together with the large areas which possessed no formalised government structures at all, were replaced (...) by precisely demarcated frontiers of the sort that European concepts of statehood deemed to be necessary'.[144]

As these frontiers were rarely guided by any concern for the identity of the indigenous societies, African colonies usually came to contain 'several traditional societies, each of which valued its own political traditions, myths and symbols'.[145] Beyond this 'lumping together' of heterogeneous groups in common territories, the colonially imposed introduction of both bureaucratic state institutions and capitalist forms of labour, property and production involved the diversification of identities whereby pre-existing social cleavages were supplemented by occupational and class groupings.

However, the break with the pre-colonial past was only partial in that political and economic transformation in colonial Africa remained incomplete. Colonial rule destroyed the pre-colonial modes of production but established a new pre-capitalist mode based on independent peasant production.[146] This 'anti-capitalist bias' arose out of a fundamental contradiction between the quest for colonial exploitation and the need for political stability.[147] As early attempts for transformation had met local resistance, colonialism refrained from imposing the full-scale development of agrarian capitalism – which would have involved primitive accumulation and caused landlessness among the African peasantry – for fear of revolt and disorder. Instead, the colonial powers spent little energy and few resources on the creation of modern state infrastructure and ruled 'indirectly' through alliances with local chiefs.[148] While 'indirect rule' helped to contain destabilising class formation, it also allowed traditional authorities to consolidate their power. As 'native' authorities were preserved, strengthened or even entirely 'invented'[149], the colonialists' assumption that Africans lived in tribes became a self-fulfilling perception. The result was a 'bifurcated' colonial state inhabited by 'citizens and subjects' and deeply anchored in the 'decentralised despotism' of the local state.[150]

---

[144] Clapham 1996: 31.
[145] Sandbrook 1985: 45.
[146] Phillips 1989: 3.
[147] Berman 1984; Phillips 1989; Boone 1994.
[148] 'Indirect rule' is arguably the dominant pattern of African colonialism. While forms of colonial rule are commonly said to have ranged from French 'direct rule' to British 'indirect rule' and Belgian 'quasi-indirect rule' (Coleman 1975), these typologies tend to be overdrawn (Mamdani 1996). French 'direct rule', for instance, often had little alternative than to govern through local chiefs (Delavignette 1950). Also, Catherine Boone (2004) has shown that patterns of colonial (and post-colonial) rule across and even within countries reflected local power structures rather than consistent colonial ideology.
[149] Ranger 1983; Amselle & M'Bokolo 1999.
[150] Mamdani 1996.

Moreover, 'indirect rule' through local chiefs made patron-client relations not only the main mode of access to the state, but also – as in pre-colonial society – the fundamental relationship between ordinary people and those with wealth and power.[151]

Unsurprisingly, the 'indirect rule state' produced very high degrees of social fragmentation across the African continent, not least when compared to their counterparts in Asia or Latin America.[152] This is not to deny that a few territories were less fragmented in that they were largely congruent with pre-existing political systems and identities (e.g. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland).[153] Such differences notwithstanding, the great majority of African colonies came to be characterised by multiple, often overlapping social cleavages.[154] The main source of cleavage were ethnic identities, defined as

> 'a subset of identity categories in which eligibility for membership is determined by attributes associated with, or believed to be associated with, descent'.[155]

Other group identities developed based on regional affiliations, not least in the context of uneven capitalist penetration that introduced significant regional disparities in many of the colonies.[156] Again other group identities reflected religious divisions, which arose from the spread of Christianity and Islam and their interaction with indigenous religions.[157] The existence of multiple ethnic, regional or religious groups was further complicated by the (albeit limited) development of 'functional' cleavages around economic class identities, evident in the spread of occupational groupings (e.g. businessmen, clerks and teachers) or trade unions. Following a 'historically grounded'[158] constructivist perspective, none of these group identities were primordial in nature but rather constantly moulded by political interaction with other groups and the institutions of the colonial state.

---

[151] Berman 1998: 316.
[152] See Kohli 2004.
[153] On differences in social fragmentation and 'state legitimacy' across Africa see Englebert 2000.
[154] For the classical treatment of social cleavages in Europe see Lipset & Rokkan 1967. On cleavages in Sub-Saharan Africa see Scarritt & Mozaffar 1999.
[155] Chandra 2006: 398. Characteristics such as common culture, common history, common territory, and common language are only sometimes associated with identities that one thinks of as ethnic and thus cannot be thought of as defining characteristics. For a similar definition of ethnicity see Fearon & Laitin 2000: 20.
[156] Following the above-cited definition of ethnicity, regional groups are not considered as ethnic groups as long as the membership rule takes into consideration the region in which an individual currently resides, rather than the region of origin of an individual's parents and ancestors.
[157] Again, religious groups are not considered ethnic groups if the attributes for membership are acquired by choice rather than by descent.
[158] See Berman 1998: 310p.

Altogether, colonially-induced fragmentation gave rise to what Jean-Francois Bayart has termed a 'hegemonic crisis', i.e. an intensified struggle for hegemony between a multitude of competing social groups.[159] This had far-reaching implications for the process of post-colonial state formation across Sub-Saharan Africa. Fragmentation involves a 'system of multiple veto players' – a situation that makes the across-group production of collective goods rather difficult.[160] Rulers that manage to establish political control may be unable or unwilling to share access to state structures as this could help potential opponents to gain leverage or create competing power centres. This dilemma has led Joel Migdal to conclude that fragmented 'social control' inevitably gives rise to weak post-colonial states and the destabilising 'politics of survival'.[161] While fragmentation certainly represents an important problem, I argue that its ultimate effects are highly contingent on subsequent political organisation. The real question is therefore whether or not high social fragmentation was successfully accommodated by forging and maintaining stable forms of political organisation.

THE CHALLENGE OF STABLE POLITICAL ORGANISATION: INCLUSIVE VERSUS EXCLUSIONARY ELITE BARGAINS

Overcoming the legacy of social fragmentation in Africa was (and often still is) a formidable challenge. From a political science perspective, *political organisation* is the key to addressing fragmentation. In the words of Samuel Huntington, political organisation can be defined as

> 'an arrangement for maintaining order, resolving disputes, selecting authoritative leaders, and thus promoting two or more social forces'.[162]

While political organisation is crucial in every society, it becomes even more important the more complex and heterogeneous a society. As a consequence, African post-colonial leaders had to find ways to create political organisations capable of integrating competing social groups, consolidating the state structures and fostering economic development.

The quest for political organisation was mostly undertaken through the creation of political parties. Historically, political parties have been the most effective types of

---

[159] Bayart 1989.
[160] Bardhan 2000: 258.
[161] Migdal 1988.
[162] Huntington 1968: 8p.

political organisation as they develop strategies and ideology, structure participation and aggregate interests.[163] In the context of the newly emerging African states, their creation was of particular importance. Whereas European parties had developed within well-established state frameworks, in Africa they constituted 'a premise for the formation of national structures, they are to a great extent originators of these structures'.[164] This means that the formation and consolidation of the African state came to depend directly on the working of the dominant political party in the pre- and post-independence period:

> '[I]nstead of the party reflecting the state, the state becomes the creation of the party and the instrument of the party' – the party becomes the veritable 'institutional embodiment of national sovereignty'.[165]

But which kind of political party organisation is likely to resolve disputes, stabilise competition and prevent Africa's fragmented societies from declining into violent conflict? I argue that what is at the heart of stable political organisation is the ability of ruling political *parties to forge and maintain an inclusive settlement at level of elites.*[166] This argument resonates with the influential work by Douglas North and colleagues who claim that the problem of endemic violence in the natural state can only be contained through the formation of a 'dominant coalition' whose members possess special privileges. [167] By limiting access to rents to members of the dominant coalition, elites create credible incentives to cooperate rather than fight among themselves. Conversely, the exclusion of powerful elites from access to privileges and rents is likely to result in violent conflict. Unfortunately, North et al's otherwise theoretically sophisticated work does not elaborate much on the inclusiveness of the 'dominant coalition' and its implications for peace and stability. This raises a number of questions. Which elites need to be included and by what means? And – more importantly – how are the included elites related to social groups and organisations?

Building on the work by North et al, scholars at the *Crisis States Research Centre* (CSRC) have advanced the related notion of the 'elite bargain'.[168] The CSRC defines

---

[163] See Duverger 1959.
[164] Chodak 1964, cited by Randall 2001: 254.
[165] Huntington 1968: 91.
[166] Elites are defined as 'holders of strategic positions in powerful organizations and movements, including dissident ones, who are able to affect national political outcomes regularly and significantly' (Dogan & Higley 1998: 15). According to this functional (or positional) definition, elites thus comprise the top leadership of all relevant organisations and movements in a country (e.g. leading national and local politicians, leaders of political parties, high-ranking bureaucrats, key military personnel, heads of business associations, trade union leaders, traditional and religious authorities, etc.).
[167] North et al. 2009: 18pp.
[168] http://www.crisisstates.com/. See also CSRC 2006.

the elite bargain as the 'distribution of rights and entitlements' across groups and classes in society, on which any state is based.[169] The elite bargain, which is typically embodied in political parties, is therefore essentially about the allocation of rents between contending elites. While this is a plausible approach, I adopt a somewhat different focus and propose to reconceptualise the notion of the 'elite bargain' in terms of elite power-sharing, not least since those who are in positions of state power ultimately determine the distribution of rights and entitlements. Accordingly, my concept of the elite bargain is defined as the *distribution of access to positions of state power between contending social groups*. This concept draws on the insights from pre-existing work on horizontal inequalities, ethnic power relations and consociationalism as discussed in chapter 1.

Figure 6: Inclusive versus exclusionary elite bargains



More specifically, I propose that elite bargains in post-colonial Africa can be captured in two ideal types that describe the *extent to which ruling political parties have used the distribution of access to positions of state power to accommodate the dominant group cleavages in society.* In general, all political parties that first managed to gain control of the post-colonial state sought to build alliances and support by providing the leadership of social groups with access to state patronage. But they did so, and here I depart from the conventional 'neo-patrimonial' argument (see chapter 1), in significantly different

[169] DiJohn & Putzel 2009.

ways. In a first group of countries, the ruling political party managed to forge and maintain an *inclusive* elite bargain by providing all major contending social groups with balanced access to positions of state power. This scenario is exemplarily illustrated in the first part of figure 6 where all ethnic, religious and class groupings are represented – albeit to different degrees – in the realm of state power. Such inclusive elite bargains, which roughly correspond to what Africanist political scientists have called the 'fusion of elites'[170], successfully accommodate social fragmentation and thereby stabilise the inter-group competition over the control of the postcolonial state. In a second group of countries, by contrast, political parties have established *exclusionary* elite bargains by providing biased access to positions of state power.[171] This scenario is illustrated in the second part of figure 6 where only selected ethnic and religious groups are represented in the realm of state power. Such exclusionary elite bargains privilege certain social groups at the expense of others and therefore fail to accommodate the legacy of social fragmentation.

The forging of inclusive versus exclusionary elite bargains via the distribution of access to state power took (and still takes) many different forms, not least depending on local circumstances. Nonetheless, I argue that differences in the inclusiveness of the elite bargain across Sub-Saharan Africa can generally be measured by assessing the extent to which positions of political, military, economic and territorial power are shared between competing social groups.[172]

Political power-sharing: Access to positions of political and administrative power is important for competing social groups in that it provides them with visible recognition, a 'say' in decision-making and control over government resources. A first obvious indicator in this respect is the *composition of government.* An analysis of the composition of government should however not – as it is often done – be limited to the distribution of minsters and deputy ministers. Instead, one should also separately consider the distribution of the most important leadership positions in what may be labelled the 'inner core' of political power, not least to uncover strategies of 'window

[170] Bayart 1981; Londsdale 1981; Boone 1994.
[171] Here, I depart from the above-cited scholars who seem to suggest that the 'fusion of elites' is a quasi-universal feature of African politics,
[172] Note that I borrow Hartzell & Hoddie's (2003) four-part typology of power-sharing but propose an alternative operationalisation of these four categories.

dressing'.[173] As a consequence, the composition of government is measured by the inter-group distribution of

- deputy ministers;
- ministers (Cabinet);
- the 'inner core of political power',[174] and
- an 'index of representation', which combines[175] the forgoing measures.

A second indicator for political power-sharing is the *composition of the ruling political party,* measured by the inter-group distribution of

- positions in the top party organ.

A third and final indicator for political power-sharing is the *composition of the civil service,* measured by the inter-group distribution of

- permanent secretary positions.[176]

Military power-sharing: Access to military power is crucial for competing social groups in that it shapes their feelings of physical security and survival. While balanced recruitment at the level of the rank-and-file may be considered important, it is especially representation at the upper levels of the army that give groups a real stake in the security sector. Key in terms of military power-sharing is therefore the *composition of the officer corps*, measured by the inter-group distribution of

---

[173] For a similar notion see Langer 2005.

[174] The number and nature of positions included in the 'inner core' of political power needs to be determined separately for each country and time period. This is obviously an extremely difficult and contentious undertaking. Many of my interviewees in both Uganda and Zambia rightly emphasised that it is not enough to simply focus on key ministers since certain presidential advisors, deputy ministers or permanent secretaries may really be more influential behind the scenes. One interviewee even argued that, given the extremely personalised nature of political power in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Jackson & Rosberg 1982), any analysis of the 'inner core' would need to concentrate on the President's Office/ State House (Interview, Prof. Joe Oloka-Onyango). While there is certainly some truth to these objections, a detailed analysis of the 'true' powerholders behind the scenes turned out to be impossible for two main reasons. First, it would have been difficult time-wise, not least since I am concerned with the composition of two post-colonial governments since independence. Second, it would have been difficult logistically, not least since foreign students asking questions around who's who in State House are typically reason for distrust. As a consequence, I have decided to focus on the President, the Vice-President (or Prime Minister) and what my interviewees considered the key ministers at the time. Even though this may be a 'second-best approach', it arguably still tells us more about where real power lies than simply focusing on all ministers and deputies. For a detailed overview of the composition of the 'inner core' of political power in Uganda and Zambia since independence see Annex 11.1.

[175] To calculate my 'index of representation', I have taken the average of my scores for deputy ministers, ministers (Cabinet) and the 'inner core' of political power. This means that the President, Vice-President and the key ministers are counted twice – once as part of Cabinet, and once as part of the 'inner core'. This is intentional in that it reflects the particular power and influence of these few individuals.

[176] It would have been preferable to also consider the composition of the lower levels of the civil service (under-secretaries, department heads, etc.), which was however impossible due to time constraints and the non-availability/non-accessibility of suitable administrative records.

- the top command positions; and
- the higher ranks.

Economic power-sharing: Access to economic power is of immediate material interest for competing social groups. Economic-power-sharing is however more difficult to define, not least because all other types of power-sharing involve control over economic resources and are therefore – albeit indirectly – also a form of economic power-sharing. These difficulties notwithstanding, a first useful indicator may be *control over key state-owned enterprises,* which are among the most lucrative public institutions in the patronage-based political systems of Sub-Saharan Africa.[177] Over the past decades, the parastatal sector has come under pressure with international donors calling on African governments to privatise their state-owned enterprises. While privatisation programmes have made progress since the 1990s, they have often opened new opportunities for patronage deployment. A second relevant indicator for economic power-sharing may therefore be *control over key privatised companies.* Both indicators[178] can be measured by the inter-group distribution of

- board directors; and
- senior management positions.

Territorial power-sharing: Territorial power-sharing provides social groups – at least if territorially defined – with an autonomous base from which they may protect their interests. This may be very significant for competing groups and their leaders, not least since high degrees of territorial power-sharing may compensate for low levels of power-sharing at the centre. Territorial power-sharing can take different forms depending on both the type of constitution (unitary vs. federal)[179] and the type of decentralisation, mainly including administrative, fiscal and political.[180] Administrative decentralisation

---

[177] See Tangri 1999.

[178] These are only two among many possible indictors for economic power-sharing. Others could include the distribution of private businesses, permits and licences (especially trade-related ones), or land titles. Yet, such indicators are even more difficult and time-intensive to research and therefore beyond the scope of this study.

[179] Norris 2008: 164pp. Unitary constitutions are defined as those states with national and subnational tiers, where the national government is defined as sovereign over all its territorial units. Federal constitutions are understood as those which distinguish between the national and subnational tiers of government, where each tier has certain specified areas of autonomy. For the classic study on the 'federal bargain' see Riker 1964. Note that territorial power-sharing in federal states is not automatically more far-reaching since centralised federal constitutions may grant only very limited territorial autonomy to subnational tiers.

[180] Treisman 2007; Norris 2008.

transfers bureaucratic decision-making authority and managerial responsibilities from central to local government, which may cover the delivery of a variety of services or decisions on budgetary expenditure and in some cases revenue raising. Even though this is the most basic form of decentralisation, it provides local groups with access to lucrative employment, at least as long as the administrative positions are filled by locals. Fiscal decentralisation gives subnational tiers either tax-raising powers or control over a significant proportion of total government spending (or both). Political decentralisation, finally, means that subnational tiers are granted a degree of policy-making authority.[181] The fiscal and political forms of decentralisation tend to be more consequential in that they involve independent control over financial resources and political decision-making. A key indicator for territorial power-sharing is the *degree of territorial autonomy,* measured[182] by the extent to which local groups

- benefit from proportional employment in local government and administration;
- have substantial tax-raising powers (and capacity) and/or receive a proportional share of decentralised budgets; and
- have a substantial degree of policy-making authority.

Altogether, I argue that there are two distinct types of elite bargains:

- *Inclusive elite bargains* involve a ruling party that provides competing social groups with balanced access to positions of political, military, economic and territorial power.
- *Exclusionary elite* bargains involve a ruling party that provides certain social groups with privileged access to positions of political, military, economic and territorial power.

PEACE OR CIVIL WAR?

How do differences in the inclusiveness of the elite bargain relate to civil war onset and civil war avoidance?

---

[181] If local elections are held for local leaders, this is appointment decentralisation (see Treisman 2007). If local authorities also have a say in national policy-making, this is constitutional decentralisation.

[182] I acknowledge that territorial power-sharing is especially difficult to measure. Assessing the degree of territorial autonomy requires data on whether local employment and decentralised budgets are distributed proportionally between competing social groups – data that are rarely available. As a result, I often had to rely on more interpretive analysis (see chapters 4-7).

I hypothesise that inclusive elite bargains accommodate the historical legacy of high social fragmentation, stabilise the inter-group competition over the control of state power and thereby favour trajectories of civil war avoidance. As competing social groups enjoy inclusive access to positions of political, military, economic and territorial power, their leadership does not have an immediate incentive to mobilise protest or even violence against the post-colonial state. African states based on an inclusive elite bargain are therefore likely to enjoy relatively secure and stable hegemony as a collective system. This is especially true the more extensive the power-sharing across the four dimensions of state power. Seen from this perspective, the avoidance of civil war over time must be understood as resulting from the ability and/or willingness of ruling political parties to forge and maintain high degrees of elite accommodation.

Exclusionary elite bargains, by contrast, fail to accommodate the historical legacy of high social fragmentation, intensify inter-group struggles over the distribution of state power and ultimately favour trajectories of civil war onset. As certain groups enjoy privileged access to positions of political, military, economic and territorial power, the excluded leaders will have an immediate incentive to mobilise protest against the state. The latter is especially likely to escalate into violent rebellion if exclusionary elite bargains are maintained over time and consistent across the four dimensions of state power. Seen from this perspective, the onset of civil war must be understood as resulting from the inability and/or unwillingness of ruling political parties to achieve sufficient degrees of elite accommodation.

The *hypothesis* underlying my PhD thesis can be summarised as follows:

Post-colonial differences in civil war occurrence across Sub-Saharan Africa are determined by the inclusiveness of the elite bargain. While inclusive elite bargains facilitate civil war avoidance, exclusionary elite bargains favour the onset of civil war.

2.3 Methodology

How do I plan to test the plausibility of my argument? In what follows, I will first discuss my research methods. This means that I explain why I have opted in favour of a

small-N comparison, lay out my criteria for case selection and detail the structure of the two country case studies. In a second step, I provide information on my data sources.

RESEARCH METHODS

My PhD thesis is based on *comparative case studies* of civil war onset and avoidance in two African countries, namely Uganda and Zambia. Why small-n comparison rather than large-N analysis? I argue that a quantitative study is not possible at this stage since suitable data on the inclusiveness of elite politics across Sub-Saharan Africa are simply not available.[183] Such data need to be arduously collected on a case by case basis for each of the four types of power-sharing and will therefore not be available for large-N samples in the short- and medium term. The only possible alternative in this regard would be to rely on data based on expert estimates as recently compiled by Andreas Wimmer et al.[184] – an undoubtedly admirable effort that could however hardly capture the level of detail and accuracy that I am looking for. Moreover, there is also reason to argue that further quantitative work is not necessarily desirable at this stage. This is especially true in the light of a civil war literature that has so far been dominated by rather superficial and mostly inconclusive quantitative models (see chapter 1). It may therefore be time to shift the research agenda towards 'more paired down but detailed sets of comparisons and contrasts'.[185] They would arguably also add to the pre-existing qualitative civil war literature, which has so far been dominated by edited volumes typically lacking a common research framework.[186]

What are the strengths and weaknesses of a case study approach?[187] The main strengths of case studies are arguably at least fourfold. First, case studies enable the researcher to achieve high levels of internal (or conceptual) validity, i.e. to identify and measure the indicators that best represent the underlying theoretical concepts. Whereas statistical studies involve the risk of 'conceptual stretching' by lumping together dissimilar cases, case studies allow for conceptual refinements with a higher level of validity over a limited number of cases. In the context of my study, this means that I can carefully identify and measure the most relevant indicators for inter-group power-sharing in

---

[183] On the broader implications of data availability for research design see Gerring 2007: 57pp.
[184] Wimmer et al. 2009; Cederman et al. 2010b.
[185] Cramer 2006: 136.
[186] See, among others, Clapham 1998; Ali & Matthews 2000; Boas & Dunn 2007.
[187] The following discussion draws on Ragin 1987; George & Bennett 2005; Gerring 2007. See also Zartman 2005a; Abu-Lughod 2007.

Uganda and Zambia – an undertaking that would have been impossible in the context of a large-N study. Second, case studies are a very useful means to closely examine the hypothesised role of causal mechanisms. While statistical studies mainly identify correlations between inputs and outputs, small-N studies enable the researcher to determine whether and how inputs and outputs can really be connected in a plausible fashion. In the context of my work, this means that I can gather and interpret all available evidence to determine if and how differences in elite power-sharing in Uganda and Zambia can really be causally linked to the observed patterns of war and peace. Third, case studies can – when compared with large-N studies – better accommodate complex causal relations such as equifinality, complex interactions effects, and path dependency.[188] As a consequence, I can not only explore the role of and interactions between multiple causes but also consider how contemporary decisions are constrained by decisions that were made in the past. Finally, only a case study approach and the accompanying fieldwork allow me to identify left-out variables and new hypotheses.

At the same time, case studies also suffer from a number of weaknesses. These may include a trade-off between parsimony and richness, a weak capability for estimating the average 'causal effect' of variables, and indeterminacy problems. Most importantly, however, small-N studies suffer from low external validity, i.e. a problem of representativeness between sample and population. Large-N research is always more representative of the population of interest than case study research, at least as long as a sensible procedure of case selection is followed (i.e. random sampling). Case study research suffers from problems of representativeness because it includes, by definition, only a small number of cases of a more general phenomenon. As a consequence, case study researchers cannot claim that their findings are applicable to the whole population of interest. In the context of my own study, this means that I cannot generalise my findings beyond Uganda and Zambia.

Why Uganda and Zambia? I selected cases to ensure maximum variation in the dependent variable, i.e. to compare and contrast cases of civil war onset with cases of civil war avoidance. As Uganda and Zambia exhibit such maximum variation in civil war occurrence (for details see chapter 1), the two countries were very suitable

[188] The question whether case studies can really better accommodate causal complexity is however controversial (see Gerring 2007: 61pp.).

candidates.[189] Note that selecting cases on the dependent variable is now widely regarded a legitimate alternative to case selection on the independent variable as long as sufficient variation in the values of the dependent variable is ensured.[190] In the context of my study, the case for selection on the dependent variable was even reinforced by an important fact: I could not select cases on the independent variable – the 'best intentional design'[191] – simply because I ignored its value(s) beforehand. This means that I initially did not know to which extent an elite bargain was inclusive or exclusionary, which could only be established in the course of my research.

Table 4: Time periods under investigation

Country	Time period	Chapter
Uganda	1. Obote I, Amin, Obote II (1962-1986) 1.1 Obote I (1962-1971) 1.2 Amin (1971-1979) 1.3 Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF), Obote II, the Okellos (1979-1986)	Chapter 4
	2. Museveni (1986-2008)	Chapter 5
Zambia	1. Kaunda (1964-1991) 1.1 First Republic (1964-1972) 1.2 Second Republic (1972-1991)	Chapter 6
	2. Movement for Multiparty Democracy (1991-2008) 2.1 Chiluba (1991-2001) 2.2 Mwanawasa (2001-2008)	Chapter 7

To compare and contrast civil war occurrence in Uganda with civil war avoidance in Zambia, I have divided the history of both countries into different time periods (see table 4). For each time period, I will proceed as follows: In a first step, I determine the values of the dependent variable, i.e. I discuss whether or not civil war(s) has occurred.

[189] Uganda and Zambia are of course not the only possible candidates when trying to contrast cases of civil war onset with cases of civil war avoidance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Other possible – and equally suitable – country pairs could have been Chad/Cameroon, Sierra Leone/Botswana, DRC/Zambia, Sudan/Gabon, etc. The ultimate decision to compare Uganda and Zambia was admittedly guided by two pragmatic concerns. First, and most importantly, Uganda and Zambia are both among the core countries of the *Crisis States Research Centre* (CSRC). Accordingly, the decision to study these two core countries provided me with important intellectual, logistical and material support. Second, Uganda as the conflict-prone of the two countries is now relatively stable and therefore suitable in terms of conducting field research. Undertaking fieldwork in Chad, DRC or Sudan, by contrast, would have been a lot more difficult.

[190] See Ragin 2004; George & Bennett 2005.

[191] King et al. 1994: 140.

In a second step, I establish the values of the independent variable, i.e. I present data on political, military, economic and territorial power-sharing between contending social groups and thereby determine the inclusiveness of the elite bargain. In a third step, I engage in 'process tracing', which means that I attempt to 'identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable'.[192] In other words, I trace to what extent the given inclusiveness of the elite bargain can plausibly explain the occurrence or non-occurrence of civil war during the period under investigation. In a last step, I briefly discuss whether or not other factors (i.e. left-out variables) are better or at least complementary explanations.

DATA SOURCES

What are my sources of data? To begin with, I conducted *desk studies* to review the very comprehensive secondary literature on Uganda and Zambia. Here, the first focus was to collect information on the various violent conflicts that have ravaged Uganda since 1962 in order to determine which of them match my definition of civil war (see section 2.1). This turned out to be difficult since there are very few reliable estimates for the total number of deaths caused by each of these conflicts. Similarly, information on 'effective resistance' (i.e. the number of deaths among government troops) is typically scarce and contested. As a consequence, I conducted detailed searches of the LexisNexis News database, which includes full-text of more than 50 major English-language newspapers from around the world, hundreds of magazines, journals, and newsletters as well as broadcast transcripts from the major television and radio networks.[193] On this basis, and using additional information from the secondary literature, I was able to identify the 15 different cases of civil war mentioned in chapter 1, even though some doubts remain (see chapters 4 and 5). The fact that I had great difficulties in finding reliable data on violent conflicts in a country that I know reasonably well raises some serious questions about the civil war data used in the quantitative literature. This may be another example for what Laurie Nathan has referred to as the 'the frightful inadequacy of most of the statistics'.[194]

---

[192] George & Bennett 2005: 206.
[193] http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/nexis/home/home.do?randomNum=0.07463397155869711.
[194] Nathan 2005.

A second focus during the desk study phase was to establish to what extent previous studies had already addressed questions pertaining to the distribution of access to positions of state power between competing social groups. While these questions are – unsurprisingly – a prominent topic in the literature on both countries, very few studies have actually bothered to provide substantial data. For Uganda, data on the inter-group distribution of positions in government and the army can be found in the work of Kasfir, Hansen, Jorgenson, Omara-Otunnu and (to a lesser extent) Carbone, albeit only for short time periods and in limited detail.[195] The only exception in this regard is Omara-Otunnu's landmark study on the Ugandan military, which provides very detailed data on the ethno-regional distribution of military power until 1986 and is therefore of considerable use for my own study (see chapter 4). For Zambia, data on the composition of government and the ruling party has been published by Dresang, Tordoff, Gertzel et al. and Hulterstrom, albeit again only for short time periods and in limited detail.[196] No previous work has been done on the distribution of positions in the administration, the parastatals and the military. Altogether, the considerable gaps in the existing literature underlined the need to collect my own data.

As a consequence, the first pillar of my *fieldwork* in Zambia (June 2008-October 2008) and Uganda (November 2008-February 2009) was to collect data on the inter-group distribution of all four types of state power (political, military, economic, territorial). Here, the first challenge was to compile lists of all ministers, deputy ministers, permanent secretaries, parastatal directors, army officers, etc. since independence. This turned out to be an extremely difficult task. As there is no tradition of centralised record-keeping in both countries, the information I was looking for was either scattered in different libraries/ministries across the capital city or (said to be) not available at all. Initially, I suspected that the responsible authorities maybe did not want to share the information with me. Soon, however, I realised that this kind of data had either never been systematically collected or was lost over time. In one extreme case, my contact person in one of the ministries even asked whether he could make a photocopy of a document that I had brought from London for his own records.

These difficulties notwithstanding, I still managed to find what I was looking for, albeit unfortunately in greatly varying detail. Compiling the names of all ministers and deputy

[195] Kasfir 1976; Hansen 1977; Jorgenson 1981; Omara-Otunnu 1987; Carbone 2008.
[196] Tordoff & Molteno 1974b; Tordoff 1980a; Dresang 1974; Gertzel et al. 1984; Hulterstrom 2004.

ministers since independence turned out to be the easiest task since I soon discovered that they are regularly listed in the official reports of parliamentary debates in both countries. Finding the names of top party officials, permanent secretaries and parastatal directors proved a lot more difficult, especially in Uganda where the violent excesses of the 1970s and 1980s seem to have destroyed most of the records. In Zambia, it was ironically sometimes easier to find information on the Kaunda period, not least due to the excellent *UNIP archives*. As a consequence of all this, some of my lists suffer from gaps (see annex 11.1) and/or are based on unofficial information received through personal contacts. Unsurprisingly, the biggest challenge was to find information on the inter-group distribution of positions in the armed forces. In both countries, my attempts to approach the Ministry of Defence were unsuccessful, not least due to the sensitive nature of the matter. I therefore had to limit myself to unofficial and partial information, again received through personal contacts.

Once I had compiled the different lists including a total of more than 1000 names for each country, the real trouble began. I had to find ways to identify the group affiliation(s) of every single individual[197] – information that is not written anywhere. Fortunately, I managed to get very patient help from a large variety of people, including former and current politicians, long-standing civil servants, former army personnel or academics. This means that people agreed to sit down with me, sometimes for hours, to help me fill in the tribal, linguistic, regional, or religious background of the officeholders (see Annex 11.1). For each name, I made sure to get at least 4-5 different opinions, preferably from people who knew the individual personally.[198] In the great majority of cases, this produced highly congruent answers, especially in Uganda where the task of identifying someone's ethno-regional background seemed relatively straightforward. In Zambia, a country with a long history of urbanisation and high rates of inter-tribal marriage, things were often a bit more complicated – an observation that may by itself already be part of the answer why the country has been able to avoid large-scale violent conflict (see chapters 6 and 7). One intellectual who I had asked for help even openly challenged the possibility of determining group affiliations in Zambia,

---

[197] On the question which group cleavages are most salient in Uganda and Zambia see chapter 3.

[198] This sometimes led to remarkable encounters. In Zambia, for example, I sat down with a long-standing civil servant who had worked in the Zambian civil service for his entire life and seemed to know every single permanent secretary since independence *personally*. For each name I brought up, he would start telling stories about where the individual had grown up, how he had died and how beautiful his wife had been. This lasted for a few hours but gave me good confidence that he would make relatively few mistakes when identifying the group affiliation of the individual.

vehemently criticising my approach as a typically 'Western' compulsion to categorise social relations:

> 'One of the basic problems of Western education is that they like compartmentalising things. Unless it comes out of a box it does not make sense. You need a box and a label on it. In fact, the Americans are probably the greatest exponents of this labelling tendency. They label things to a level of idiocy. It does not even make sense. If they cannot compartmentalise it, then they won't understand it. When they are looking at the world, they see a world made up of neatly packed societies. Societies are not like it. Most societies that I know are not neat and compartmentalised'.[199]

Altogether, I managed to collect a substantial set of original data (see Annex 11.1). Even though I found less data than I had hoped for, my dataset is – at least to my knowledge – still a lot more comprehensive than any comparable data not only for Uganda and Zambia but also for the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa. In terms of reliability, I acknowledge that my data may include occasional errors but am nonetheless convinced that it does closely reflect the actual distribution of inter-group access to positions of state power in both countries.

The second pillar of my fieldwork was to conduct *interviews* with a wide range of stakeholders, including key members of all relevant political parties (current and former), civil servants, army leaders, businessmen, trade-unionists, clergymen, academics and staff of international organisations. In total, I conducted 103 interviews, 54 in Zambia and 49 in Uganda (for a list of all interviewees see section 10). The great majority of these interviews took place in the capital cities, Lusaka and Zambia, but I also spent some time interviewing people on the Zambian Copperbelt (in Kitwe) and in Northern Uganda (in Gulu).

The interviews were semi-structured in nature. I used an interview guideline for each of the two countries (see Annex 11.2) but made sure to handle it in a flexible manner. The more interviews I had done, the more I focused on open questions in order to avoid excessive repetition and to close remaining gaps. Every interview started with a broad and open question on why the country had experienced/avoided civil war. This was very important not only to hear my interviewees' own ideas but also to see whether they would themselves relate the occurrence or non-occurrence of violent conflict to inter-group competition over access to state power. In many cases, the answers to this broad opening question turned out be very long and elaborate (up to 30 minutes at times),

[199] Interview, Dr. Bright Chungu.

which I took as a sign that people had very precise ideas about the drivers of peace and war. Afterwards, I typically focused on what my interviewees considered the main cleavages in society (tribe, region, religion, class, etc.) before turning to questions on the shape of the elite bargain (without calling it the elite bargain of course) and its impact on patterns of civil war onset and avoidance. The subjective perceptions of how access to positions of state power has been distributed over time were a very important complement to the 'objective' data I collected, not least since one may be inclined to think that they are equally, if not more consequential than the actual distribution of power (see chapter 8). My interviews typically ended with questions on the explanatory power of some of the most prominent competing hypotheses, including the impact of economic performance, democracy and international factors.

The length of my interviews varied greatly, lasting from a minimum of 20 minutes to a maximum of three hours. The average duration was however somewhere in between 60 and 80 minutes. During the interviews, I took as detailed notes as possible. Moreover, almost all of my interviews were recorded, with only three out of the 103 interviewees asking not to be recorded. This obviously raises the question whether my interview partners would have been more talkative if I had not recorded them. While this cannot be excluded in some cases, the great majority of the people I interviewed appeared to be very comfortable and openly talked even about the more sensitive issues. This was not least due to the fact that both Uganda and Zambia have a relatively free press with extremely critical opposition newspapers (*The Daily Monitor* in Uganda and *The Post* in Zambia). As many of my interviewees are key protagonists in past and current public debates, they did not seem particularly worried to be linked to controversial statements.

After my return from the field, I first edited the collected data according to the indicators specified in my theoretical framework. This means that I calculated the inter-group distribution of political, military, economic and territorial power over time, always related to the respective groups' population shares as detailed in census reports – an extremely time-consuming process. In a second step, I listened to the recorded interviews. While I decided not to transcribe the interviews in full, I carefully extracted the main messages and key quotes in order to be able to use them as supporting evidence.

2.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have first defined what I understand by civil war and then gone on to develop my own theory of civil war that focuses on the inclusiveness of elite politics. I argue that a country's propensity for conflict or peace is determined by the inclusiveness of the elite bargain, which I define as the distribution of access to positions of state power (political, military, economic and territorial) between contending social groups. I hypothesise that inclusive elite bargains facilitate civil war avoidance, whereas exclusionary elite bargains favour the onset of civil war.

In the following five empirical chapters, I will probe the plausibility of my hypothesis based on a paired comparison of Uganda and Zambia, which draws on 103 interviews, a comprehensive set of original data on the inter-group distribution of political, military, economic and territorial posts, and in-depth historical analysis.

3 Historical perspectives – The genesis of social fragmentation in Uganda and Zambia

In this chapter, I trace the genesis of social fragmentation in Uganda and Zambia and identify the dominant social cleavages that structure political competition in both countries. This comparative historical perspective is indispensable for understanding the fundamental conflict lines in Ugandan and Zambian society and therefore serves as an important backdrop to my subsequent analysis of post-colonial differences in civil war occurrence (chapters 4-7). I proceed as follows: In each case, I first briefly review the main features of pre-colonial and colonial history and then go on to establish the most salient group cleavages in society.

3.1 Uganda

PRE-COLONIAL AND COLONIAL HISTORY

The territory that would become known through colonial rule as Uganda is home to many tribal groups, none of whom forms a majority of the population. The largest ones include the Baganda in the centre, the Banyankole, Bakiga, Batoro and Banyoro in the West, the Basoga, Bagisu and Iteso in the East and the Langi, Acholi, Lugbara and Karamojong in the North (see map 1). Significantly, and in sharp contrast to the situation in Zambia, these groups are also part of different linguistic communities, including Bantu-speakers in the South-West, Nilotic-speakers in the North-East, and Sudanic- (or Madi-Moru) speakers in the North-West.

Politically, pre-colonial Uganda contained at least 200 distinct entities, which varied greatly in terms of size and complexity.[200] These differences can be summarised into two categories, including stratified and nonstratified societies.[201] In nonstratified (or segmentary) societies, power was spread horizontally through the clan as the main social unit. Typically, the clan leader had no power to extract labour, demand taxes, or enforce laws. While most people in the northern and eastern parts of the territory lived under such nonstratified social systems (e.g. the Madi, Alur, Lugbara, Acholi, Langi,

---

[200] Jorgenson 1981: 36p. Busoga and Acholi alone each contained more than 50 mini-states.
[201] Kasozi 1994: 17pp.; Mutibwa 1992: 1pp.

Karamojong, Iteso, or Bagisu),[202] there were also a few segmentary societies in the South (e.g. the Bagisu, Bakonzo or Bakiga). In stratified (or hierarchical) societies, by contrast, power was distributed vertically and centralised in the hands of the leader whereby the political system resembled a pyramid at whose apex was a clan leader, a paramount chief or a king. Such hierarchical social systems were concentrated in the South-West and mainly included the Kingdoms of Buganda, Ankole, Toro, Bunyoro and Busoga. The process of concentrating power was a gradual and uneven one across these kingdoms, typically greatly reinforced in times of prevalent war. By the 19th century, the Kingdom of Buganda had become the most stratified society, with the King (the Kabaka) having an absolute right to use violence and an uncontested right to make war or peace. The Kings of Ankole and Bunyoro were also powerful but their authority was moderated by other sources of political power. Altogether, the colonial state came to contain a multitude of groups that were at different stages of political development. Significantly, the beginnings of external trade during the 19th century strengthened the already strong states in the South (especially Buganda and Bunyoro), whereas the penetration by the world economy had more disruptive effects in the North, especially during the Egyptian period of administration.[203]

The advent of British rule from the early 1890s heightened pre-existing differences and divisions. In 1890, the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) entered into a military alliance with the powerful Buganda Kingdom in order to extend its reach throughout the territory.[204] The most prominent joint military campaign was the conquering of Bunyoro in 1893, after which the Baganda were rewarded with land torn away from Bunyoro (the 'lost counties') – an issue of enduring conflict between the two kingdoms. The preferential treatment of the Baganda continued after the British government took over from the IBEAC in 1894 and turned the territory into a Protectorate. Most importantly, the 1900 Buganda Agreement provided the kingdom with considerable autonomy and gave substantial land rights to the Kabaka, his family and collaborating chiefs, which resulted in the creation of a land-owning elite. The special role accorded to the Buganda Kingdom was due to two reasons. First, the colonial officers admired the Kingdom's highly sophisticated political system, in which territorial chiefs enforced law and order, collected taxes and mobilised labour, and

[202] For the example of Lango see Tosh 1978.
[203] See Jorgenson 1981: 37p.
[204] Jorgenson 1981: 44pp.

therefore viewed the Baganda as superior to other tribal groups.[205] This perception was reinforced by the fact that the earlier introduction of Christianity in Buganda had given its people early access to Western education and thereby equipped them with a level of literacy unseen in other parts of the territory. Second, and arguably more important, the preferential treatment of the Baganda – especially the granting of extremely generous land rights under the *mailo* system[206] – reflected the weakness of the British colonial state vis-à-vis the Kabaka and the chiefs.[207] Fearing the high costs of violent conflict, the British preferred to give in to Buganda's far-reaching demands and thereby won loyal allies in the Kingdom.

Moreover, the colonial administration tried to establish control over the rest of the territory by imposing the hierarchical Buganda model of administration even on segmentary societies and appointing Baganda chiefs as administrators and tax collectors.[208] This 'indirect rule' through Baganda chiefs created long-lasting anti-Baganda sentiment throughout much of the colony, especially in the segmentary societies of the North-East where the stratified Kiganda institutions were perceived as entirely alien. The perception of Baganda 'sub-imperialism' was reinforced by the importation of Luganda as the official language of state administration, education and religion.[209] While most of the Baganda agents had been withdrawn by the early 1920s, the colonial state continued to rule indirectly through chiefs who were presented as representing local customs. In some cases, these 'traditional' chiefs were entirely invented. In other cases, the British perverted the functions of pre-colonial chiefs by transforming the originally constrained authority structures into more authoritarian and arbitrary systems – Mamdani's 'decentralised despotisms'.[210] In almost all cases, these native administrations followed tribal boundaries, which in turn strengthened tribal identification and antagonism.

---

[205] Golooba-Mutebi 2008: 3p.
[206] Significantly, the chiefs won control over half of the land in Buganda, including the better agricultural land.
[207] Jorgenson 1981: 44pp. This underlines Catherine Boone's (2004) thesis that the course and pace of colonisation were mostly shaped by patterns of local political organisation.
[208] Kasozi 1994: 22pp.; Jorgenson 1981: 78pp.
[209] According to Kasozi (1994: 227pp.), certain members of the colonial administration later tried to introduce Kiswahili as the official language of administration but were successfully opposed by Christian missionaries (who controlled the schools) and the Baganda ruling elite. While Christian missionaries suspected Kiswahili of transmitting Islamic values, the Baganda dismissed it as the language of prostitutes, thieves and liars. By 1948, six African languages were used for teaching, including Luganda, Lunyoro, Lwo, Ateso, Lugbara, and Kiswahili (dropped in 1952). As a consequence there was no common language to weld the various tribal groups together.
[210] Mamdani 1996.

Map 1: Tribal and regional cleavages in Uganda[211]

The latter were further reinforced by extreme discrepancies in regional development. Significantly, all development opportunities were concentrated in the southern parts of the territory, including education, cash crops (cotton and coffee) and infrastructure. In terms of education, the Baganda held twice as many secondary school places as the rest of the country by 1960 and were also greatly over-represented at Makerere University College – the only university in East Africa during colonial rule and an undisputed gateway to positions of political and economic power.[212] In terms of economic opportunities, the higher levels of commerce, industry, and agriculture were monopolised by Europeans, while Asians dominated small and medium business.[213] Africans were therefore not only excluded from the processing and marketing stages of agricultural production – the most lucrative sector in the colony's commodity-based economy – but were also left far behind in business expertise and capital. To make matters worse, the few economic opportunities that existed for Africans were spread very unevenly between regions. The greatest, and arguably most explosive, disparity was again between the centre, Buganda, and the rest of the country, or, geographically,

---

[211] Own compilation.
[212] Kasfir 1976.
[213] For details on the position of the Asian community in Uganda see Mamdani 1976: 65pp.

between North and South.[214] Cash crops – initially cotton, later coffee – were first introduced in Buganda and spread rapidly whereby the Kingdom came to contain more than 40% of the country's agricultural wealth. By 1958, almost 80% of gross money income was concentrated in Buganda and the Eastern Province, especially in Mengo, Busoga, Masaka and Bugisu districts. The Northern and Western regions, by contrast, were designated to become the labour reserves of the Protectorate, exporting migrant labourers to the urban centres and rural cash crop areas and plantations.[215] This uneven development was a deliberate policy designed to ensure the continued flow of labour to the cash-crop areas. As a consequence, the production of cash-crops in the affected areas was actively and openly discouraged. In 1925, for example, an agricultural officer in West Nile District was asked 'to refrain from actively stimulating the production of cotton or other economic crops in outlying districts' because of the country's dependence on migrant labour who carry out 'essential services in the central or producing areas'.[216] Even though cotton was later introduced in the North, it remained much less lucrative than the coffee grown in the South. Altogether, regional economic disparities were extremely pronounced, with the impoverishment of the North becoming the condition for the relative prosperity of the South.

The only notable exception to Southern dominance was the security sector where the British pursued a deliberate policy of tribal imbalance in favour of the people from the North.[217] Initially, the IBEAC had recruited a standing army from the Emin Pasha's Sudanese troops, which were taken over into the newly created Uganda Rifles in 1895. The situation changed however with the Sudanese mutiny in 1897 that ended the confidence in the foreign troops' loyalty. During the ensuing reorganisation of the army, recruitment came to be concentrated in the northern parts of the territory, especially among the Acholi, Langi, Iteso and West Nilers. This did not change until the end of the colonial period when the bulk of the army still consisted of the four foregoing groups. Similarly, the Uganda police was dominated by Northerners, in particular by the Acholi (15.5%), Iteso (15.2%), Langi (7.5%), Alur (6.1%) and Lugbara (4.5%).[218] As a consequence, much of Uganda, including the Northerners themselves, came to believe that only groups from the North had the right to bear arms.

---

[214] Kasozi 1994: 48pp.
[215] Jorgenson 1981: 109pp. Ankole and Kigezi were designated labour reserves for Buganda, whereas West Nile and Acholi were designated for Bunyoro and the Eastern districts.
[216] Mamdani 1976: 52.
[217] Omara-Otunnu 1987: 12pp.
[218] Jorgenson 1981: 119pp.

Beyond ethno-regional antagonism, colonial rule also reinforced religious divisions. In the last quarter of the 19th century, British Protestants and French Catholics had fought for control over Buganda. When Kabaka Mwanga II acceded to the throne in 1884, he attempted to expunge all foreign religions by ordering persecutions of Christians.[219] As a reaction, Catholic, Protestant and Muslim chiefs armed themselves, united and overthrew the Kabaka in 1888. However, the cooperation between the three denominations soon broke down and the Muslim chiefs managed to expel the two Christian groups from government. Buganda was briefly turned into a Muslim state headed by Kabaka Kalema and much blood was spilled. In 1889, the Christian chiefs formed an alliance with the exiled Kabaka Mwanga and succeeded in returning him to the throne. While Muslim chiefs were exiled, the Catholic and Protestants factions – the former backed by the French, the latter backed by the British – divided the chiefly offices between themselves. Disputes about control of land and usufruct persisted however and by 1891 the Protestant chiefs, numerically in the minority, found their position eroding. These tensions culminated in the 1892 Battle of Mengo for control of the state where the Protestant faction defeated the Catholics with the assistance of IBEAC troops. The Protestant victory empowered a minority wing of the Baganda elite and was subsequently enshrined in the 1900 Buganda Agreement. Anglican Protestantism became the established religion, whereas the Catholics – the majority – took second place and the Muslims were fully marginalised. Throughout the colonial period, the British continued to favour Protestants in access to land and authority, leading to grievances among both Catholics and Muslims.

In the light of these divisions, it is hardly surprising that no united nationalist movement developed. Until the mid-1940s, African political opposition was expressed by the Native Civil Servants' association (1922) and various tribal movements, which were typically led by emerging traders, farmers and professionals who were pressing for changes in European and Asian domination.[220] In 1946, the Bataka party – the successor of the Bataka movement in the 1920s – was formed in Buganda and started voicing popular grievances over low prices for cotton and coffee growers, the indirect elections of chiefs and the Buganda government, which was perceived as a stooge of the British. One year later, Ignatius Musazi established the Uganda African Farmers' Union (UAFU) with the goal of mobilising all farmers in Uganda to take control of the

[219] Kasozi 1994: 27pp.; Jorgenson 1981: 47pp.
[220] Jorgenson 1981: 179pp.

marketing of cash crops. These combined political activities in favour of an Africanisation of trade led to the cotton hold-up of 1949, after which both the Bataka Party and the UAFU were banned. In 1952, Musazi founded the Uganda National Congress (UNC) – the first countrywide political party that had its strongholds in the export-commodity producing areas. It was initially controlled by predominantly Baganda and Protestant leadership. Within Buganda, the UNC appealed to growers of cash crops and opponents of the Mengo hierarchy, while concentrating on cotton producers in other parts of the territory. From the mid-1950s, the UNC was however riddled by divisions between members from outside Buganda (who favoured a unitary post-colonial state) and members from within Buganda (who took a pro-federal or even pro-separatist stance). These tensions escalated in 1958 when two anti-Buganda UNC members of the Legislative Council broke away to establish the Uganda People's Union (UPU) with other non-Baganda members of the Council. Two years later, the UPU merged with the anti-Buganda wing of the UNC to form the Uganda People's Congress (UPC), headed by Milton Obote. As the UNC fully disintegrated, the originally Buganda-born party was replaced by the anti-Buganda but still Protestant UPC.

The second main political party that emerged during the 1950s was the Democratic Party (DP).[221] It was founded in 1954 by Catholics who not only resented the privileges of the Protestant-dominated Mengo hierarchy but also perceived the UNC as just another vehicle of Protestant hegemony. Accordingly, the DP – whose leadership was in the hands of professionals rather than chiefs – recruited mainly in predominantly Catholic territory. Its strongholds lay in areas with limited or no export-commodity production (West Nile, Ankole and Kigezi) and in Bunyoro where people were still alienated by the Mengo's annexation of the 'lost counties' (see above). The third political party emerged from within the Buganda government at Mengo. Faced with the anti-Buganda UPC and the Catholic DP, the Mengo first tried to declare the Kingdom independent in 1960. This separatist bid was rooted in an alliance between traditionalists (royal family, higher functionaries, saza chiefs), rentier landlords and capitalist farmers.[222] While the former group was interested in the perpetuation of traditional privileges, the latter two perceived secession as a means to protect the mailo land system and their economic hegemony, including access to cheap migrant labour. After the secessionist bid failed, the Buganda government launched its own political

[221] Mutibwa 1992: 13pp.; Jorgenson 1981: 193pp.
[222] Jorgenson 1981: 190pp.

party in 1961, the Kabaka Yekka ('The King Alone', or KY), which was soon infiltrated by Musazi's pro-Buganda UNC faction.

Altogether, the nationalist movement gave birth to three largely sectarian political parties, including the anti-Buganda and Protestant UPC, the Catholic and anti-Mengo DP and the Mengo-dominated KY. As the country proceeded towards independence, Obote's UPC and the KY entered into an unlikely alliance in October 1961.[223] This was mainly due to the fact that the DP had ignored the Mengo's boycott of the March 1961 parliamentary elections and thereby easily won 20 of 21 seats in Buganda (with only about 2% of the eligible votes). As the DP also won a majority in the rest of the country, it provided the country's first Prime Minister in the person of Benedicto Kiwanuka – a Catholic Muganda commoner. Unsurprisingly, the Protestant establishment at Mengo was furious that Kiwanuka had not only ignored the boycott but also dared to place himself in a position superior to the Kabaka. To remove the DP from power, the KY and UPC joined forces in what was essentially an anti-Catholic pact and together won the parliamentary elections of April 1962. As a consequence, Obote – who's UPC had won the majority of seats – became Prime Minister of Uganda and led the country to independence in October 1962.

Despite the peaceful transition to independence, the alliance between the conservative and monarchist KY and the anti-Buganda and nationalist UPC was extremely uneasy and fragile. During the 1961-62 constitutional negotiations in London, the UPC had had to give in to Buganda's demands for a federal state with strongly entrenched powers for Buganda and indirect election of Buganda's representatives to the National Assembly.[224] Accordingly, the Independence Constitution granted full federal status to Buganda and a semi-federal status to other kingdoms, while the other districts were governed from the centre in a unitary fashion. This meant that post-colonial Uganda came to consist of the Kingdoms of Buganda, Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro, the territory of Busoga, and the districts of Acholi, Bugisu, Bukedi, Karamoja, Kigezi, Lango, Madi, Sebei, Teso and West Nile. While this complex nature of the Constitution reflected the unavoidable need for power-sharing, it created significant 'pockets of power' that were beyond the reach of the central government. Moreover, there was no strong sense of nationalism with all of the manifold social divisions remaining unaddressed.

---

[223] Mutibwa 1992: 19pp.
[224] Ibid.: 22pp.

SOCIAL CLEAVAGES

As argued in the previous section, colonial rule produced extremely high levels of social fragmentation in Uganda. But which are the dominant social cleavages around which political competition is structured in post-colonial Uganda? Or, asked differently, which are the main cleavages that need to be accommodated to prevent violent group mobilisation?

Establishing the dominant cleavages in society is not an easy task, neither in Uganda nor elsewhere. Implicit in the notion of social groups is the idea that both members and non-members recognise the group boundaries and expect that significant social actions are – or could be – conditioned on them.[225] In this sense, the main social cleavages are what people *think* they are at a given point in time.[226] It follows that the best way to establish the dominant social cleavages would be a countrywide survey. As the latter is beyond the scope of my study, I rely on my impressionistic interview evidence, census reports and the interpretation of other secondary sources.

The main source of social cleavage in post-colonial Uganda has been *tribe*. As discussed above, the country contains a multitude of tribal groups. The first census in 1959 listed 35 different indigenous tribes, while the most recent one in 2002 identified even 56.[227] In line with my definition of ethnicity, these tribes are ethnic groups in that membership is determined by the tribal background of the individual's parents, i.e. by descent. None of these groups are primordial in character but at least partially the product of divisions and amalgamations imposed by both colonial and post-colonial rule. Despite some changes in classification, one can identify a fairly stable set of 19 tribes with a population share of more than 1% (see table 5). In 2002, the ten largest ones included the Baganda (17.7%), Banyankole (10.7%), Basoga (10.4), Bakiga (7.2%), Iteso (6.7%), Langi (6.4%), Bagisu (5.6%), Acholi (4.9%) and Lugbara (4.4%). Needless to say that these groups are not fully homogeneous but affected by more or less pronounced internal divisions. The most prominent example for intra-group

---

[225] Fearon 2003: 6.

[226] Such perceptions of group boundaries are of course not wholly exogenous. Instead they vary with a broad range of other variables such as a country's political institutions or economic circumstances (see Posner 2005).

[227] Note that the censuses in 1969, 1980 and 1991 excluded questions on an individual's tribal affiliation, mainly for political reasons.

divisions would be the Banyankole tribe, which has traditionally been divided into the Bahima (cattle-owners) and Bairu (agriculturalists) subgroups.

Table 5: Tribal groups in Uganda and their population share, 1959-2002 (in percent)[228]

Tribal group	1959	2002
Baganda	16,3	17,7
Iteso	8,1	6,7
Banyankole	8,1	10,0
Basoga	7,8	8,9
Bakiga	7,1	7,2
Banyarwanda	5,9	3,3
Langi	5,6	6,4
Bagisu	5,1	4,8
Acholi	4,4	4,9
Lugbara	3,7	4,4
Batoro	3,2	2,6
Banyoro	2,9	2,9
Karamajong	2,0	1,1
Alur	1,9	2,3
Bagwere	1,7	1,8
Bakonzo	1,7	2,6
Japadhola	1,6	1,5
Banyole	1,4	1,5
Madi	1,2	1,3
Others	10,3	8,1
Total	100,0	100,0

As I will show in detail in chapters 4 and 5, tribal divisions have played a major role in political competition and conflict over the Ugandan state since 1962. While party formation during the nationalist struggle was shaped by the conflict between the Buganda Kingdom and an anti-Baganda coalition of other tribes (organised in the UPC), these tensions persisted throughout Obote's first Presidency during the 1960s. Under Idi Amin, the main conflict line was between the tribal groups from West Nile (Amin himself being a Kakwa from West Nile) and the rest of the country. While some of my interviewees felt that tribal divisions have become less salient over time, recent political debates in the country underline that competition over the state continues to be framed in tribal terms.[229] This becomes evident on the occasion of every cabinet reshuffle when the different groups not only publicly gauge how many of their tribesmen have been appointed to government but also send delegations of elders and prominent leaders to

[228] East African Statistical Department 1960: 1; UBOS 2006b: 46.
[229] Various interviews.

the president to demand a fair share of the national cake.[230] Also, tribal undertones have been omnipresent in recent debates about government appointments, decentralisation and land reform. Even though the importance of the tribal question is often downplayed,[231] it clearly remains – to use the words of one of the country's foremost academics – the 'elephant in the room that nobody wants to talk about'.[232]

Table 6: Ethno-regional groups in Uganda and their population share, 1959-2002 (in percent)[233]

Regional group	1959	2002
Buganda (Southern)	17,2	18,8
Eastern	30,1	28,4
Northern	20,7	22,3
Western	32,1	30,5
Total	100,1	100,0

A related, yet broader source of cleavage in Ugandan society has been *region*. During colonial rule, the territory was divided into four regions, including Central (Buganda), Eastern, Northern and Western region. Even though colonial and post-colonial local administration has always – except for a brief period under Idi Amin – revolved around the district as the highest unit,[234] the four regions have over time remained an important vehicle of group identification, evident in the ubiquitous distinction between Southerners (Baganda), Northerners, Easterners and Westerners. Such distinctions are shaped by the historically grounded disparities in regional economic development, especially between the North and the rest of the country. Significantly, membership in these regional groupings is determined not by the region in which an individual currently resides but by descent from one of the region's tribal groupings, which makes them *ethno*-regional groups.[235] Easterners, for example, comprise all members of tribes from Eastern region, including Iteso, Basoga, Bagisu, Bagwere, Japadhola, Banyole,

---

[230] Muhereza & Omurangi Otim 1998: 195.

[231] The tendency to downplay the salience of tribal affiliation has recently been criticised by the outspoken opposition MP Bety Kamya in her letter 'There is nothing wrong with tribalism', *The Monitor*, 5 January 2009.

[232] Interview, Prof. Joe Oloka-Onyango.

[233] Compiled based on East African Statistical Department 1960: 1; UBOS 2006b: 46.

[234] Sathyamurthy 1982: 16pp.

[235] Note that newspaper reports often define regional groups as comprising all individuals who currently live in the respective region (see, for example, 'National cake: Who eats the chunk, who picks the crumbs?', *The Independent*, 8 – 21 February 2008). This is problematic since common residency in a region does not automatically yield a cohesive group identity. In Central Region, for instance, only 63% of the local residents are actually Baganda (UBOS 2006b: 23). When Ugandans think of the 'Baganda' as a group with a common identity, they think of these 63% rather than of the entire population in Central Region.

Basamia, etc. In terms of population share, Westerners constitute the largest ethno-regional group, followed by Easterners, Northerners and the Baganda (see table 6).

How salient are the broader ethno-regional cleavages when compared with tribal divisions? In general, interview evidence suggests that the four ethno-regional groups exhibit a considerable degree of common identity and solidarity. The distribution of jobs and resources, for example, is often analysed in ethno-regional terms, typically accompanied by claims about regional neglect and marginalisation.[236] Nevertheless, there are considerable divisions within each of the four ethno-regional groups. The Northern group, for instance, has experienced recurrent conflict not only between the Acholi-Langi and West Nile factions, but also within both of these subgroups (see chapters 4-5). In the end, ethno-regional cleavages do matter but determine political behaviour less than tribal affiliation. To use an extreme example, if people take up arms against the government, they do so as Acholi or Lugbara rather than as Northerners.

Table 7: Religious groups in Uganda and their population share, 1959-2002 (in percent)[237]

Religious group	1959	2002
Protestant	28,2	36,6
Catholic	34,5	41,6
Muslim	5,6	12,3
Other	31,7	9,5
Total	100,0	100,0

A third social cleavage in Uganda has been *religion*. As discussed above, colonial rule introduced divisions between Protestants, Catholics and Muslims, which became a key driver behind the formation of the first political parties. Numerically, Catholics have always been the largest of these three religious groups[238], followed by Protestants and Muslims (see table 7). The salience of religious cleavages was particularly pronounced during the first Obote regime and under Idi Amin who tried to turn the predominantly Christian country into a Muslim state (see chapter 4). According to interview evidence, the significance of religious divisions has decreased since the 1980s and is now clearly outweighed by tribal and regional cleavages. Even though there is still evidence for

[236] See, for example, recent parliamentary debates in GOU 2009a: col. 3.11.
[237] East African Statistical Department 1960; UBOS 2006b.
[238] Uganda's three religious groups are not ethnic in character since membership is determined not only by descent but *also* by the choice of a religion. While family ties remain important in determining religious affiliation, interview evidence suggests that religious conversions are not uncommon in Uganda.

religious grievances,[239] it seems rather unlikely that significant social action will be conditioned on religious divisions. This is not least due to the fact that Catholics, Protestants and Muslims are present throughout the territory, which means that religiously-based collective action tends to be countered by tribal divisions.[240]

In contrast to tribal, regional and religious divisions, *class* can only to a very limited extent be considered a salient cleavage in Uganda. During the colonial period, the British deliberately avoided full-scale capitalist transformation, which was not only considered morally repugnant but also a threat to political stability.[241] Even though there was of course social stratification in both urban and rural areas, class formation remained limited in that very few people had nothing to sell but their labour. Rural peasants retained their land as a means of production and subsistence, while urban workers were typically peasants first and workers second, which means that they maintained their roots in the countryside to which they returned after earning money in the city. There is reason to think that this situation has not changed much since independence. President Museveni himself, for example, has argued that

> '[b]ecause of our backward, pre-industrial economies, there are no pan-national social forces which can ensure horizontal linkages. The only organised groups are either tribes or religious factions'.[242]

The main thrust of this argument is that Uganda mostly remains a rural society mainly composed of peasants and therefore lacks salient class cleavages. Nelson Kasfir has taken issue with Museveni's 'one class' analysis on the grounds that it negates a 'considerable degree of class differentiation in rural Uganda', opposing capitalist farmers and rich peasants to poor peasants and mere labourers.[243] While this is certainly true, it is nonetheless a matter of fact that this social stratification in rural areas has hardly given rise to distinct class-based group identities that shape collective behaviour (i.e. in form of political parties). Similarly, class issues may be becoming more important in the context of rising urban poverty but are still far from being the main determinant of social action. This became evident in the 2009 'Buganda riots' in Kampala that were rooted in the central government's unresolved conflict with the

---

[239] Although Catholics are the largest religious group in Uganda, the country has never been ruled by a Catholic President. This is still an emotional issue among many Catholics. See 'The battle to succeed Museveni', *The Independent*, 18 March 2009.

[240] To give an example, Catholics in Northern region (59.2% of the population) will have relatively little in common with Catholics in Central region (41.2% of the population). Moreover, and in sharp contrast to countries like Nigeria or Sudan, Muslims in Uganda are not concentrated in the North but evenly spread throughout all four regions (see UBOS 2006b: 28).

[241] Jorgenson 1981: 109pp.; Kasozi 1994: 40pp.

[242] Museveni 1997: 31.

[243] Kasfir 1998: 59p.

Buganda Kingdom and therefore reflected tribal rather than class divisions (see chapter 5). Altogether, it seems safe to argue that class cleavages in Uganda continue to be overshadowed by tribal, regional and – to a lesser extent – religious cleavages.

3.2 Zambia

PRE-COLONIAL AND COLONIAL HISTORY

In pre-colonial times, the territory of present-day Zambia contained a multitude of tribal groups. The largest ones included the Bemba and Lunda in the North, the Ngoni and Chewa in the East, the Tonga in the South and the Lozi in the West (see map 2). Significantly, and in sharp contrast to the situation in Uganda, all groups are part of the Bantu-speaking family.

Politically, almost all groups were governed by chiefs by the end of the 19th century.[244] Among the people in the central and north-eastern parts of the territory, the first chiefs came from the country of the Luba in south-eastern Congo, while chiefly traditions in the North-West originated among the Lunda in south-western Congo. A few groups, including the Bemba, Lunda, Ngoni and Lozi, came to be organised around centralised chieftainships that possessed developed bureaucracies. The Bemba Kingdom in the North, for example, exhibited an important degree of cohesion, with political power becoming increasingly centralised during the 19th century. Even more centralised was the Lozi Kingdom in the West where the King (the Litunga), as the guardian of land, had built up a following of loyal chiefs by allotting them land on the Zambezi flood plain. The Lozi Kingdom consisted of a highly centralised heartland, inhabited by the Lozi themselves, surrounded by a larger but more loosely controlled region inhabited by subject groups such as the Mbunda, the Kwangwa or the Totela. The great majority of tribes, by contrast, lived in rather decentralised societies. Here, chiefs were part of traditional social organisation but bureaucratic institutions remained underdeveloped and weak. Among the Bantu-Botatwe, or Tonga-speaking people, in the South, finally, the Luba- or Lunda-derived chieftainship had made the least impact. As a consequence, chiefs were largely uncommon among the Ila and Tonga – acephalous communities of cattle herders with a weak sense of common identity.

---

[244] Roberts 1976: 80pp.

Map 2: Tribal, linguistic and provincial cleavages in Zambia[245]

The advent of colonial rule did little to fully integrate all groups into one national community. In 1889, the millionaire Cecil Rhodes was able to persuade the British government to grant a charter to his British South Africa Company (BSAC).[246] This allowed him to make treaties with African chiefs and helped him to establish administrative powers over Northern Rhodesia until the turn of the century, using remarkably little force.[247] The most important treaty was the Lochner concession (1890) whereby the Lozi King Lewanika – unwittingly – signed away mineral rights throughout his Kingdom. In the aftermath, the BSAC administered the territory with two goals in mind.[248] On the one hand, it sought to extract labour from the local population to be able to sustain its mining efforts, while trying to minimise its costs on the other. The solution to achieving both goals was taxation that not only generated revenue but – because taxes were payable in cash only – also forced Africans to engage in wage-labour in the mines of Southern Rhodesia and Katanga (in which the BSAC had direct or indirect financial interests). To ensure efficient tax collection, the BSAC entered into an alliance with local chiefs who agreed to use their authority to extract

[245] Own compilation.
[246] Roberts 1976: 156pp.; Hall 1976: 8pp.
[247] Only the Ngoni in the East were submitted by the mere force of arms in 1898.
[248] Posner 2005: 26pp.

revenue from their subjects and, in return, were recognised and protected by the company.[249] While this strategy worked well in the highly centralised chieftaincies[250], it was difficult to implement in decentralised societies. As a consequence, the BSAC introduced the Administration of Natives Proclamation (1916), which standardised the role of chiefs throughout the territory and boosted their authority, not least in areas where chiefs had previously been weak.[251] Moreover, the BSAC acted to rationalise previously fuzzy tribal boundaries whereby the territory was parcelled up into tribal areas that were enforced on the ground. These measures paved the way for the 'tribalisation' of the territory's local authority structures.

This transformation was taken even further after the British colonial office took over from the BSAC in 1924 and turned Northern Rhodesia into a Protectorate. In 1929, a system of Indirect Rule was introduced through the Native Authority Ordinance, which was – according to the Legislative Council – meant to establish

> 'a more advanced form of native administration, which gives to chiefs the management of their own affairs within their tribal areas, and it is hoped it will preserve and maintain all that is good in native custom and tribal organisation'.[252]

As the tribe became the main unit of rural administration, chiefs were given – through their positions as heads of the newly created Native Authorities – control over valuable resources (e.g. treasury funds and land) and unprecedented judicial powers.[253] This provided the population with extremely strong incentives to cultivate their relationship with both the chief and their tribe. Accordingly, Native Authorities became the drivers behind tribal identities throughout the territory. As Posner has shown, tribes with Native Authorities tended to grow in size, whereas those without Native Authorities shrank.[254]

---

[249] In fact, the BSAC relied upon a small body of white civil servants who were dispersed among a number of stations all over the territory. But as the BSAC had less than fifty of such administrators, it urgently needed the help of chiefs.

[250] The position of Barotseland in the West was unique (Roberts 1976: 162pp.). Under the Lewanika concession (1900), the Lozi Kingdom had been divided into an inner 'reserved area' and a region more open to European enterprise, which allowed the Lozi to retain substantially more autonomy under colonial rule than others peoples. Lozi chiefs had to collect tax for the Company, but they were the only chiefs to receive a fixed percentage of the taxes paid by their subjects.

[251] There is some disagreement on whether this policy really strengthened the role of chiefs. In contrast to Posner, Hall (1976: 50pp.) takes the view that the chiefs' role as agents of the BSAC quickly reduced their stature in the eyes of their people. To support his argument, Hall cites the colonial officer Lord Hailey as follows: 'The general effect of the policy was to preserve the outward form of the indigenous systems, but to undermine the authority of the chiefs both by making them depend on the administrative officer and by taxation which obliged large numbers of men to leave their villages for considerable periods of time'.

[252] Cited after Hall 1976: 51p.

[253] Posner 2005: 30pp.

[254] Ibid.: 36pp.

Beyond the entrenchment of tribal divisions, colonial rule also favoured the emergence of distinct linguistic group cleavages. The latter became evident in the progressive consolidation of four dominant regional languages, including the Bemba-speakers in the North, Nyanja-speakers in the East, Tonga-speakers in the South, and Lozi-speakers in the West (see map 2).[255] This process was driven by three features of colonial rule. First, missionary schools were unable to teach Africans in all local languages and therefore used Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga and Lozi as the only languages of instruction. Second, colonial education policies formally adopted the four languages as official languages of instruction in 1927 in order to simplify the administration's job.[256] Third, intra-territorial labour migration had a profound effect on the country's language map. Once the labour migrants settled in the major urban areas along the 'line of rail'[257], their patterns of language use changed and a single language naturally emerged as a common medium of communication, including Bemba on the Copperbelt, Nyanja in Lusaka and Lozi in Livingstone. A fifth, albeit looser language group came to exist in the North-West where no single dominant regional lingua franca emerged but Lunda, Kaonde and Luvale enjoyed first-among-equals status.[258] On the whole, the process of language consolidation meant that national conflicts were increasingly seen in linguistic terms, while local interactions continued to be framed in tribal terms. The picture was further complicated by the fact that the different communal identities were clustered into eight (later nine) administrative provinces (see map 2).

Colonial economic policies had an ambiguous impact in terms of national integration. On the one hand, the rapid growth of the mining industry on the Copperbelt from the 1930s led to the emergence of an export-oriented mono-economy that was mined by foreign multi-national corporations and characterised by highly uneven economic development.[259] The manufacturing and agricultural sectors remained underdeveloped

---

[255] Ibid.: 56pp.

[256] Moreover, Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga and Lozi were also chosen, along with English, as languages of both the African newspaper Mutende and Northern Rhodesian radio broadcasting.

[257] The 'line of rail' refers to the area, which is served by the railway linking the Copperbelt with Lusaka, the capital, and with the border town of Livingstone.

[258] This unique position of the North-West goes back to the absence of the very factors that favoured language consolidation in the rest of the country (ibid.: 78p.). First, there were very few missions in North-Western Province. Second, none of the three languages was privileged by colonial education policies. And third, even though labour migration to the Copperbelt existed, it never equalled the number of Bemba-speaking migrants.

[259] Roberts 1976: 185pp.; Hall 1976: 71pp. Copper from one of the world's richest deposits was discovered in the late 1920s. As four large mines were developed from the early 1930s, the value of exports increased five-fold between 1930 and 1933, and the contribution of copper rose from 30% to 90%.

with infrastructure development almost exclusively geared towards the needs of the mining industry. Investment in agriculture was minimal and most rural areas remained condemned to subsistence farming, which was in turn undermined by the absence of able-bodied men who worked in the mines for most of the year. As the rural areas off the 'line of rail' were left behind, the Copperbelt became 'an island of comparative plenty in a vast sea of rural poverty', evident in wide income gaps between rural and urban dwellers. All this played out in a context of a racially segregated colonial society. While the European minority monopolised managerial, professional and skilled artisan occupations, Asians were given control over much of the country's middle-range retail trade. The African majority suffered from institutionalised racialist practises, including wage discrimination, exclusion from many occupations, segregated public services and alienation of the best land to European settlers.

On the other hand, the rise of mining involved rapid urbanisation and transformed the previously sparsely populated Central African plateau into a tribally-diverse melting pot. This did not automatically weaken tribal cleavages as the colonial government adopted a series of policies to avoid a 'detribalization' of urban society and contain destabilising class formation.[260] A first set of policies attempted to structure urban life as much as possible along tribal lines. This involved the creation of a system of Tribal Elders, the setting up of Native Urban Courts, the practise of segmenting tribes into particular occupational niches in mining, and the encouragement of inter-tribal recreational competition and chiefly visits. A second set of policies attempted to encourage migrant workers to maintain their linkages with their rural homes. Most importantly, migrants had no access to housing, social services and food without formal employment and were denied the right to buy land – a situation that provided them with powerful incentives to retain a foot in the rural camp. Nevertheless, there were considerable forces working against the attempt to fully prevent the 'detribalisation' of the urban workforce.[261] From the late 1940s, the companies placed increasing emphasis on mechanisation, which meant that the mines began to develop an interest in stabilising at least some African mineworkers so that they could acquire and retain certain skills. Moreover, many families preferred to take their chance in the towns rather than to starve in the poverty-stricken rural areas. In 1953, tribal representatives were abolished throughout the entire Copperbelt, at the insistence of more than 80% of the total African

[260] Posner 2005: 43pp.
[261] Roberts 1976: 188pp.

labour force. African migrants on the Copperbelt could therefore best be described as 'men of two worlds'[262]: They were still tribesmen, with homes in distant villages, but they were also workers and townsmen. In the end, the multi-tribal Copperbelt became the cradle of the modern political history of Northern Rhodesia and gave rise to a broad-based nationalist movement.

Political resistance – fuelled by racial discrimination and the authoritarianism of colonial rule – began with voluntary welfare societies organised by the tiny minority of Africans with a Western primary school education.[263] These societies became widespread in towns along the 'line of rail' from the early 1930s and clearly represented a 'detribalised force'.[264] After a lull in political activity from the mid-1930, welfare societies resurfaced from the early 1940s and amalgamated into the Northern Rhodesian Federation of Welfare Societies in 1946, which became the Northern Rhodesian African National Congress (NRANC) two years later – the colony's first political party. The African National Congress (ANC) – as the NRANC soon became – was initially led by Harry Nkumbula and worked hard to unite the whole territory in a sense of common purpose, namely fierce opposition to the planned Central African Federation (CAF) between Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Even though the failure to prevent the imposition of the Federation in 1953 had initially a demoralising effect, the existence of the Federation – that triggered massive immigration by white settlers and was clearly dominated by Southern Rhodesian interests – ultimately stimulated the growth of African nationalism.

By the mid-1950s, the ANC had recovered its pre-Federation strength and could boast of more than 400 branches throughout the country.[265] At the same time, there was growing dissent within the ANC leadership, opposing a conservative faction by Harry Nkumbula to a radical faction led by Kenneth Kaunda. In 1958, Kaunda and his radical followers broke away to form the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC) and won widespread allegiance from party branches in the northern and eastern parts of the country within a matter of weeks. Following its boycott of the territorial elections in

---

[262] Ibid.: 201p.
[263] Ibid.: 196pp. The beginnings of political opposition in Northern Rhodesia were greatly influenced by educated Africans from Nyasaland. David Kaunda – a Nyasalander and father of Kenneth Kaunda – founded the Mwenzo Welfare Association as the country's first welfare association in 1912.
[264] Hall 1976: 59pp. To give an example, nine of the fourteen officials of the Livingstone Welfare Association came from Northern Province.
[265] Ibid.: 123pp.

early 1959, ZANC was banned[266] but soon re-emerged as the United National Independence Party (UNIP). In the aftermath, UNIP led a widespread civil disobedience campaign – the Cha-cha-cha movement – that brought the country to a standstill and forced the British government to revise the constitution and clear the way to majority rule. In 1962, UNIP and the ANC together won a majority of Legislative Council seats against the settler-dominated United Federal Party (UFP) and entered into an uneasy coalition. This provided the death blow to the Federation, which fell apart in 1963. In the same year, UNIP alone won a decisive majority in the colony's first universal adult suffrage election, including one third of the European vote and almost the entire Asian vote, and formed a government that led the country to independence in October 1964.

UNIP disposed of a powerful, mass-party organisation, especially on the Copperbelt, and functioned as an important agent of integration among Africans.[267] Even though Bemba-speakers dominated, non-Bemba speakers from *all* parts of the country played important roles in the leadership of UNIP. Nevertheless, UNIP's support was far from complete. To begin with, the relationship with the powerful trade union movement remained ambiguous. Building on a tradition of militant strike action during 1930s and 1940s, the trade unions – led by the African Mineworkers Union (AMWU) – organised successful industrial activity during the 1950s and became the second centre of African political organisation. Significantly, however, the authority of UNIP stopped at the union doors. Even though the party enjoyed close personal links with the union through its Copperbelt leadership, there was no formal association with AMWU repeatedly resisting its subordination under the party.[268] As a consequence, UNIP found it hard to obtain any direct control over mineworkers who tended to look to AMWU for the solution of their problems.

Moreover, the impact of the nationalist movement was uneven across the country. While the liberation struggle was deeply rooted in Copperbelt, Northern and Luapula

---

[266] More than 50 of ZANC' key leaders – including Kaunda – were arrested and jailed. The policy of the government was to detain the African leaders at places as remote as possible from their tribal homes, so that they should not influence local people. Accordingly, Sikota Wina from Western Province was detained in Bembaland, while Simon Kapwepwe from Northern Province was detained in Barotseland. Sikota Wina recalls that this policy ironically cemented the process of elite integration (Interview, Sikota Wina).

[267] Gertzel & Szeftel 1984: 124p.

[268] In 1953, for example, AMWU ignored the ANC's call for work stoppage on the Copperbelt, which was meant to mobilise protest against the Federation. This caused a long-standing sense of betrayal among ANC/ UNIP party activists.

Provinces, other parts of the country – especially Western and North-Western Provinces – remained largely untouched. In Southern and parts of Central Province, the ANC retained mass support among the Bantu-Botatwe (a synonym for the Tonga, Ila and Lenje tribal groups), which owed much to a deliberate 'southernisation' of the party structures and a tribalisation of its support base from the early 1960s.[269] There was however also a political economy dimension to the ANC survival in that it represented the interests of 'rich peasants' in Central and Southern Provinces who felt discriminated against by the colonial state's credit and marketing systems.[270] Macola shows that UNIP handled the persistence of organised opposition in an extremely intolerant manner harassing ANC leaders and denying them the right of full political citizenship.[271] In turn, the ANC relied on anti-Bemba propaganda and successfully used violence against local UNIP members to prevent UNIP from making substantial inroads into the Bantu-Botatwe areas. Just before independence, Harry Nkumbula – the ANC leader – rebuffed UNIP's offer to form a national front based on the merger of the two parties.

UNIP suffered from a similarly fragile position in Western Province where the Barotse Agreement with the British had granted the Lozi Kingdom the status of a 'protectorate within the protectorate' and thereby enabled the traditional government to maintain a high degree of autonomy throughout the colonial period.[272] The growth of African nationalism was perceived as a fundamental challenge by the traditional leadership who made repeated, albeit ultimately unsuccessful secessionist bids from the late 1950s in order to preserve its independence and privilege.[273] Young educated Lozi, by contrast, played a key role in the growth of urban nationalism on the Copperbelt[274] – a situation that gave rise to a bitter struggle between Lozi 'traditionalists' (who dominated the Lozi government) and Lozi 'nationalists' (who were prominently represented in the UNIP leadership).[275] Even though the 'traditionalists' could not prevent the penetration of the province by the 'nationalists' (UNIP won massive Lozi support in the 1962 and 1963

---

[269] Macola 2008: 29pp.
[270] Ibid.; Momba 1989.
[271] Macola 2008: 21p. Macola argues that Kaunda saw party and nation as being coterminous and therefore identified opposition as illegitimate and 'treasonable'. Even though it seems exaggerated to accuse Kaunda of an 'exclusionary nation-building paradigm', UNIP's hegemonic project left little room for alternative views.
[272] Gertzel 1984b: 206pp.
[273] On the unsuccessful secessionist bids see Sichone & Simutanyi 1996: 178pp.; Hall 1976: 184pp.
[274] The striking prominence of young educated Lozi within the nationalist movement was due to the fact that Barotse-speakers had gained a head start in education over other Africans. Significantly, the Barotse National School was created in 1906 and remained the only government school in the territory until 1930.
[275] For details on the intra-Lozi conflict see Caplan 1968.

elections), they managed to win concessions in the form of the May 1964 Barotseland Agreement, which made Barotseland an integral part of Zambia but guaranteed the Lozi Kingdom a special status and preserved its traditional rights.[276]

Altogether, the broad-based nationalist movement faced more opposition than it is generally acknowledged. The accommodation of leaders in Western, North-Western, Central and Southern Provinces remained incomplete and there were even pockets of resistance in the UNIP strongholds in the northern parts of the country. This became all too evident in July 1964 – four months before independence – when Northern Province witnessed the extremely violent conflict between UNIP cadres and the followers of the Lumpa Church in July 1964.[277] At least 1000 people died as a consequence of army action and Lumpa retaliatory attacks.

SOCIAL CLEAVAGES

The previous section has shown that colonial rule in what used to be Northern Rhodesia produced high levels of social fragmentation. But which are the dominant social cleavages around which political competition is structured in post-colonial Zambia?

The main source of social cleavage in post-colonial Zambia has arguably been *language*. As discussed above, colonial rule favoured the progressive emergence of four main language groups, including Bemba-, Nyanja-, Tonga- and Barotse-speakers. While no single common language emerged in the North-West, Lunda-, Luvale- and Kaonde-speakers are commonly considered – i.e. in the 1980 and 2000 censuses – to form a North-Western language group. Zambia's five main language clusters are not ethnic in nature since membership is determined by the predominant language that an individual uses for his/her daily communication rather than by descent.[278] In terms of population share, the group size has slightly varied over time (see table 8). In 2000, Bemba-speakers accounted for 41.7% of the population, followed by the Nyanja (23.8%), Tonga (13.9%), North-Western (7.7%) and Barotse (6.9%) groups.

---

[276] The concessions made by UNIP were however limited as the Barotseland Agreement was not made part of the Independence Constitution. Sichone & Simutanyi (1996: 178pp.) argue that this was due to the fact that the central government held all economic cards and was therefore in a strong bargaining position.
[277] For details on this neglected episode of Zambian history see Gordon 2008.
[278] Various interviews; CSO 2003: Instructions manual, Appendix 7.

Table 8: Language groups in Zambia and their population share, 1969-2000 (in percent)[279]

Language group	1969	1980	1990	2000
Bemba	38,8	42,9	43,1	41,7
Nyanja	21,7	22,3	23,8	23,8
Tonga	15,2	13,3	14,8	13,9
North-Western	10,6	7,7	8,8	7,7
Barotse	9,2	8,0	7,5	6,9
Other	4,5	6,0	1,9	6,0
Total	100,0	100,2	99,9	100,0

As I will show in chapters 6 and 7, language group cleavages have remained the main axis of political competition in Zambia since independence in 1964. This became first apparent during the 1967 crisis when elections for UNIP's Central Committee (CC) opposed a coalition of Bemba- and Tonga-speakers to an alliance between Nyanja- and Barotse speakers.[280] Afterwards, the competition for resources and influence continued to be structured along linguistic divides. This becomes evident when looking at the main opposition parties during the First Republic (1964-1972). While the ANC retained its stronghold among Tonga-speakers, the rise of the United Party (UP) and the United Progressive Party (UPP) during the late 1960s reflected grievances of the Barotse- and Bemba-speaking groups. Language group cleavages remained salient after the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) took over in 1991. Again, the main opposition parties have had their strongholds among distinct language groups, including the Lozi-based National Party (NP), the Tonga-based United Party for National Development (UPND), and the Bemba-based Patriotic Front (PF).

A second important source of social cleavage in Zambia has been *tribe*. The country is commonly said to be home to 73 tribes – an almost mythical figure that is omnipresent in popular usage and was mentioned in every single of my interviews. According to Posner, this enduringly influential classification goes back to J. Moffat Thomson's 1934 *Memorandum on the Native Tribes and Tribal Areas of Northern Rhodesia*.[281] Even publications by the Zambian Central Statistical Office (CEO) make reference to the country's 73 tribes, yet their own listings typically include a smaller number of tribes. The 1969 census, for example, counts only 60 indigenous tribal groupings, while the

[279] CSO 1985: 3, CSO 2003: 46. Note that the 2000 Census distinguishes two further language groups, namely Mambwe- and Tumbuka-speakers. According to interview evidence, these two smaller language groups are however usually subsumed under the Bemba (Mambwe) and Nyanja (Tumbuka) clusters.
[280] Rotberg 1967.
[281] Cited after Posner 2005: 54p.

one in 2000 lists a total of 61 tribes.[282] These tribal groups are ethnic in nature since membership is commonly determined by the tribal affiliation of an individual's parents. In terms of population share, one can identify 18 tribal groups who have over time accounted for more than 1% of the country's total population (see table 9). In 2000, the ten largest included the Bemba (18.1%), Tonga (12.7%), Chewa (7.2%), Lozi (5.6%), Nsenga (5.5%), Tumbuka (4.2%), Ngoni (4%), Lala (3.3%), Kaonde (3%), Namwanga (2.7%), and Lunda (2.5%). Note that these smaller tribal groupings taken together make up the larger language groups (see map 2). The Bemba language group, for example, is mostly[283] composed of Bemba tribesmen and members of the other Bemba-speaking tribes (Lala, Namwanga, Mambwe, Ushi, Lamba, Bisa, Lunda, etc.).

How salient are tribal divisions when compared with the broader linguistic divides? Baylies & Szeftel have argued that the Second Republic (1972-1991) witnessed an increased focus on local issues, which meant that tribal divisions became more important, while the salience of the language groups declined.[284] Similarly, Posner found that the one-party state of the Second Republic tended to emphasise tribal boundaries, whereas language group cleavages dominated political competition under the multi-party regimes of the First and Third Republics.[285] This is however only partially convincing as tribe has continued to play an important role throughout the Third Republic (1991-today). According to interview evidence, President Levy Mwanawasa's practise of appointing members of his 'family tree' – that is, members of the small Lamba and Lenje tribes – has heightened tribal divisions since 2001. Moreover, and related to the problem of the 'family tree', the mounting strength of both UPND and PF reflects perceptions of marginalisation among the Tonga and Bemba *tribes* who feel that they have been neglected vis-à-vis some of the smaller Tonga- and Bemba-speaking groupings. While language group cleavages arguably remain the main axis of political competition, tribal divisions within these larger groupings are also enduringly relevant, especially as far as the country's largest tribes are concerned.

---

[282] CSO 1973: 28, CSO 2003: Instructions manual, Appendix 7.
[283] As mentioned before, and in contrast to claims by Posner (2005), Zambia's language clusters are not ethnic groups in that membership is determined by the predominant language that an individual uses for his daily communication rather than by descent. This means that one can be classified a Bemba-speaker without being a member of one of the Bemba-speaking tribes. Nevertheless, those belonging to one of the Bemba-speaking tribes represent the overwhelming majority of the Bemba language group.
[284] Baylies & Szeftel 1984.
[285] Posner 2005.

Table 9: Tribal groups in Zambia and their population share, 1969-2000 (in percent)[286]

Tribal group	1969	2000
Bemba	18,3	18,1
Tonga	10,5	12,7
Ngoni	6,3	4,0
Lozi	5,5	5,6
Nsenga	5,1	5,5
Chewa	4,8	7,2
Tumbuka	3,8	4,2
Lala	3,1	3,2
Kaonde	2,9	3,0
Luvale	2,4	2,1
Lunda (North-West)	2,3	2,5
Ushi	2,2	2,4
Lamba	2,2	2,2
Bisa	2,0	1,8
Lenje	1,9	1,7
Namwanga	1,6	2,7
Mambwe	1,6	2,3
Mbunda	1,5	1,4
Other	21,9	17,3
Total	100,0	99,9

A third, albeit less salient source of social cleavage has been *class*. Many of the most astute country specialists have argued that class is more or less peripheral to Zambian politics. During the 1970s, Molteno observed that

> 'in Zambia, neither leaders nor followers have perceived class membership as a variable relevant to political behaviour'.[287]

More recently, Posner argued that 'class identities are not sufficiently deeply felt for them to play a role'.[288] While acknowledging 'objectively identifiable' class differences in urban Zambia, he claims that these have not been paralleled by the emergence of class consciousness and therefore continue to be outweighed by tribal and linguistic cleavages. Even though it is plausible to assume that tribe and especially language are still more important determinants of Zambian politics, class as a potential source of political action should not too easily be dismissed. As early as in 1935, the first strike by mineworkers on the Copperbelt displayed an undeniable consciousness of common interest and the capability to organise concerted resistance within the urban environment.[289] After independence, political competition mainly played out along linguistic and tribal lines but class issues always simmered below the surface. The rise

[286] CSO 1973: 28; CSO 2003: 51.
[287] Molteno 1974: 80.
[288] Posner 2005: 86p.
[289] Roberts 1976: 201p.

of the UPP during the early 1970s, for example, reflected not only grievances among Bemba-speakers but also considerable support among workers on the Copperbelt who were frustrated by the lack of social progress since independence.[290] During the economic crisis of the 1980s, the leading role of the trade unions and recurrent urban riots on the Copperbelt suggest a considerable degree of class consciousness –a phenomenon that can hardly be dismissed as peripheral given the central role of the Copperbelt in Zambian politics. In recent years, the importance of class issues seems to have increased rather than decreased. Most importantly, the rise of Michael Sata's PF since 2001 does not only reflect Bemba grievances but also articulates class-based urban discontent – a strategy that has won the opposition party many votes and seats not only on the Copperbelt but also in Lusaka.[291] On the whole, class does matter in Zambian politics, albeit often interrelated with tribal and linguistic divisions.

How about other potential social cleavages such as province or religion? Province is indeed an interesting contender. As mentioned above, Zambia has a total of nine provinces, including Copperbelt, Luapula, Northern, Eastern, Central, Lusaka, Southern, North-Western and Western Provinces (see map 2).[292] Identities based on these provincial divisions seem on several occasions to have driven political action in post-colonial Zambia. During the First Republic, for example, leaders from Luapula Province organised under the banner of 'We Luapulans' complaining that they had been neglected when compared with leaders from Northern Province.[293] During the Second Republic, UNIP tried to minimise inter-group conflict by trying to ensure equal provincial representation on its Central Committee (CC).[294] And even during the Third Republic, complaints about favouritism are occasionally framed in provincial terms.[295] Yet, there is reason to argue that provincial identities ultimately reflected linguistic and tribal divisions. The conflict between leaders from Luapula and Northern Provinces, for instance, largely mirrored divisions between Bemba-speaking tribal groupings in Luapula Province (Ushi, Lunda, Ng'umbo) and the Bemba tribe in Northern Province. Similarly, UNIP's attempt to balance provincial representation was first and foremost a way to balance appointments between the country's major language groups. Moreover,

---

[290] Gertzel & Szeftel 1984: 125pp.
[291] Larmer & Fraser 2007; Gould 2007.
[292] Lusaka Province was carved out of Central Province in 1978.
[293] Baylies 1984.
[294] Tordoff 1980a: 17p.
[295] 'Rupiah is the worst chief tribalist – Sata', *The Post*, 13 October 2009.

people in the urban Copperbelt and Lusaka Provinces organise based on either linguistic, tribal or class cleavages rather than on a cohesive provincial identity.

Religion, finally, has never been a relevant source of social cleavage in Zambia. In 2000, about 87% of the population were Christian (65% Protestants and 22% Catholics), 1% were Muslim or Hindu, 5% adhered to other faiths, and 5% were atheist.[296] Even though this religious profile is not dissimilar to that of Uganda, religion has never been a significant factor in Zambian politics. This is not to deny that the Christian churches have at times played an influential role in politics.[297] But unlike in Uganda, divisions between Protestants and Catholics or between Christians and Muslims have never structured the country's political or economic playing field.

3.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown that colonial rule in what is now Uganda and Zambia produced high levels of social fragmentation. In Uganda, the main sources of social cleavage are tribe, region and – albeit to a declining extent – religion. In Zambia, the most salient social dividing lines include language, tribe and – albeit to a lesser extent – class. While the legacy of high social fragmentation represented an important challenge for post-colonial governments in both countries, social divisions in Uganda were clearly more pronounced than in Zambia. This became most evident in the absence of a united nationalist movement and the dominance of tribally- and religiously-based political parties. Zambia's nationalist movement was also characterised by serious divisions but nonetheless more broad-based in character. This was not least due to the urbanised Copperbelt that played an important integrating role.

In the following chapters, I will show that Uganda's post-colonial leaders have been less successful in overcoming social divisions than their counterparts in Zambia. Uganda's leaders have repeatedly failed to effectively accommodate tribal, regional and religious cleavages – a failure that has become a key driver behind recurrent civil war since 1962 (chapters 4 and 5). In Zambia, by contrast, post-independence leaders have managed to effectively contain linguistic, tribal and class divisions, which explains the country's enduring peace and stability since 1964 (chapters 6 and 7).

---

[296] CSO 2003.
[297] Hinfelaar 2008.

4 From Obote to Amin and back – exclusionary elite bargains and recurrent civil war in post-independence Uganda

As shown in chapter 3, colonial rule left Uganda with extremely high levels of social fragmentation, evident in the absence of a united nationalist movement and the dominance of tribally- and religiously-based political parties. As a consequence, the country's post-independence leaders faced the difficult challenge of forging an inclusive elite bargain from a narrow and sectarian power base. In this chapter, I will argue that the Obote I, Amin, Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) and Obote II administrations have all, albeit to different degrees, failed to meet this difficult challenge – a failure that can be directly related to the various insurgencies that have ravaged the country between 1962 and 1986.

To develop my argument, I will first provide information on the eight different civil wars that took place in Uganda between 1962 and 1986 (section 4.1). In a second and third step, I will show that the Obote I, Amin, UNLF and Obote II elite bargains were mostly exclusionary in nature (section 4.2) and then go on to argue that the observed lack of power-sharing between competing groups can be causally related to the recurrent outbreak of civil war (section 4.3). The chapter ends with brief thoughts on competing explanations (section 4.4).

4.1 Conflict levels between 1962 and 1986

Uganda between 1962 and 1986, unfortunately for the Ugandan people, offers almost unequalled opportunities for the study of political violence, including two successful military coups, more than a dozen coup attempts, state-directed killings, and eight cases of civil war (one even with international involvement).[298]

The first Obote regime (1962-1971) was relatively peaceful by Ugandan standards. As part of the UPC-KY alliance, Obote became Prime Minister, while the Buganda King,

[298] As mentioned in chapter 2, information on the number of war-related deaths and 'effective resistance' is generally scarce and contested. While some doubts remain, my review of the secondary literature and newspaper articles in the Lexis Nexis News database suggests that all eight insurgencies match my definition of civil war.

Mutesa II, was made President. The first signs of instability were the Rwenzururu movement[299] and the army mutiny of January 1964, which was however put down without bloodshed. Only two years later, Uganda experienced its first civil war, which opposed government troops to the Buganda Kingdom and became known as the 'Battle of Mengo'.[300] After the violent subordination of the Mengo, Obote became President and introduced a unitary Constitution (1967). The country seemed to return to relative stability, albeit interrupted by the violence surrounding the imposition of a one-party state in December 1969.[301] In January 1971, Idi Amin ousted President Obote in the country's first successful military coup.

The reign of Idi Amin was extremely violent by every standard, with anywhere from 12.000 to 300.000 deaths between 1971 and 1979.[302] Beyond repeated waves of state-directed killings and at least a dozen known military coup attempts,[303] the Amin administration witnessed two incidents of civil war. The first was the failed insurgency of September 1972 when an exile group of 1300 people – mainly belonging to Obote's forces but supported by Yoweri Museveni's Front of Salvation (FRONASA) – crossed into Uganda in order to topple Amin.[304] The second civil war was the anti-Amin rebellion in 1978-79 that ultimately led to the downfall of the regime.[305] The conflict involved a total of 28 groups from both within and outside Uganda, which were organised under the umbrella of the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). This successful insurgency had however a very strong international component in that it was Nyerere's Tanzania that – provoked by Amin's invasion of the Kagera Salient on 30 October 1978 – led the Ugandan groups to military victory.

The Amin regime was followed by the intermezzo of the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) that witnessed the coming and going of three different Presidents

---

[299] In the early 1900s, the Rwenzururu Kingdom of the Bakonzo people had been arbitrarily subjected to the Toro Kingdom. After demands for their own district had been refused by the colonial government, the Bakonzo launched a low-intensity guerrilla struggle against the British, which they continued throughout all the independent governments following decolonisation. It is only in 1982 that the Rwenzururu leadership finally signed an armistice with the Obote II government (see Kasfir 1976: 130pp.; Prunier 2004: 367p.).

[300] Government estimates put the number of deaths at 40, whereas the Baganda cited a figure between 400-4000 (Kasozi 1994: 86). Eyewitness evidence from palace occupants to the Human Rights Commission (GOU 1994a) tends to support the larger figure.

[301] ACR 1969/1970: B212.

[302] Estimates range from 12.000-30.000 (Jorgenson 1981: 315), 80.000-90.000 (ACR 1977/1978: B444), 150.000 or more (Kyemba 1977: 115) to 50.000-300.000 (Kasozi 1994: 104).

[303] ARC 1974/1975: B310; ACR 1976/1977: B378; ACR 1978/1979: B425.

[304] The rebellion claimed the lives of about 500 people (ACR 1972/1973: B276; Museveni 1997: 70).

[305] Avirgan & Honey 1982.

between April 1979 and December 1980. The UNLF came to an end with the controversial elections of December 1980 that brought back to power Milton Obote. The latter ruled until July 1985 when he was toppled in a military coup led by Bazillo and Tito Okello. The period between 1979 and 1986 was again characterized by extreme levels of political violence. Most of the latter occurred in the context of five different civil wars. Two civil wars occurred in West Nile, including insurgencies by the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) and the Former Uganda National Army (FUNA). The remaining three civil wars took place in Buganda, the epicentre of violent conflict under Obote II. The two smaller insurgencies involved the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) on the one hand, and the Federal Democratic Movement of Uganda (FEDEMO) on the other. The by far most sustained and ultimately successful insurgency in Buganda was however Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA), which launched a guerrilla war in the Luwero Triangle on 6 February 1981 and captured power on 26 January 1986.The total extent of death and destruction caused by the five anti-UNLF/ Obote II civil wars is difficult to estimate. Most sources indicate that a few hundred thousand people died – the bulk of them during the NRA war.[306]

How can one explain the outbreak of civil war in Uganda between 1962 and 1986? In what follows, I will show that that the Obote I, Amin, UNLF and Obote II governments all failed to accommodate the colonial legacy of high social fragmentation by forging an inclusive elite bargain – a failure that can be directly related to recurrent civil war.

4.2 The post-independence elite bargains (1962-1986)

4.2.1 The Obote I elite bargain (1962-1971): The incomplete quest for national integration

At independence, Obote seemed to have a clear 'plan for nationhood', promising 'to use government machinery and funds without favour to either tribe or race, religion or sex'.[307] In line with such promises, the Obote I administration did indeed witness sustained – albeit incomplete – attempts for political and economic power-sharing between the country's ethno-regional groups. Yet, the quest for national integration remained incomplete due to the absence of military and territorial power-sharing.

---

[306] Estimates range from 300.000 (Mutibwa 1992: 159) to 500.000 (Kasozi 1994: 145pp.).
[307] Obote 1962.

The distribution of government positions under Obote I was on average carefully balanced between Uganda's ethno-regional groups. In absolute terms, all four groups received a remarkably similar share of government appointments between 1962 and 1970 (see figure 7a). This was true not only for ministers and deputies but also for the more consequential positions in the 'inner core' of political power. In terms of population share, the Baganda and Northerners were slightly overrepresented, while Easterners and Westerners were moderately underrepresented (see figure 7b).

Figure 7: Ethno-regional composition of government in Uganda, 1962-1970[308]



[308] Own data compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; GOU Various Years.

This balanced picture based on average values is however somewhat deceiving. As shown in figure 7c, the Baganda were initially seriously overrepresented, whereas Northerners, Easterners and Westerners remained underrepresented. This situation reflected not only the dominant position of the Buganda Kingdom at independence but also the constraints of the UPC-KY alliance, which obliged Obote to appoint a large number of KY ministers. Accordingly, in 1962, the Baganda – at the time representing 16.3% of the population – controlled 33.3% of all ministers (5 out of 15 portfolios), 46.2% of deputy ministers and 28.6% of the 'inner core', including the powerful ministries of Finance and Economic Affairs. The early dominance of the Baganda was reinforced by the elevation to the presidency and Head of State of Kabaka Mutesa II on 4 October 1963. This reflected an unwritten pact between Obote and the Kabaka that – as part of the reward for supporting Obote to become Prime Minister at independence – Mutesa II would become President.[309]

Table 10: Tribal composition of government in Uganda, Index of Representation, 1962-1970 (in percent)[310]

Tribe	Population (1959)	1962	1964	1966	1968	1970
Baganda	16,3	36,0	27,8	17,1	17,2	18,3
Iteso	8,1	7,0	7,8	10,1	6,1	10,0
Banyankole	8,1	12,1	13,3	11,9	10,4	10,0
Basoga	7,8	9,5	10,6	8,2	1,9	1,7
Bakiga	7,1	2,2	2,2	6,4	1,9	1,7
Banyarwanda	5,9	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Langi	5,6	9,2	10,0	8,6	11,1	10,0
Bagisu	5,1	2,6	2,8	1,9	1,9	1,7
Acholi	4,4	2,6	2,2	4,1	4,9	3,3
Lugbara	3,7	0,0	0,0	3,7	3,0	3,3
Batoro	3,2	2,2	2,2	2,2	11,6	11,7
Banyoro	2,9	2,6	2,8	4,1	5,6	5,0
Karamajong	2,0	0,0	2,8	1,9	1,9	1,7
Alur	1,9	0,0	0,0	0,0	3,0	3,3
Bagwere	1,7	2,2	2,2	4,1	0,0	0,0
Bakonzo	1,7	0,0	2,8	1,9	3,0	3,3
Japadhola	1,6	0,0	0,0	1,9	5,6	5,0
Banyole	1,4	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Madi	1,2	2,2	7,8	6,0	5,6	5,0
Others	10,3	9,5	2,8	6,0	5,6	5,0
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

The initial prominence of the Baganda heightened long-standing fears of Buganda dominance in other parts of the country. Trying to correct the imbalances, Obote – himself a Langi from the North – soon managed to lure more and more MPs of the

[309] Mudoola 1993: 94; Mutibwa 2008: 65pp.
[310] Own data compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; GOU Various Years.

Democratic Party (DP) into crossing the floor to the UPC.[311] Similarly, some MPs from the 'progressive' KY faction decided to look beyond their tribal identities and changed sides to the ruling party.[312] As a result, the alliance with KY soon became dispensable for the UPC and was formally ended in August 1964. Significantly, Obote used the end of the alliance to quickly reduce the prominence of the Baganda in government (see figure 7c). Although the Baganda still received a proportional share of government appointments, the significant *decline in influence* was a clear threat to Baganda monarchists who were not willing to settle for less than a dominant place in the nation's politics. Even more importantly, the Baganda ministers in Obote's post-coalition government were precisely those that had previously crossed the floor to UPC. As these ministers were little more than traitors in the eyes of the Baganda monarchists,[313] the Buganda Kingdom at Mengo – the key player in Ugandan politics for the past decades – found itself *fully excluded from political power* by the mid-1960s. To make matters worse, the position of the Mengo was further damaged by the 'lost counties' referendum held in November 1964. Despite the fierce resistance of the Kabaka, there was overwhelming support for the return of two of the three counties to Bunyoro. While the transfer struck a severe symbolic blow to the pride of the Baganda, it also 'reduced the number of patronage posts available for distribution by the Mengo hierarchy'.[314] In political economy terms, the issue was also over who would 'control the economic surplus in Buganda'.[315]

As the Baganda share in Obote's government declined, that of the other ethno-regional groups increased (see figure 7c). If one disaggregates this broader picture to the level of tribal groups, we see that of all twenty tribes with more than 1% of the population, only the Banyarwanda[316] and Banyole did not have representation in government between 1962 and 1970 (see table 10). Among Westerners, the Banyankole, Batoro, Banyoro and Bakonzo were all well represented, with only the Bakiga lagging somewhat behind. Among Easterners, all groups (Iteso, Basoga, Bagwere, Japadhola) except the Bagisu

---

[311] Jorgensen 1981: 220. Among those who crossed the floor was the DP Secretary General Basil Bataringaya.
[312] Mutibwa 2008: 76p. These included, among others, Joshua Luyimbazi-Zake and William W. Kalema.
[313] Ibid.; various interviews.
[314] Jorgenson 1981: 220.
[315] Mamdani 1976: 243.
[316] The Banyarwanda at the time comprised three groups, including nationals, migrants and refugees (Mamdani 2001: 161pp.). Their non-representation in the public sector was due to two reasons. While nationals did not constitute an active political force, non-nationals were subjected to open discrimination by the Obote I government.

received proportional representation. Among Northerners, often reputed to have acquired a disproportionate share under Obote, only the Langi and Madi were overrepresented (albeit not dramatically), while the Acholi, Lugbara, Karamajong and Alur had more or less proportional representation.

Figure 8: Ethno-regional distribution of permanent secretaries in Uganda, 1970[317]



A look at the distribution of civil service appointments reveals a similar picture. Between 1959 and 1967, no tribe with more than 1% of the population was totally unrepresented in the civil service.[318] As in the case of government appointments, none of the Northern groups were ever significantly over-represented (except the Acholi in 1965), while the Baganda were over-represented by a factor fluctuating between two and three times their population share. In terms of permanent secretary appointments, the Baganda were also overrepresented, while the other groups – especially Easterners and Westerners – were underrepresented (see figure 8).

The quest for national integration was also mirrored in the ruling party. In the early years of independence, UPC suffered from a weak organisational base, with Obote – in sharp contrast to Kaunda in Zambia – lacking the necessary means to exercise sufficient control over the party. From its creation in 1960, the UPC had been little more than a loose confederation of 'locally powerful political notables' that had no centralised

[317] Compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; 'The beast of tribalism', *The Independent*, 25 January – 7 February 2008.
[318] Kasfir 1976: 182p.

hierarchy and only limited support at the grassroots.[319] This loose coalition was even further strained when DP and KY MPs joined the ruling party in mid-1964 (see above). As a consequence, factional conflicts within UPC started to escalate from 1964-65, with a 'centre faction' (led by Obote) opposing a 'conservation faction' (led by the UPC Secretary General Grace Ibingira). This split

> 'soon polarised over ideology and ethnicity, for Obote's faction assumed the mantle of a nationalistic and socialist movement championing the interests of the so-called 'disadvantaged' of the north and east, while Ibingira's faction became identified with the conservative wing of the party which also served as an advocate for the position and interests of the Bantu'.[320]

After the 1966 crisis, the Obote faction had clear control of the party. This can be seen when looking at the composition of the UPC Party Cabinet (the highest party organ), which included three Northerners (1 Langi, 1 Acholi, 1 Madi), two Easterners (1 Musoga, 1 Mugisu), one Westerner (1 Mutoro) and one Muganda during the second half of the 1960s.[321] Nevertheless, the UPC's structure was overhauled in 1968 in order to eliminate tribalism and strengthen its organisational base.[322] The new party structure preserved a dual hierarchy of conference and executive at three levels (the parish, parliamentary constituency, and national), while deliberately weakening the district party organisation that had in the past facilitated tribal strife. Also, Obote introduced an innovative electoral scheme whereby parliamentary candidates had to fight elections not only in a 'basic' constituency in their home region but also in 'national' constituencies in each of the other three regions.[323] The rationale was to force candidates to look beyond tribal boundaries and focus on national rather than local issues.

Finally, the Obote I administration also made efforts to accommodate religious divisions. The main challenge was to appease the Catholics who were in the majority (34.5% against 28.2% Protestants in 1959) and perceived themselves as victims of the Protestant establishment (see chapter 3). Obote – himself Protestant – succeeded in co-opting such Catholic notables as Felix Onama, Cuthbert Obwangor and Mathias Ngobi who 'appear to have been the unofficial interpreters' between the government and the Catholic Church'.[324] While the government remained dominated by Protestants, Catholics received a proportional share of government appointments between 1962 and 1970, especially in the 'inner core' of political power (see figures 9a and 9b). Similarly,

---

[319] Jorgenson 1981: 221pp.
[320] Mutibwa 1992: 33.
[321] Own data compiled based on UPC 2008.
[322] Kasfir 1976: 205pp.
[323] For details see Willets 1975: 286pp.
[324] Mudoola 1993: 35.

the Muslims were well-integrated into Obote's elite bargain. Led by Prince Badru Kakungulu (the Kabaka's uncle), they rallied behind the UPC-KY alliance and were – in relation to their small numbers (5.6% in 1959) and political marginality upon independence – adequately represented in government. The position of Muslims within the ruling coalition was enhanced in July 1965 when Ali Kisekka, Abu Mayanya and Issa Ssebunya – three prominent Muslims – joined UPC.

Figure 9: Religious composition of government in Uganda, 1962-1970[325]



From the mid-1960s, attempts to overcome religious divisions were however undermined by mounting tribal conflict, which may be taken as evidence that tribal cleavages outweighed religious divisions. On the one hand, the election of the first Anglican Archbishop in 1966 divided the Church of Uganda into two competing factions opposing the non-Muganda Bishop Eric Sabiiti to the Muganda Bishop of Namirembe, Dunstan Nsubuga.[326] After Sabiiti emerged winner, the new 'UPC archbishop' went on to legitimise Obote's action against the Buganda Kingdom in 1966 – a step that led to the alienation of the Namirembe faction and earned Obote enduring hostility in parts of the Anglican Church until the coup in 1971. On the other hand, the establishment of the National Association for the Advancement of Moslems (NAAM) in August 1965 divided the Muslim community.[327] Officially created to promote unity among Muslims, the real intention was to rival Prince Badru Kakungulu's Uganda

[325] Own data compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; GOU Various Years.
[326] Mudoola 1993: 43pp.
[327] Mudoola 1993: 51pp.; Mutibwa 2008: 124.

Moslem Community (UMC), especially in Buganda. As a consequence Muslim support was now divided along tribal lines. While the NAAM faction was deeply integrated into Obote's elite bargain, the UMC and its detained leader was severely alienated.

ECONOMIC POWER-SHARING

Attempts for economic power-sharing were initially hampered by the fact that Uganda had little control over its own economy, which limited the scope for patronage distribution outside party and government. As a consequence, the Obote I administration used the late 1960s to increase its stake in the economy. Key in this respect was the 'Commanding Heights Strategy' whereby the parastatal sector was greatly expanded and 'Africanised'.[328] This involved not only the creation of new parastatals and the reorganisation of existing ones but also comprehensive nationalisation measures in May 1970 when the government announced the 60% nationalisation of 80 major firms. Significantly, the dramatic expansion of the parastatal sector provided Obote with an enlarged material basis for his elite bargain, i.e. a substantially increased reservoir for patronage distribution.

Interestingly, the bulk of this growing 'economic cake' seems to have gone to the Baganda. Figures 10a and 10b detail the distribution of key appointments in 27 parastatal companies as of 1970, including data on key parastatals such as the Uganda Development Corporation, the Coffee Marketing Board, the Lint Marketing Board, the National Trading Corporation, the National Insurance Corporation and the Bank of Uganda. In absolute terms, the Baganda received about 40% of all appointments against 20% each for the other three ethno-regional groups.[329] In terms of population share, the Baganda were seriously overrepresented, while Easterners, Northerners and Westerners were underrepresented. A similar picture emerges from my own data on the Coffee Marketing Board – arguably the key parastatal along with the Uganda Development Corporation. Here, the 1969 Board of Directors included three Baganda, three Westerners (1 Munyankole, 1 Munyoro, 1 Mukonzo), two Easterners (1 Musoga, 1 Mugisu) and one Northerner (1 Lugbara).[330] All this taken together refutes claims by

---

[328] Jorgenson 1981: 231pp.
[329] At the level of tribal groups, the Baganda, Iteso, Acholi, Batoro and Banyoro were overrepresented, while the rest was underrepresented.
[330] Own data compiled based on CMB 1973.

Jorgenson that Obote tried to stifle the Baganda economically.[331] While it may be true that the government used the newly created economic infrastructures to prevent excessive Baganda domination,[332] the above data and interview evidence indicate that the Baganda continued to play a prominent role in the economic sector.

Figure 10: Ethno-regional distribution of key appointments in 27 parastatal companies in Uganda, 1970[333]



MILITARY POWER-SHARING

Attempts for political and economic power-sharing were contradicted by the persistence of a Northern-dominated army. After independence, UPC had not responded to the soldiers' demands for swift Africanisation and improved conditions of service – a situation that fuelled discontent and culminated in the 1964 mutiny.[334] In contrast to their counterparts in Kenya and Tanzania, the Ugandan government reacted very leniently to the munity. It not only continued to expand the size of the army but also granted the mutineers major concessions, including 'phenomenal' pay rises and accelerated Africanisation. Predictably, in line with colonial imbalances, rapid Africanisation led to an army dominated by Northerners – a trend that was reinforced by

[331] Jorgenson 1981: 246p.
[332] To give an example, the cooperative unions – mostly in the hands of Baganda farmers – were deprived of their independence and subjected to government control (Kasozi 1994: 93).
[333] Compiled based and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; 'Where was Tribalism in Uganda?', *The Standard (Tanzania),* 12 February 1971.
[334] Omara-Otunnu 1987: 48pp.

the repeated purging of Baganda officers.[335] Omara-Otunnu has argued that Obote had little choice but to retain a Northern-dominated army:

> 'The position of the UPC was precarious, and its position in government was to begin with based only on a coalition. In the army the majority of the troops came from the north, the Prime Minister's own regional power base These two factors combined to make it imprudent for Obote to take harsh measures in reaction to the mutiny'.336

Yet, it is important to ask whether the army – that had so far been largely absent from the political stage – was really so crucial to Obote's survival, especially in early 1964 when Obote was still in a rather strong position. The army was still small at the time and could have easily been disbanded, especially if Obote had – like Nyerere in Tanzania – relied on British military support. Also, even though the creation of a tribally balanced army was certainly difficult in the short run given the historical imbalances, the extremely rapid promotions after the mutiny suggest that there was considerable leeway. And even during the late 1960s, Obote could have exploited the massive Israeli military presence in the country to change the character of the army.[337] It seems therefore more plausible to argue that Obote simply ignored the possibility of rebuilding the army as a politically neutral and tribally representative organisation. Instead, he *chose* to continue the military's colonial legacy and strengthen the army as his main power bastion. This choice had important repercussions in that the military was henceforth used as the key battleground for politicians to play out their struggles.

Figure 11: Ethno-regional distribution of appointments in the army and military police command in Uganda, 1966 & 1969[338]



[335] Kasozi 1994: 74, Mudoola 1993: 96.
[336] Omara-Otunnu 1987: 64.
[337] Interview, Dr. Sallie Simba Kayunga.
[338] Compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; Omara-Otunnu 1987: 80.

The persistence of a Northern bias in the security sector is illustrated in figures 11a and 11b. Northerners dominated both the army and military police command, while the other three ethno-regional groups – especially the Baganda and Westerners – were clearly marginalised. In the officer corps, the bulk of the positions was held by the Acholi, Langi and the Iteso (see table 11). The military police command, by contrast, was clearly dominated by the West Nile tribes, including the Lugbara, Alur, Madi and Kakwa. The Northern bias was even more pronounced at the level of the 'rank and file'. In 1969, 61% of the soldiers were from the North against 22% Easterners, 12% Westerners and 5% Baganda.[339]

Table 11: Tribal distribution of appointments in the army and military police command in Uganda, 1966 & 1969 (in percent)[340]

Tribe	Population (1959)	Army command (1966)	Military police command (1969)
Baganda	16,3	9,4	0,0
Iteso	8,1	14,0	5,6
Banyankole	8,1	4,1	5,6
Basoga	7,8	5,8	2,8
Bakiga	7,1	1,2	2,8
Banyarwanda	5,9	0,6	2,8
Langi	5,6	13,5	8,3
Bagisu	5,1	3,5	0,0
Acholi	4,4	15,2	13,9
Lugbara	3,7	8,8	25,0
Batoro	3,2	1,2	0,0
Banyoro	2,9	1,2	0,0
Karamajong	2,0	0,0	2,8
Alur	1,9	5,3	13,9
Bagwere	1,7	1,8	0,0
Bakonzo	1,7	0,0	0,0
Japadhola	1,6	0,0	0,0
Banyole	1,4	0,0	0,0
Madi	1,2	4,7	5,6
Others	10,3	9,9	11,1
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0

The coexistence of a strong Acholi-Langi axis on the one hand, and a strong West Nile faction on the other soon created jealousies, which translated into tensions between Obote and the Army Commander Idi Amin, a Kakwa from West Nile.[341] Amin tried to bolster his position by mainly recruiting among Sudanic-speakers from West Nile. This became evident not only in the Military Police (see above) – his main stronghold – but also in the army as a whole where there was a marked increase of 74% in Sudanic-speakers between 1968 and 1969 and a striking stagnation in Nilo-Hamitic speakers

[339] Omara-Otunnu 1987: 82.
[340] Compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; Omara-Otunnu 1987: 80.
[341] Omara-Otunnu 1987: 78pp.

(Obote's language group). Obote struck back by shifting resources and competences to the Special Forces and the General Service Unit (GSU) – rival organisations that were stuffed with his own Langi tribesmen.[342]

TERRITORIAL POWER-SHARING

At independence, Uganda inherited a fairly autonomous and well-developed system of local government.[343] Under colonial rule, the district was established as the central unit of local administration. While the centre retained control through the powerful overseeing presence of District Commissioners (DCs), the districts were ruled through directly elected councils, which were empowered to raise their own revenue through local taxation, recruit their own staff and deliver a broad range of social services (e.g. roads, water, education and health). The 1962 Independence Constitution cemented high, albeit varying degrees of territorial power-sharing.[344] As mentioned in chapter 3, Buganda was granted full federal status and therefore enjoyed considerable local autonomy, which was structured around the institution of the Kabaka, a Parliament with directly elected representatives and a local administration organised in ministries and headed by political ministers. The other kingdoms (Toro, Ankole, Bunyoro and Busoga) were given semi-federal status whereby their rulers, political institutions and administrations became part of local government. The non-kingdom areas came to be divided into nine unitary districts, which continued to be governed through directly elected councils and retained their pre-independence competences. Altogether, the post-independence system of local government provided the local leadership of the various tribal groups with a wide range of opportunities for political participation and employment, especially in Buganda.

Territorial power-sharing was however increasingly undermined from 1963 when the Ministry of Regional Administrations was given more powers over local government.[345] Accordingly, the Councils were not only made more financially dependent but also gradually lost control over local appointments. This trend was greatly reinforced by the abrogation of the Independence Constitution in 1966 – the main guarantee for territorial power-sharing. The ensuing 1967 Republican Constitution strengthened the centre at the

---

[342] Hansen 1977: 88. Kasozi (1994: 89) claims that 75% of Special Force member were Langi.
[343] Sathyamurthy 1982; Golooba-Mutebi 1999.
[344] Barongo 1989: 73p.
[345] Sathyamurthy 1982; Golooba-Mutebi 1999.

expense of the periphery. Most importantly, all kingdoms were abolished and replaced by now 18 unitary districts that suffered from seriously curtailed local autonomy. First, local councils were stripped of most service delivery functions, which meant that 'local budgets and thus local political arenas' diminished steadily.[346] Second, the reach of the centre was greatly increased, evident not only in the growing powers of the DCs but also in the President's Office control over local appointments. As local government appointments effectively became party appointments, chiefs and other local staff were replaced by UPC supporters. Altogether, territorial power-sharing had been more or less abrogated by the late 1960s. The change was most dramatic in Buganda that was divided into four districts and deprived of its entire local hierarchy.

THE END OF OBOTE I

In contrast to current descriptions of Obote as a notorious 'tribalist'[347], his first administration displayed clear signs of an inclusive nation-building project. This became evident in serious attempts for political and economic power-sharing. However, the quest for an inclusive elite bargain remained incomplete. First, Obote failed to achieve lasting accommodation with the Buganda Kingdom. Even though the Baganda were by no means fully excluded from political and economic power, the Buganda monarchists at Mengo were alienated by their loss of influence at the central state level, the abrogation of the post-independence provisions for territorial power-sharing, and the uncompromising desecration of the Kabaka's symbols.[348] Second, Obote's attempts to achieve national integration were undermined by the unresolved legacy of a Northern-dominated army, which had gained a high political profile and increasingly escaped his control. This ultimately paved the way to the 1971 military coup. In late 1970, Obote tried to contain the escalating factional struggles in the army by demoting the Army Commander Idi Amin and his closest West Nile associates.[349] But it turned out that Obote had unleashed a genie after the mutiny in 1964 that he now found impossible to put back in the bottle. The Amin faction proved strong enough to counterstrike and ousted Obote on 25 January 1971. In doing so, Amin received the silent support of other

---

[346] Kasfir 1976: 251.
[347] Museveni 2000: 118. For a more nuanced appraisal of Obote see Anguria 2006.
[348] Kasfir 1976: 212p. After the 1966 crisis, the Kabaka's palace in Kampala was turned into an army barracks, while the Buganda Parliament became an office building for the Ministry of Defence. The deposed Kabaka himself was treated with outright disrespect when Obote first refused to offer the exiled monarch a pension (in contrast to other deposed kings) and later even rejected the demand to bring his body back for burial at home.
[349] For details see Omara-Otunnu 1987: 89pp.

alienated social forces, including Baganda monarchists, the Anglican Namirembe faction and Prince Badru Kakungulu's UMC.

4.2.2 The Amin elite bargain (1971-1979): The era of undisguised exclusion

Amin seized power with a very narrow support base. While the downfall of Obote was greeted with jubilation among many Baganda, there was considerable apprehension in the rest of the country. Against this backdrop, Amin initially tried to present himself as the 'man of peace' who was mainly concerned with reconciliation, national unity and prosperity. Measures of goodwill included the abolition of the one-party state and the release of political prisoners.[350] Most importantly, Amin brought back the body of Sir Edward Mutesa II from London for burial in Uganda – a step that earned him popularity among many Baganda and bolstered his fragile leadership.[351] Nevertheless, it soon became obvious that Amin's drive for reconciliation was little more than a masquerade. As all political institutions (including Parliament) were suspended, Uganda was henceforth ruled by decree. Moreover, the regime came to be characterised by extremely low levels of power-sharing, evident in a striking ethno-religious bias in favour of a 'Nubian-Kakwa' core group and Muslims in general.

MILITARY POWER-SHARING

True power under Amin lay with the army. Even though the military government initially announced that the army as a whole was to be made more tribally representative, the reality was always different. After the coup, the size of the military was almost doubled from 6700 men in 1970 to 11.409 by the end of 1971.[352] As large parts of the army were exchanged, the new 'rank and file' came to exhibit a pronounced ethno-religious bias. While about 4000 were former Sudanese or Zairian rebels and most of the rest from West Nile, the proportion of Muslims reached an estimated 40%. By 1977, the situation was scarcely different. Of about 15.000 serving soldiers, an estimated 4000-5000 were from West Nile, while 3000 were Southern Sudanese.[353] This

---

[350] Kasozi 1994: 105pp.; Ravenhill 1974: 231.
[351] Mutibwa 1992: 86.
[352] Omara-Otunnu 1987: 107p.
[353] ACR 1977/1978: B442.

estimate is supported by data on recruitment in 1978 when 68% of all recruits came from West Nile district, of which 36.3% were Kakwa and 21% Lugbara.[354]

These imbalances at the 'rank and file' level were mirrored in the officer corps. Significantly, no less than 13 of 22 officers promoted shortly after the coup were from West Nile, while another 4 were immigrants from Zaire and Sudan.[355] These imbalances even worsened from late 1972 when Amin decided to strengthen his hold on the army by ensuring that key positions were in the hands of close affiliates. From now on, it was especially the Kakwa (his own group) and Nubians[356], and Muslims generally who got the strategic posts. This came largely at the expense of other West Nile officers (Alur, Madi and Lugbara), many of whom were removed or even killed from late 1971.[357] While the Amin regime always continued to have its base in West Nile with still substantial contingents of Alur, Madi and especially Lugbara officers, the dominance of the 'Nubian-Kakwa' core group became more and more entrenched. By 1977, 32% of the 22 key army officers were Kakwa, 9% Nubian, 18% Sudanese, 27% were from other West Nile tribes and only 14% were from outside West Nile (see table 12).[358] Maybe even more strikingly, 17 of the 22 key officers – that is, 77.3% – were Muslims (5.6% of the population in 1959).

Table 12: Tribal distribution of the top army command in Uganda, 1977 (in percent)[359]

Tribe	Population (1959)	1977 (total distribution)	1977 (distribution relative to population share)
Kakwa	0,8	31,8	3877,3
Nubian	0,1	9,1	8990,9
Sudanese	0,4	18,2	4445,5
Other West Nilers	7,2	27,3	278,8
Others	91,5	13,6	-85,1
Total	100,0	100,0	0,0

[354] Omara-Otunnu 1987: 134p.
[355] Jorgenson 1981: 269p.
[356] The Nubians originally came from Southern Sudan where they were recruited by Emin Pasha in the 19th century and later incorporated into the British colonial forces. Nubians have settled in all parts of Uganda but constitute only about 0.1% of the population. The firm link between all Nubians is their Islamic faith (of the Sunni sect) and their language 'Lunubi', which is based on Arabic. When adopting 'Nubi' practises, everybody can become a Nubian: Some Nubians are Baganda, while others are Basoga, Banyoro, Acholi, Langi or Kakwa (see ACR 1973/1974: B295; 21; Hansen 1977: 109).
[357] For details see Hansen 1977: 113pp.
[358] Omara-Otunnu (1987: 134) reports that in 1977 no less than 54% of the entire officer corps were Sudanic-speakers (Lugbara, Madi, Kakwa – 7% of the population) against 26% Bantu-speakers (66% of the population), 12% Luo-speakers (14.5% of the population) and 7% Nilo-Hamitic-speakers (12.5% of the population).
[359] Compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; ACR 1977/1978: B442.

The army's ethno-religious bias became also evident in the Defence Council, which was originally meant to deal only with military matters but soon became the country's paramount decision-making organ, relegating the Cabinet to a secondary role.[360] The Council presumably included most military officers at the Lieutenant Colonel rank and above, plus commanding officers of key military units.[361] Even though membership was never fully disclosed, it was clearly monopolised by Amin's ethno-religious cronies. By 1977, the Council's top hierarchy comprised President Idi Amin (a Muslim Kakwa), Vice-President Adrisi (a Muslim Lugbara and Amin's uncle), the Chief of Staff Maj-Gen Lumago (a Christian Kakwa and Amin's cousin), the Chief of Operations Col. Maliyamungu (a Christian Kakwa and Amin's cousin) and the Commander of the Marines Col Taban (a Kakwa and Amin's nephew).[362]

Beyond the regular army, Amin's various secret service organisations – responsible for most of the state-directed terror – were also firmly in the hands of the Kakwa-Nubian core group.[363] The notorious State Research Department, the largest secret service with 2000 agents, was formally headed by Francis Itabuka from Busoga but effectively commanded by Farouk Minawa, a Nubian. The two other key agencies were also controlled by Nubians. While Ali Towili headed the Public Safety Unity, Hussein Marella was in charge of the Military Police.

POLITICAL POWER-SHARING

The extent of political power-sharing was similarly limited. Between 1971 and 1979, Northerners were on average heavily overrepresented in terms of government appointments (see figures 12a and 12b). Westerners, by contrast were grossly underrepresented, while Southerners and Easterners received a more a less proportional share. Significantly, the 'Northern bias' in government increased over time from 15% overrepresentation in 1973 to 237.4% in 1979 (see figure 12c). At the same time, the Eastern share in government declined dramatically, whereas that of Southerners remained at fairly constant levels.

---

[360] ACR 1973/1974: B292.
[361] Jorgenson 1981: 282.
[362] ACR 1977/1978: B434.
[363] Kyemba 1977: 111p.; ACR 1976/1977: B374.

Figure 12: Ethno-regional composition of government in Uganda, 1971-1979[364]



If one disaggregates this broader ethno-regional picture to the level of tribal groups, we see that the overwhelming majority of Northern ministers belonged to Amin's West Nile-Nubian-Sudanese axis, especially after 1975 (see table 13). Accounting for about 8% of the population, the latter provided 47.6% and 61.9% of all ministers in 1977 and 1979. Their share in the 'inner core' of political power was even higher, with 75% in 1977 and 78.2% in 1979. All other tribes – except the Baganda and to a lesser extent the Iteso, Basoga and Bakiga – were fully marginalized by the late 1970s.

[364] Own data compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; Jorgenson 1981: 283. Note that data on deputy ministers under Amin are not available.

Table 13: Tribal composition of government in Uganda, Index of Representation, 1971-1979 (in percent)[365]

Tribe	Population (1959)	1971	1973	1975	1977	1979
Baganda	16,3	19,4	15,5	17,4	19,6	18,3
Iteso	8,1	8,3	9,9	4,2	4,8	2,4
Banyankole	8,1	0,0	0,0	2,1	2,4	2,4
Basoga	7,8	11,1	12,7	4,2	2,4	4,8
Bakiga	7,1	2,8	9,9	4,2	4,8	2,4
Banyarwanda	5,9	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Langi	5,6	2,8	2,8	0,0	0,0	0,0
Bagisu	5,1	8,3	9,9	7,6	0,0	0,0
Acholi	4,4	5,6	5,6	2,1	0,0	0,0
Lugbara	3,7	8,3	2,8	11,8	13,4	12,7
Batoro	3,2	2,8	5,6	0,0	0,0	0,0
Banyoro	2,9	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Karamajong	2,0	2,8	2,8	2,1	2,4	0,0
Alur	1,9	8,3	0,0	2,1	2,4	2,4
Bagwere	1,7	2,8	2,8	0,0	0,0	0,0
Bakonzo	1,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Japadhola	1,6	8,3	9,9	7,6	0,0	0,0
Banyole	1,4	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Madi	1,2	0,0	0,0	15,3	17,3	10,3
Kakwa	0,8	8,3	9,9	7,6	8,6	15,9
Sudanese	0,4	0,0	0,0	2,1	11,0	18,3
Nubian	0,1	0,0	0,0	7,6	8,6	10,3
Others	9,0	0,0	0,0	2,1	2,4	0,0
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

The religious bias of the Amin governments was even more extreme. On average, Muslims were hugely overrepresented in Cabinet between 1971 and 1979 (see figures 13a and 13b). Protestants were moderately overrepresented, while Catholics and other religions were marginalised. Over time, Muslim overrepresentation grew from 98.4% in 1971 to a staggering 1246.4% in 1979 (see figure 13c). In the 'inner core', Muslims held 87.5% and 88.9% of all appointments in 1977 and 1979. Protestants were initially extremely prominently represented in government but then found themselves fully marginalised by the late 1970s. The disproportionate recruitment of Muslims reflected a deliberate attempt to 'muslimise' the overwhelmingly Christian country, which became also evident in the increasingly aggressive treatment of the Christian churches.[366] This began as early as in 1972 when Amin broke with Israel and cultivated friends in the Arab world (especially Libya and Saudi Arabia) – a step that culminated in Uganda's adherence to the Organisation of Islamic Conference in 1974. Islam becoming the religion of the establishment, Christian missionaries were on several occasions expelled from the country, while 27 Christian organisations were banned in 1977. Furthermore, a

[365] Own data compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; Jorgenson 1981: 283.
[366] Kasozi 1994: 108p.

number of high ranking Christians were murdered, most notably Benedicto Kiwanuka in late 1972 and the Anglican Archbishop Luwum in early 1977. The latter incident – that received worldwide condemnation – was followed by the killing of thousands of Christians and disastrously sharpened the distinction between Islam and Christianity.[367]

Figure 13: Religious composition of government in Uganda, 1971-1979[368]



On the whole, political power was distributed in an extremely biased manner. It is however important to recognise that the Cabinet was generally of little importance under Amin. Ruling through the gun, Amin abandoned 'any pretence at Cabinet rule'

---

[367] ACR 1976/1977: B392.

[368] Own data compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; Jorgenson 1981: 283.

from 1972.[369] The ministers – who had all been made military cadets liable to military discipline – were mostly ineffective and demoralised.[370] According to Amin's former minister Kyemba, ministers

> 'were reduced to little more than ciphers. We were forbidden to discuss anything of significance, because such subjects were classed as security matters. Since nearly half the country's budget was devoted to the armed forces, we could not discuss the budget seriously'.[371]

From the late 1970s, the cabinet was further undermined by the existence of a 'veranda cabinet' made of elders of the Kakwa clan who were based in Kampala and controlled a substantial reservoir of patronage.[372]

ECONOMIC POWER-SHARING

Patterns of exclusion became equally visible in the economic sector. Giving in to growing demands by Baganda bureaucrats and traders for more rapid Africanisation of trade, Amin launched the infamous 'economic war' in late 1972 whereby 50.000 Asians were expelled from the country.[373] As the latter owned about half of the country's wealth, the expulsion opened the way for the state to take control of Asian assets. The Government took over the biggest companies (e.g. the Madhvani Industrial Group), while the remainder of small and medium-sized businesses were redistributed. This move was politically shrewd in that it helped Amin to regain popularity in a country weary of Asian economic domination. More importantly, it for the first time placed the whole of the economy in Ugandan hands,[374] substantially increased the available reservoir of patronage and thereby enlarged the material basis of Amin's elite bargain.[375] If handled properly, the 'economic war' could have therefore been used to create a more secure economic and social basis for the regime. In practice, however, the distribution of spoils was again heavily skewed in favour of three overlapping groups, namely the Nubians, the military and Baganda Muslims.[376] Significantly, applicants

---

[369] ACR 1972/1973: B271pp.
[370] While many ministers fled the country (e.g. W. Kibedi, E. Rugumayo, E. Wakhweya and H. Kyemba), at least six were killed in office or after being dismissed (Jorgenson 1981: 282).
[371] Kyemba 1977: 101.
[372] ACR 1977/1978: B434.
[373] For details see Jorgenson 1981: 285pp.
[374] Amin declared that 'if they do not remember us for any other good thing, they will at least remember us for having given Uganda her economic independence' (cited after Mutibwa 1992: 97). My own interviews in Uganda suggest that Amin is indeed still remembered for having placed the economy into Ugandan hands.
[375] The spoils of the economic war consisted of 5655 firms, factories, ranches and agricultural estates, as well as homes, cars and household goods (Jorgenson 1981: 288.). In response to the state takeover of firms, public sector employment grew from 134.000 to 202.000 between 1971 and 1977.
[376] ACR 1973/1974: B303p.; Kyemba 1977: 63p.; Mutibwa 2008: 64p.

often feigned adherence to Islam in the hope of being taken for Nubians – the most favoured of all groups.

TERRITORIAL POWER-SHARING

The regime's ethno-religious bias was also mirrored at the local level. After Amin took over, the move towards political centralisation was carried significantly further than before.[377] Local councils were abolished along with numerous civil service posts, ostensibly to fight corruption and reduce the costs of local administration. In 1972-73, the country witnessed an extensive re-organisation of local government. First, the four regions were replaced by nine (later ten) provinces. The newly appointed provincial governors – who wielded considerable power – were all high-ranking military officers and almost all Muslim West Nilers.[378] Second, the number of districts was increased to satisfy the desire of small tribal groups for more autonomy – a strategy that won the military government considerable support among the beneficiary groups. The districts were ruled directly by centrally appointed DCs who were mostly military men and enjoyed immensely enlarged powers, including control over local expenditure. Army officers were deployed across the country to select thousands of chiefs at village, parish and sub-county and county levels.[379] While the local chiefs were drawn from both the military and civilian spheres, they came by and large from West Nile, and were mostly Muslims.

THE END OF THE AMIN REGIME

By the mid-1970s, Amin had established a highly exclusionary elite bargain, which was based on the Nubian-Kakwa core group on the one hand, and on Muslim support on the other. Despite high levels of state repression throughout the 1970s, this extreme minority regime was ultimately impossible to sustain and overthrown by the UNLA in 1978-79.

---

[377] Golooba-Mutebi 1999; Sathyamurthy 1982: 28pp.
[378] ACR 1973/197: B292; ACR 1977/1978: B447.
[379] Omara-Otunnu 1987: 124p.

4.2.3 From the UNLF to Obote II and the Okellos (1979-1986): The elusive quest for an inclusive elite bargain[380]

THE UNLF ELITE BARGAINS

When the UNLF took power in 1979, it was made up of a broad spectrum of competing political forces, which were divided along both tribal and ideological lines:[381]

- The *(Baganda) monarchists*, including conservatives like Prof. Yusuf Lule, Andrew Kayiira, Sam Sebgereka and Grace Ibingira.
- The *DP centrists*, led by the veteran politician Godfrey Binaisa.
- The *(Marxist) radicals*, divided into two wings. One wing was led by Museveni, while a more orthodox Marxist wing comprised the so-called 'Gang of Four'.
- The *UPC/pro-Obote forces*, led by Paulo Muwanga and Brig. David Oyite-Ojok.

Significantly, only Museveni and the pro-Obote forces had substantial support in the 'hotchpotch' UNLA – the real locus of power along with the Tanzanian army.[382]

The initial conflicts were between those who favoured Obote's return, and those opposed to the exiled former President. In this context, the radicals lined up with the DP centrists and Baganda monarchists to gain the majority in the UNLF, thereby excluding the pro-Obote forces. This anti-Obote coalition had chosen the Muganda Prof. Lule – perceived as relatively neutral – as President. However, Lule turned out to be a heavy-handed President who quickly alienated *all* major political forces.[383] Most problematically, Lule heightened divisions by his unbalanced appointment policies. Even though the President initially respected the UNLF balance of power by including key representatives of all political factions in Cabinet, this could hardly disguise the fact that his government was heavily dominated by the old 'Mengo clique' of conservative elements in Buganda (see figure 14 and table 14). Accordingly, Baganda ministers – mostly in person of monarchists such as Sam Sebgereka, Andrew Kayiira or Arnold Bisase – held 35% of ministerial appointments and even 50% of the 'inner core'.[384] A major blunder was also the manner in which the Lule regime distributed the businesses

---

[380] Given the short-lived nature of the various regimes between 1979 and 1986, I will not systematically distinguish between the different forms of power-sharing but rather discuss them in an integrated manner.
[381] ACR 1979/80: B347p.
[382] ACR 1979/80: B361p.; Jorgenson 1981: 335p.
[383] Interview, Yona Kanyomozi.
[384] Note, however, that one of the key ministers from Buganda, the Minister of Internal Affairs Paulo Muwanga, had been a staunch UPC supporter since the 1960s and was now a leading figure in the 'pro-Obote' camp.

of Amin's supporters who had fled the country for fear of reprisals: Lule's closest associates, especially from among his fellow Baganda, were taking a lion's share of the assets.[385] Suspicions of a revival of Kiganda power were further heightened by the President's failure to cultivate a national image, evident in the fact that he ended his swearing-in speech in Luganda language telling his fellow tribesmen that 'Now it is our turn'.[386]

Figure 14: Ethno-regional composition of government in Uganda, 1979-1985[387]



The imbalances were greatly reinforced by Lule's cabinet reshuffle on 7 June 1979.[388] Among other changes, the President demoted both Muwanga and Museveni from key ministries, while replacing them with conservative Baganda. This alienated the militarily powerful pro-Obote and pro-Museveni forces and dealt a severe blow to the UNLF balance of power. Furthermore, Lule introduced a proposal on army recruitment that foresaw a quota system where the number of recruits from each tribal group should be proportionate to its population share.[389] While this proposal may have been well meant with the view to overcoming the legacy of a tribally biased army, it was perceived as entailing a high intake of Baganda and further alienated the pro-Museveni and pro-Obote factions. Museveni, for instance, bitterly complained about the fact the Lule wrote him an official letter requiring him to disband the FRONASA forces he had

[385] Tindigarukayo 1988: 609p.; Gertzel 1980: 479.
[386] Avirgan & Honey 1992: 153.
[387] Own data compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; Jorgenson 1981: 338p.
[388] ACR 1979/80: 354p.
[389] Omara-Otunnu 1987: 146p.

just recruited.[390] In the end, the inability to accommodate the major UNLA factions became the key driving force behind Lule's downfall on 20 June 1979.

Table 14: Tribal composition of government in Uganda, Index of Representation, 1979-1985 (in percent)[391]

Tribe	Population (1959)	Lule (1979)	Binaisa (1980)	Military Commission (1980)	Obote II (1981)	Obote II (1983)	Obote II (1985)
Baganda	16,3	42,5	40,1	18,8	17,1	17,1	17,1
Iteso	8,1	5,0	10,9	11,2	13,1	13,1	13,1
Banyankole	8,1	16,3	12,7	16,6	11,3	11,3	11,3
Basoga	7,8	11,3	14,7	12,5	7,8	7,8	7,8
Bakiga	7,1	2,5	1,8	2,7	2,4	2,4	2,4
Banyarwanda	5,9	0,0	0,0	0,0	1,8	1,8	1,8
Langi	5,6	0,0	1,8	9,8	10,8	10,8	10,8
Bagisu	5,1	8,8	1,8	1,4	2,4	2,4	2,4
Acholi	4,4	13,8	10,9	17,5	9,0	9,0	9,0
Lugbara	3,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,9	2,9	2,9
Batoro	3,2	0,0	1,8	1,4	1,8	1,8	1,8
Banyoro	2,9	0,0	0,0	1,4	2,9	2,9	2,9
Karamajong	2,0	0,0	0,0	1,4	2,9	2,9	2,9
Alur	1,9	0,0	1,8	1,4	1,8	1,8	1,8
Bagwere	1,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Bakonzo	1,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	1,8	1,8	1,8
Japadhola	1,6	0,0	0,0	1,4	1,8	1,8	1,8
Banyole	1,4	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Madi	1,2	0,0	0,0	1,4	1,2	1,2	1,2
Others	10,3	0,0	1,8	1,4	7,3	7,3	7,3
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

Lule was replaced by another Muganda, Godfrey Binaisa – a choice that was largely meant to make sure that the ousting of Lule could not be construed as an anti-Baganda move.[392] Binaisa initially sought to restore the UNLF balance of power. As Muwanga and Museveni were reinstated to their key ministries, his government came to contain key representatives of all major political factions. Nevertheless, it remained biased with view to ethno-regional cleavages, still privileging the Baganda at the expense of the other groups (see figure 14 and table 14).[393] Binaisa's fragile elite bargain was further undermined when the pro-Obote forces manipulated the President to remove Museveni from the powerful Ministry of Defence.[394] The temporary alliance between Binaisa and

[390] Museveni 1997: 110.
[391] Own data compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; Jorgenson 1981: 338p.
[392] Museveni 1997: 112p.
[393] Significantly, all Baganda ministers (except Arnold Bisase) were now of either DP centrist (Jack Sentengo) or radical orientation (Bidandi Ssali) – a situation that alienated the Baganda monarchists from the centre.
[394] See Avirgan & Honey 1982: 210p.

the pro-Obote group was rooted in a shared fear of Museveni and his FRONASA forces – a fear that was not unfounded as Museveni had used his position to enlist a disproportional number of recruits from his tribal base in Ankole, and from closely related Kigezi (see figures 15a and 15b). But Binaisa soon realised that the pro-Obote forces were only using him and desperately sought to undermine their growing power base – first by unsuccessfully trying to remove Muwanga from cabinet and then by bluntly sacking the powerful Army Chief of Staff Oyite-Ojok on 10 May 1980. Faced with this challenge, the UNLF Military Commission assumed powers on 13 May 1980.

Figure 15: Tribal distribution of military recruitment in Uganda, November 1979[395]



The military government, headed by Muwanga, marked the return to power of the pro-Obote forces, evident in cabinet where Northerners – i.e. the Langi-Acholi axis – regained considerable influence, mostly at the expense of the Baganda (see figure 14 and table 14). The Military Commission itself consisted of six members, including Muwanga (the Chaiman), Oyite-Ojok, Okello, Omaria, Museveni and Maruru. It remained divided between the two political factions that were left in the UNLF power struggle – the pro-Obote forces on the one hand, and Museveni on the other. The real rulers in the Military Commission were however Muwanga and Oyite-Ojok, while Museveni was little more than a 'figurehead':

> 'Numerically, we were in a minority on the Commission because I was the only active anti-Obote member. Paulo Muwanga, Oyite Ojok and William Omaria were pro-Obote. The

[395] Compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; Omara-Otunnu 1987: 150p.

other two, Tito Okello and Col Zed Maruru, while not necessarily pro-Obote, were not actively against him either. So I was left alone to hold the line against Obote'.[396]

The controversial parliamentary elections of December 1980 sealed the victory of the pro-Obote forces. Irrespective of whether the elections were rigged,[397] the pro-Obote forces now not only controlled military power but also held a comfortable parliamentary majority. The UPC gained 74 parliamentary seats (plus 22 nominated MPs) against 51 for Ssemogerere's DP and only 1 for Museveni's Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM) whereby Milton Obote – who had returned from his Tanzanian exile on 27 May 1980 – became once again President.

THE OBOTE II ELITE BARGAIN

Upon his return to power, Obote had promised a government of national unity in order to contain the unresolved divisions. This promise was however at best partially fulfilled, not least since all ministers were UPC members. As under Obote I, Northerners were overrepresented in government, especially the old Langi-Acholi axis (see figure 16 and table 14). Westerners were mostly underrepresented (except the Banyankole), whereas Easterners and the Baganda received largely proportional representation. The prominence of the Baganda, especially in the 'inner core' of political power, is however deceiving. As UPC had been denied even a single parliamentary seat throughout the whole of Buganda during the 1980s elections, Obote used his right of nomination to ensure Baganda representation. The nominees were however long-standing members of UPC and therefore lacked constituents in Buganda. Most prominently, the key Muganda in government, Vice-President and Minister of Defence Paulo Muwanga, was widely considered to be a Northerner (see above). Against this background, the Baganda monarchists were again fully excluded from political power.

Beyond government, there seems to have been more Northern favouritism than under Obote I. The scant available evidence suggests that Northerners – in particular the Langi and Acholi – clearly dominated both the civil service and the parastatal sector between

---

[396] Museveni 1997: 115.

[397] While most observers identify abundant evidence for rigging (e.g. Mutibwa 1992: 138pp.; Kasozi 1994: 136pp.), the Commonwealth Observer's Report came to the following conclusion: 'Despite the imperfections and deficiencies to which we have drawn attention, and subject to the concern expressed on the question of nominations and unopposed returns, we believe this has been a valid electoral exercise which should broadly reflect the freely expressed choice of the people of Uganda' (cited after ACR 1980/81: B370).

1981 and 1986.[398] More consequential was however the persistence of a Northern-dominated army, suggesting that Obote had learned little from the past. While detailed figures are not available, Obote himself estimated that in 1985 the rank-and-file comprised 60% Acholi, 20% Langi and 20% other tribal groups.[399] This picture was mirrored in the officer corps, which was heavily dominated by the Acholi, Langi and Itesot.[400] Admittedly, there was a certain path-dependency in these imbalances in that the Acholi and Langi had already dominated the anti-Amin struggle along with Museveni's FRONASA forces and were now the only ones left when the latter followed Museveni into the bush after the 1980 elections. While this made the creation of a balanced army difficult in the short-term, the government made only limited efforts to correct the imbalances.[401] Instead, Obote seemed to regard the UNLA as his own army that would ultimately keep him in power.[402]

Figure 16: Ethno-regional composition of government in Uganda, 1981-1985[403]



In the end, the persistence of a politically partisan and tribally biased army gave again rise to factional struggles. When the respected Chief of Staff Oyite-Ojok (a Langi) died in a plane accident in 1983, Obote chose to replace him with Lt.-Col. Smith Opon Acak

---

[398] Mutibwa 1992: 211; Ginywera-Pinchwa 1989: 52.
[399] Cited after ACR 1985/86: B478.
[400] Omara-Otunnu 1987: 158pp.; various interviews.
[401] According to Obote's son, the President tried to create a more balanced army around a number of non-Northern army officers who had been recruited from the political party wing and were extremely loyal to Obote (Interview, Jimmy Akena) – a claim that was confirmed in other interviews. However, this alienated the 'old guard', especially the Acholi faction, and thereby contributed to the 1985 coup.
[402] This became evident during the 1980 election campaign when Obote challenged the DP leader Paul Ssemogerere to show him 'his generals' (Mutibwa 1992: 150).
[403] Own data compiled and calculated based on East Africa High Commission 1960; GOU various years.

(another Langi) – a decision that alienated more senior Acholi officers.[404] As the army became riddled by tensions between Langi and Acholi elements, the President was increasingly opposed by an Acholi faction led by Prime Minister Otema Alimadi, Army Commander Tito Okello and Brig. Bazillio Okello. The Acholi's perception that Obote was trying to eliminate them ultimately led to the military coup of the two Okellos on 27 July 1985.

THE OKELLOS

Once in power, the new government led by Tito Okello as Head of State and Bazillio Okello as Chief of Defence Forces proclaimed their intention to form a government of national unity.[405] As a consequence, all rebel groups – with the exception of Museveni's NRA – signed a peace agreement and gained representation on the Military Council depending on their military strength. The NRA's refusal to join the government of unity was overcome by the conclusion of the Nairobi peace accord on 17 December 1985. The latter amounted to a power-sharing agreement between all fighting forces who agreed on a fairly inclusive composition of the Military Council: UNLA (7), NRA (7), FEDEMO (2), UMF (1), FUNA (1) and UNRF (1). Also, it provided for the creation of a nationally representative army. Yet, the power-sharing agreement soon collapsed and Museveni's NRA captured power.

4.3 Exclusionary elite bargains and civil war onset

> 'If you are head of a family, and you treat one or two of your children better than the others, chances are that you are going to have a rebellion in your house. A country is just like family'.[406]

I argue that recurrent civil war onset in Uganda between 1962 and 1986 can be traced back to the persistence of mostly exclusionary elite bargains. The main thrust of this argument was widely confirmed during my interviews in Uganda. When asked about the key drivers of Uganda's civil wars since 1962, the overwhelming majority of my interviewees made immediate and prominent reference to problems that are more or less explicitly linked to my notion of an exclusionary elite bargain. Accordingly, the

---

[404] Omara-Otunnu 1987: 160p. To Obote's credit, it would have been equally contentious to give the number two army appointment – after the Army Commander Tito Okello – to another Acholi.
[405] Ibid.; Mutibwa 1992: 172p.
[406] Interview, Ben Wacha.

repeated insurgencies were said to be due to 'domination by ethno-regional groups'; 'tribal divisions', 'ethnic grievances', 'ethnicity as underlying cause of all conflicts', 'a sense of injustices felt by communities', 'imbalances in the distribution of jobs and resources', 'politics rooted in tribal differences', 'an unequal sharing of the national cake', 'the North-South divide', 'structural injustices interpreted in ethnic terms' and 'the absence of a national ethos'.[407]

In what follows, I will briefly discuss each of the eight civil wars that ravaged the country between 1962 and 1986 and show that they can all be causally related to the persistence of largely exclusionary elite bargains.

THE BATTLE OF MENGO

As discussed above, the Obote I regime was characterised by attempts for political power-sharing. The only exception was the political marginalisation of the Baganda monarchists after the end of the UPC-KY alliance in 1964, most evident in their sidelining in government and the painful loss of the 'lost counties'. As a result, the Buganda government at Mengo felt seriously disadvantaged – a situation that paved the way to the 'Battle of Mengo' in 1966.

In reaction to the break-up of the UPC-KY alliance, the Baganda monarchists did not immediately seek open confrontation with the Obote government but instead sought to exploit the UPC's weak organisational base. Aware of the factional divisions within the ruling party, the Mengo decided to disband KY and instructed its members to join the UPC in early 1965. Trying to fight the UPC 'from within', the Baganda monarchists entered into an (informal) alliance with Ibingira's 'conservatives'. The emergence of a strong 'conservative' faction within UPC constituted a very real threat to Obote's hold on power, especially when his rivals shifted the attack to the national level.[408] On 4 February 1966, during Obote's absence from Kampala, the Ibingira faction successfully introduced a motion in Parliament calling for the suspension of Idi Amin and an investigation into the alleged receipt of gold and ivory from Congolese rebels by Amin, Obote, Onama, and Nekyon – the four key figures in the ruling coalition and all from the North.

---

[407] Various interviews.
[408] Jorgenson 1981: 229.

At the same time, the opponents were using the factionalised army as a battleground to play out their struggles. While the 'conservatives' turned to the Army Commander Opolot who had married the daughter of a minister in the Buganda government und was therefore considered the Kabaka's man, Obote relied on the support of Idi Amin who was then Opolot's deputy.[409] In mid-1965, Obote consolidated his power over the army by taking direct control over the Ministry of Defence. The Kabaka – as President still titular Commander-in-Chief – and Opolot reacted by recruiting a secret army and shifting officers and units loyal to Obote to the periphery.[410] This was later admitted by the Kabaka himself.[411]

Obote struck back on 22 February 1966 by arresting the core of the conservative faction and taking over all powers of government. The same day, he appointed Amin as Army and Air Force Chief of Staff, while demoting Opolot to the powerless position of Chief of Defence Staff. The army now fully placed in his hands, Obote abrogated the 1962 Independence Constitution – the key expression of territorial power-sharing. Confronted with the *total exclusion from both political and military power* and the 'untimely dismantling of federalism'[412], the Buganda Parliament ordered central government to withdraw from Buganda soil on 24 May 1966. Faced with this open secessionist threat, the army – led by none other than Idi Amin himself – invaded and captured the Kabaka's palace after brief but fierce fighting. Altogether, the 1966 'Battle of Mengo' clearly resulted from Obote's failure to ensure a lasting integration of the Baganda monarchists into his elite bargain.

THE ANTI-AMIN INSURGENCIES (1972, 1978-79)

Idi Amin's elite bargain was exclusionary by every standard (see section 4.2.2). This extreme degree of ethno-religious exclusion arguably became the key driver behind the two anti-Amin insurgencies in 1972 and 1978-79.

The failed 1972 insurgency, to begin with, originated precisely among those tribal groups that had suffered the by far most pronounced exclusion in the early days of the

---

[409] Mutibwa 1992: 36.
[410] For details see Omara-Otunnu 1987: 74. The Kabaka allegedly even tested the idea of ousting Obote in a military coup with a number of Western embassies (ACR 1980/81: B353).
[411] Mutesa 1967: 186.
[412] Interview, John Ken Lukyamuzi.

regime, namely the Acholi and Langi. Significantly, the post-coup reorganisation of government and the armed forces came largely at the expense of these two groups who had held key government positions under Obote I and composed about one third of his army. Unsure about their loyalty, Amin began to systematically purge Langi and Acholi from all positions of influence, most notably in the army. These violent purges occurred in four waves between January 1971 and September 1972.[413] While thousands of Langi and Acholi were secretly eliminated, others managed to escape to Tanzania where they joined Obote who had gone into exile after the 1971 coup. This heightened Amin's sense of insecurity, motivated further purges against the Acholi and Langi and ultimately caused still more of them to flee to Tanzania. Beyond the extreme case of the Acholi and Langi, it was especially Westerners – in particular the Banyankole (Museveni's group) – who suffered from exclusion during the early years of Amin's rule. Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that the failed 1972 insurgency was mainly driven by Obote's Acholi-Langi fighting force and supported by Yoweri Museveni's FRONASA. Even though one could argue that Obote would have tried to regain power at one point or another, it were first and foremost Amin's exclusionary policies within the military that provided the former President with a sufficient reservoir of potential guerrilla fighters.

A similar argument can be made in relation to the 1978-79 insurgency. As Amin's elite bargain grew more and more exclusionary during the 1970s, a total of 28 Ugandan opposition groups emerged both within and outside the country and began to coordinate their efforts to remove the regime. Given that Amin's 'minority regime' excluded large parts of Ugandan society, the various groups came from almost every tribal and ideological background.[414] It is however no coincidence that the only two rebel movements with significant military muscle – Obote's *Kikoosi Maluum* and Museveni's FRONASA forces from Ankole-Kigezi – hailed from the two areas that arguably suffered from the most serious marginalisation. This was especially the case for Obote's Langi-Acholi constituency that experienced enduringly high levels of exclusion and repression throughout the 1970s.[415] Similarly, Westerners, especially the Banyankole, continued to be systematically denied access to positions of state power. Easterners, by contrast, were treated with relative favour as both the Busoga and Iteso were – at least

---

[413] ACR 1971/1972: B229; ACR 1972/1973: B277p.; ACR 1976-1977: B376pp.; Kyemba 1977: 44p.
[414] For a list of all Ugandan resistance groups and their leaders see ACR 1978/1979: B445p.
[415] ACR 1972/73: B277p.; ACR 1976/1977: B374.

until the late 1970s – comparatively well-represented in the circles of both military and political power. Buganda, finally, was home to many commercial elites that benefited from the Africanisation of trade.[416] Prominent among the latter were Baganda Muslims. Here, Amin benefitted from his alliance with Prince Badru Kakungulu who helped him gain the support of many Baganda, including non-Muslims.[417] Even when Kakungulu became too powerful and was sidelined, the UMSC – led by Baganda Muslims – remained the foundation for the Amin-Baganda alliance and turned out to be an important bedrock for the survival of the regime in all matters that were not military. In the words of Mutibwa,

> 'the Buganda Factor, in the form of the Baganda Muslim community, was something to reckon with in the survival of Amin's regime for the long period it lasted'.[418]

The hour of the UNLA came in mid-1978 when Amin's narrow but powerful base among the Nubian-Kakwa core group started to disintegrate.[419] Increasingly concerned about Amin's excesses, the influential Nubian community in Bombo asked Vice-President Adrisi to push for a civilian Administrator-General. As a consequence, fighting broke out between Amin and Adrisi and caused a split within the innermost circles of the regime. As a result, a mutiny began within one of Amin's most loyal units, the Malire Mechanized Regiment. Even though Amin managed to quell the mutiny, he was now in serious trouble. Trying to cover up for his disintegrating power base, Amin's army invaded Tanzania and occupied the Kagera Salient. Supported by several thousand of Tanzanian soldiers, the UNLA used this occasion to invade their own country and overthrew the Amin regime in April 1979.

THE ANTI-UNLF/OBOTE II INSURGENCIES (1980-1986)

The collapse of the UNLF elite bargain and Obote's return to power produced three main 'losers', including (1) West Nilers; (2) the Baganda; and (3) Museveni with his followers from Ankole-Kigezi. Significantly, all three of these groups reacted to their marginalisation by launching armed insurgencies against the government. In this sense, the five different civil wars that ravaged Uganda during the first half of the 1980s were

---

[416] According to Jorgenson (1981: 314), 'members of the African elite voted with their feet to remain in Uganda, indicating that the calculus of violence and enrichment was such that the opportunities for wealth outweighed the risks of death and disappearance'.
[417] Mutibwa 2008: 159pp.
[418] Ibid.: 167.
[419] ACR 1978/1979: B424pp.

all closely related to the failure of the post-Amin governments to establish a truly inclusive elite bargain.

The West Nile insurgencies

Those that had lost out from the moment the UNLF took power were West Nilers who had monopolised state power under Amin and were now systematically purged from all positions of influence. This became most visible in the case of the Amin's army, which was regarded as a West Nile institution and therefore ousted and driven into Sudan.[420] In the aftermath of the war, the UNLF – allegedly a broad-based coalition inclusive of *all* social groups – made no attempt to reach out to West Nile leaders. In the UNLA – dominated by pro-Obote forces that had suffered most at the hands of Amin's soldiers – the total exclusion of West Nilers was almost to be expected. But their marginalisation became also apparent under Lule and Binaisa who appointed only a single minister from West Nile (see section 4.2.3). The Obote II government included a few West Nilers who had however little constituency in their home areas in that they had been returned uncontested due to absence of voter registration in large parts of West Nile before the 1980 elections.[421] The exclusion from the new elite bargain was worsened by the UNLA's general attitude of stigmatisation and revenge.[422] As a consequence, both former UA soldiers and West Nile civilians were subjected to indiscriminate violent attacks by UNLA soldiers. Throughout the early 1980s, the West Nile territory was at times almost empty with 60.000 refugees in Zaire and 350.000 in Sudan.[423]

Feelings of political and military marginalisation coupled with UNLA violence provided a fertile breeding ground for rebellion. Accordingly, the remnants of Amin's defeated army launched a series of attacks on UNLA targets in West Nile in October 1980, before splitting into two factions.[424] One faction came to be known as the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF), headed by Moses Ali and mainly composed of members of the Lugbara, Aringa and Madi communities. Ex-combatants rationalize the UNRF insurgency in the following terms:

> 'The problem in Uganda is the culture of pushing out a whole army and replacing it with a new one. Then you have people who are so well trained. Then you start harassing the

[420] Lomo & Hovil 2004a: 5pp.
[421] Bwengye 1985: 250pp.
[422] For details see Avirgan & Honey 1982: 225p.
[423] Kasozi 1994: 178p.
[424] Lomo & Hovil 2004a: 5pp.

> former soldiers. What do you expect? Why should the whole of West Nile be forced to feel guilty for Amin's sins? Human beings were pegged to the ground alive, left dying, rotting. So could we just sit and not fight the government of the day? People had to fight against such injustices'.[425]

The UNRF remained in Uganda, scoring a number of victories between 1980 and 1982. Less active was a second faction called the Former Uganda National Army (FUNA) that was essentially composed of the Nubian-Kakwa core of Amin's defeated army. The FUNA – whose leadership remained unclear – retreated into the Sudan and the DRC, launching occasional ambushes against the UNLA. Both rebel groups lost momentum due to internal divisions but continued to attack government forces until the 1985 coup.

The Baganda insurgencies

The second group that had lost out from the UNLF intermezzo were the Baganda who had initially enjoyed a prominent position. With Lule and Binaisa, there had been two Baganda Presidents and both of them had provided their tribesmen with a disproportionate share of appointments (see section 4.2.3). Lule had been especially popular as witnessed by the wild rejoicings upon his inauguration and the mammoth demonstrations after his removal.[426] By the time the period of the UNLF came to an end, the Baganda were not only again excluded from political and military power but also saw their arch-enemy Obote being returned to the Presidency. As a result, they were far more disaffected than any other tribe in the country.

This feeling of betrayal and marginalisation translated into the insurgencies that sprung up in Buganda from early 1981. Accordingly, a group of Baganda monarchists – who had been sidelined with the ousting of Lule – founded the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) and were later, after the removal of Binaisa, joined by a number of Baganda DP centrists.[427] Headed by Andrew Kayiira, the UFM launched two abortive coups attempts in early 1981. From 1982, following the failed attack on the Lubiri Barracks in Kampala[428] and the destruction of UFM training camps by government forces, the UFM lost momentum but continued to exist until 1985. A second rebel group was George Nkwanga's Federal Democratic Movement of Uganda (FEDEMO), which emerged from 1982-83 and was also exclusively based among the Baganda. While some sources

---

[425] Cited after ibid.
[426] Mutibwa 2008: 175pp.
[427] Various interviews; Kasozi 1994: 166pp.
[428] 'Guerrillas Launch Attack on Kampala Barracks, Deaths Reported', *The Associated Press*, 23 February 1982.

indicate that FEDEMO was no more than the successor of UFM[429], the two groups were later separately recognised under the 1985 Nairobi power-sharing agreement (see below). UFM and FEDEMO were both clearly motivated by the perception that the Baganda were excluded from access to state power. Francis Bwengye, for instance, who initially joined UFM and later played a key role in FEDEMO, vehemently criticised the tribally biased composition of the Obote II government and identified this as a major impediment for peace and reconciliation.[430]

The NRA insurgency[431]

The third major social force that had been progressively deprived of influence under the UNLF was Museveni and his followers from Ankole-Kigezi. Originally a key figure in the UNLF, Museveni had been demoted by both Lule and Binaisa, sidelined in the Military Commission and forced to contest multi-party elections he knew he could not win with his only recently created UPM (see section 4.2.3). Afterwards, he faced the prospect of a government led by his arch-rival Obote from whom he could not expect anything.

Museveni has portrayed himself as a principled nationalist who had to fight against a system of 'petit bourgeois' politicians and military officers who maintained power by manipulating sectarian cleavages of religion and ethnicity.[432] The narrative of Museveni as a nationalist who had a programme around which he built considerable unity and adherence to his fight cannot be entirely dismissed.[433] Interestingly, however, he reveals that when the UNLF was destroyed and multi-party elections were announced in late May 1980,

> '[i]t was from that point that some of us knew that we would eventually have to resort to arms yet again to fight the system, and from then on, we decided to make our position very clear'.[434]

The point in time Museveni refers to – the coup by the Military Commission he had little control over and the announcing of multi-party elections he knew he could not win

---

[429] 'Reported Statements by Opponents of the Former Obote Government in Uganda', *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 6 August 1985.
[430] Bwengye 1985: 259p.
[431] For a more extensive discussion of the NRA civil war see Museveni 1997; Amaza 1998; Kasfir 2005.
[432] Museveni 1997.
[433] On the role of nationalist and Marxist ideology in Museveni's struggle see Museveni 1997; Amaza 1998; Kasfir 2005. Note, however, that Museveni's nationalist agenda is at least partially contradicted by the anti-Northern undertone of the NRA insurgency (see below) and the tribal bias in his post-1986 government (see chapter 5).
[434] Museveni 1997: 116.

– is exactly when his own political marginalisation had been sealed. It therefore seems more plausible to argue that the NRA insurgency was mainly motivated by the progressive sidelining of Museveni and his followers within the UNLF. This is implicitly confirmed by Kirunda-Kivejinja, Museveni's long-standing comrade, who locates the beginning of the NRA war in Binaisa's fateful decision to oust Museveni from the Ministry of Defence:

> 'The fall of the UNLF and subsequent events that hinged on the gun as the arbiter of political debate has roots in this decision taken in the Ministry of Defence. It is safe to say that the country would have been spared this ordeal if this reshuffle had not taken place. History could have been different'. [435]

Even after Obote regained power, the formation of a more inclusive government might have prevented the NRA war. Insiders like Francis Bwengye suggest that '[h]ad Obote formed a government of national unity, Museveni would never have gone to the bush'.[436]

Was Museveni fighting his personal exclusion or on behalf of his tribe, the Banyankole? Significantly, and this is often overlooked, Museveni could hardly claim to be fighting on behalf of the Banyankole as a whole. On the contrary, the Banyankole were prominently represented under the UNLF and especially – Ankole being a traditional UPC stronghold – under Obote II (see section 4.2.3). Key to understanding this apparent contradiction are the 'politics of Ankole' with the uneasy relationship between the two main sub-groups – Bairu farmers (the majority) and Bahima cattle owners (the minority). Historically, the UPC in Ankole was dominated by Protestant Bairu.[437] Even though the Bahima – Museveni's group – were also Protestant, they realised that they were being edged out of positions of social significance and therefore voted for the Catholic DP. This in turn became a serious threat for the Protestant Bairu in the UPC who now faced the combined vote of the Protestant Bahima, the Catholic Bairu and the Catholic Banyarwanda. Significantly, the UPC was actively playing on these divisions by labelling FRONASA as 'anti-Bairu'[438] and denying some Bahima – along with the Banyarwanda and Catholic Bairu – the right to vote during the 1980 elections. Also, all Banyankole ministers under Obote II were Protestant Bairu thereby accentuating both the inner-Ankole divisions and the alienation of the Bahima.[439] Altogether, Museveni had only the core support of the small Bahima community and some followers in nearby

---

[435] Kirunda-Kivejinja 1995: 251.
[436] 'The clash of two warlords', *The Monitor*, 13 July 2005.
[437] Kasozi 1994: 186p.
[438] Museveni 1997: 98p.
[439] Interview, Yona Kanyomozi.

Kigezi – a situation that made it impossible to begin the insurgency in Western Uganda. This is precisely why the NRA chose to launch their guerrilla war in Buganda where the opportunity to mobilise popular support was greatest due to the almost unreserved resentment for the pro-Obote forces. In the words of the former NRA guerrilla Jim Muhwezi:

> 'Buganda was very strongly opposed to Obote (...). 99% of them did not like Obote. So it was the best place to operate from (...). They [the Baganda] were so annoyed, they needed someone to organise them into a rebellion'.[440]

While the NRA guerrillas were initially perceived as 'outsiders', the merger with another Baganda rebel group, namely Lule's Uganda Freedom Fighters (UFF), soon helped to boost their support among the Baganda.[441] As a consequence, the NRA became a 'Bantu alliance', which was mostly headed by Bahima commanders and otherwise composed of Baganda foot soldiers. The NRA's anti-tribalist rhetoric notwithstanding, the bush war had a strongly 'anti-Northern' (and especially anti-Acholi) undertone, which reflected the rebels shared hatred for the pro-Obote forces who hailed mostly – even though by no means exclusively – from Northern Uganda. This is even confirmed by otherwise laudatory NRA insiders.[442] Museveni's true motivations were revealed in the often-cited interview with the *Drum* magazine in October 1985:

> 'The problem in Uganda is that the leadership has mainly been from the north. The southerners who are mainly Bantu have played a peripheral role all these years since independence in 1962'.[443]

The Obote II regime did extremely little to accommodate the NRA rebellion. Instead, the situation was considerably worsened by the eviction of the Banyarwanda. In 1982, a total of 75.000 Banyarwanda – most of them Ugandan citizens – were evicted from Ankole and had to move into refugee camps, along with twelve thousand Bahima and Bakiga.[444] The main reason for this violent persecution was that the Catholic Banyarwanda – who had long been considered a threat to the Protestant Bairu establishment along with the Bahima and Catholic Bairu (see above) – had now become identified with the NRM. They suffered at the hands of the party rather than the army and subsequently joined the NRA insurgency en masse whereby a quarter of its forces

---

[440] Interview, Maj.-Gen. Jim Muhwezi.
[441] Kasfir 2005: 283p.
[442] See Amaza 1998: 62.
[443] Cited after Nabudere 2003: 34.
[444] Kasozi 1994: 186pp.

came to be of Rwandese origin.[445] Moreover, Obote failed to consider a political resolution of the conflict. Instead, his UNLA launched a series of large-scale military campaigns against the insurgents and often directed their anger and frustration against Baganda peasants. Faced with unabated rebellion, it was especially Obote himself who displayed a stubborn unwillingness to engage in talks with his arch-rival Museveni. In early 1985, the NRM reportedly sent emissaries to various government officials to negotiate for peace but Obote declined hoping to win an outright victory. [446] This uncompromising attitude contributed to internal regime divisions and ultimately led to the 1985 coup.

THE FAILURE OF THE NAIROBI PEACE ACCORD (1985)

Why did the 1985 Nairobi Peace Accord – a seemingly inclusive power-sharing agreement –not bring about lasting peace? First, there were once again divisions over the distribution of access to positions of state power. On the one hand, there were complaints about Acholi dominance in appointments to government, the army and the parastatals.[447] On the other hand, a key stumbling block was the unresolved scramble for the Ministry of Defence with both the UNLA and NRA knowing that whoever controls the military ultimately holds political power.[448] Second, the agreement threatened vested military interests by providing for the establishment of a national army that would initially number only 8.480.[449] As a consequence, many of the 15.000 UNLA soldiers knew that they would soon be demobilised. Facing a bleak future for employment, they reacted by engaging in looting and murder. The NRA finally used these enduring human rights violations as a pretext to take full control of Kampala in late January 1986 and thereby satisfied their own ambitions for power.

4.4 Competing explanations

What are other factors that account for recurrent civil war in Uganda between 1962 and 1986? As discussed in chapter 1, standard explanations focusing on natural resource availabilities, economic performance, income inequality, ethnic fractionalisation and

[445] Ngoga 1998: 98.
[446] Omara-Otunnu 1987: 162.
[447] Barongo 1989: 83
[448] Omara-Otunnu 1987: 168.
[449] Tindigarukayo 1988: 620.

formal regime type are of little use when trying to understand the seemingly never-ending cycle of insurgencies and counter-insurgencies in post-colonial Uganda.

Moreover, events between 1962 and 1986 confirm my initial contention that *in some cases* horizontal inequalities at the elite level alone are sufficient to cause violent conflict. This is by no means to deny that Uganda has a long history of socioeconomic horizontal inequalities at the mass level that goes back to the colonial period when the British favoured the southern parts of the country (see chapter 3). As a consequence, the Baganda had privileged access to water, health services, education, employment and income throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, whereas the other groups – especially in the North – lagged behind.[450] Significantly, however, these severe mass-level horizontal inequalities can hardly explain the various civil wars between 1962 and 1986. Some insurgencies originated among tribal groups that were clearly privileged in socioeconomic terms but excluded at the elite level. The 1966 'Battle of Mengo', for example, did not reflect the grievances of the broader population in Buganda (who was in fact better off in socioeconomic terms than the rest of the country) but those of the marginalised Mengo elite. Similar arguments can be made for the anti-Obote II insurgencies in Buganda during the early 1980s (NRA, UFM, FEDEMO). Other civil wars originated among tribal groups that were – when compared with the groups in power – in a similar position at the mass level but discriminated against at the elite level. This is true not only for the anti-Amin rebellions but also for the West Nile insurgencies of the early 1980s (FUNA, UNRF). In all of the above cases, the excluded leadership was – despite the absence of relative deprivation at the mass level – able to recruit followers and mobilise violence against the government.

In the end, there is really only one crucial competing explanatory factor to explain recurrent civil war in Uganda between 1962 and 1986, namely *violent repression.* As it has already become evident in section 4.3, all eight civil wars were caused not only by the exclusion of certain tribal groups from the ruling coalition but *also* by concurrent state violence against the excluded groupings. The 1966 'Battle of Mengo', to begin with, was caused not only by the progressive marginalisation of the Baganda monarchists but also by the army's attack on the Kabaka's palace. The anti-Amin rebellions were caused not only by the extremely exclusionary nature of the regime but

[450] For details on socioeconomic horizontal inequalities at the mass level in Uganda see Matovu & Stewart 2001: 270pp.; Klugman et al. 1999.

also by repeated waves of state-directed terror, especially against the Acholi and Langi but also – as time went on – against most other groups. In the words of Museveni and many of my interviewees, Ugandans were jointly taking up arms against Amin 'because he was a killer'.[451] Similarly, the FUNA and UNRF rebellions in West Nile in the early 1980s went back not only to the total exclusion of West Nilers from the post-Amin elite bargain but also to enduring UNLA violence against the local population. To quote the former commander of UNRF, Maj.-Gen. Bamuze:

> 'In 1979, I went into exile (...). We were asking, now what is our future? How can we go back to Uganda? We had to fight because the government was fighting our people in the country'.[452]

The three anti-Obote II insurgencies in Central Region, finally, did not only reflect the political sidelining of both Baganda monarchists and Museveni's followers from the West but also harsh state violence against the Baganda peasantry and Banyarwanda refugees.

What was more important as a trigger of civil war – exclusion or repression? The answer varies from insurgency to insurgency. The 'Battle of Mengo' mainly reflected the escalating power struggle between the government and the Baganda monarchists. As the latter were openly seeking confrontation with the government to redress their marginalisation, the army's attack on the palace merely forestalled an already inevitable conflict. In the UFM and NRA cases, the exclusion aspect was also clearly predominant with state violence against the Baganda peasantry and Banyarwanda refugees only fuelling the ongoing rebellions. The anti-Amin rebellions and the West Nile insurgencies, by contrast, were maybe more triggered by excessive state repression and the imperatives of physical survival. If the Acholi and Langi under Amin and West Nilers under UNLF had only been excluded, the insurgencies might not have occurred in the short-term. In the long run, however, outright exclusion is likely to have caused violent conflict anyway. Moreover, one could argue that violent state repression is largely endogenous to the existence of exclusionary elite bargains. This becomes most evident when looking at Amin's extreme minority regime. In order to maintain the latter, violent repression against the excluded majority was almost inevitable. So even if the UNLA was fighting indiscriminate killings as the most visible aspect of Amin's regime, it was in the end fighting Amin's exclusionary elite bargain that was causing the violence in the first place.

---

[451] Museveni 1997: 33; various interviews.
[452] Cited after Lomo & Hovil 2004a: 6.

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that recurrent civil war in Uganda between 1962 and 1986 goes back to the persistence of mostly exclusionary elite bargains, evident in enduringly low levels of political, economic, military and territorial power-sharing under the Obote I, Amin, UNLF and Obote II governments. This continued failure to fully accommodate the colonial legacy of extremely high ethno-regional fragmentation became the key driver behind the eight civil wars that ravaged the country during its first two and a half decades of independence. At the same time, this chapter has shown that the seemingly never-ending cycles of civil war in Uganda were not only caused by tribal marginalisation but *also* by concurrent violent repression against the excluded groupings. Altogether, the story of Uganda's post-independence instability is a story of exclusion and repression along tribal lines.

5 Fundamental change or just another change of guard? Broad-based politics and civil war in Museveni's Uganda

> 'No one should think that what is happening today is a mere change of guard: it is a fundamental change in the politics of our country. In Africa, we have seen so many changes that change, as such, is nothing short of mere turmoil. We have had one group getting rid of another one, only for it to turn out to be worse than the group it displaced. Please do not count us in that group of people (...)'.[453]

In the last chapter, I have argued that recurrent civil war in Uganda between 1962 and 1986 can be traced back to the persistence of exclusionary elite bargains. In this chapter, I will ask how the country's elite bargain evolved after Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) took power in January 1986. To what extent has the NRM brought about the promised fundamental change by sharing access to positions of state power more equitably between the country's major tribal groups? And how has this affected Uganda's peace and stability?

To find answers to these questions, I will start by discussing the observed levels of violent conflict in post-1986 Uganda (section 5.1). In a second and third step, I will establish the inclusiveness of the NRM elite bargain (section 5.2) and then analyse its impact on peace and stability (section 5.3). I conclude with brief thoughts on competing explanations (section 5.4).

5.1 Conflict levels between 1986 and 2008

Museveni was sworn in as President on 26 January 1986 and has ruled the country ever since. Between 1986 and 1996, his NRM held power on the basis of a 'no-party democracy' (see below) – a transitional political arrangement that was constitutionalised in 1995. In 1996 and 2001, the President and his 'Movement' scored clear victories in two rounds of presidential and parliamentary elections. To be able to stay in power, Museveni had the presidential term limit removed in 2005, while giving in to demands to reinstitute multi-party politics. In 2006, he and his party won the first multi-party elections since 1980 by a large margin, losing only in the North and in parts of the

[453] Yoweri Museveni, 1986 inauguration speech reproduced in 'Museveni 24 years later: Ours is not a mere change of guard; it is a fundamental change', *The Monitor*, 29 January 2010.

East.[454] The Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) emerged as the largest opposition party, followed by UPC, DP, CP and the Justice Forum (JEEMA).

The official rhetoric of reconciliation notwithstanding, the NRM's track record in re-building national unity is mixed at best. Significantly, the Museveni government has faced at least seven civil wars since 1986 – more than any other government in post-colonial Uganda.[455] The main theatre of civil war has been 'Acholiland' in the North where the 1986 uprising by the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA) was soon followed by Alice Lakwena's Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) and Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). While the UPDA and HSM insurgencies ended in 1988, the LRA war dragged on until 2006 making it one of the longest wars in post-colonial Africa. Outside Acholiland, the Teso area in the East witnessed the rebellion by Peter Otai's Uganda People's Army (UPA), which lasted from 1987 to 1992. Moreover, the government faced two insurgencies in West Nile. While the first one was launched by the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) (1995-1997), the second was a revival of the Uganda National Rescue Front (labelled UNRF II) that went back to the bush between 1998 and 2002. Finally, there was also one civil war in Western Uganda, namely the rebellion by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) (1996-2002). There are few reliable estimates on civil war-related deaths under Museveni.[456] It is certain that most casualties occurred during the LRA war, followed by the HSM, ADF, UPDA and UPA insurgencies, while the West Nile wars were clearly less conflict intensive. Altogether, it is roughly estimated that total war-related deaths amount to a staggering 500.000.[457]

Over time, the scope and intensity of civil war have diminished. While the violence peaked during the anti-NRM insurgencies of the late 1980s, the more recent rebellions have never developed the same momentum with lower levels of mobilisation, casualties

---

[454] See Kiiza et al. 2008.

[455] While it is true that the NRM government has also lasted far longer than any of its predecessors, civil war in post-1986 Uganda has often been downplayed in a rather cynical manner, not only within the inner circles of the NRM but also by outside observers. Reinikka & Collier (2001), for instance, herald Uganda as 'the main model of successful postconflict recovery in Africa' where both peace and economic growth have been restored. The civil wars in the North are mentioned 'en passant' but dismissed as peripheral.

[456] Information on war-related deaths and 'effective resistance' is again scarce and contested. Such difficulties notwithstanding, my review of newspaper articles in the Lexis Nexis News database suggests that all seven insurgencies match my definition of civil war. This sets them apart from many other post-1986 splinter rebel groups. The Uganda Amnesty Commission counted a total of 28 rebel groups for the period between 1986 and 2009 ('23,500 Denounce Rebellion', *The New Vision*, 1 October 2009).

[457] Lomo & Hovil (2004b: 4) reported 'hundreds of thousands of deaths', thousands of abductions (mostly children) and 1.4 million displaced people. More recently, the Project Ploughshares (2009) estimated that 500.000 have been killed, 20.000 abducted and 2 million displaced.

and civilian displacement. By the early 2000s, five out of the seven insurgencies (UPDA, HSM, UPA, WNBF, UNRF II) had been formally brought to an end. The ADF has been more or less inactive since 2003, while the LRA has not operated in Uganda since the start of peace negotiations in 2006. Yet, the unity of the country remains fragile. This has become evident in threats of Northern secession[458], rumours about the emergence of new rebel groups[459] and the highly publicised 'Buganda riots'[460] of September 2009.

What explains the persistence of civil war in Museveni's Uganda? And how can one make sense of the more recent decline in violent conflict? In what follows, I will argue that the Northern insurgencies can be traced back to the existence of an exclusionary elite bargain, evident in the lack of political, military and economic power-sharing. At the same time, territorial power has been shared more equitably as a result of the NRM's comprehensive decentralisation policy since the mid-1990s, which has eased conflict over imbalances at the centre and thereby contributed to a decline in violence.

5.2 The NRM elite bargain (1986-2008)

When NRM took power, it found itself in a difficult position. First, the country's political and economic structures had been almost entirely destroyed by the violent excesses of previous regimes, leaving the NRM with very little to build upon. Second, the former guerrilla force had only a very limited political base in that its leadership exhibited a marked tribal bias in favour of the western and southern parts of the country (see chapter 4). As a consequence, the NRM urgently needed a formula that would convince people in all parts of Uganda that it was not just another 'change of guard' but interested in 'fundamental change'. The answer to this problem was a political system that was based on an inclusive 'Movement' rather than traditional political parties.[461] This notion of 'no-party politics' was rooted in Museveni's interpretation of Uganda's post-colonial history as a spiral of violence caused by communally based political parties.[462] The NRM's alternative was 'Movement' democracy where political party activity was banned and elections were held strictly between individual candidates.

---

[458] 'North MPs Threaten to Secede Over Marginalisation', *The New Vision*, 30 April 2009.
[459] 'Mao Confirms New Rebel Group', *The New Vision*, 29 June 2009.
[460] '500 Suspects Held, 14 Dead in City Riot', *The Monitor*, 13 September 2009.
[461] See Kasfir 2000; Oloka-Onyango 2000; Carbone 2008.
[462] Museveni 1997.

A key component of 'Movement' democracy was the promise to establish a broad-based government. The notion of broadbasedness was never clearly defined and therefore somewhat ambiguous in meaning. On the one hand, there was a political understanding of the concept whereby key figures of the old political parties were to be co-opted into the 'Movement'. On the other hand, and more importantly, the concept was clearly linked to the NRM's declared intention to eliminate all forms of ethnic, regional and religious sectarianism.[463] In the end, the essence of broad-based government was to offer the leaders of all groups access to positions of power and influence in order to extend the NRM's reach into Ugandan society. Current and former NRM insiders describe this approach 'as a way of healing the wounds of the past'[464], as an all-encompassing ideology to 'bring everybody on board and build unity'[465].

Yet, as I shall demonstrate below, the NRM's approach of broad-based government was at best partially implemented. At the central state level, the distribution of political, military and economic power has been heavily biased in favour of Southern and Western Uganda. Territorial power, by contrast, has been shared more equitably, evident in the substantial decentralisation policy from the mid-1990s.

POLITICAL POWER-SHARING

> 'The balancing act was always there. I was Prime Minister and I had to form a government balancing groups very consciously. I had to do it. Whenever a minister had to form a committee, he would bring the names to the Prime Minister to do what we call the 'balancing act'. And this 'balancing act' was ethnic, religious, regional, and gender'.[466]

As evident in the above quote, members of the NRM tend to maintain that their government has always been broad-based in nature. Such rhetoric is however in striking contrast to the actual composition of government since 1986.

In terms of political broadbasedness, the NRM did make an initial effort to offer positions to well-known leaders of the old political parties. Accordingly, the first NRM Cabinet did not only include NRM leaders but also well-known representatives of the DP, the UPC or the CP, even in more important positions. However, this approach had

---

[463] See NRM Ten-Point Political Programme, reproduced in Amaza 1998: 242pp.
[464] Interview, Prof. Tarsis Kabwegyere.
[465] Interview, Maj.-Gen. Mugisha Muntu.
[466] Interview, Kintu Musoke.

clear limits. First, there was never a veritable 'coalition government' meant to achieve a settlement with the old parties as political organisations. Instead the focus was solely on co-opting individuals who were 'extrapolated from their political communities', not least to weaken the old political parties.[467] Second, it was always questionable how much power the co-opted ministers actually enjoyed, not least since their deputies were often trusted figures in the NRM's 'inner circles'.[468] Third, political broadbasedness began to fade as early as during the late 1980s when some of the co-opted opposition politicians were dismissed or even imprisoned over political disagreements with the government.[469] By mid-1995, the government had lost all its appearance as an inclusive coalition, evident in the resignation of Paul Ssemogerere (DP) and the dismissal of all ministers who had expressed themselves in favour of a return to a multiparty system.[470]

In terms of ethno-regional cleavages, the NRM was never broad-based to begin with. Despite the introduction of an Anti-Sectarian Law in 1988, the composition of government between 1986 and 2008 has on average been heavily skewed in favour of Southerners and Westerners, especially as far as the more consequential positions in the 'inner core' are concerned (see figures 17a and 17b). As shown in figure 17c, this bias has remained a fairly constant phenomenon since NRM took power. This refutes the often-heard claim that the Museveni government was initially broad-based but then became exclusionary over time.[471]

Unsurprisingly, the main beneficiaries of this favouritism have been groups from Western Uganda, Museveni's home. Between 1986 and 2008, the Westerners' overrepresentation increased from 38.8% to 60.5% (see figure 17c), reflecting rises in the share of ministers (31.3% to 46.7%) and the 'inner core' (54.5% to 61.5%). This means that the West has become more and more visible in government since 1986, in particular in the key positions. The bulk of the latter have gone to the Banyankole – especially to Museveni's Bahima subgroup – who have always been grossly overrepresented (see table 15). The second most influential Western tribe in Museveni's

---

[467] Jimmy Akena recalls that a few prominent UPC leaders were singled out and co-opted, while UPC cadres at lower levels were persecuted, arrested or even killed. In the end, broad-based politics were therefore 'more of a ruse in undermining the old political parties' (Interview, Jimmy Akena).
[468] Kasfir 2000: 67.
[469] Examples include Francis Bwengye (DP – Minister of Commerce), Dawid Lwanga (FEDEMO – Minister of Environmental Protection) and Andrew Kayiira (UFM – Minister of Energy) (Omara-Otunnu 1992: 449).
[470] ACR 1994/1996: B444.
[471] Various interviews; Green 2006: 380; Rubogoya 2007: 72; Carbone 2008: 24.

governments has been the Bakiga. The Banyoro, Batoro and Banyarwanda have been less prominently represented, while the Bakonzo have had no representation.

Figure 17: Ethno-regional composition of government in Uganda, 1986-2008[472]



The second largest share of government appointments has gone to the Baganda who were, at least initially, amply rewarded for their support during the NRA war. Accordingly, Baganda ministers have been extremely prominent in the NRM governments since 1986 (see figure 17 and table 15). This is especially true for the 'inner core' of political power. More recently, however, the Baganda share in government has suffered a serious decline. Between 2000 and 2008, the Baganda

[472] Own data compiled and calculated based on UBOS 2006b; GOU Various Years.

overrepresentation fell from 101% to 38.2% (see figure 17c). Moreover, some of the Baganda ministers who retain prominent portfolios have fallen out with the Mengo and are therefore no longer considered as 'true' representatives of the Buganda Kingdom.[473] Altogether, there is a growing feeling of marginalisation among many Baganda, not least with respect to the increasingly blatant dominance of Westerners. A prominent opposition MP, himself a Muganda, describes the widespread unease in the following terms:

> 'The feeling is that they include you, they make you Vice-President or Prime Minister, but you only do what you have been told. And you can always be shuttled out. People can trace ministers from the West who have been in the government from the beginning to the end. But you cannot say that for anybody from Buganda'.[474]

While the Western-Buganda alliance still remains the bedrock of Museveni's regime, it has clearly become more fragile over time.

Easterners and Northerners, by contrast, have always been underrepresented in government. This is maybe somewhat less the case for Easterners whose underrepresentation has remained fairly constant since 1986 but who have at least received a minimum share in the 'inner core'. Over time, there have always been a few influential Easterners in the upper NRM ranks, mostly – but not exclusively – from Bantu-speaking Busoga (see table 15). Yet, most tribal groups from the East have on average been underrepresented, especially the Itesot – the second largest group – but also the Bagwere, Japadhola, Banyole and Samia. This situation has been criticised even within NRM. In December 2007, Capt. Mike Mukula, NRM Vice-Chairman for Eastern Uganda, openly challenged President Museveni on the grounds that the Western bias in appointments was making the mobilisers' work in the East difficult.[475]

---

[473] The most prominent example would be the current Prime Minister, Apolo Nsibambi, who had fallen out with the Kabaka by the time he was appointed to government and is therefore said to lack a social base in Buganda.

[474] Interview, John Baptist Kawanga.

[475] 'Govt Struggles to End Sectarianism Debate', *The Weekly Observer*, 14 February 2008.

Table 15: Tribal composition of government in Uganda, 1986-2008[476]

Tribe	Population (2002)	Position	1986	1988	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008
Baganda	17,7	'Inner Core'	36,4	36,4	46,2	46,2	46,2	27,3	27,3	50,0	45,5	45,5	36,4	30,8
		Ministers	37,5	36,4	40,0	39,3	39,3	24,0	25,0	31,0	30,8	26,9	25,0	26,7
		Deputies	23,5	17,6	21,4	25,0	28,6	29,0	27,6	32,4	22,7	20,0	22,2	20,5
Banyankole	10,0	'Inner Core'	9,1	9,1	23,1	30,8	30,8	36,4	36,4	16,7	18,2	18,2	27,3	30,8
		Ministers	9,4	9,1	14,3	21,4	21,4	28,0	29,2	27,6	19,2	19,2	25,0	23,3
		Deputies	35,3	41,2	19,0	15,0	14,3	12,9	13,8	2,9	18,2	13,3	11,1	22,7
Basoga	8,9	'Inner Core'	9,1	9,1	7,7	7,7	7,7	9,1	9,1	8,3	9,1	0,0	9,1	0,0
		Ministers	6,3	6,1	5,7	7,1	7,1	12,0	8,3	10,3	3,8	3,8	4,2	10,0
		Deputies	11,8	11,8	7,1	10,0	9,5	6,5	6,9	0,0	6,8	4,4	6,7	6,8
Bakiga	7,2	'Inner Core'	18,2	18,2	7,7	0,0	0,0	9,1	9,1	8,3	9,1	18,2	27,3	23,1
		Ministers	9,4	9,1	8,6	3,6	3,6	4,0	4,2	6,9	11,5	11,5	16,7	10,0
		Deputies	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Iteso	6,7	'Inner Core'	0,0	0,0	7,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
		Ministers	3,1	3,0	5,7	7,1	7,1	8,0	8,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	3,3
		Deputies	0,0	0,0	7,1	0,0	0,0	6,5	3,4	5,9	6,8	8,9	8,9	4,5
Langi	6,4	'Inner Core'	0,0	0,0	0,0	7,7	7,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
		Ministers	3,1	3,0	2,9	3,6	3,6	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	3,3
		Deputies	0,0	0,0	4,8	0,0	0,0	6,5	6,9	2,9	4,5	4,4	4,4	0,0
Acholi	4,9	'Inner Core'	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	7,7
		Ministers	3,1	3,0	2,9	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	3,4	0,0	0,0	0,0	3,3
		Deputies	5,9	5,9	7,1	20,0	19,0	6,5	6,9	5,9	4,5	4,4	4,4	0,0
Bagisu	4,8	'Inner Core'	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	9,1	9,1	0,0	0,0
		Ministers	6,3	6,1	2,9	3,6	3,6	0,0	0,0	0,0	7,7	7,7	4,2	3,3
		Deputies	5,9	5,9	0,0	0,0	0,0	3,2	3,4	5,9	4,5	4,4	2,2	4,5
Lugbara	4,4	'Inner Core'	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
		Ministers	3,1	3,0	2,9	3,6	3,6	0,0	0,0	0,0	3,8	3,8	4,2	0,0
		Deputies	0,0	0,0	2,4	5,0	4,8	3,2	3,4	2,9	2,3	2,2	2,2	0,0
Banya-rwanda	3,3	'Inner Core'	9,1	9,1	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
		Ministers	3,1	3,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
		Deputies	0,0	0,0	4,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,9	2,3	6,7	6,7	2,3

[476] Own data compiled and calculated based on UBOS 2006b; GOU Various Years.

Banyoro	2,9	'Inner Core'	9,1	9,1	0,0	0,0	0,0	9,1	9,1	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
		Ministers	3,1	3,0	5,7	3,6	3,6	4,0	4,2	3,4	3,8	7,7	8,3	6,7
		Deputies	0,0	0,0	7,1	0,0	0,0	6,5	6,9	8,8	9,1	8,9	6,7	4,5
Batoro	2,6	'Inner Core'	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	9,1	9,1	8,3	9,1	9,1	0,0	0,0
		Ministers	3,1	3,0	2,9	3,6	3,6	4,0	4,2	6,9	3,8	3,8	0,0	3,3
		Deputies	5,9	5,9	4,8	5,0	4,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,3	4,4	4,4	2,3
Bakonzo	2,6	'Inner Core'	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
		Ministers	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
		Deputies	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Alur	2,3	'Inner Core'	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
		Ministers	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
		Deputies	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	3,2	3,4	2,9	2,3	2,2	2,2	4,5
Bagwere	1,8	'Inner Core'	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
		Ministers	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	3,3
		Deputies	5,9	5,9	2,4	5,0	4,8	3,2	3,4	2,9	0,0	2,2	2,2	2,3
Japadhola	1,5	'Inner Core'	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
		Ministers	0,0	3,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
		Deputies	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,3	2,2	2,2	2,3
Banyole	1,5	'Inner Core'	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
		Ministers	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
		Deputies	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Madi	1,3	'Inner Core'	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	8,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
		Ministers	3,1	3,0	2,9	0,0	0,0	8,0	8,3	6,9	7,7	7,7	8,3	0,0
		Deputies	5,9	5,9	4,8	5,0	4,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,3	2,2	2,2	2,3
Samia	1,2	'Inner Core'	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
		Ministers	3,1	3,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
		Deputies	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	5,9	0,0	0,0	2,2	4,5
Karamajong	1,1	'Inner Core'	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
		Ministers	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
		Deputies	0,0	0,0	2,4	5,0	4,8	3,2	3,4	5,9	4,5	4,4	4,4	4,5
Others	6,9	'Inner Core'	9,1	9,1	7,7	7,7	7,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	7,7
		Ministers	3,1	3,0	2,9	3,6	3,6	8,0	8,3	3,4	7,7	7,7	4,2	3,3
		Deputies	0,0	0,0	4,8	5,0	4,8	3,2	3,4	2,9	2,3	2,2	2,2	6,8

The position of the North has been even more marginal (see figure 17). While Northerners received a more or less proportional share of deputy ministers (the least influential positions), they were seriously and consistently underrepresented in terms of ministerial appointments. Even more problematically, they were almost entirely excluded from the 'inner core' of political power. Significantly, the marginalisation in government has affected all key tribal groups in Northern Uganda, including the Lugbara in the North-West, the Acholi and Langi in the North and the Karamajong in the North-East (see table 15). In the case of the Acholi and Langi, the dominant groups under Obote, it is even hard to think of any key figure that has remained in government for a substantial period of time. Accordingly, Northerners typically complain that all the 'juicy ministries' are monopolised by Southerners and Westerners.[477]

Furthermore, interview evidence suggests that the position of the few ministerial appointees from the North has been undermined by two forms of 'window dressing'.[478] First, there seems to be a tendency to disempower ministers from the North by appointing 'Westerners' as deputy ministers or permanent secretaries in the same ministry who then wield 'real' power – a claim that is largely backed by my own data. Second, many of the appointees are said to lack a substantial constituency in the North and are therefore not regarded as 'true' representatives of their groups.[479] In the context of the unabated distrust for Museveni and the NRM in the North, the situation has gotten to a point where most ministers from the North lose popular support once they are appointed to government.[480] People like Felix Okot Ogong, one of the few NRM ministers from the North who was actually perceived as representing Northern interests, were soon dropped from government.

The tribal bias in government is mirrored in the ruling party. During the days of 'no-party democracy', the NRM functioned through the structures of the Ugandan state.[481] After the re-introduction of multi-party politics in 2006, it had to organise itself as a political party. The key organ of the ruling party is now the NRM Central Executive Committee (CEC). While the latter is commonly said to wield little influence, it is

---

[477] Interview, Kitara McMot.
[478] Various interviews.
[479] A prominent example is Cosmas Adyebo from Lango who was Prime Minister in the early 1990s.
[480] The most-often cited example would be Daniel Omara-Atubo from Lango, a former member of UPC, who used to be very popular but lost support after his appointment to the Ministry of Lands where he was perceived as propagating the NRM's unpopular policies.
[481] Carbone 2008.

heavily dominated by Westerners (mostly Banyankole) and Baganda (see figure 18 and table 16 below). The only Northerner on the CEC is Moses Ali, a Madi from West Nile.

Figure 18: Ethno-regional distribution of the NRM Central Executive Committee (CEC) in Uganda, 2008[482]



In the civil service, finally, the Museveni government tried to downsize and rationalise the bloated structures it had inherited from previous governments.[483] During the first half of the 1990s, the size of the civil service was cut from about 200.000 to 150.000 but then slowly crept back up reaching about 250.000 in 2007 (see figure 23 below). Civil servants from the northern and eastern parts of the country were allegedly the firsts to suffer from retrenchment after the NRM took power.[484] The overall tribal composition of the civil service is difficult to establish. My data for permanent secretaries in 1991 and 2007 again show a strong bias in favour of the Baganda and Westerners (mostly Banyankole) – a bias that has become worse over time (see figure 19 and table 16 below). Also, there is evidence that the North is marginalised even at the lower levels of the civil service. In a recent parliamentary debate, Felix Okot Ogong, NRM MP from Dokolo County Lira, complained:

> 'I have clear records here that even in our administrative service in this government the North is not treated equally. When you look at the PS level, we have only one. At the under secretaries' level, from West Nile to Teso we have only one, that is Olon Atipo. When you go to principle assistant secretaries, we have only one but they have the majority. Many of these have stayed in the same posts for long without promotion (...). There were seven positions that were advertised for under secretaries. Six were filled and none of them came

[482] Own data compiled and calculated based on UBOS 2006b; NRM 2008.
[483] Mwenda & Tangri 2005: 456pp.
[484] Interview, Cecilia Ogwal.

from the North, and the person that was not promoted was from the North. I went to the principal assistant secretaries and 18 officers were promoted but none from the North. Members of Parliament, these are the people who plan for government. They are the people who plan for the entire country. When part of the country is not integrated within the planning, then that is a sign of doom to our people'.[485]

Figure 19: Ethno-regional distribution of permanent secretaries in Uganda, 1991 & 2007[486]



MILITARY POWER-SHARING

In the army, arguably still the locus of real power in Uganda, tribal imbalances are even more pronounced. This is maybe less the case at the level of the rank-and-file where the NRM made efforts for tribal balancing. Accordingly, the government introduced a quota system whereby each district is required to send a specific number of recruits to the army.[487] Moreover, many of the defeated armies were absorbed into the NRA (later renamed Uganda People's Defence Forces – UPDF), including the UNLA, FEDEMO, UNRF, UPDA and UPA.[488] It is difficult to say to what extent these measures have been successful. Insiders suggest however that the composition of the rank-and-file is now relatively balanced.[489]

---

[485] GOU 2009a: col. 3.11.
[486] Own data compiled and calculated based on UBOS 2006b; GOU 1991, 2008a.
[487] Muhereza & Omurangi Otim 1998: 199.
[488] Mudoola 1991: 239; 'Uganda to incorporate former rebel forces'. *Xinhua News Service*, 10 November 1988.
[489] Interview, Maj.-Gen. Mugisha Muntu.

Figure 20: Ethno-regional composition of the army command in Uganda, 2007[490]



The UPDF officer corps, by contrast, remains heavily biased in favour of Westerners. Complaints about the 'entrenchment of Bahima/Banyankole/Banyarwanda hegemony' surfaced in the late 1980s.[491] By the mid-1990s, discontent within the army was rising due to the fact that Westerners – and in particular the Bahima – were not only still monopolising the army command but also benefitting from rapid promotions, largely at the expense of Baganda officers.[492] This situation has not changed until today.[493] Since 1986, no less than five out of six Army Commanders were from Ankole (Elly Tumwine, Salim Saleh, Mugisha Muntu, James Kazini and Aronda Naykairima), and all but one (Muntu) were from the Bahima subgroup. Saleh is even Museveni's brother, while Kazini is a distant cousin to Museveni's wife. The only non-Munyankole Army Commander was Jeje Odongo, an Itesot, who is reported to have yielded very little real influence.[494] Moreover, all officers appointed to the rank of full general since 1986 are Bahima – Museveni, Tumwine, Tinyefuza, Nyakirima and Saleh.[495]

The heavy Western bias is mirrored in the current distribution of the 23 UPDF Top Command positions (see figures 20a and 20b). Here, Westerners account for 61% of all

---

[490] Own data compiled and calculated based on UBOS 2006b; GOU 2008b.
[491] ACR 1987/1988: B446p.
[492] ACR 1994-1996: B448; Muhereza & Omurangi Otim 1998: 199.
[493] A good case in point is Museveni's own son, Lt.-Col. Kainerugaba Muhoozi, who has benefited from extremely rapid promotion, whereas many Baganda officers who joined the army with him are still secondary lieutenants or cadets.
[494] Various interviews.
[495] 'Does Museveni favour Bahima kinsmen?, '*The Independent*', 22 February – 6 March 2008.

positions, including 44% Banyankole (mostly Bahima) (see table 16). They also monopolise the top seven strategic positions.[496] The Baganda are also overrepresented, while Easterners and Northerners are again seriously underrepresented. The ethno-regional bias in the UPDF officer corps becomes less pronounced when analysing the current distribution of the top five army ranks (see figures 20a and 20b).[497] Interestingly, the data show that Northerners – especially the Acholi (see table 16) – are by now more prominently represented within the top five army ranks. While many of them are former rebels who were allowed to retain their ranks but wield little influence[498], at least a few appear to occupy relatively influential positions.[499] Insiders agree however that it is especially at the level of the junior ranks that attempts are made to reach out to other regions.[500] The ambitions of young cadets from other parts of the country are then typically frustrated by denying them adequate training and promotion.

Altogether, the Banyankole-Bahima dominance in the army remains firmly entrenched. Interestingly, the paramount role of the 'historicals' from Western Uganda is even enshrined in the 2005 UPDF Act that explicitly mentions 20 such historicals and grants them a lifelong right to sit on the top two military bodies, namely the High Command and the Defence Forces Council.[501] This clearly shows that the UPDF is still first and foremost Museveni's army, a partisan organisation that owes allegiance not to the state but rather to the President and what he considers 'his' people. The latter are not only defined by their tribal background but also by political loyalty to the President. Even though these two criteria coincide in most cases, independent-minded officers from the West who support a professional army tend to be sidelined. A prominent example would be the former Army Commander Maj.-Gen. Mugisha Muntu, himself a Munyankole but from the Bairu subgroup.

---

[496] These include the Commander of Defence Forces (CDF), the Deputy Commander of Defence Forces (DCDF), the Joint Chief of Staff (JCOS), the Commander Land Forces (CLF), the Commander Air Forces (CAF), the Chief of Staff Land Forces (COS-LF) and the Chief of Staff Air Forces (COS-AF).
[497] General, Lieutenant General, Major General, Brigadier and Colonel.
[498] Examples include the two former LRA commanders Brig. Kolo and Brig. Banya.
[499] Relatively influential Northerners include the Chief Political Commissar (CPC), Francis Okello, and two of the current division commanders, Lucky Kidega and Charles Otema Owany (all Acholi).
[500] Various interviews.
[501] GOU 2005.

Table 16: Tribal distribution of key positions in the ruling party, the civil service and the army in Uganda, 1991-2008[502]

Tribe	Population (2002)	NRM NEC (2008)	Permanent Secretaries (1991)	Permanent Secretaries (2007)	Top UPDF command (2007)	Top five UPDF ranks (2007)
Baganda	17,7	28,6	26,3	33,3	26,1	28,0
Banyankole	10,0	19,0	21,1	33,3	43,5	28,0
Basoga	8,9	9,5	0,0	4,8	0,0	1,3
Bakiga	7,2	9,5	5,3	4,8	8,7	6,7
Iteso	6,7	4,8	7,9	0,0	4,3	4,0
Langi	6,4	0,0	10,5	4,8	0,0	0,0
Acholi	4,9	0,0	2,6	4,8	8,7	13,3
Bagisu	4,8	0,0	2,6	4,8	0,0	0,0
Lugbara	4,4	0,0	2,6	0,0	0,0	1,3
Banyarwanda	3,3	0,0	2,6	4,8	0,0	0,0
Banyoro	2,9	9,5	2,6	0,0	4,3	2,7
Batoro	2,6	0,0	7,9	4,8	4,3	2,7
Bakonzo	2,6	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Alur	2,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1,3
Bagwere	1,8	4,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Japadhola	1,5	0,0	5,3	0,0	0,0	2,7
Banyole	1,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Madi	1,3	4,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,7
Samia	1,2	4,8	2,6	0,0	0,0	0,0
Karamajong	1,1	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	4,0
Others	6,9	4,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	1,3
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

Beyond the regular army, Museveni's Uganda has witnessed the proliferation of formal and informal security organisations.[503] Out of about 30 different security outfits, some are statutory, including, among others, the Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (CMI), the Internal Security Organisation (ISO) or the External Security Organisation (ESO). Many others are of non-statutory nature. Carved out of the army, the police or the statutory intelligence services, they typically operate independently of their mother organisations and report directly to the President. Examples include the Presidential Guard Brigade (PGB), the Joint Anti-Terrorism Taskforce (JATT), the Civic Defence Unit (CDU), the Popular Intelligence Network (PIN), the Black Mamba Squad or the Kalangala Action Plan. These armed units are an important source of jobs that the President hands out to his supporters. Observers agree that 'most of these informal security outfits are stuffed with the president's villagemates, relatives, and tribesmen as these are deemed to be most loyal'.[504] Instructive in this respect is the example of the PGB, which is widely considered as Museveni's personal militia in charge of the army.

[502] Own data compiled and calculated based on UBOS 2006b; GOU 2008b.
[503] 'Museveni's many security organs: A ticking time bomb', *The Independent*, 6-12 December 2009.
[504] Ibid.

It has some 10.000 personnel, mostly Banyankole (Bahima), and is very privileged in terms of resources and equipment, including control over the Mechanised Brigade in Masaka.

ECONOMIC POWER-SHARING

The Ugandan economy has undergone comprehensive liberalisation since 1986, most notably in the parastatal sector that had been a source of patronage under previous regimes. Before the launch of privatisation in 1992, there were more than 140 parastatals, most of which were majority-owned by the government.[505] To date, 89 public enterprises have been divested, while another 33 companies were liquidated. Ironically, this process of structural economic reform seems to have created more rather than fewer opportunities for patronage deployment – opportunities that have again mostly been to the benefit of Westerners and Southerners.

Figure 21: Ethno-regional distribution of employment in key semi-autonomous agencies in Uganda, 1996-2008[506]



First, the opening of the economy created a need for institutions to regulate the liberalized sectors.[507] Accordingly, the government began to establish specialised statutory bodies to carry out the newly emerging economic and administrative tasks.

---

[505] GOU 2008c.
[506] Own data compiled and calculated based on UBOS 2006b; 'Uganda: Baganda Hold Most Jobs in Revenue Body', *The New Vision*, 29 January 2008; UCDA Various Years.
[507] See Mwenda & Tangri 2005: 456pp.; Mwenda 2007: 30p.

The early 1990s saw the creation of semi-autonomous agencies such as the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), the Uganda Investment Authority (UIA) or the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), soon followed by 'development authorities' for cotton, coffee, tea and tobacco, which replaced the old marketing boards. Moreover, the task of liberalising the telecommunications, power-generation, and broadcasting industries was assigned to new regulatory bodies. By 2003, the country had 95 semi-autonomous agencies that commanded huge budgets and provided nearly 50.000 people with well-paid employment. All available evidence indicates that the NRM government has used these agencies to 'reward its political and ethnic clients from the south-western part of the country with jobs'.[508] Such tribally-based recruitment has repeatedly raised concerns in both the press and parliament. Most recently, a Northern MP presented Parliament with a list, which details the ethno-regional distribution of jobs in a total of 87 remaining parastatals, semi-autonomous agencies and commissions.[509] The document showed a very marked bias against the eastern and northern parts of the country. Such claims are supported by my own data for two of the country's key authorities. As shown in figures 21a and 21b, Easterners and Northerners are grossly underrepresented in both the URA and the Uganda Coffee Development Authority (UCDA).

Second, the privatisation process itself was used for patronage deployment. Of the 89 privatised companies, 46 were sold to Ugandan investors, while the rest was acquired by foreign buyers.[510] The process was however from the beginning undermined by irregularities. Critics typically deplore the non-transparent manner of the exercise, the favouring of foreign buyers at the expense of indigenous investors and the undervalued selling of state assets to supporters within the innermost circle of the NRM.[511] Most stories of cronyism and corruption concerned the President's relatives who were accused of overly benefitting from privatisation. The undisputed protagonists in this respect were Salim Saleh (Museveni's brother) and Sam Kutesa (Museveni's in-law) who were both heavily involved in the scandals surrounding the divestitures of various companies.[512] A highly dubious role in all this was played by the Minister of State for Privatisation, Matthew Rukikaire, whose family had long been closely associated with Museveni and his wife. Despite public criticism, Saleh and Kutesa were publicly

[508] Okuku 2002: 38.
[509] GOU 2009b: col. 7.17.
[510] GOU 2008c.
[511] Various interviews.
[512] For details see Tangri & Mwenda 2001: 118pp.

defended by the President and never faced criminal charges – a situation that was hardly surprising given that the heads of anti-corruption agencies were themselves mostly loyal supporters from Museveni's home region. All this shows that privatisation has by no means put an end to the corruption and favouritism that hitherto characterised the bloated parastatal sector. While the flagship assets were mainly distributed among Westerners, some of the smaller assets were awarded to political supporters in all parts of the country.[513] This can be interpreted as a form of rent-sharing meant to appease the local leadership.

On the whole, the process of economic reform has created new avenues of rent deployment that have mainly benefitted the President's ethno-regional core constituency. This limited extent of economic power-sharing may be partially offset by the fact that the downsizing of the state has generally increased economic opportunities outside the state. The recent growth of the non-state economy has 'created the opportunity for people to look elsewhere than government', which was not possible before.[514] As economic opportunities have spread, even those without close connections to the Museveni regime may benefit. Given the fact that educational and economic opportunities have always been concentrated in the south-western parts of the country, it is however doubtful whether the peripheral areas in the North and East will really benefit from these changes, at least in the short- and medium term.

Interestingly, ethno-regional imbalances at the centre involve an increasingly visible element of 'family rule' whereby the President's own relatives are prominently represented in the country's political, military and economic structures (see table 17). In this context, marriage within narrow tribal confines seems to play an important role in securing a loyal 'inner core' and guaranteeing regime survival.[515] Museveni's wife is also a Muhima, while all his children are married to Bahima. Most high-ranking military officers have married strategically to gain access to the 'inner circles' of the regime. NRM heavyweights like Sam Kutesa or Maj.-Gen. Jim Muhwezi may disagree here and there with the President but nonetheless remain closely connected through marriage. These family connections provide the regime with a unique character and give rise to a degree of unity that should not be underestimated.

---

[513] Examples include the Acholi Inn (Col. Otema Awany – Acholi), the Lira Hotel (Sam Engola – Langi), the Soroti Hotel (Mike Mukula – Itesot) or the Mount Moroto Hotel (Cornelius Kodet – Karamajong).
[514] Interview, Prof. Joe Oloka-Onyango.
[515] Interview, Dr. Sallie Simba Kayunga.

Table 17: Museveni's family tree[516]

	NAME	DEGREE OF KINSHIP	POSITION IN 2009
POLITICS	Gen. Salim Saleh (Caleb Akandwanaho)	Museveni's younger brother	Presidential Advisor on Defence (formerly MoS for Micro-Finance and army commander)
	Janet Kataha Museveni	Museveni's wife	MoS for Karamoja Affairs and Member of Parliament
	Maj. Bright Rwamirama	Museveni's cousin	MoS for Agriculture and Member of Parliament
	Maj. Gen. Jim Muhwezi	Museveni's in-law	Member of Parliament (formerly Minister of Health)
	Sam Kutesa	Museveni's in-law	Minister of Foreign Affairs
	Moses Byaruhanga	Museveni's in-law	Presidential Assistant on Political Affairs
MILITARYY	Lt. Col. Muhoozi Keinerugaba	Museveni's son	Commander of Special Forces under the Presidential Guard Brigade
	Maj. Sabiiti Magyenyi	Museveni's cousin	Overall commander of the elite Presidential Guard Brigade
	Col. Kateera	Cousin of Museveni's wife	Second commander the Gulu-based 4th Division
ECONOMY	Edwin Karugire	Museveni's son-in-law	Real estate agent who handles many government contracts
	Geoffrey Kamuntu	Museveni's son-in-law	Owns a procurement firm that does oil-related consultancy work
	Hannington Karuhanga	Cousin of Museveni's wife	Chairman of a leading coffee exporting company (UGACOF) and a director in Stanbic Bank

TERRITORIAL POWER-SHARING

At the national level, the NRM has largely replicated the tribal favouritism of earlier regimes. In this sense, it has been little more than just another 'change of guard'. At the local level, by contrast, there are indeed signs of far-reaching change. Here, the NRM government adopted a decentralisation policy, which gives local authorities substantial political, administrative and fiscal powers and is therefore considered as 'one of the most far-reaching local government reform programmes in the developing world'.[517]

In 1987, the NRM introduced political decentralisation by spreading its system of 'Resistance Councils' (RCs), with their origins in the bush war period, throughout the entire country. Accordingly, the existing RC system was converted into a pyramidal, five-tier structure of Local Councils (LCs), linked through complex political and administrative arrangements (see figure 22).[518] In rural areas, the highest tier is the district (LCV), followed by counties (LCIV), sub-counties (LCIII), parishes (LCII) and villages (LI), whereas urban areas are divided into the city of Kampala (LCV), municipalities (LCIV), towns (LCIII), wards (LCII) and zones (LCI). Significantly, LCs were given decision-making functions on all matters except security, national planning, immigration, foreign affairs, and national projects. Most executive decisions are taken at

[516] Compiled based on 'Family rule in Uganda', *The Independent*, 11 March 2009.
[517] Francis & James 2003: 325.
[518] See Steffensen et al. 2004; Ahmad et al. 2006; Ssewankambo et al. 2008.

the level of the districts and municipalities.[519] Districts, municipalities, sub-counties and towns are headed by an elected executive (the chairperson) and a Local Government Council, composed of directly elected councillors.[520] At the district level, the central government is represented through the Resident District Commissioner (RDC).

Figure 22: Local government and administrative units in Uganda, 2006[521]



Administrative decentralisation followed the political decentralisation process apace. The devolution of responsibility for a large number of key public services, including primary education and health services, required substantial administrative capacity at the local level. Most importantly, local governments were delegated to administer service delivery under the Poverty Action Fund (PAF) – a share that reached up to 70% in the early 2000s.[522] As a consequence, the number of local civil servants expanded considerably (see figure 23). Most of the administrative and technical staff is concentrated at the LCV and LCIII level. The Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) and

---

[519] The lower-level decision-making authorities are the sub-counties, towns and divisions, while parishes and wards are considered as administrative units supporting their upper structures.

[520] In rural areas, chairpersons and councillors are elected at the district, sub-county, and village levels, while in urban areas, they are elected at the city, municipality, town, division, and cell levels. At the remaining levels, the chairpersons are selected by electoral colleges consisting of lower-level councillors. Operations are conducted through five-member executive committees selected by the chairperson, and endorsed by the Council.

[521] Ssewankambo et al. 2008: 137. Note that the boxes refer to institutions with status as LGs, whereas the oval figures refer to the level of institutions with only administrative status.

[522] Ahmad et al. 2006: 8.

the town clerk are the heads of public service and chief accounting officers for the district and city, leading an elaborate administrative system with several sector departments. To support local government administration, several statutory bodies have been created, including, among other, the District Service Commission in charge of recruitment and firing of local civil servants, the District Land Board in charge of land issues and the Tender Board in charge of procurement.

Figure 23: Size of the civil service in Uganda, 1993-2007[523]



Political and administrative devolution would be incomplete without fiscal decentralisation – the backbone of any decentralised system. The extent of fiscal decentralisation in Uganda is high by regional and even interregional standards, with the local governments' share of total government expenditure rising from 25.2% in 1999 to 35.2% in 2005.[524] Correspondingly, the size of local revenue almost quintupled between 1998 and 2006 (see figure 24a) whereby locally available revenue as percentage of total government revenue increased from 19.8% to 31.1% (see figure 24b). On the downside, and as almost everywhere in the developing world, fiscal decentralisation has been rather modest with respect to local revenue-generation. Even though local authorities are constitutionally empowered to raise revenue through local taxation, the latter's share in total local revenue has fallen from about 15% in 1998 to only some 5% in 2006 (see

[523] Compiled and calculated based on Ssewankambo et al. 2008: 141.
[524] IMF 2009.

figure 24a).[525] This already narrow tax base has been further undermined by the recent abolishment of the Graduated Income Tax (GT), which had previously accounted for more than two thirds of local tax revenue.[526] As a consequence, local governments are highly reliant on grants from central government that now contribute more than 90% of local revenue. Moreover, almost 90% of these grants are of conditional nature (see table 18), i.e. they are earmarked by the centre for the provision of specific services. The local governments' scope in allocating local revenue is thus limited.

Figure 24: Local revenue in Uganda, 1998-2006[527]



Interestingly, the process of decentralisation has been accompanied by an increase in the number of local government units. While the country had 22 districts when the NRM took power in 1986, the number has since then literally exploded to no less than 94 in 2009[528] – a development that is increasingly criticised for its economic non-viability not only in the public[529] but also in the higher ranks of the NRM.[530]

---

[525] Ahmad et al. (2006: 11p.) report that the share of locally generated revenue amounted to as much as 80% in the early stages of the decentralisation process.
[526] Steffensen et al. 2004.; Muhumuza 2008: 68p. Note that the GT grew out of the colonial hut tax and, after independence, was imposed by law on every male person of the apparent age of 18 and every mature female with an income (Cammack et al. 2007: 32pp.). Historically, GT revenues went to central government but, with the introduction of decentralisation under the NRM, it was decided that the GT would be collected by local governments.
[527] Compiled based on IMF 2009.
[528] 'Govt Names Fourteen New Districts', *The New Vision*, 19 May 2009. For further details see Green 2008.
[529] 'Too Many Districts Burden to Government', *The New Vision*, 4 December 2008; 'Can The Country Afford 200 Districts?', *The New Vision*, 23 October 2009.
[530] 'Otafiire Shuns Creation of New Districts', *The New Vision*, 30 March 2009.

Table 18: Grants from central government in Uganda, 1995-2007 (in billion UGX)[531]

Year	1995/96		1997/98		1998/99		1999/00		2000/01		2001/02	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Conditional grants	77,2	65,5	170,6	76,0	220,9	77,0	320,2	82,3	418,8	83,4	533,2	87,3
Unconditional grants	40,6	34,5	54,3	24,0	64,4	23,0	66,8	17,2	79,1	15,8	73,8	12,1
Equalisation grants	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,0	0,5	4,0	0,8	3,9	0,6
Total	117,8	100,0	224,9	100,0	285,2	100,0	389,0	100,0	502,0	100,0	610,9	100,0
Year	**2002/03**		**2003/04**		**2004/05**		**2005/06**		**2006/07**			
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%		
Conditional grants	576,0	87,7	639,8	88,0	714,4	88,7	741,8	85,8	767,0	88,8		
Unconditional grants	76,9	11,7	83,6	11,5	87,5	10,9	119,7	13,8	93,3	10,8		
Equalisation grants	4,2	0,6	3,3	0,5	3,5	0,4	3,5	0,4	3,5	0,4		
Total	657,1	100,0	726,7	100,0	805,5	100,0	864,9	100,0	863,8	100,0		

What are the main drivers behind decentralisation? The government has argued that decentralisation favours popular participation, accountability and improved service delivery:

> 'In sum, decentralisation is a democratic reform, which seeks to transfer political, administrative, financial, and planning authority from the centre to local government councils. It seeks to promote popular participation, empower local people to make own decisions, and enhance accountability and responsibility. It also aims at introducing efficiency and effectiveness in the generation and management of resources and in the delivery of services'.[532]

Yet, there is strong reason to argue that the practice of decentralisation has been driven by political objectives rather than administrative efficiency or popular participation.[533] More specifically, decentralisation has been used to build political support in all parts of the country by 'buying off' local leadership through access to political influence, paid employment and government resources.[534] The number of included elites at the local level is considerable. Mwenda & Tangri estimated that more than 400.000 local councillors were receiving government salaries or sitting allowances in 2003[535] – a number that has surely grown ever since. Combined with the almost 200.000 civil servants employed in the local administration (see figure 23), there are well-above

---

[531] Compiled and calculated based on Ssewankambo et al. 2008: 137.
[532] GOU 1994b.
[533] For critical reflections on whether decentralisation has advanced popular participation and service delivery see Golooba-Mutebi 2005; Steiner 2007; Morris 2009.
[534] Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain data on whether local employment and decentralised budgets have been distributed equitably between competing tribal groups. Yet, anecdotal interview evidence suggests that there is no tribal bias in the distribution of the spoils of decentralisation (various interviews). This is supported by the fact that 45 out of 80 districts in 2007 were located in the less populated North-East (23 in Northern Province, 22 in Eastern Province), while the more populated South-West had 'only' 35 districts (19 in Western Province, 16 in Central Province) (Uganda Districts Information Handbook 2007). This can be interpreted as an attempt to build support among the local leadership of the otherwise marginalised North-East.
[535] Mwenda & Tangri 2005: 457.

500.000 local elites across the country who have benefitted from decentralisation. Critics argue that such 'co-optation strategy' is considered less expensive than delivering adequate services to the people.[536]

Significantly, and this is key to effective territorial power-sharing, the available evidence suggests that these jobs are overwhelmingly filled with locals, i.e. local councillors and civil servants in Gulu district are typically Acholi, while those in Jinja District are mostly Busoga, etc. A recent study by Therkildsen & Tidemand, for instance, found that staff in local government is mostly recruited locally (typically from the same tribal group or even sub-group in the district), not least since 'sons and daughters of the soil' are considered 'more understanding' of community problems.[537] Wherever this is no longer the case, locals have tended to protect 'their' share of territorial power. This has become evident in Bunyoro where the 'indigenous' people vehemently complained that Bakiga settlers had taken over important positions in local government. In line with the political rationale of decentralisation, President Museveni reacted by publicly proposing to 'ring-fence' local leadership positions in the whole of Bunyoro region for the indigenous people, except in urban areas.[538]

The recent proliferation of new districts has to be situated in the context of the return to multi-party politics from 2006. Faced with a dwindling political base in the country, the NRM has used district creation to undermine opposition and win broad electoral support. This strategy, which has been largely successful,[539] is succinctly summarised by an opposition MP:

> 'Everywhere the President sees opposition, he creates a district'.[540]

At the same time, local leaders have sought to exploit the logic of decentralisation and actively mobilised for their own autonomous district where they would get a surer piece of the 'national cake'. Tribal differences are often used to justify the creation of new districts:[541]

> 'Whenever you hear of a new district, there is some ethnicity involved (...). In fact, each group thinks that if you get district, you get services closer to you and get attached. Because

---

[536] Interview, Peter Walubiri.
[537] Therkildsen & Tidemand 2007: 71. See also Francis & James 2003.
[538] 'Museveni's letter: Guidance on Banyoro Bafuuriki question', *The Daily Monitor*, 31 July 2009.
[539] See Green 2010.
[540] Interview, Hussein Kyanjo.
[541] Evidence on the influence of ethnicity on district creation remains however ambiguous. While Saito (2003) concludes that the splitting created more ethnic homogeneity in each district, Green (2010) finds no evidence that ethnicity has played a primary role in the creation of new districts over the past two decades.

> then you can get a job in the district, you can get a cow (...). That is what people are pressing for because at the centre they do not see themselves. When you get a new district, you get a new MP, you get a woman MP coming from your area, you go to the dining table'.[542]

Altogether, decentralisation has brought about a degree of territorial autonomy that is unusual by historical standards. While the process is increasingly inefficient in economic terms, inclusive elite politics at the local level have helped the NRM to 'buy' support throughout the territory. In this context, the described limits to fiscal decentralisation are no contradiction since the emphasis on grants has allowed the centre to retain sufficient control over the 'politics of patronage'. Nevertheless, a number of recent changes indicate that the degree of territorial power-sharing is becoming more constrained. First, the already mentioned abolition of the GT in 2005 has seriously constrained the operations of local authorities, which depended on it for general administration.[543] This means that local governments are often no longer able to pay salaries to full-time district leaders, sitting and transport allowances to councillors as well as pensions to their retired employees. Second, and closely related to the problem of inadequate funds, the central government had to take over the salaries of top local government political leaders, while also re-centralising the power to recruit and control key local civil servants (including the CAOs and town clerks). Third, political control over district procurement – a key site of rent-seeking[544] – was removed from the local leaders and transferred to centrally controlled civil servants.

5.3 The NRM elite bargain and civil war onset

> 'The people from Western Uganda took it as their turn to lead Uganda and therefore fell into the same trappings as the first governments: Recruit your tribespeople to the army, fill all the public service positions with your people and disempower the rest of society. And of course this leads only to one response: Fight back! Just fight back!'.[545]

How has the combination of exclusion at the centre and inclusion in local government affected the country's peace and stability since 1986? In what follows, I will argue that the ethno-regional bias at the centre was a key driving force behind the various anti-NRM insurgencies. Since the mid-1990s, however, violent conflict over imbalances at the centre has been eased by the accelerating process of decentralisation, which has

---

[542] Interview, John Baptist Kawanga.
[543] Cammack et al. 2007: 32pp.; Muhumuza 2008: 71pp.
[544] For details see Muhumuza 2008: 74.
[545] Interview, Salaamu Musumba.

provided the local leadership in all parts of the country with access to employment and resources and thereby integrated them into the elite bargain.

THE ACHOLI REBELLIONS

In Northern Uganda, Museveni was widely perceived as 'a man of Southern Uganda' who had removed 'their own government' whereby the NRM victory came to be interpreted as one of the South over the North.[546] The feeling of defeat and disempowerment was particularly pronounced in Acholiland – the locus of the most violent and sustained anti-NRM rebellions. Here, the loss of state power had dramatic dimensions. In July 1985, for the first time in Ugandan history, both political and military supreme positions were held by Acholi (see chapter 4). Only six months later, the NRM had set aside the power-sharing provisions of the Nairobi Peace Accord – causing a long-standing sense of betrayal – and ousted the Acholi from all positions of real power. As the NRM failed to mobilise the North politically by incorporating its leaders into its ranks (see section 5.2), it looked like a 'Southern government, as regionally exclusive as the previous regimes'.[547] Even more consequentially, the loss of military power – the 'traditional' domain of Acholi influence – was perceived as particularly humiliating, not least since it was now in the hands of the Banyankole. This is well-explained by the current RDC of Gulu District, Walter Ochora, who is himself an Acholi and a former participant in the UPDA insurgency:

> 'The Acholi (...) think they are very strong, they are very fit because they eat millet. And other tribes like the Banyankole, they call them opoko. Opoko is a goat (...). So they say the Banyankole are lazy, they cannot do anything as far as the army is concerned (...). When Museveni overthrows the government, the people cannot contemplate how a weak tribe could displace them from the army. When they hear Aronda, the CDF, is a Munyankole, when they hear the Chief of Staff is a Muturo, when they hear this, they remember those past days of glory when they used to command. And therefore what is now their alternative since the army has been hijacked from them?'[548]

It is in this overall context that the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA) launched the first Acholi rebellion in August 1986. Often described as the 'war of the generals', the insurgency was led by a section of the Okellos' ousted army officers who had fled north after the NRA victory. According to its political wing, the principal goal of the UPDA was

---

[546] Various interviews.
[547] Mahmood Mamdani, cited after Branch 2005: 12.
[548] Interview, Walter Ochora.

'to vindicate the right of the people from all parts of the country to participate in government'.[549]

Behind this lay the generals' determination to fight in order to negotiate for readmission into the military and receive an equitable share in national government, which they perceived to be heavily dominated by Westerners.[550] Feelings of marginalisation were coupled with the excessive atrocities that the NRA committed in Acholiland. Ironically, these atrocities began in early 1986 when the scattered former UNLA (and future UPDA) leaders were in a very weak position and had little or no political legitimacy among the broader Acholi population.[551] Wrongly assuming that the Acholi population was the mass base for a still-existent Northern military force, the NRA expected deep popular resistance and behaved as if occupying enemy territory – thereby undertaking, in the words of Adam Branch, 'a counter-insurgency without the insurgency'. This entailed massive anti-civilian violence, including a veritable 'witch-hunt' for former UNLA soldiers.[552] Finally, the Acholi were also alienated by an unprecedented looting of their wealth by Karamajong cattle-rustlers in 1986-87, which the NRA soldiers did not prevent or even colluded in.[553] Altogether, feelings of political and military exclusion, the experience of NRA violence and the loss of cattle provided a fertile breeding ground for the UPDA civil war. The latter was brought to an end through the Gulu Peace Accord on 17 March 1988, which guaranteed 2000 UPDA officers and soldiers reintegration into the NRA.[554] While this satisfied the immediate concerns of some rebels, others had either left before or now refused to surrender. This was not least due to the fact that the peace deal did not address the wider issues of exclusion and human rights violations.

A parallel insurgency had broken out in late 1986 when Alice Auma – a young Acholi woman who claimed she was a medium for the holy spirit 'Lakwena' – started to raise an army, which she called Holy Spirit Movement (HSM). According to Heike Behrend, the HSM was not only fighting against an 'external enemy' represented by the NRM but

---

[549] Cited after Omara-Otunnu 1992: 456.
[550] Nabudere 2003: 45; Lomo & Hovil 2004b: 5.
[551] Branch 2005: 9pp.
[552] ACR 1987/88: B443pp. Many claim that the worst atrocities were committed by FEDEMO, which had been incorporated into the NRA in early 1986 and was subsequently deployed to the North, allegedly to give them a chance to seek revenge for UNLA violence against the Baganda during the NRA war. Nabudere (2003: 42p.), by contrast, argues that it was the NRA who committed the atrocities and then blamed them on FEDEMO.
[553] Gersony 1997: 31. The cattle population in Gulu and Kitgum was reduced from 285.000 in 1985 to about 5.000 in 1997, less than 2% of the earlier number.
[554] See Lamwaka 1998: 152pp.

also against 'internal enemies' in the form of impure soldiers and witches.[555] The motivations underlying the war against the 'external enemy' concerned not only the marginalisation of the Acholi in the public sector but also the escalating NRA atrocities. The political agenda of the HSM became evident in Lakwena's announcement that the movement was fighting to depose the Museveni government and unite all people in Uganda.[556] More specifically, the link between Museveni's exclusionary elite bargain and the HSM war becomes evident in the following poem of one unnamed Holy Spirit soldier:

> 'Now as time come for him [Museveni] in power (...), only the Westerns [sic] having good posts in all gov't depts. Pailarmany [sic] bodies (...) This gov't has undergone the System of tribialism [sic] (...) But now, only the westerns [sic], have good progress in education (...) Is this really national progress?'[557]

But unlike the UPDA, the HSM had also a very strong spiritual dimension focusing on the internal conditions in Acholiland. Here, the Acholi soldiers returning from the 'Luwero triangle' were considered as impure – death in war being interpreted in terms of witchcraft (kiroga) – and identified as the cause of all evil. The rebellion was therefore also an attempt to redeem soldiers who had become 'internal strangers' in Acholiland, which explains the prominence of rituals to purify soldiers of evil and witchcraft. Unsurprisingly, the message of both political empowerment and spiritual redemption from violence found widespread echo not only among the Acholi, but also in other areas experiencing insecurity and exclusion. Accordingly, the HSM marched from Kitgum to Soroti, Kumi, Mable and Tororo and found willing recruits among the Langi, Teso and Japadhola. It was only when the HSM reached Busoga – a *Bantu* area relatively well-integrated into the NRM elite bargain – that the rebels were defeated in late October 1987.

The third and most sustained Acholi insurgency, Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), started in June 1987 as a splinter of the UPDA.[558] The LRA shares many of the HSM's rituals and beliefs, including the idea that Acholiland requires spiritual cleansing. Kony allegedly sees himself as a messenger of God and strives for a government based on the Ten Commandments. At the same time, the LRA has become notorious for its extremely brutal violence against the Acholi population, including abductions, mutilations and indiscriminate mass killings. This has made it relatively

---

[555] Behrend 1999.
[556] Allen 1991: 395.
[557] Cited after Behrend 1999: 163pp.
[558] Lomo & Hovil 2004b: 141p.; Kayunga 2000: 114p.

easy to dismiss Kony as a religious fanatic or mere lunatic. Such position is typically taken by NRM politicians in Kampala[559] or NRM representatives in the North who consider Kony a madman 'who believes he talks with God twice every day without airtime'.[560] Similar assessments can be found in the press[561] and in the academic literature where some scholars place the LRA entirely outside politics.[562]

Nevertheless, the 'Kony as maniac' hypothesis is a too easy dismissal of one of the longest civil wars in postcolonial Africa. Instead, there is – albeit scattered – evidence that the LRA insurgency involves a political agenda that speaks to the marginalisation of the Acholi people. Interviews with former LRA combatants, for example, suggest that Kony claimed to be fighting to overthrow the government and justified this in terms of specific Acholi grievances such as the 'overstayed rule of the Banyankole' or land issues.[563] Similar grievances are also expressed in a number of LRA manifestos.[564] A political agenda became also evident after the failed 1994 peace talks when the LRA launched an information campaign in the villages, explaining to civilians how the NRM government had sabotaged the peace talks.[565] Similarly, the rebels announced a ceasefire for the 1996 elections, encouraging the population to support Museveni's opponent, Paul Ssemogerere. The most important manifestation of the LRA's political agenda occurred however in the context of the recent Juba Peace Talks (2006-2008). During the negotiations, the LRA delegation made broad political demands, including the establishment of an independent commission to oversee the reconstruction of northern and eastern Uganda, a referendum on federalism within two years, compensation of cattle stolen during the war, land reform, and the creation of a new national army reflective of Uganda's tribal diversity.[566] Later, it demanded that Northerners and Easterners be assured 35% representation in military, government and ambassadorial posts[567] – claims that are obviously related to patterns of ethno-regional exclusion at the centre.

---

[559] Interview, Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda.
[560] Interview, Walter Ochora.
[561] 'The deadly cult of Joseph Kony', *The Independent* (UK), 8 November 2008.
[562] See Gersony 1997: 103; Chabal & Daloz 1999: 86; Van Acker 2004: 348.
[563] Lomo & Hovil 2004b: 16. Note however that the evidence is inconclusive as other interviews with ex-combatants did not reveal any political agenda.
[564] Finnström 2008: 122pp.
[565] Branch 2005: 18p.
[566] ICG 2007: 5.
[567] ICG 2008: 2.

But does this really prove that the LRA insurgency was caused by the marginalisation of the Acholi? The answer remains heavily contested – even among those Acholi leaders who were closely involved in the peace talks. Norbert Mao, one of the most eloquent spokespersons of the Acholi cause, remains convinced that the LRA does have a political agenda, which is however poorly articulated and deliberately denied by the national and international media:

> 'The fact that you cannot articulate an agenda does not mean that you do not have one. And I think this has been the problem with the LRA. The LRA has been extremely inarticulate. And for me who spent at one time one full week in the LRA camp talking to the rebels and talking to Joseph Kony, I can tell you very plainly that the Joseph Kony phenomenon was just a symptom of deep-seated resentment of Museveni's assumption of power (...). In fact, Joseph Kony has been speaking out. Only that there is a narrative, which was accepted by the media and the Western World, that this is a madman. And even when Joseph Kony tries to articulate the causes of his grievances, it is just pushed by the wayside (...). I never saw any religious zealotry for all the one week that I spent there. I never saw any religious rituals. Most of this is an invention of the Western media, it is propaganda'.[568]

Others find the LRA's political demands irreconcilable with its brutality against Acholi civilians.[569] Again others have vehemently questioned the authenticity of the LRA's political demands. A key issue in this context is the role played by the Lord's Resistance Movement (LRM), the political arm of the LRA that is organised by members of the Acholi diaspora. Significantly, the LRA delegation during the Juba Peace Talks was dominated by diaspora Acholi, which has led to accusations that the LRM does not actually represent the rebels on the ground but has rather opportunistically imposed its own political agenda from the outside:

> 'The issue of political agenda started emerging recently (...). You will not get anything coming from the LRA leadership in Uganda (...). But now when the peace talks started, opportunists also came in, hurriedly developed the so-called political agenda and the peace talks became a political process (...). Actually, at the beginning I was there [in Juba]. These people [the diaspora Acholi] could not discuss anything with the government. They were not informed on what was on the ground. I talked with them twice. They knew nothing about facts on the ground to enable them talk convincingly in the negotiation'.[570]

This assessment is shared by many Northern leaders who feel that the Acholi diaspora has 'hi-jacked' the Juba Peace Talks to impose far-reaching political demands.

On the whole, however, elements of political opportunism, religious zealotry and unjustifiable brutality do not necessarily disqualify the LRA from having a political agenda. The Kony insurgency clearly originated in a political context of ethno-regional exclusion and still speaks to deeply felt Acholi grievances. It therefore remains – just like the UPDA and the HSM – a product of the unresolved marginalisation of the North.

---

[568] Interview, Norbert Mao.
[569] ICG 2004; Interview, Richard Todwong. For a critical assessment of this argument see Branch 2005: 7p.
[570] Interview, Fabius Akumu-Alya.

The NRM has been unwilling to tackle this underlying root cause and thereby – somewhat ironically – given some credence to a brutal and wretched war. This explains why Acholi leaders are often so ambivalent when talking about the Kony phenomenon:

> 'Have you seen the pictures of the Northern leaders when they meet Kony? You just look at the body language, the way they look at the guy. They do not look at the guy as if he is maniac (...). Kony is a loony, there is no doubt, but he is speaking to deeply felt Northern grievances (...). Northern leaders are very ambivalent about it, you hardly find anybody condemning him. At the same time, they will tell you that Kony is a real bastard. Where is the disconnect?'[571]

The LRA has been inactive in Uganda since the start of peace negotiations in 2006.[572] While the latter were never concluded due to Kony's failure to sign the agreement[573], the LRA has since then been driven into the DRC where it is bringing havoc on the local population.[574]

THE TESO REBELLION[575]

In Teso, the only major non-Bantu area in the East, the rise to power of Museveni's NRM led to a considerable loss of influence. Under Obote II, the Iteso had enjoyed privileged access to positions of state power. This could be seen in government where Peter Otai, Col. Omaria and Stephen Ariko held important positions. The key Iteso strongholds under Obote II were however the security services, including the police, prison and military staff. Most importantly, Obote had introduced a paramilitary police, the so-called Special Forces, where 5000 out of 8000 recruits originated from Teso. The latter were led by Col. Omaria and played an instrumental role under Obote II, not least in trying to defeat Museveni's guerrillas. After Obote's fall, the Iteso lost much of their former influence. As the NRM began to reorganise the public sector, it not only summarily dismissed large parts of the security forces but also sacked the entire Special Forces. This resulted in huge unemployment among the Iteso and gave rise to strong perceptions of marginalisation and neglect.

To make matters worse, exclusion was combined with a deteriorating security situation, which was caused by two factors. First, the NRM decided to disband local militias that had been set up under Obote in order to defend Teso against cattle rustlers from

---

[571] Interview, Prof. Joe Oloka-Onyango.
[572] On the peace negotiations see ICG 2007, 2008.
[573] 'Kony fails to sign peace deal', *The Monitor*, 29 November 2009.
[574] This suggests that the LRA has over time developed an economic agenda that is – a least partially – independent of the political situation in Uganda.
[575] The following paragraphs draw heavily on Buckley-Zistel (2008), the only comprehensive academic treatment of the Teso insurgency.

neighbouring Karamoja. As a consequence, a series of raids in 1986-87 destroyed the cattle stocks of the Iteso with estimated losses being as high as 500.000 (or 93%), which was not only dramatic in economic terms given the social and cultural significance of the cattle. The government did little to stop the Karamajong warriors. This was commonly interpreted as a deliberate policy of intimidation aimed at punishing the Iteso for their support of Obote and depriving them of their main source of livelihood. Second, the NRA engaged in serious human rights abuses against the local population. While former political and military leaders – especially ex-members of the Special Forces – were often arrested and harassed, villagers also suffered from mistreatment by NRA soldiers. The most prominent incident occurred in 1989 when 55 Iteso prisoners in NRA custody were suffocated in a railway wagon in Mukura.[576]

As in Acholiland, the combination of political and military marginalisation, Karamajong cattle rustling and NRA violence ultimately motivated disgruntled former Iteso officials – mostly from the disbanded Special forces – to take up arms against the Museveni government in 1987. The ensuing Uganda People's Army (UPA) insurgency was led by Peter Otai, Obote's former minister, and pursued military action against the government until 1992. The UPA civil war was concluded not via a formal peace accord but through the efforts of the NRM-sponsored Teso Commission (1990-2000), which was composed of respected Iteso and sought advice from a broad range of stakeholders. Among the Commission's major outcomes were the reduction of army presence in Teso, the recruitment and training of local defence units and the reinstatement of former security personnel. Moreover, former rebel leaders were co-opted into national (e.g. Omax Omeda) and local government (e.g. Hitler Echweru), which had a significant impact on the termination of the UPA rebellion and helped to improve Iteso representation in the NRM elite bargain, at least until the late 1990s (see section 5.2).

THE WEST NILE REBELLIONS

In 1986, the situation in West Nile was different from Acholiland and Teso. This was mainly due to the fact that Museveni' NRA and Moses Ali's UNRF had signed a 'declaration of unity' in 1985.[577] It was agreed that if the NRA won the anti-Obote II war, Ali would become Vice-President, and vice-versa. After the war, UNRF was

[576] '20 years after, still too many apologies for Mukura deaths', *The Independent*, 28 July 2009.
[577] Nabudere 2003: 34.

rapidly integrated into the NRA and its leaders were actively working to build support for the NRM regime among their own people. As a consequence, the NRA met no resistance when it reached West Nile in late March 1986.[578] Also, the NRA initially maintained high levels of discipline thereby defusing fears of human rights abuses. All this explains the relative peace in West Nile during the early years of NRM rule.

From the late 1980s, however, it became clear that the power-sharing pact between Museveni and Moses Ali was at best partially honoured. This can be seen when looking at the composition of government (see section 5.2). Moses Ali himself never became Vice-President but was first made a minister and then – after his temporary arrest in the early 1990s (see below) – enjoyed enduring political influence as Deputy Prime Minister between 1996 and 2006. Accordingly, the Madi, Ali's group, are the only West Nile tribe that has been relatively prominently represented in the NRM government since 1986. Others, especially the Lugbara as the biggest West Nile group, have been confined to rather marginal positions, especially during the mid-1990s. The half-hearted incorporation of West Nilers into the NRM regime became even more evident in the army. First, not all of the ex-Amin soldiers had been absorbed into the NRA after 1986. While most FUNA combatants remained in exile in north-eastern Zaire, some ex-UNRF were deemed unqualified for NRA service.[579] Those who were absorbed into the NRA often complained that the initial agreement between Museveni and Ali had not been adequately honoured. In the words of a former UNRF II combatant:

> 'The agreement was that UNRF combatants were to retain their ranks. But people were demoted instead (...). Many UNRF deserted the army, others retrenched, others retired. The whole process of integration was not done. All these things demonstrated lack of government commitment to the agreement, that the government was insincere to the whole agreement (...)'.[580]

The retrenchment mostly occurred in the early 1990s when the overall size of the NRA was reduced from 100.000 to 50.000. As educational qualification was a criterion in demobilisation, Muslims from northern Arua tended to be disproportionately affected.

To make matters worse, feelings of marginalisation combined with mounting insecurity in West Nile from the late 1980s, evident in the constant harassment of UNRF members who were assaulted, imprisoned or even killed.[581] Among those arrested in the early 1990s was not only Moses Ali but also other prominent West Nile leaders such as Rajab

---

[578] Gersony 1997: 84.
[579] Ibid.: 87.
[580] Cited after Lomo & Hovil 2004a: 11.
[581] Ibid.: 12.

Rembe, Maj. Alidiga or Maj. Noah Talib. Also, the NRA allegedly attempted to assassinate Maj. Gen. Bamuze – the future leader of UNRF II.[582] This undermined the initial confidence in NRA discipline and caused fears that West Nile was bound to suffer another round of bloody revenge.

Eventually, the familiar pattern of exclusion and violent repression led to the formation of two rebel groups in West Nile. In 1995, Juma Oris – formerly a minister under Amin and then a member of FUNA – launched the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) that was mainly based among those ex-Amin soldiers who had not been integrated into the NRA. The WNBF insurgency capitalised on the widespread feeling of political and economic neglect.[583] Former combatants complain about a generalised lack of employment in the area, especially in the army that was perceived to be monopolised by the 'Banyankole or Baganda'.[584] The rebellion was at times accompanied by high levels of violence[585] but ultimately lost momentum due to acts of violence against local communities. It was put to an end in 1997 through a combination of military defeat, a government amnesty and the skilful mediation of the UPDF officer Maj.-Gen. Katumba Wamala.[586] The second West Nile insurgency, the revival of the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF II), was launched in 1998. According to its leader, Maj. Gen. Bamuze, the insurgency was an immediate reaction to the perceived breach of the agreement between Museveni and Moses Ali, the repeated harassment of former UNRF soldiers and the overall feeling of political and economic neglect.[587] Significantly, it was mainly based among the marginalised and repressed Lugbara-Aringa communities, and especially among those Muslim soldiers who had been retrenched in the early 1990s. The link between UNRF II and Museveni's exclusionary elite bargain became also evident in subsequent negotiations over a peace deal where the rebel leaders specifically asked for positions in government, the parastatals, the foreign service and the army.[588] Some of these demands were fulfilled in the December 2002 peace agreement, which granted the rebels 10 positions in government, allowed former UNRF commanders to retain their military ranks and provided for the re-integration or resettlements of UNRF combatants.[589]

---

[582] Ibid.
[583] Ibid.: 14p.
[584] Cited after ibid.
[585] '2,000 Ugandans killed in fight near border with Sudan', *Xinhua News Service*, 17 March 1997.
[586] Lomo & Hovil 2004a: 18pp.
[587] Ibid.: 11pp.
[588] 'Bamuze's rebels now want to be ministers', *The Monitor*, 29 April 2002; 'UNRF II rebels face government with huge demands', *The New Vision*, 23 October 2002.
[589] 'Rebels reap 10 govt posts', *The New Vision*, 27 December 2002.

THE REBELLION IN WESTERN UGANDA

The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) are a case apart in that most of their fighters came from Buganda and operated in Western Uganda, the two main pillars of the NRM's support base. As a result, the link with Museveni's exclusionary elite bargain was less straightforward than in the case of the Northern insurgencies, yet not entirely absent.

The ADF war has been described as 'rebellion without a cause', not least since the rebels lacked a coherent political agenda.[590] This is however misleading since ADF brought together a number of small and extremely disparate anti-NRM elements, which all had their specific political grievances.[591] The first group was a radical Muslim movement known as Tabliq that turned political in 1989 when the Ugandan Supreme Court ruled in favour of one of the rival factions within the Muslim community.[592] Interpreting this as state interference in Muslim affairs, the Tabliq henceforth considered the constitution of an Islamic state as the only way to protect Muslim interests in Uganda. In 1991, hundreds of Tabliq activists were jailed after they occupied by force the Kampala Central Mosque. After their release from prison in 1993, a radical Tabliq group soon re-appeared under the name of Uganda Muslim Freedom Fighters. Two other Buganda-based splinter rebel groups emerged in 1995. The Uganda Muslim Liberation Army (UMLA) had its base among Baganda Muslims and vowed to fight alleged violence and discrimination against the Muslim community. The Allied Democratic Movement (ADM) was created by Baganda ultra-monarchists. While the NRM was firmly rooted in Buganda, a small monarchist faction was unhappy that Museveni had restored the Buganda Kingdom only in a diminished, non-political form (see below) and therefore decided to take up arms against the government. A final rebel group, the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), was a revival of the old Rwenzururu movement in Western Uganda, which had fought for the restoration of the Bakonzo Kingdom since the 1950s (see chapter 4). Significantly, the Bakonzo were not only alienated by the NRM's refusal to restore their Kingdom[593] but also by the fact

---

[590] Hovil & Werker 2005: 14.
[591] If not marked otherwise, this paragraph draws heavily on Prunier 2004: 367pp.
[592] Kayunga 2000: 115pp. The Tabliq, set up in India in the 1920s, had initially been a revivalist Muslim sect that started to spread worldwide from the 1950s and eventually reached Uganda.
[593] The Bakonzo Kingdom was finally restored as a cultural institution on 19 October 2009. See 'Rise of Rwenzururu kingdom', *The Sunday Vision*, 17 October 2009.

that they were the only major tribal group in Western Uganda who were excluded from access to positions of state power (see section 5.2).[594]

From the mid-1990s, the four rebel groups came together to form the ADF, aided and abetted by the Sudanese government (see section 5.4 below).[595] The incorporation of NALU was of key importance for two reasons. First, it provided the rebels with a good peasant grounding in local realities, which was also important in terms of future recruitment. Second, the Rwenzori mountains were not only strategically ideal for rebellion but also offered the advantage of the DRC as nearby refuge. The ADF went into action in late 1996. The heterogeneity of the involved groups explains the absence of a coherent political agenda. Whereas the ADM elements claimed to be fighting 'to re-introduce multi-party politics' and 'stop Museveni's nepotism giving all the juicy jobs to Westerners', the Tabliq and NALU components sought to establish an Islamic State and an autonomous Bakonzo Kingdom. From late 1997, the ADF was progressively undermined by its own violence against the civilian population[596] and soon shifted to urban terrorism.[597] As mentioned above, the ADF has been more or less inactive since 2003 even though a formal peace agreement is yet to be concluded.[598]

THE RECENT DECLINE IN VIOLENT CONFLICT

> 'It is now perceived as if we can now recruit our people from home. The centre is less important, the periphery can decide on its own'.[599]

One puzzle remains. Why has the persistence of ethno-regional exclusion in Museveni's Uganda not caused more violent conflict? How come the scope and intensity of violence have even declined since the late 1990s?

I argue that tensions over the tribal bias at the centre have been eased by the process of decentralisation. As the LC system was spread throughout the country and divided into an ever-growing number of districts, hundreds of thousands of local leaders – including

---

[594] Note that Crispus Kiyonga, a key minister in Museveni's government since 1986 and often thought to be a Mukonzo, is in fact from the tiny Banyabindi tribe. As such, he was long the 'headmaster' of those opposed to the restoration of the Omusingaship and therefore strongly opposed by most Bakonzo.
[595] Prunier 2004: 373pp.
[596] Hovil & Werker 2005.
[597] 'ADF rebellion: Guerrilla to urban terrorism', *The New Vision*, 21 May 2007.
[598] 'ADF Rebels Want Peace Talks', *The New Vision*, 18 November 2008.
[599] Interview, Fabius Akumu-Alya.

former rebels – from all tribal backgrounds have been able to obtain access to paid employment, political influence and government resources (see section 5.2). Since jobs and resources are no longer exclusively controlled at the central state level, the value of holding national power has declined – a powerful disincentive for rebellion.

The LC system as a locus of territorial autonomy has only developed over time, especially in the conflict-ridden North. Here, the spread of the LC system was initially fairly uneven and often subject to heavy interference from the centre. A good case in point is Acholiland in the late 1980s and early 1990s where Council members or civil servants suspected of rebel collaboration were often dismissed or even arrested.[600] As the RCs became mere tools of the central state, there was little scope for the development of independent Acholi leadership. This situation seems to have changed over time as Acholi leaders are now in a position to use the LC system to develop local constituencies and mobilise opposition against the national government. The best example in this regard is Norbert Mao who resigned from Parliament in 2006 and then – successfully – ran for the position of Gulu LCV Chairman. Afterwards, he declared that he had been

> 'tired of being a commentator in Kampala: in local government, you are in charge. In fact I wish I had gone there earlier'.[601]

The increased political space for independent Acholi leadership at the local level has reduced the need to reverse the persistent ethno-regional bias at the centre. Even though the latter is still vehemently criticized by Acholi leaders, lucrative alternatives in local government arguably undermine support for existing or future rebellion.

The relationship between decentralisation and peace can also be observed in West Nile. Here, most of the UNRF II combatants were drawn from Aringa county, which was formerly part of Arua District but later elevated to District status and named Yumbe District. Interestingly, the fact that Aringa county initially lacked District status was a specific focus for grievances, as evident in the following complaint by a former UNRF II member:

> '[M]arginalization was a major cause of the war. When we were under Arua, central government funds were not making it to Yumbe'.[602]

---

[600] Branch 2005: 16.
[601] Cited after Green 2008: 432.
[602] Cited after Lomo & Hovil 2004a: 13.

This issue was resolved with the creation of Yumbe District in 2000 – in the midst of the UNRF II rebellion. It seems safe to argue that the jobs and resources that accompanied the new district facilitated the rapid conclusion of the conflict.

All this is not to claim that the relationship between decentralisation and conflict avoidance is straightforward. While the NRM's manipulation of local government has helped to buy support and stability in the short- and medium term, it may not be sustainable in the long run. As the 'patronage empire' at the local level continues to grow, Museveni's 'politics of survival' are likely to become increasingly unviable and unstable. This is especially the case since district creation has already bred a number of local-level tribal conflicts.[603] Prominent examples include not only the above-cited quarrels in Bunyoro but also similar conflicts in Buliisa, Tororo or Pallisa districts.

Another important source of conflict surrounding the decentralisation process is that the Baganda have always demanded more far-reaching autonomy in the form of a federal system of government (Federo).[604] To many Baganda, this is a lot more important than influence at the level of the central state.[605] In 1993, the NRM government did restore the Buganda Kingdom, albeit only as a purely cultural institution, which remains constrained by the centre's control over its finances.[606] Moreover, it has only offered a more limited 'regional tier system', which the Mengo has repeatedly rejected as insufficient. In recent years, tensions over frustrated demands for federal autonomy have built up and contributed – along with other factors – to the outbreak of violence during the September 2009 'Buganda riots'. Tellingly, the Mengo publicly reiterated its 'federo demands' at the height of the crisis.[607]

5.4 Competing explanations

Which other factors account for the persistence of civil war in Museveni's Uganda? First, the above discussion has shown that two of the anti-NRM insurgencies in the North, namely the HSM and the LRA, were also motivated by an important *spiritual agenda*. Second, and in contrast to my findings in chapter 4, there is reason to argue that

---

[603] 'Museveni districts breeding tribal wars', *The Independent*, 30 June 2009. See also Green 2008; Morris 2009.
[604] See Mutibwa 2008.
[605] Interview, Frederick Golooba-Mutebi.
[606] Carbone 2008; Mutibwa 2008.
[607] 'Mengo lists federo demands', *The New Vision*, 18 September 2009.

the post-1986 insurgencies were not only due to enduring exclusion at the level of elites but also facilitated by concurrent socioeconomic inter-group inequalities at the level of the masses. Even though the gaps have narrowed over time, the basic pattern of unequal access to economic opportunities and social services has remained in place since Museveni took over in 1986, with Northern Region consistently ranked bottom. This can be seen when analysing recent trends in poverty incidence (see figure 25) and other social indicators.[608] As a consequence, tribal groups from the North and parts of the East were now clearly disadvantaged at both the elite and mass levels. This situation made it easier for Northern and Eastern rebel leaders to find willing recruits. At the same time, however, it is important to recognise that the great majority of foot soldiers in the post-1986 insurgencies were former members of the security services (see section 5.3) rather than impoverished Acholi, Lugbara or Iteso peasants.

Figure 25: Incidence of poverty in Uganda, 1992-2006[609]



Third, all anti-Museveni insurgencies – except maybe the ADF – were also due to *violent repression* against the excluded tribal groups. Accordingly, the three civil wars in Acholiland were caused not only by the political and military disempowerment of the Acholi but also by excessive NRA violence against both former UNLA soldiers and the civilian population. This is especially true for the UPDA insurgency that was launched when exclusion had not yet fully taken root and was therefore mainly a 'defensive war',

[608] UBOS 2006a; UNDP 2007.
[609] Compiled based on UBOS 2006a.

a 'war of survival' and a 'conflict about self-preservation'.[610] In the words of a local grassroots activist:

> 'When they [NRA] took over, they started killing, started looting our properties very badly (...). I saw how people were tied (...) and slaughtered, ten people were killed and buried in one grave, in the North here (...).That is why people went to the bush'.[611]

Similarly, the insurgencies in West Nile and Teso did not only reflect the exclusion of former security service personnel from access to jobs and resources but also their violent persecution and harassment by NRA soldiers. To quote Omax Omega, a former UPA leader:

> 'The truth about the insurgency is very clear. We were forced to go into the bush (...). For when the arrests of prominent politicians started, when they started prosecuting former Special Forces and police understandably people ran away. We were not organised that we wanted to fight government – people just run to the bush for fear of being harassed. Then, after some time, we saw the thing continued, and we thought that the only way to handle this situation was to group ourselves (...). So the only way we thought we had was to take up arms and defend ourselves'.[612]

Finally, four out of the seven anti-Museveni insurgencies – namely the LRA, WNBF, UNRF II and ADF – also involved important *regional spillover effects* in that they were part of a 'proxy war between Uganda and Sudan'.[613] While the Sudanese government provided Ugandan rebel groups with financial and military aid, the NRM government did in turn back John Garang's Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). As for the Kony war, Sudan made contact with the LRA from 1992-93 and has since provided it with weapons and training facilities[614] – a situation that leads NRM politicians to describe Kony as a mere 'surrogate of the Khartoum administration'[615]. Similarly, the Sudanese provided both the WNBF and the UNRF II with considerable military and logistical support.[616] Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that the three rebel groups were strongly rooted in local realities and therefore first and foremost a product of the Acholis' and West Nilers' feeling of exclusion and persecution in the Ugandan polity. The case of the ADF may be different in that the role of Sudan in setting up the insurgency was extremely instrumental.[617] Even though the four ADF components were also anchored in perceptions of exclusion and neglect, they were rather small splinter

---

[610] Various interviews.
[611] Interview, Margaret Odong.
[612] Cited after Buckley Zistel 2008: 102.
[613] Prunier 2004.
[614] Ibid: 366; ICG 2004: 24p.
[615] Interview, Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda.
[616] Gersony 1997: 88; Lomo & Hovil 2004a: 13; Prunier 2004: 376.
[617] Prunier 2004: 373pp. Note that the ADF is also believed to have received funding from a number of other external sources, including Mobutu's Zaire, Al Qaeda and other radical Islamists (Hovil & Werker 2005: 13).

groups in areas that were otherwise deeply integrated into the NRM elite bargain. It seems therefore doubtful that ADF would have emerged without the decisive support of Sudan.

5.5 Conclusion

> 'But where is Museveni's heart? Where does he yearn to go, and if nowhere, why destroy the only country that he knows? Can't he see that this sectarian thing he is nurturing is not only dangerous but unsustainable? Does one need to be soothsayer to see that he is leading Uganda to a terrible genocide, with only one community [the Bahima] eligible for State House scholarships, lucrative jobs, land allocation, control of security organisations and the country's finances in 20 years?'[618]

Almost 24 years after it took power, the NRM is still to deliver much of the 'fundamental change' it once promised. Despite flamboyant promises of broad-based government, the ethno-regional bias at the centre not only remains unaddressed but even seems to be getting worse over time. Ironically, one could say that the greatest offender of the anti-sectarian law has been the government itself. This unwillingness to forge a more inclusive elite bargain – together with socioeconomic inter-group inequalities, violent state repression and regional spillover effects – has undoubtedly been a key driver behind the seven civil wars that have ravaged the country since 1986. Some of these tensions have been eased by the comprehensive decentralisation policy from the mid-1990s, which has created a huge 'patronage empire' at the local level and thereby bought the support of the local leadership. Territorial power-sharing in its current form does however hardly amount to 'fundamental change' in that it has already become a source of tribally coloured local-level conflict.

What are the prospects for future peace and stability? My own interviews in Uganda suggest that the gloomy predictions by Bety Kamya as cited above are shared by a surprising number of people. Many fear that the country may be sitting on a 'time bomb' and predict genocidal violence against members of Museveni's tribal core constituency if the imbalances are not redressed.[619] Such predictions may be somewhat exaggerated and motivated by the opposition's attempt to discredit the NRM government. Nevertheless, the recent 'Buganda riots', which indeed involved sporadic

---

[618] Bety Kamya, 'Where is Museveni's Heart?', *The Monitor*, 28 January 2008.
[619] Various interviews.

violence against people believed to be Banyankole[620], show that such predictions may be not entirely unfounded. It can therefore not be excluded that anger over the potential misconduct of the 2011 elections or the unexpected death of the President will escalate into a 'Kenya-like' scenario.

To avoid future conflict and violence, the NRM will need to move beyond its anti-sectarian rhetoric and finally start to bridge the North-South divide that has become strikingly entrenched, not least psychologically. While new insurgencies in the North are currently considered to be rather unlikely, Northerners continue to perceive the 'Southern government' with unabated distrust and speak of 'two political countries divided by the Nile'.[621] Similarly, people in the southern parts of the country

> 'cannot imagine that the Northerners can come back and rule. They see themselves as being an endangered species. If you allow the people in the North to go back to power, then they are finished'.[622]

Significantly, Northerners seem to be particularly distrustful of the President himself – a situation that goes back to his decision to set aside the power-sharing provisions under the Nairobi Peace Accord (1985) and his reported derogatory talk about 'Northerners'.[623] A fresh start for national unity may therefore require an unspent political leadership after the 2011 elections.

More generally, the country will need a new political framework that not only tackles the long-standing socioeconomic inequalities but also gives more substance to the notion of broadbasedness. This could involve a new national dialogue on the ethno-regional question and the place of the different communities in Uganda. The much-talked about introduction of a federal order is by no means a 'magic bullet' since distributional conflicts over jobs and resources would not disappear. But it may provide a stronger institutional framework for the accommodation of social cleavages and thereby become an important step towards the overdue 'fundamental change'.

---

[620] 'More Deaths in Kampala Riots', *The New Vision*, 11 September 2009. According to eyewitnesses, people were dragged out of cars at road blocks in several parts of the city for looking like Banyankole, and beaten up.
[621] Interview, James Atoh.
[622] Interview, Sam Njuba.
[623] Museveni allegedly said he would put the Acholi in a bottle like grasshoppers so that they can eat themselves (Lomo & Hovil 2004b: 11) – a statement that was mentioned in many of my interviews with Northern leaders.

6 'One Zambia, One Nation' – The UNIP elite bargain and the foundations of Zambia's lasting peace

In the preceding two chapters, I have shown that civil war in Uganda can be traced back to the persistence of exclusionary elite bargains. In the next two chapters, I will contrast Uganda's story of recurrent exclusion with the Zambian experience of enduring inclusion and show that the persistence of inclusive elite bargains has helped to accommodate the spectre of ethno-regional violence. I will start by discussing the elite bargain of the First and Second Republic (1964-1991), which has laid the solid foundations of the country's lasting peace and stability.

In line with the structure of the two previous chapters, I start my discussion by describing the observed level of violent conflict during the First and Second Republic (section 6.1) and then move on to establish the inclusiveness of the UNIP elite bargain (section 6.2). In a third step, I analyse the relationship between UNIP's inclusive elite bargain and the country's peace and stability between 1964 and 1991 (section 6.3). The chapter ends with brief thoughts on competing explanations (section 6.4).

6.1 Conflict levels between 1964 and 1991

As shown in chapter 3, there was considerable potential for conflict when UNIP led Zambia to independence in October 1964. To begin with, the ruling party faced opposition not only from Nkumbula's ANC in the South but also from the traditional government in Barotseland, which had only recently displayed overt secessionist aspirations. Moreover, as an indigenous economic class with control of capital or skills was virtually non-existent, access to the offices and resources of the post-colonial state was of key importance and almost inevitably bound to lead to bitter struggles among the leaders of the country's major social groups.

Yet, Zambia has remained an 'oasis of peace and tranquillity'[624] in an otherwise highly unstable region. Under the multi-party regime of the First Republic (1964-1972), President Kaunda ruled the country on a comfortable majority, albeit challenged by the enduring strength of the ANC in Southern Province and the emergence of the Lozi-

[624] Interview, Marc Chona.

based United Party (UP) in Western Province.[625] In 1968, UNIP won the general elections but had to accept defeat to the ANC not only in the southern but also – after the ban of UP – in the western parts of the country. An even more significant challenge to UNIP emerged in 1971 when the Bemba-based United Progressive Party (UPP) challenged its authority in the North, the ruling party's stronghold during the nationalist struggle. As UNIP found itself on the verge of becoming a regional party, it introduced a one-party state in December 1972. Intense factional struggles notwithstanding, there were only a few isolated incidents of violence during the First Republic, most notably a clash between UNIP and UP supporters on the Copperbelt in 1968 that resulted in six deaths. Moreover, there was considerable state repression against all opposition parties, especially before and after the imposition of the one-party regime.

During the Second Republic (1972-1991), UNIP 'won' the general elections in 1973, 1978, 1983 and 1988, with considerable support for President Kaunda even at the height of economic crisis and no signs of large-scale violent conflict.[626] This is not to deny that the country witnessed several incidents of low-level political violence throughout the course of the Second Republic. From the mid-1970s, for example, Adamson Mushala and his followers tried to launch an armed rebellion in North-Western Province – the only attempted insurgency in the history of post-colonial Zambia.[627] Even though the Mushala rebellion temporarily destabilised parts of the province, it failed to gain momentum and never came close to qualifying as a full-blown civil war. This means that war-related casualties were in the dozens rather than in the hundreds, violence was far from sustained and the weaker party was never able to mount effective resistance.[628] Other forms of political violence were similarly unsuccessful and short-lived. Three military coup attempts in 1980, 1988 and 1990 were either uncovered in the planning phase or put down within a matter of a few hours.[629] More serious and sustained was a series of violent (and on several occasions deadly) urban riots throughout the 1980s that originated in the context of extreme economic decline, growing urban poverty and the confrontation between the government and the trade unions. In the light of the mounting

---

[625] Tordoff & Molteno 1974a.
[626] Tordoff 1980a; Gertzel et al. 1984.
[627] For details on this largely unknown episode in Zambian history see Larmer & Macola 2007.
[628] Given the extremely limited available information on the Mushala rebellion, the exact number of conflict-related deaths was impossible to establish. Nonetheless, interview evidence as well as information published in Wele (1987), Larmer & Macola (2007) and the Africa Contemporary Record (Various Years) makes it safe to assume that the attempted rebellion never came close to qualifying as a civil war.
[629] ACR 1989/1990: B674; Phiri 2002.

protest, UNIP's fortunes changed in the early 1990s with growing pressure for the reintroduction of multipartyism and a humiliating electoral defeat to the trade union-led Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in 1991. Nevertheless, Zambia always remained light-years away from the civil wars experienced by many of its neighbouring countries. Instead, the country managed a transition to multi-party rule that is still widely regarded as one of the most peaceful in the history of the African continent.

How can one explain Zambia's remarkable peace and stability? While there is an abundant literature on war and breakdown in the neighbouring countries, civil war avoidance in Zambia seems to be have been taken for granted. The only exception in this regard is the work by Peter Burnell who has made an attempt to grapple with 'Zambian exceptionalism'.[630] Burnell stresses the need for 'dynamic explanation' and identifies a number of factors that explain conflict avoidance in Zambia at different moments in time (see section 6.4). Yet, he only briefly and superficially touches upon what is arguably the key driving force behind 'Zambian exceptionalism', namely its inclusive elite bargain.

6.2 The UNIP elite bargain

After independence, UNIP made a sustained attempt to forge an inclusive elite bargain in order to complete national unity. '*One Zambia, One Nation*' being the overarching motto, the government relied on a practice called 'tribal balancing' whereby access to positions of state power was to be distributed equitably among competing groups. This practise was maintained throughout the First and Second Republic and implemented at all levels of the public sector, which became evident in high degrees of political, economic and military power-sharing.

6.2.1 The elite bargain of the First Republic (1964-1972)

The First Republic witnessed the birth of an inclusive nation-building project meant to cultivate a 'sense of oneness'[631] and make the motto of 'One Zambia, One Nation' a reality. In the field of education, for example, secondary schools were created in every district, of which many were established as 'national' boarding schools. Selection for

[630] Burnell 2005.
[631] Interview, Njekwa Anamela.

the latter was nationally based, which means that there was a deliberate attempt to bring together pupils from all provinces of the country and make them grow up in a 'national' environment. The historian B. Phiri, one of Zambia's foremost academics, recalls that

> 'through this system you found yourself for five years in a boarding school in a region other than where you originate from. So by the time you finish these five years, you had grown up in an environment different from your own. And therefore you cultivated friendships (...). So by the time you are going to college, you had already known people from other provinces (...). So at the end of the day, people became closer as Zambians. People began to see themselves as Zambians (...)'.[632]

In a similar vein, civil servants were deliberately transferred across the country and typically served outside their home areas. The same was true for political leaders in party and government (for details see below) and even trained soldiers who were purposefully posted outside their home provinces to ensure the national integration of the armed forces.[633] These measures taken together promoted multilingualism and lasting inter-cultural contact – especially in form of inter-marriages – and thereby helped to lower tribal sentiment. At the same time, the ruling party tried to consolidate national unity by ensuring an inclusive inter-group distribution of access to positions of state power.

POLITICAL POWER-SHARING

The UNIP governments during the First Republic were on average carefully balanced between the country's five main language groups. In absolute terms, government was dominated by Bemba-speakers, followed by the Nyanja, Tonga, Barotse and North-Western groups (see figure 26a). This distribution closely matched the groups' population share, with none of the groups being seriously underrepresented and only the relatively small group of Barotse-speakers (8.6% of the population) being clearly over-represented (see figure 26b). Significantly, this proportional balance was achieved not only for ministers and deputies but also for the more consequential positions in the 'inner core' of political power. Moreover, UNIP made sure that the government was also inclusive in racial terms by appointing a few individuals of white or coloured background to influential positions.

---

[632] Interview, Prof. Bizeck J. Phiri.
[633] Interview, Gen. Malimba Masheke.

Figure 26: Linguistic composition of government in Zambia, 1964-1972[634]



However, it took a while to establish this overall balance. Initially, Bemba- and Nyanja-speakers – the two largest groups – were underrepresented, while the Tonga- and especially Barotse-speaking groups were overrepresented (see figure 26c). The prominence of Tonga-speakers was clearly meant to increase UNIP's appeal in the southern parts of the country, the core constituency of the opposition ANC. Lozi domination was due to the fact that when Kaunda constituted his first Cabinet in 1964, Lozi leaders had used the ultimate threat of withdrawal from the party to insist on being given what they considered adequate ministerial representation.[635] The President could not afford to ignore such a threat, which might have precipitated the secession of

[634] Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 1973, GOZ Various Years a.
[635] Molteno 1974: 66.

Barotseland. At the same time, Lozi overrepresentation angered Bemba-speakers. S. Wina, one of the key Lozi ministers at the time, recalls that S. Kapwepwe – the leader of the Bemba-speaking bloc – repeatedly complained about Lozi dominance in Cabinet arguing that appointments had to be properly balanced.[636]

The initial imbalances in government were mirrored in UNIP's Central Committee (CC), the key organ of the ruling party. In the early post-colonial days, all major factions were represented on the UNIP CC, including S. Kapwepwe (Bemba), R. Kamanga (Nyanja), S. Wina (Lozi) and M. Chona (Tonga). Nevertheless, Nyanja- and especially Barotse-speakers were overrepresented, while the Bemba-speaking faction was again underrepresented (see table 19). This led to growing disaffection among Bemba-speakers who felt neglected relative to their major contribution to the freedom struggle.[637] The perception of relative neglect culminated in the upheavals surrounding the August 1967 UNIP elections.[638] While members of the UNIP CC had previously run for office on a balanced team ticket, now for the first time seven out of the eleven posts were contested, not least to demonstrate that the principles of political democracy could work.[639] Bemba-speaking leaders used this occasion to join up with the weak Tonga-speaking faction to unseat leading Lozi- and Nyanja-speaking leaders (see table 19). As a result, the Bemba-Tonga alliance won all but one of the contested seats and the top four UNIP CC positions were now held by two Bemba and two Tonga.

Table 19: Linguistic composition of the UNIP Central Committee (CC) in Zambia, 1964-1969 (in percent)[640]

Language Group	Population (1969)	1964	1967	1969
Bemba	38,8	28,6	45,5	41,7
Nyanja	21,7	28,6	9,1	16,7
Tonga	15,2	14,3	27,3	25,0
North-Western	10,6	0,0	0,0	8,3
Barotse	9,2	21,4	18,2	8,3
Other	4,5	7,1	0,0	0,0
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

The imbalances on the UNIP CC alienated Nyanja- and Barotse-speakers. As a result, a 'Unity in the East' movement sprung up, which reflected the fear that the declining

---

[636] Interview, Sikota Wina.
[637] Pettman 1974: 233; Molteno 1974: 66.
[638] For details on the 1967 crisis see Rotberg 1967.
[639] Rasmussen 1969: 422; Tordoff & Molteno 1974a: 24.
[640] Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 1973; Rotberg 1967; 'KK scraps top UNIP committee', *Times of Zambia*, 26 August 1969.

influence of Nyanja-speaking leaders would negatively affect the group's development share.[641] Disaffection in Barotseland was even more deep-seated. Even though the Barotse-speakers were clearly over-represented, UNIP's support in the West had always remained fragile due to the deep divisions in the Lozi ruling class. Significantly, most Lozi ministers were 'nationalists' and therefore in sharp conflict with the Lozi 'traditionalists' who maintained considerable 'say' in Western Province.[642] The 'traditionalists' were further alienated by the progressive dismantlement of the formal structures of the Barotse national government between 1965 and 1970 – a policy that was implemented by the Lozi 'nationalist' faction and earned them bitter resentment in the province. This resentment was reinforced by the visible loss of Lozi influence at the centre, evident not only in the Lozi defeat during the 1967 party elections but also in the previous dismissal for alleged financial impropriety of two Lozi ministers – one of them Nalumino Mundia who was widely recognised as a vocal spokesman for traditional Barotse interests. Lozi discontent ultimately gave momentum to the UP, which had been created in 1966 and was soon taken over by Mundia. The UP – that openly played on anti-Bemba sentiment[643] – was banned after a clash with UNIP on the Copperbelt in August 1968.[644] This proved however ineffective as the UP continued its activities under the umbrella of the ANC and won most of the seats in Western Province during the 1968 general elections.

To make matters worse, UNIP's sustained efforts to win over the ANC-dominated South proved futile.[645] Even though Tonga-speakers were well-represented in party and government, the ANC won – to the great disappointment of UNIP[646] – the 1968 general elections in Southern Province, albeit with a considerably smaller margin. The reason why UNIP's strategy of careful political cultivation failed is difficult to explain. Molteno stresses that ANC had operated in the Southern Province for ten years before UNIP broke away whereby 'socialisation' may explain why the swing to UNIP was so small in 1968.[647] Maybe more importantly, many of the Tonga-speaking leaders within

---

[641] Molteno 1974: 73.
[642] Gertzel 1984b: 206pp.
[643] Dresang 1974: 1610.
[644] Tordoff & Scott 1974: 136p.
[645] Rasmussen 1969: 410p.
[646] Kaunda himself was furious, evident in his often-cited 'it pays to belong to UNIP' speech: 'I cannot see how I can continue to pay a police officer or a civil servant who works for Nkumbula (...). How dare they bite the hand that feeds them? They must learn that it pays to belong to UNIP. Those who want to form a civil service of the opposition must cross the floor and get their pay from Harry Nkumbula' (cited after Phiri 2006: 141).
[647] Molteno 1974: 71p.

UNIP – in particular M. Chona and E. Mudenda – had long been described as 'mere tools of the Bemba regime' and therefore lacked a substantial power base in their home areas.[648]

In the light of these divisions, UNIP intensified its quest for unity from the late 1960s. Immediately after the 1967 party elections, Kaunda had appointed four national trustees to the UNIP CC from areas which would have otherwise been underrepresented as a result of the elections. This had however little effect since 'the split within UNIP went too deep to be healed by what had become a familiar balancing device (...)'.[649] As a consequence, the President soon opted for structural change. In 1969, he disbanded the UNIP CC and replaced it with a more balanced Interim Executive Committee (see table 19). Moreover, a new party Constitution (1970) was adopted, which did not formally embody a proposal for strict equality of provincial representation in the UNIP CC but emphasised the 'need to get candidates from all parts of the country' and provided that each province should henceforth have 600 delegates at national conferences.

At the same time, the President became even more anxious to project a government with a national image. Accordingly, the distribution of government positions between language groups became remarkably balanced from the late 1960s (see figure 26c). As the imbalances of the early post-colonial years were being redressed, the President took care to improve the position of the North-Western group and addressed Luapulan concerns about marginalisation within the Bemba-speaking group.[650] Moreover, he used his nominating powers (five possible nominees from outside Parliament) to appoint people from Western and Southern Province where UNIP had lost the 1968 elections – a strategy that ensured that both Barotse- and Tonga-speakers continued to have largely proportional representation. The nomination of J. B. Siyomunji (Lozi) as Provincial Cabinet minister for Western Province in 1969 was of particular significance as it reflected a deliberate strategy to win back support among Barotse-speakers by seeking closer links with the Lozi 'traditionalists'.[651]

---

[648] Macola 2008: 36pp.
[649] Tordoff & Scott 1974: 114pp.
[650] Baylies 1984: 163pp. From the mid-1960s, leaders from Luapula Province – hitherto part of the Bemba-speaking bloc – had started to complain about political marginalisation. A UNIP stronghold during the nationalist struggle, the Province was not represented in Cabinet or the UNIP CC until the late 1960s. The ensuing complaints about political neglect were especially directed against Northern Province politicians (also Bemba-speakers) who were accused of insulting Luapulans and taking over Luapula National Assembly seats.
[651] Gertzel 1984b: 216.

Efforts for political power-sharing could also be observed in the civil service. The latter's size increased dramatically from 22.561 in 1964 to 51.491 in 1969.[652] Along with this expansion went a rapid 'Zambianisation' of the administration. In 1964, only 6.3% of all permanent secretaries were Zambian – a share that rose to 86.4% in 1968 and 100% in 1972 (see table 20). These top civil service appointments once again reflected a balance between the country's major language groups. Insiders confirm that this was a deliberate policy meant to ensure that all groups would feel that they have a substantial stake in the administrative running of the country.[653] Moreover, the scant available evidence indicates that this balance at the level of permanent secretaries was mirrored at the lower levels of the civil service.[654]

Table 20: Linguistic distribution of permanent secretaries in Zambia, 1968-1972 (in percent)[655]

Language Group	Population (1969)	1964	1968	1972
Bemba	38,8	0,0	31,8	28,0
Nyanja	21,7	0,0	22,7	36,0
Tonga	15,2	0,0	9,1	12,0
North-Western	10,6	0,0	4,5	4,0
Barotse	9,2	6,3	18,2	20,0
Other	4,5	93,8	13,6	0,0
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

ECONOMIC POWER-SHARING

Attempts for economic power-sharing were initially hampered by the fact that Zambia had very little control over its own economy – a situation that limited the scope for patronage distribution. As a consequence, the UNIP government engaged in far-reaching economic reform meant to gain control over the economy and thereby increase the material basis of the elite bargain. In April 1968, Kaunda announced the 'Mulungushi economic reforms' whereby the government took a 51% controlling share in twenty-six large industrial and commercial firms and used its power to restrict certain economic opportunities, especially retail trading, to Zambian citizens.[656] The Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO) was given vast new responsibilities and thus became – almost overnight – an industrial corporate giant. In August 1969, the government took a 51% ownership of the two copper-mining giants (Anglo American

[652] Tordoff & Molteno 1974b: 269.
[653] Interview, Vernon Mwaanga.
[654] Dresang 1974: 1612.
[655] Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 1973, GOZ Various Years b.
[656] Johns 1980: 106pp.

Corporation and Roan Selection Trust), which were placed under the Mining Development Corporation (MINDECO). INDECO and MINDECO were made subsidiaries of a huge conglomerate, the Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO).

The political economy dimension of the nationalisation measures was all too obvious in that the reforms extended patronage opportunities into the productive sectors.[657] As the number of jobs in the parastatal sector expanded substantially[658], Kaunda could – faced with mounting discontent – now distribute patronage outside state and party jobs.[659] Interviewees typically claim that there was a very deliberate attempt to share these rewards equitably between the country's language groups.[660] While detailed information on the distribution of key parastatal appointments during the First Republic is not available, my own data for the Second Republic corroborate such claims (see below).

MILITARY POWER-SHARING

The UNIP government also made attempts to promote military power-sharing. Interestingly, the nationalist movement had established very close contacts with African officers in the colonial army, the Northern Rhodesian Regiment. S. Wina, a key member of the liberation struggle, recalls that senior African officers in the army and police would even secretly inform the 'freedom fighters' whenever the colonial government planned a crackdown on the nationalists.[661] As a consequence, there was little distrust between civilian and military leaders when Zambia reached independence in 1964. At the same time, however, the 1964 military coup attempt in Tanzania just a few months before Zambia's independence had sent a timely warning to the UNIP leadership that harmonious civil-military relations could not be taken for granted. Trying to avoid the Tanzanian experience, UNIP set out to put the Zambian army under tight civilian control.

---

[657] Burdette 1988: 85pp.
[658] Szeftel 1982: 6.
[659] As more than 80% of the Zambian economy was now in the hands of the parastatals, there were little economic opportunities left outside the state. Former dissidents point out that this allowed UNIP to effectively marginalise political opponents who were denied access to jobs and resources (Interview, Tentani Mwanza).
[660] Various interviews.
[661] Interview, Sikota Wina.

At independence, the Northern Rhodesian Regiment was renamed the Zambian Defence Forces (ZDF) that came to consist of three pillars, including the Zambia Army (ZA), the Zambia Air Force (ZAF) and the Zambia National Service (ZNS). Whereas the UNIP government inherited an army of only 2.900 soldiers from Northern Rhodesia, the size of the ZDF was rapidly expanded from 4.400 in 1968 to 16.200 in 1986.[662] This dramatic growth was closely related to regional threats to national security, including the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in Southern Rhodesia (1965), liberation struggles in Angola, Mozambique and Namibia as well as South Africa's recurrent destabilisation attempts.[663]

Recruitment into the Zambian army was based not only on merit but also on the principle of 'tribal balancing'. Accordingly, the ruling party abolished all racial and tribal discrimination in recruitment to the ZDF, not least since it recognized that tribal imbalances had played a major role in military interventions across Sub-Saharan Africa.[664] At the level of the rank-and-file, a newly introduced quota system prescribed that army units were to be composed of soldiers from all provinces and districts – a system that ensured that all tribal groups had a stake in the army.[665] Similarly, the officer-corps was deliberately drawn from all parts of the country (see below). Interestingly, insiders claim that national integration within the army was facilitated by the fact that the first Army Commander, Gen. Chinkuli, was from the small Lenje tribe rather than from one of the bigger groups – a situation that helped to avoid patterns of tribal dominance:

> 'If we had started with someone from a big tribe like the Bemba, maybe the tribal disease would have grown. But we started with a brilliant young man from a small tribe'.[666]

The national outlook of the military was further enhanced by the creation of the ZNS as a third pillar of the army. The ZNS emerged from the UNIP Youth Wing that had established Youth Production Camps in all districts after independence and was also mandated to provide youths with military training.[667] In 1971, the ZNS was formally established and involved *all* Zambians between 18 and 35 who – upon graduation – became members of a reserve army, the so-called Home Guard. The ZNS proved useful

---

[662] IISS Various Years.
[663] Agyeman-Duah 1992: 145p.
[664] Haantobolo 2008: 136p.
[665] Interview, Gen. Malimba Masheke.
[666] Interview, Peter Matoka.
[667] Haantobolo 2008: 146pp.

in different ways. First, it combined military training with training in food production and thereby bridged the gap between the broader population and army personnel in a productive way. Second, the government's policy of dispersing ZNS camps throughout the territory anchored the military in every corner of the country and contributed to the emergence of a nationwide sense of belonging.

TERRITORIAL POWER-SHARING

The extent of territorial power-sharing, by contrast, was more limited. At independence, UNIP had little control over the provincial and district administration that had enjoyed considerable discretionary power under colonial rule.[668] As a consequence, the government decided to break up the pre-existing structures and transferred most of their functions to newly established central government departments at the provincial level. This was followed by the 1965 Local Government Act, which abolished the Native Authorities – seen as symbols of colonial oppression – and replaced them with 67 new and democratically elected local governments (24 urban authorities, 43 rural councils).[669] While the latter were formally given wide-ranging functions, the primary aim of local government reform was clearly to institute political control by the centre.[670] Accordingly, an Under-Minister was appointed to each of the eight provinces and became the political and administrative head of the region. Similarly, at the district level, the highest civil servant, the District Secretary, was replaced by the partisan UNIP Regional Secretary. The result of these reforms was not only a centralisation of political power but also a significant politicisation of local government structures.

These trends were reinforced by the 1968 decentralisation policy, which was – somewhat paradoxically – essentially an attempt to contain the sectional conflict surrounding the 1967 party elections. Anxious to strengthen national unity, President Kaunda stressed the need to

> 'decentralize in centralism. I define this decentralization in centralism as a measure whereby through the Party and Government machinery, we will decentralize most of your Party and Government activities while retaining effective control of the Party and Government machinery at the centre in the interest of unity. In short, you decentralise to avoid regionalism (...)'.[671]

---

[668] Chikulo 1981, 2009.
[669] The chiefs who previously headed the Native Authorities were not abolished like their counterparts in Tanzania. Even though they lost most of their power, they remained important as a link to the political legitimacy of the pre-colonial past (Sichone & Simutanyi 1996: 173p.).
[670] Saasa 2002: 115p.
[671] Cited after Tordoff 1980b: 205.

At the provincial level, the most significant aspect of decentralisation was the posting of a full Cabinet minister as the political head, supported by a Minister of State and a permanent secretary.[672] At the district level, a District Governor was made the politico-administrative head of each of the 53 districts. Yet, besides the transfer of a few senior politicians to the provincial and local level, most of the administrative and technical staff remained concentrated at the centre and local departments had little 'say' in policy-making. Moreover, local governments – especially rural councils – were in practice not entrusted with any major functions (except bridge and road maintenance) and therefore remained on the sidelines of the central government's activity.[673] The rather marginal position of local governments during the First Republic is underlined by the limited extent of fiscal decentralisation (see figures 27a and 27b). Even though local revenue increased in absolute terms between 1964 and 1970 (mostly due to more borrowing), its percentage of total government revenue stagnated at rather low levels. In line with this situation, the 'Simmance review' of local government in 1971-72 concluded that the decentralised system of government was not working because executive authority remained heavily concentrated at the centre.[674]

Figure 27: Local revenue in Zambia, 1964-1970[675]



[672] Chikulo 1981: 60pp.
[673] Grass-roots participation remained minimal since the established network of development committees (Village Productivity Committee, Ward Development Committee; District Development Committee and Provincial Development Committee) were turned into partisan instruments of control dominated by ruling party cadres.
[674] Cited after Mukwena 2001: 7.
[675] Compiled and calculated based on GOZ Various Years c.

Despite of high levels of power-sharing at the centre, it ultimately proved difficult to keep the broad-based coalition together. From the early 1970s, it was again the Bemba-speakers who felt neglected. Bemba neglect was more perceived than real as Bemba-speaking leaders remained well-represented in government, party and administration. Nonetheless, they were offended by the dissolution of the UNIP CC and the reappointment of three leaders defeated in 1967 – a move that was perceived as depriving them of a victory won in open elections. As a consequence, S. Kapwepwe, the charismatic leader of the Bemba-speaking bloc, resigned as Vice-President in protesting the 'victimisation' of his fellow tribesmen.[676] Bemba disgruntlement came to a head in August 1971 after Kaunda suspended four Bemba-speaking ministers, including Kapwepwe's lieutenant J. Chimba. Convinced that the balance of power within UNIP had swung away from them, Kapwepwe and his supporters created the UPP and managed to win one of the by-elections in late 1971.[677] Faced with this challenge, the government banned UPP in February 1972 and detained Kapwepwe and other key figures.

Even though the UPP was Bemba-dominated, its emergence was more than an expression of Bemba grievances.[678] Another source of disagreement was ideological difference about the role of the ruling party and intra-party democracy. While younger, more educated leaders stressed the importance of unity and control from above, the older, more populist 'freedom fighters' emphasised the need for mass participation and popular control. As the populist faction now felt marginalised in favour of more educated Zambians and decided to regroup under the umbrella of the UPP, the latter was at least as much an expression of common roots in militant nationalist politics as in shared Bemba parentage. More broadly, the UPP attracted all those who were frustrated by their lack of progress or promotion since independence, especially in the urban society of the Copperbelt where expectations were especially difficult to fulfil.[679] UPP was therefore a heterogeneous coalition of workers, trade unionists, small businessmen and party militants, many of them Bemba but not all of them.

---

[676] ACR 1969/1970: B231p.
[677] Kapwepwe himself won the seat for Mufulira West on the Copperbelt.
[678] Gertzel et al. 1984: 14p.; Scott 1978: 327.
[679] Gertzel & Szeftel 1984: 125pp.

Altogether, UNIP found itself on the verge of becoming a regional party in the early 1970s. While the ANC continued to control both Southern and Western Provinces, the great popularity of Kapwepwe's UPP challenged its authority in the Northern parts of the country – UNIP's stronghold during the days of the nationalist struggle. Significantly, UNIP seemed too weak in organisational terms to allow the unchecked interplay between factions, not least because Kapwepwe had taken with him many of UNIP's most efficient and outspoken leaders and thereby weakened the ruling party's mobilisation capacity.[680] The introduction of the one-party state in December 1972 was therefore seen as the only way to preserve UNIP's authority and contain the increasingly destabilising factional struggles.

6.2.2 The elite bargain of the Second Republic (1972-1991)

At the beginning of the Second Republic, UNIP found itself in a difficult position. The banned opposition parties were still well-entrenched and support for the ruling party was probably lowest since independence. The main challenge was therefore to establish a broader support base that would embrace both former opposition stalwarts and key interests groups. This required however a better 'institutional balance between participation and control' as increased participation after independence had heightened factional struggles.[681]

To increase control, the new Constitution provided for a centralisation of political power. Above all, it increased the powers of the President who now acted at his discretion on a wide range of issues, including foreign affairs, and was accorded extensive nominating powers.[682] Moreover, the Constitution introduced a division between party and government with the former being supreme. Overall policy direction was assigned to the UNIP CC, while administrative decision-making was delegated to the Cabinet. Executive power also expanded in Parliament with primary elections organised among Party officials before a general election and the UNIP CC taking the final decision on Parliamentary candidates. Finally, a 'leadership code' was introduced to control the assets held by all public leaders.

---

[680] Gertzel et al. 1984: 14p.
[681] Ibid.: 4.
[682] ACR 1972/1973: B302.

Significantly, however, the centralisation of power was combined with the sustained attempt to establish the broadest possible basis of support for the regime. To widen support, the 'Chona Commission' (1972) had not only recommended that UNIP should be open to anyone but also argued in favour of institutional representation in Parliament.[683] This was clearly an attempt to appeal to civil servants, trade unionists, businessmen and students – groups who, mainly because of the dominance of local party organisers, had been sidelined during the First Republic and therefore flirted with the UPP opposition. Even though the idea of formal institutional representation was not adopted, in practise

> 'the one party State saw an enormous increase in the influence of senior civil servants, trade union leaders, parastatal managing directors, business and the small professional elites'.[684]

UNIP's alliance with the Zambian 'middle class' helped to win back support of major interests groups but alienated local party officials who were frustrated that the expected economic rewards under the one-party state did not materialise. As a result, both party membership and activism declined considerably throughout the Second Republic leaving the ruling party as an 'amorphous body'[685] largely unable to effectively implement and communicate government policies.

UNIP also tried hard to (re)build stable support in the former opposition areas. The first 'settlement' was reached with the ANC. While Nkumbula had initially refused the 'invitation' to join UNIP, he soon decided that he could not leave his followers out in the political cold and approached Kaunda with a view to reconciliation.[686] The latter was publicly celebrated in Choma, Southern Province, on 17 June 1973 when Nkumbula called ANC members to join UNIP. The reconciliation with the 'Lozi faction' of the former ANC was less formalised and did not start until 1974 when the former UP leader N. Mundia was released from prison and 'allowed' to win a parliamentary seat in a by-election.[687] The relationship with the former UPP faction was most uneasy. Even though Kapwepwe and 34 other UPP detainees were released in December 1972, UNIP remained highly suspicious of former UPP supporters. As Kaunda feared infiltration by former UPP men, the latter were not allowed to join as UNIP members except by applying to the UNIP CC – a provision which effectively

---

[683] Scott 1980: 148p.
[684] Ibid.
[685] Ibid.: 158.
[686] ACR 1973/1974: B326p.
[687] Gertzel 1984b: 218pp.

blocked UPP entry.[688] Nevertheless, UNIP sought accommodation with the former UPP top leadership by making them financial overtures and using the mediation of UNIP Bemba leaders.[689] After prolonged negotiations, Kapwepwe and four of his senior aides were readmitted into UNIP on 9 September 1977 for the 'sake of complete unity'.[690]

To bolster this new unity, Kaunda further intensified efforts to project a national outlook of the regime's leadership. Significantly, the practise of 'tribal balancing' was maintained throughout the Second Republic, with the President repeatedly emphasising the usefulness of this approach with view to preserving peace and stability.[691]

POLITICAL POWER-SHARING

Government appointments during the Second Republic remained on average carefully balanced between the country's main language groups (see figures 28a and 28b). This was again true not only for ministers and deputy ministers but also for the more consequential positions in the 'inner core' of political power. In terms of my 'Index of Representation', the Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga and North-Western groups were almost perfectly represented, while only the small Barotse-speaking bloc was overrepresented.[692] If we analyse the composition of government beyond average values, we see that proportional representation was a fairly constant phenomenon between 1974 and 1990 (see figure 28c). Interestingly, government appointments continued to be used strategically to anchor the one-party state in former opposition areas. Instructive in this respect was an informal agreement that the Prime Minister would always be either a Tonga or a Lozi.[693] Accordingly, three out of the six Prime Ministers during the Second Republic were Tonga-speakers (M. Chona, E. Mudenda and K. Musokotwane), while the remaining three were from the Barotse-speaking bloc (D. M. Lisulo, N. Mundia and M. Masheke). The appointment of N. Mundia – the former dissident who had been returned to Cabinet in 1976 – as Prime Minister in February 1981 was of particular significance and finally restored solid links between Western Province and the centre.

---

[688] ACR 1973/1974: B327p.
[689] Larmer 2008: 112p.
[690] ACR 1977/1978: 467.
[691] ACR 1981/1982: B836.
[692] This refutes claims that Barotse-speakers remained outside the 'fusion of Zambian elites' (Englebert 2005).
[693] Sichone & Simutanyi 1996: 186p.

Figure 28: Linguistic composition of government in Zambia, 1974-1990[694]



If one disaggregates this broader picture to the level of tribal groups, we see that some of the larger tribes were on average slightly underrepresented, including the Tonga, Nsenga, Tumbuka, and Ngoni (see table 21). The reverse was true for some of the smaller groups, in particular the Lunda and Lenje. On the whole, however, it is striking that none of the country's 19 tribal groups with more than 1% of the population were entirely excluded from government between 1974 and 1990. Moreover, only four of these 19 groups (Namwanga, Lamba, Luvale and Mbunda) never had a minister in the 'inner core' of political power. Finally, even the smaller groups subsumed under 'Other' were prominently represented.

---

[694] Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 1973, 1985; GOZ Various Years a. Data for 1988 are missing.

Table 21: Tribal composition of government in Zambia, Index of Representation, 1974-1990 (in percent)[695]

Tribe	Population (2000)	1974	1976	1978	1980	1982	1984	1986	1990
Bemba	18,1	24,4	17,3	16,2	15,5	15,2	15,0	11,8	11,8
Tonga	12,7	14,4	13,9	11,4	4,6	4,4	5,8	6,1	4,3
Chewa	7,2	7,0	7,8	11,3	10,8	9,6	9,1	9,6	12,8
Lozi	5,6	8,3	8,6	12,5	16,6	19,5	15,9	16,7	9,3
Nsenga	5,5	2,8	3,0	3,8	1,4	0,0	1,5	1,6	9,1
Tumbuka	4,2	4,4	4,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	1,5	1,6	2,0
Ngoni	4,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	6,1	5,5	3,8	0,0	1,0
Lala	3,2	4,4	1,3	1,2	4,6	4,4	2,9	4,6	2,0
Kaonde	3,0	2,8	4,8	3,8	3,1	3,0	2,9	0,0	5,4
Namwanga	2,7	2,8	3,5	5,1	1,7	3,0	1,4	1,4	1,7
Lunda (N/W)	2,5	5,8	5,6	3,8	3,1	3,0	2,9	3,0	0,0
Ushi	2,4	0,0	1,3	1,2	0,0	0,0	1,5	5,6	6,4
Mambwe	2,3	4,4	0,0	3,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Lamba	2,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	4,3	2,9	1,4	2,9	3,3
Luvale	2,1	1,4	3,0	4,9	3,1	4,4	2,9	3,0	1,0
Bisa	1,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	4,7	4,1	3,8	4,0	5,4
Lenje	1,7	2,8	1,8	3,8	1,7	1,5	5,3	5,6	6,1
Lunda	1,4	1,4	8,6	1,2	1,7	3,0	10,6	7,2	6,4
Mbunda	1,4	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1,0
Other	15,9	13,0	15,2	16,2	16,9	16,6	12,0	15,2	11,0
Total	99,9	100,0	99,9	100,1	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

The quest for political power-sharing became also evident in the UNIP Central Committee (CC) – the key decision making body during the Second Republic.[696] Accordingly, the UNIP CC was broadly reflective of the country's main language groups between 1973 and 1988 (see figures 29a and 29b). While Bemba- and Nyanja-speakers were very slightly underrepresented, the smaller groups were moderately overrepresented.

The UNIP CC was generally known as Kaunda's 'sacred cow' representing many of the nationalist leaders of the independence struggle (the 'old guard') who were still influential behind the scenes and had to be included. Moreover, former opposition stalwarts were brought on board to foster accommodation. A key appointment in this respect was that of Edward Liso – Nkumbula's lieutenant – who was unanimously voted to UNIP's CC in December 1973[697] and remained one of Southern Province's key leaders throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In a similar vein, N. Mundia and other key Lozi-speaking politicians were integrated into the UNIP CC from the late 1970s to restore support in Western Province. The attempt to use the highest party organ for

[695] Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 2003; GOZ Various Years a.
[696] Tordoff 1980a: 17p.
[697] ACR 1975/1976: B383.

purposes of national integration became also visible in the appointments of both Illuete Yeta IV (the Litunga) and Chitimukulu Mutale Chitapankwa (Bemba Paramount Chief) in 1983 – a move intended to weld the influential traditional rulers more firmly into the political structures.[698]

Figure 29: Linguistic composition of the UNIP Central Committee (CC) in Zambia, 1973-1988[699]



'Tribal balancing' also continued to be practised in the civil service. The latter's size grew from 51.491 in 1969 to 126.260 in 1977[700] and still numbered around 90.000 in the late 1980s.[701] In general the need to accommodate 'the fluctuating pressures of strategic provincial and other interests' remained a constant concern.[702] The result was a fairly proportional distribution of senior civil service appointments between the country's major language groups throughout the 1970s and 1980s (see figures 30a and 30b). Even though some groups were at times slightly better or worse off, the overall picture was of balancing the claimants.

---

[698] ACR 1983/1984: B870; Interview, Dr. Patrick Manda.
[699] Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 1973, 1985; UNIP Various Years.
[700] Szeftel 1982: 6.
[701] ACR 1987/1988: B828.
[702] Dresang & Young 1980: 86p.

Figure 30: Linguistic distribution of permanent secretaries in Zambia, 1976-1985[703]



ECONOMIC POWER-SHARING

In terms of economic power-sharing, the picture was similarly balanced. By the late 1970s, the size of the parastatal sector had grown to 128.350[704] and provided the Zambian government with a huge reservoir of well-paid employment. My data indicate that these rewards were distributed in a remarkably equitable manner. As shown in figures 31a and 31b, all language groups – with the exception of the North-Western group – received proportional shares of appointments to the boards of directors and the senior management of the country's three major parastatals (ZIMCO, INDECO and the mining parastatals). At the same time, individuals of white or Asian background continued to hold prominent positions throughout the Second Republic (subsumed under 'Other'). Parastatal positions were generally more lucrative than positions in the civil service and often used to co-opt influential opposition figures. In the context of the mounting conflict with the trade unions (see below), President Kaunda appointed four key Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) leaders (F. Chiluba, C. Sampa, N. Zimba and H. Bweupe) to the ZIMCO board in 1983.[705] One year later, T. Walamba, the influential Vice-Chairman of Mineworkers' Union of Zambia (MUZ), accepted a position on the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) board of directors.

---

[703] Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 1973, 1985; GOZ Various Years b.
[704] Szeftel 1982: 6.
[705] ACR 1983/1984: B872.

Figure 31: Linguistic distribution of parastatal appointments in Zambia, 1974-1990 average[706]





MILITARY POWER-SHARING

In the military sector, the inclusive recruitment and promotion policies that had been introduced after independence facilitated the emergence of an officer corps with a national outlook. While detailed information on the composition of the entire officer corps is not available, a close look at all Zambian Army Commanders during the Second Republic shows that all of the country's five major language groups have over time enjoyed substantial representation at the very top of the military hierarchy (see table 22).

To further promote the integration of the military into the elite bargain, the Second Republic witnessed a progressive 'politicisation' of the army and a 'militarisation' of politics. On the one hand, UNIP organs commonly referred to as 'Works Committees' were introduced in the barracks and appointments to key army positions were generally given to those believed to be loyal to the ruling party. Moreover, all ranks had to participate in political education seminars where party policy was explained and loyalty to the one-party state was promoted.[707] On the other hand, high-ranking army leaders were offered lucrative positions at all levels of government. This began as early as 1973 when Kaunda nominated the three heads of the armed services to Parliament and

---

[706] Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 1973, 1985; ZIMCO Various Years; INDECO Various Years; MINDECO Various Years; ZCCM Various Years.
[707] ACR 1975/1976: B384.

appointed all three of them as Ministers of State.[708] Such a strategy of inclusion was maintained throughout the 1970s and 1980s with many current or former army officers being appointed to Cabinet, the UNIP CC or as District Governors. Prominent ministers with military background included, among others, Maj.-Gen. Chinkuli, Gen. Masheke, Lt.-Gen. Mibenge, Brig.-Gen. Haimbe and Lt.-Gen. Lungu. As more and more army officers were serving in high-ranking civilian positions, people started wondering whether the President was slowly turning over the country to soldiers.[709]

Table 22: Linguistic distribution of army commanders in Zambia, 1976-1991[710]

	Unified command structure (1976)	
	Zambia National Defence Force	
	Gen. G. K. Chinkuli (Tonga)	
	Lt.-Gen. P. D. Zuze (Nyanja)	
	Lt.-Gen. B. N. Mibenge (Bemba)	
	De-unified command structure (1980)	
Air Force	*Army*	*National Service*
Maj.-Gen. C. Kabwe (Bemba)	Gen. M. N. Masheke (Barotse)	Brig.-Gen. C. J. Nyirenda (Nyanja)
Lt. Gen. A. Lungu (Nyanja)	Lt.-Gen. C. S. Tembo (Nyanja)	Brig.-Gen. F. S. Mulenga (Bemba)
Maj.-Gen. Simbule (Bemba)	Lt.-Gen. G. M. Kalenge (North-Western)	Maj.-Gen. T. Fara (Nyanja)
Lt.-Gen. Simutowe (Bemba)	Lt.-Gen. F. G. Sibamba (Barotse)	

TERRITORIAL POWER-SHARING

While the Second Republic exhibited high levels of political, economic and military power-sharing, territorial power-sharing was more limited. As during the First Republic, executive authority remained concentrated at the centre, the provinces were granted only a small share in the central government's expenditure, and most rural councils operated within a context of 'central control and local impotence'.[711] Furthermore, the politicisation of local government structures reached a new dimension in 1976 when provincial members of the UNIP CC (MCCs) took over as political heads of the provinces.

The fusion of party and local government was formalised with the 1980 Local Administration Act, which abolished the distinction between party, central and local government and established a single administrative agency in each district – the District

[708] ACR 1973/1974: B333.
[709] ACR 1988/1989: B758.
[710] Own data compiled based on Wele 1995: 158; Interview, Gen. Malimba Masheke; Interview, Geofroy Haantolobo.
[711] Tordoff 1980b: 206.

Council.[712] The latter was headed by a centrally appointed District Governor and became responsible for the totality of party, central and local government activity in the district. The 1980 Act not only devolved further executive powers to the district level but also provided the Councils with more scope to raise their own revenue. Yet, despite this formal increase in autonomy, most District Councils remained undermined by the de facto absence of any significant sources of local revenue. Moreover, the planned integration of party and government proved difficult to achieve since the districts lacked integrated budgets.[713] On the one hand, central government departments continued to depend on their ministerial headquarters for funds, making it difficult for the District Councils to control their activities. On the other hand, UNIP itself made the integration unattainable by continuing to control its district party accounts from Lusaka. In the end, the main objective of the 1980 reforms was again to increase political control over the local councils rather than to achieve genuine decentralisation.

Figure 32: Posting of Provincial Ministers and MCCs in Zambia, 1974-1988 average[714]



Interestingly, the Second Republic witnessed a special form of 'tribal balancing' whereby the great majority of both Provincial Ministers and Provincial MCCs were deliberately posted outside their 'home' areas' (see figure 32). The few exceptions to this pattern all belonged to the Bemba, Tonga or Lozi tribes.[715] This is unlikely to be a

[712] Chikulo 1985: 74pp.
[713] Mukwena 2001: 8p.
[714] Own data compiled and calculated based on GOZ Various Years a; UNIP Various Years.
[715] Similarly, very few of the 55 District Governors in 1977 served in their 'home' district and at least three-quarters of them served also outside their province of origin (Tordoff 1980b: 198).

coincidence. Instead, it can be interpreted as another attempt to build support in former opposition areas

THE DECLINE OF THE UNIP ELITE BARGAIN

Altogether, UNIP managed to forge an increasingly stable elite bargain where access to positions of political, economic and military power was distributed in a remarkably equitable manner. From the late 1970s, however, the escalating economic crisis put a severe drain on UNIP's patronage machine, caused serious legitimacy problems for the ruling party and ultimately led to political realignments.

Figure 33: The representation of Copperbelt Province in Zambia's government, 1964-1990[716]



The Achilles' heel of the UNIP elite bargain was clearly the failure to effectively accommodate class cleavages, evident in the insufficient incorporation of the Copperbelt. This problem went back to the breakaway of UPP in the early 1970s that had taken with it UNIP's most outspoken leaders and destroyed much of the ruling party's support in what had been its stronghold since the nationalist struggle. Even though UNIP had survived and officially attempted to 'reconcile' with former UPP supporters, the party on the Copperbelt remained deeply affected by suspicion and

[716] Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 2003; GOZ Various Years a. Data for 1988 are missing. Note that figure 33 considers how many ministers and deputies were elected in Copperbelt constituencies rather than how many members of government were of Copperbelt descent.

accusation.[717] As a consequence, the Copperbelt failed to retrieve its old prominence in both the ruling party and government. While Copperbelt MPs had provided a significant proportion of both party and government cadres during the First Republic, the 1973 general elections removed virtually the whole generation of Copperbelt nationalist politicians from leadership.[718] As the new MPs had strong local connections rather than links with the centre, the urban population on the Copperbelt was left without recognisable leadership of national stature. The declining representation of Copperbelt society in government during the Second Republic is shown in figure 33.

UNIP's inability to exercise control over the Copperbelt could initially be compensated for by providing stable consumer prices to urban consumers, especially subsidised maize – the nation's staple food.[719] In the context of rapid urbanisation and economic decline, it became however increasingly costly to 'buy off' urban consumers. As subsidies were reduced and economic hardship increased, the unions began to fill the political void on the Copperbelt. During the 1970s, the government had gained considerable influence over organised labour by placing party faithful into the leadership of the ZCTU and making the latter a branch of UNIP.[720] Despite signs of accommodation, union leaders could hardly ignore the grievances of their members and remained critical of government, especially from the late 1970s when rapid economic downturn resulted in growing urban unemployment, spiralling prices and declining real wages.[721] The result was an increase in industrial action and mounting tensions between government and the trade unions that became more and more powerful with a membership of 367.000 in 1980 (double that of UNIP).[722] The confrontation escalated in 1980 over the reorganisation of local government in mine townships and eventually culminated in a series of strikes, the suspension of 17 union leaders from UNIP and the detaining of some, including the influential ZCTU leader F. Chiluba.[723]

The government-union power struggle was temporarily defused with the release of the detained union leaders in November 1981 and their appointment to key parastatal positions in 1983/84 (see above). Nevertheless, union mobilisation soon resurfaced in

---

[717] Larmer 2008: 108.
[718] Gertzel & Szeftel 1984: 135pp.
[719] Johns 1980: 114p.; Bates & Collier 1995: 122pp.
[720] Burdette 1988: 128p.
[721] Larmer 2006a: 167pp.
[722] Gertzel 1984a: 92p.
[723] Ibid.; Larmer 2006a: 169pp.

the light of the unabated economic crisis and controversial structural adjustment policies.[724] In late 1986, the removal of price control led to the doubling of the price of 'breakfast' mealie meal (food eaten by most urban Zambians) and sparked violent riots on the Copperbelt. These 'food riots' revealed the weakness of the one-party state and marked the starting point of efforts to reintroduce multipartyism and remove UNIP from power. Significantly, UNIP was no longer able to effectively co-opt the union leadership. Whereas Chiluba is believed to have turned down overtures to join UNIP's leadership in the late 1980s, others accepted high-level appointments but were subsequently considered as 'sell-outs' among union members and eventually removed from the leadership. Ultimately, the unions became the main driver behind the opposition's rise to power in 1991 with the fledgling MMD structures being built around the local branches of ZCTU's member unions.

The unions received support from other 'middle class' elements who were disillusioned by combined effects of one-party dominance and economic crisis. Paradoxically, the unions' key allies were businessmen who mobilised opposition against the regime's socialist economic policies that favoured state enterprises at the expense of the private sector.[725] Opposition first became apparent in 1977 when a business community-dominated Parliamentary Select Committee criticised the inefficient party and government structures and made recommendations on resolving the economic crisis. At the turn of the decade, the outspoken businessmen E. Chipimo not only publicly recommended a return to multi-party politics but also participated – along with other businessmen – in the October 1980 coup plot. Afterwards, business leaders, organised in the Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI), remained a centre of opposition to the regime and provided campaign funds to the union-led democratisation movement. Beyond this 'class compromise between business and labour'[726], the opposition movement also included churchmen, academics and intellectuals. Finally, the broad-based coalition over time also attracted more and more one-time UNIP leaders who had been purged or defected from the ruling party's 'inner core'.

---

[724] Larmer 2006b: 297pp.
[725] Bartlett 2000: 434pp.; Simutanyi 1996: 830pp.
[726] Bartlett 2000: 444.

Altogether, UNIP came to face an opposition movement that was very similar to itself – an inclusive coalition that drew together various organised interests and representatives from all parts of the country. The emergence of broad-based opposition centred on the trade unions was only the logical consequence of an elite bargain that was non-sectarian in nature but had only shallow control over the urban areas, especially the Copperbelt. Using both popular discontent and the fall of the communist bloc in 1989 as 'windows of opportunity', MMD proved strong enough to develop national appeal and swept to victory in the 1991 elections.

6.3 UNIP's inclusive elite bargain and civil war avoidance

I argue that civil war avoidance in Zambia during the First and Second Republic can be traced back to the continued existence of an inclusive elite bargain. Without UNIP's sustained attempt to accommodate the dominant social cleavages by means of 'tribal balancing', the at times hefty factional struggles between the country's major groups would have undoubtedly – as they did in many other African countries – escalated into open violence and war.

When asked about the main drivers of Zambia's enduring peace and stability since 1964, the overwhelming majority of my interviewees made immediate and prominent reference to UNIP's motto of 'One Zambia, One Nation' and Kaunda's practise of 'tribal balancing'. To give an example, H. Mwale, a long-standing minister under Kaunda, explained Zambia's peace in the following terms:

> 'When we got independence, we had the motto of One Zambia One Nation. Under this One Zambia, One Nation we organised all the 73 tribes in Zambia to be one (...). That's why the country has been stable (...) Us, as the old freedom fighters, we created Zambia as one country and one people'.[727]

Similarly, Gen. M. Masheke, Prime Minister during the 1980s, maintained:

> 'Tribal balancing has helped to prevent violent conflict. There is nothing more frustrating for a group of people in a country than knowing that they are not taken care of because of their tribal background. That was taken care of (...). They were made part and parcel of Zambia (...). You can have ministers from one tribe only and they can be efficient in terms of doing their work. But they will be inefficient in the fact that they will not be accepted in other areas'.[728]

Interestingly, such assessments were widely shared not only among UNIP stalwarts but also among former opposition politicians, civil society representatives and academics.

---

[727] Interview, Haswell Mwale.
[728] Interview, Gen. Malimba Masheke.

But how can one further substantiate the link between Zambia's inclusive elite bargain and civil war avoidance? In the Ugandan case, the challenge was to understand whether the given degree of tribal exclusion can plausibly explain events that *did occur* (i.e. recurrent instances of civil war). This could be done by investigating the specific historical contexts of the observed insurgencies and the underlying motivations of their protagonists. In the Zambian case, things are more complicated. Here, the challenge is to understand whether the given degree of tribal inclusion can explain an event that *never occurred* (i.e. the absence of civil war). This is obviously more difficult (and speculative) since there are simply no successful insurgencies to investigate and no protagonists to interview. The only solution to this problem is *counterfactual reasoning* – a method for evaluating claims of causation by exploring what might have happened had the causal event not occurred.[729] This means that I have to reason what might have happened if there had been no inclusive elite bargains in Zambia between 1964 and 1991. I suggest that this can best be done by looking at distinct *moments of crisis* in the history of the First and Second Republic.

A first moment of crisis occurred in the wake of independence when UNIP faced the still looming secessionist threat from Barotseland. The ruling party responded to this threat by playing on the deep-seated divisions between Lozi 'traditionalists' and Lozi 'nationalists'. As detailed in chapter 3, the traditional Barotse leadership favoured independence to preserve its autonomy and privilege, whereas young educated Lozi such as Sikota and Arthur Wina played a key role in the nationalist movement and saw no economic future for an independent Barotse state. The Kaunda government skilfully managed to drive a wedge between these two factions by giving in to the Lozi 'nationalist' faction's claims for an extremely generous allocation of government and party positions (see section 6.2). Admittedly, this did by no means appease the 'traditionalists' since most of the appointed Barotse-speakers were from within the inner circles of the 'nationalist' faction. This partly explains the emergence of the UP from the mid-1960s despite Lozi overrepresentation in party and government. Nevertheless, Kaunda's move arguably accommodated the 'nationalists' and thereby prevented the emergence of a strong and united secessionist movement in Barotseland. If the President had rejected the nationalists' demands for a prominent share of key appointments, the

[729] While Edwar Carr (1961: 97) dismissed counterfactual history as a 'parlour game' played by the 'losers' in history, others have argued for careful counterfactual thinking (e.g Hawthorn 1993; Ferguson 2000). For some case studies comparing the possible against the actual see Tuchman 1984; Parker 1993; Zartman 2005b.

'nationalist' faction might have joined forces with the traditional Barotse government. It seems plausible to suggest that such a united secessionist movement would have – if faced with persistent exclusion – ultimately resorted to violent means.

A second moment of crisis occurred after the 1967 UNIP CC elections when the victory of the Bemba-speaking bloc and the ensuing imbalances in party and government produced widespread fears of Bemba domination throughout much of the country. This was arguably the most serious political crisis in Zambia's post-colonial history and threatened to tear apart the still fragile unity of 'One Zambia, One Nation'. Kaunda himself was deeply shocked by the extent of tribal divisions and used his address to the UNIP Party Council after the divisive 1967 party elections to proclaim:

> 'We have canvassed so strongly and indeed, viciously, along tribal, racial and provincial lines, that one wonders whether we really have national or tribal and provincial leadership. I must admit publicly that I have never experienced in the life of this young nation, such a state of hate, based entirely on tribe, province, race, colour and religion, which is the negation of all that we stand for in this party and government (...). It is very easy to shout 'ONE ZAMBIA, ONE NATION' but very difficult to think and act in that way honestly and sincerely. As we discuss this matter here, I don't want to hide from you all that there are very few fields in the life of this nation which have not been adversely affected. How difficult it is to build, but how easy to destroy'.[730]

These intense tribal tensions were however defused by the subsequent appointment of a more balanced Interim Executive Committee and reinforced attempts to increase the national outlook of government and administration. If the controversial 1967 UNIP CC had not been dissolved, this would almost certainly have caused lasting alienation among the Nyanja- and Barotse-speaking factions and might ultimately have led to the emergence of violent conflict. Instead, the UNIP government always sought to placate the grievances of the disaffected groups, evident in the continued efforts to win (back) support among Tonga- and Barotse-speakers throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s. The deliberate appointment of Lozi 'traditionalists' may have been of particular significance in this context as it facilitated a rapprochement with the traditional Barotse government and thereby further mitigated the threat of secessionist violence.

A third moment of crisis occurred after the imposition of the one-party state in 1972-73, which involved the banning of all opposition parties – most notably of UPP – and therefore caused considerable frustration and disaffection. If the introduction of one-party rule had been accompanied by systematic discrimination against the core constituencies of the banned opposition parties, the likely outcome would have been

[730] Cited after Rotberg 1967: 33.

violent conflict. This was however never the case. While the one-party state was undoubtedly autocratic in nature and did not hesitate to victimise those individuals who challenged its authority (see below), there is no evidence that groups as a whole were ever discriminated against. This pattern can be illustrated by looking at the example of UPP. As discussed above, many known or suspected UPP members were actively prevented from re-joining politics or even imprisoned throughout much of the 1970s. Yet, the Bemba – both as a tribe and language group – always continued to have remarkably proportional representation at all levels of the public sector (see section 6.2). Significantly, this prevented the emergence of cohesive group grievances that are arguably especially conducive to violent mobilisation. In the end, the extremely inclusive elite bargain of the Second Republic helped to systematically accommodate sectional cleavages and thereby achieved more unity than critics typically concede, especially when taking into account the severe economic and regional crises that faced the country at the time.

A fourth moment of crisis occurred in 1976 when A. Mushala launched the only attempt of armed insurrection against the Zambian post-colonial state. Initially a member of UNIP, Mushala joined the UP in the late 1960s and then became – after the UP was banned – ANC Provincial President in North-Western Province.[731] Unlike the top ANC leadership, Mushala and a few followers boycotted the negotiations over the one-party state and – after having received limited training and support in South Africa – ultimately launched a guerrilla war in North-Western Province in 1976. Typically characterised as mere 'bandits' or 'South African puppets' by members of the ruling party,[732] the rebels claimed to be fighting the one-party state and the marginalisation of North-Western Province. Even though the low-level rebellion dragged on until late 1982 when Mushala was killed, it failed to gain substantial support. The main reason for this failure was arguably that the mainstream of the North-Western leadership was fully integrated in the country's elite bargain throughout the Second Republic. As shown above, this was not only true for the North-Western group as a whole but also for all three tribes in the Province, including the Kaonde, Lunda and Luvale. Of particular interest in this context is the position of the Lunda leadership – Mushala and most of his followers were Lunda – who were extremely prominently represented not only in government (see above) but also in other parts of the public sector. If the Lunda

[731] Larmer & Macola 2007.
[732] Interview, Marc Chona.

leadership had been marginalised, the insurgency might have been more successful. But as this was far from the case, Mushala remained a relatively isolated figure who proved unable to mobilise significant support.

A final period (rather than moment) of crisis occurred during much of the 1980s when Zambia was hit by extreme economic decline and mounting social unrest. If the worsening economic crisis had – as it happened in other African countries – been accompanied by a biased distribution of the dwindling 'national cake', this might have caused a 'tribalisation' of political competition, which might ultimately have turned violent. But this was never the case. Instead, there is evidence for what one might label an 'inclusive sharing of losses'. V. Mwaanga, a former Minister under Kaunda, recalls that

> 'even at the time when resources were very extremely limited, an attempt was made to equitably share jobs and resources among the various competing interests (...). It was not always easy but at least an attempt was made'.[733]

Similarly, Reverend F. Sakala, one of the country's most outspoken clerics, remembers:

> 'When we suffered we suffered together. There wasn't a privileged section of Zambian society which enjoyed immunity when the economy went down. We all suffered'.[734]

On the whole, the persistence of an inclusive elite bargain even in times of economic crisis prevented the country's disintegration into violent group conflict. At the same time, however, UNIP's inclusive handling of economic decline could not prevent generalised discontent across sectarian lines and thereby produced – somewhat ironically – a broad-based opposition movement that proved strong enough to displace it from power.

6.4 Competing explanations

As shown in chapter 1, most standard explanations of civil war are of limited use when trying to understand civil war avoidance in Zambia. Also, events between 1964 and 1991 tend to support my expectation that patterns of war and peace are mainly driven by inter-group inequalities at the level of elites rather than by inter-group inequalities at the level of the masses. Interestingly, post-independence Zambia was initially characterised by considerable socioeconomic inequalities. While the urban areas on the Copperbelt were much better off, socioeconomic development lagged behind in the rural areas

[733] Interview, Vernon Mwaanga.
[734] Interview, Reverend Foston Sakala.

throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Even though comprehensive data is not available, the scant available evidence indicates that Western, North-Western and Luapula Provinces were particularly disadvantaged in socioeconomic terms – a situation that gave rise to pronounced feelings of marginalisation. In Western Province, widespread resentment was mainly due to a lack of tangible development progress and the government's decision in 1966 to prohibit any further labour migration to South Africa through the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WENELA).[735] The closure of the latter – that had for many years been a major source of income – meant rising unemployment in a region where there were few alternative opportunities. Similar socioeconomic grievances existed in North-Western and Luapula Provinces.[736] All this means that the absence of civil war under Kaunda can hardly be related to a lack of socioeconomic inter-group inequalities at the level of the masses. Instead, it was arguably Kaunda's practise of 'tribal balancing' at the level of elites that prevented existing socioeconomic disparities from escalating into violent conflict.

The key importance of 'tribal balancing' notwithstanding, Zambia's peace and stability between 1964 and 1991 was also due to a number of other factors. First, regime type seems to have mattered, albeit in a different form than commonly suggested. Advocates of the 'anocracy favours civil war' argument suggest that repression under the autocratic one-party regime contributed to the stability of the Second Republic.[737] Indeed, the one-party state entailed considerable repression against those who were suspected of opposing the official doctrine of 'one party participatory democracy'.[738] Yet, even critics of the one-party state concede that repression was always relatively 'mild' when compared with other countries and can therefore not explain the absence of violent conflict.[739] More consequential was the fact that one-party rule limited political competition and thereby helped to contain the destabilising factional struggles of the First Republic. As discussed above, 'tribal balancing' alone could not prevent the emergence of tribally-based opposition parties that threatened to unravel the ruling coalition. This was because the post-independence context of multi-party competition – and more specifically the option of defection into the opposition – favoured political

[735] Gertzel 1984b.
[736] Baylies 1984; Larmer & Macola 2007.
[737] Burnell 2005: 118p.
[738] For details see Phiri 2006: 162pp.; Erdmann & Simutanyi 2003: 7.
[739] Interview, Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika.

fragmentation and made stable elite accommodation inherently difficult to achieve.[740] The introduction of the one-party state put an end to 'the crisis of fragmentation'[741] and thereby stabilised political competition over the distribution of spoils. All this is not to claim that one-party rule was a direct cause of Zambia's peace, not least since the latter also prevailed under the multi-party arrangements of the First and Third Republic. But it did help to stabilise and further entrench Zambia's inclusive elite bargain.

Second, there is what one might label the 'Kaunda factor'. Although born among the Bemba in Northern Province, Kaunda's Nyasaland (now Malawi) parentage and his strong anti-tribal stance led him to be regarded as the only one capable of playing politics 'above tribe'.[742] In the words of Aka Lewanika:

> 'Kaunda was chosen as a unifier, as one who is above tribe (...). The leaders of the Bemba could accept Kaunda because he grew up as a Bemba. The others could accept him because basically he was not Bemba'.[743]

Kaunda's role as a mediator 'above tribe' was crucial in maintaining the fragile post-independence elite bargain, especially since his own Bemba background enabled him to stand up to Bemba demands without producing an escalation of conflict. If, for example, a Lozi President had disbanded the UNIP CC in 1969 and thereby revised the electoral victory of the Bemba-speaking bloc, this would almost certainly have caused violent conflict. The undue dependency on Kaunda as a mediator became evident in early February 1968 when the President – shocked by the extent of tribal divisions – stepped down for one night. Many commentators agree that there is little doubt that the Zambian political system would have disintegrated into open violence if Kaunda had not agreed to stay.[744] This speculation is underlined by N. Tembo, the Minister of State for North-Western Province at the time, who described the implications of Kaunda's resignation in the following terms:

> 'I left that Hall with one theme in mind – the Republic is finished (...). My family was left behind in the Solwezi provincial capital of North-Western Province. My first thought, following the shock of Ken's resignation, was the security of my family who were more than six hundred and forty kilometres away from this confusion (...). I was therefore going to drive all night to Solwezi, pick up my family, pack a few essential belongings and drive

---

[740] The dilemma of 'tribal balancing' in the context of multi-party politics was that it turned out to be a 'zero-sum game': Once the centre responded to allegations of (real or perceived) neglect by one group, it would almost inevitably take away from other groups and therefore provoke new concerns of (relative) deprivation. In this 'vicious' circle, the central government tended to oscillate between competing group demands and ultimately suffered from a steadily shrinking power base.

[741] Interview, Sikota Wina.

[742] Phiri 2006: 148.

[743] Interview, Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika.

[744] Tordoff & Scott 1974: 151. In the wake of the 1967-68 crisis, Kaunda strategically used his position as 'pacifier above tribe' to consolidate his own position vis-à-vis political opponents (Interview, Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika).

> back to Lusaka, and then to Lundazi in the Eastern Province, which is my home. I was going to leave them in the safety of the villagers and return to Lusaka with my shot gun and join in the street fighting'.[745]

Third, there was the 'regional factor'. Significantly, post-colonial Zambia found itself in a context of extreme regional instability, including liberation wars in many of its neighbouring countries (Southern Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique) as well as recurrent destabilisation attempts from apartheid South Africa. The liberation struggle in Southern Rhodesia had the most dramatic impact on Zambia. Accused of harbouring liberation fighters, the country was on several occasions subject to Rhodesian air raids in 1978/79, which were destructive both in terms of loss of life and property, but also psychologically.[746] Moreover, the presence of thousands of war refugees on Zambian territory threatened to embroil the country in its neighbour's affairs.[747] Interestingly, however, and in sharp contrast to the situation in Uganda, these regional spill-over effects proved to be an integrating force. Rather than causing internal conflict, the presence of an external threat strengthened UNIP's domestic authority and ultimately helped to unify the country. This was however only made possible by the existence of an inclusive elite bargain, which meant that neighbouring countries had few opportunities to destabilise Zambia by playing on feelings of marginalisation. A case in point is the South Africa-sponsored Mushala insurgency, which failed to gain ground in the North-West due to the absence of cohesive group grievances. In the end, the inclusive elite bargain helped to insulate Zambia from the potentially destabilising regional spillover effects.

Finally, there was the 'urban factor'. As detailed in chapter 3, the growth of the mining industry on the Copperbelt from the 1930s led to rapid urbanisation whereby Zambia exhibited above African average levels of urbanisation upon independence (see figure 34). Afterwards, the share of the urban population rose from about 20% in the mid-1960s to about 40% in the late 1970s, making Zambia the second most urbanised country in Africa at the time. The urban contact that followed – especially in form of intertribal marriages – blurred language- and tribe-related cleavages and, over time, helped to create a sense of 'Zambia-ness'[748], which made inter-group conflict less likely. Nevertheless, the hefty factional struggles throughout the 1960s and 1970s

---

[745] Cited after Phiri 2006: 146.
[746] ACR 1978/1979: B450.
[747] Burnell 2005: 116p.
[748] Interview, Mbita Chitala.

showed that language and tribe as sources of social cleavage remained salient even in an increasingly urbanised society. In this sense, 'tribal balancing' was arguably without alternative with a view to securing peace and stability.

Figure 34: Urbanisation in Zambia[749]



6.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that Zambia's peace and stability during the First and Second Republic goes back to the existence of an inclusive elite bargain, which manifested itself in high degrees of political, economic and military power-sharing. In sharp contrast to the situation in Uganda, competing linguistic and tribal groups enjoyed remarkably proportional access to positions of state power. This helped to accommodate the colonial legacy of high social fragmentation, prevented the emergence of cohesive group grievances and thereby laid the foundations for Zambia's lasting peace.

While the UNIP elite bargain is key to understanding civil war avoidance between 1964 and 1991, national integration was also facilitated by a number of other factors. These include the presence of President Kaunda as a credible 'mediator above tribe', the existence of an external threat in the form of regional instability, high levels of urbanisation, and one-party rule during the Second Republic.

---

[749] World Bank 2009.

7 Between cracks and continuity – Zambia's elite bargain and the lasting peace of the Third Republic

In the last chapter, I have argued that civil war avoidance during Zambia's First and Second Republic can be traced back to UNIP's inclusive elite bargain. In this chapter, I will ask how the country's elite bargain evolved after the reintroduction of multi-party politics in 1991. To what extent has the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) followed UNIP's tradition of sharing access to positions of state power equitably between the country's major linguistic and tribal groups? And how has this affected Zambia's peace and stability?

To find answers to these questions, I will start by assessing the observed levels of violent conflict during the Third Republic (section 7.1). In a second and third step, I will establish the inclusiveness of the MMD elite bargain (section 7.2) and then analyse its impact on peace and stability between 1991 and 2008 (section 7.3). The chapter again ends with brief thoughts on competing explanations (section 7.4).

7.1 Conflict levels between 1991 and 2008

Chiluba and his MMD won a large majority in the 1991 elections, losing only in Eastern Province that remained a UNIP stronghold.[750] In 1996, MMD – benefitting from UNIP's electoral boycott – even managed to win a majority throughout the entire country.[751] The situation changed in 2001 when the new MMD candidate L. Mwanawasa – hampered by Chiluba's controversial but ultimately unsuccessful bid for a 'third term' – won the presidency by a very narrow margin and even failed to gain a majority in Parliament.[752] While MMD retained control of the North (Copperbelt, Northern, Luapula, and – to a lesser extent – Central Provinces), the three main opposition parties dominated in the rest of country, including UNIP in the East, the Forum For Democracy and Development (FDD) in Lusaka and the United Party for National Development (UPND) in Southern, Western and North-Western Provinces. MMD's position was however strengthened in the 2006 poll where Mwanawasa won

[750] Baylies & Szeftel 1992.
[751] Baylies & Szeftel 1997.
[752] Burnell 2002, 2003.

the presidency by a larger margin and recaptured a solid parliamentary majority.[753] While an electoral alliance between UPND, UNIP and FDD showed a disappointing performance except in Southern Province, the Patriotic Front (PF) emerged as the leading opposition party sweeping Lusaka and the Copperbelt and garnering substantial support in Luapula and Northern provinces. Mwanawasa's second term was abruptly ended by his death in July 2008. He was replaced by Vice-President R. Banda who won the presidential poll in October 2008.[754]

Throughout the Third Republic, there were again hardly any signs of political violence. One of the few exceptions was another military coup attempt in October 1997 when Captain Lungu (alias Captain 'Solo') and his comrades managed to gain control of Radio Zambia claiming they had taken over on behalf of the National Redemption Council, the alleged political wing of the defence force.[755] Yet, as the coup attempt was organised by relatively junior army officers who enjoyed little support in the higher ranks, it was immediately crushed by loyalist forces. Another minor exception were urban riots following the 2006 elections. As PF leader and presidential candidate M. Sata claimed the vote had been rigged, Lusaka and the Copperbelt –the opposition strongholds – witnessed urban violence for two consecutive days.[756] The protests ended however quickly when Sata himself asked his supporters to stop the violence. On the whole, Zambia remained light-years away from experiencing civil war.

How can one explain this enduring peace and stability? In what follows I will show that MMD largely followed UNIP's practise of forging an inclusive elite bargain, some cracks in the ruling political coalition notwithstanding. This has arguably remained a key driver behind civil war avoidance between 1991 and 2008.

7.2 The MMD elite bargain (1991-2008)

The Third Republic did by no means revolutionise Zambia's political culture. A first element of continuity was centralised political power. While MMD had campaigned for

---

[753] Gould 2007; Larmer & Fraser 2007.
[754] Cheeseman & Hinfelaar 2010. Note that I limit my analysis to the Chiluba and Mwanawasa administrations and do not cover events since Rupiah Banda took over as President in October 2008. This is due to the fact that my fieldwork ended in mid-October 2008, two weeks before the Presidential by-elections.
[755] Phiri 2002: 12.
[756] 'Zambia vote count sparks violence', *BBC News*, 1 October 2006.

a parliamentary system of government, it left the presidential system largely unchanged. Power continued to be concentrated in the presidency and Parliament remained rather weak with all legislation still originating within the executive.[757] The second element of continuity was the predominance of one political party. The size of MMD's victory in 1991 and the weakness of UNIP as the only serious opposition party made the re-introduction of multi-party politics more formal than real.[758] As a consequence, MMD reproduced rather than replaced UNIP. Even though opposition parties gained strength under Mwanawasa (especially during the 2001 elections), MMD always remained the only political party with considerable political support in all parts of the country.[759] Continuities between MMD and the former ruling party were also evident in the substantial presence of former UNIP cadres in the MMD ranks[760] – a pattern that can be observed until today. The current President R. Banda, for example, was once a minister under Kaunda and left UNIP to join the MMD only in the course of Mwanawasa's first term.

The third – often overlooked– element of continuity was the enduring attempt to forge an inclusive elite bargain. Significantly, both Chiluba and Mwanawasa continued to make a UNIP-style attempt to accommodate linguistic and tribal cleavages by forming a 'maximum coalition'[761], evident in high degrees of political, economic and military power-sharing.

POLITICAL POWER-SHARING

Officially, the Chiluba government rejected the convention of 'tribal balancing' arguing that such an approach would be undemocratic and economically harmful.[762] But does this really mean that 'tribal balancing' was fully abandoned? Many scholars seem to think so and report a growing 'Bemba bias' in appointments, typically related to the fact

---

[757] Burnell 2001: 104p.
[758] Baylies & Szeftel 1992: 89.
[759] As discussed above, MMD did not win the majority of votes in some Provinces during both the 2001 and 2006 elections. Yet, MMD always managed to win a considerable amount of votes even in areas where the opposition prevailed (see Burnell 2001, Larmer & Fraser 2007). This makes it different from regionally-based opposition parties like UPND or PF and explains why the ruling party has so far managed to remain in power.
[760] According to Baylies & Szeftel (1992: 83), '[n]o fewer than 20 MMD candidates in the 1991 elections were former or sitting UNIP MPs and 12 had been cabinet ministers or central committee members. Another six had been UNIP regional secretaries or district governors and four were former army officers'.
[761] Van Donge 1995: 214.
[762] Chikulo 1996: 33.

that Chiluba himself is a Bemba-speaking Lunda from Luapula Province.[763] Among Zambians, there is an often-heard perception of Bemba domination under Chiluba, which Rueben Lifuka, Director of Transparency International Zambia, summarised in the following terms:

> 'More Bemba had access to positions of power; all key positions went to the Bemba. This was disruptive in the sense that it alienated other tribes who felt that they were not taken on board'.[764]

Similarly, another civil society activist recalled that 'Chiluba bembanised the country, which created a lot of resentment'.[765]

Table 23: Linguistic distribution of the MMD National Executive Committee (NEC) in Zambia, 2001-2008 (in percent)[766]

Language Group	Population	2001	2008
Bemba	41,7	50,0	42,1
Nyanja	23,8	12,0	14,0
Tonga	13,9	16,0	21,1
North-Western	7,7	12,0	12,3
Barotse	6,9	9,0	8,8
Other	6,0	1,0	1,8
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0

Such accusations of a generalised 'Bemba bias' under Chiluba are however unjustified. This is not to deny that MMD was initially indeed dominated by the Bemba-speaking group. At the National Convention in February 1991, Chiluba captured the party presidency, while leaders from Western (A. Wina) and North-Western Provinces (H. Mulemba) lost out.[767] At the same time, elections for the MMD National Executive Committee (NEC) produced a clear bias in favour of Bemba-speakers who held 18 out of 28 (or 64%) of all positions – a situation that produced open complaints about 'tribalism'.[768] Especially pronounced was the underrepresentation of Nyanja-speakers from Eastern Province who were perceived to represent the only remaining UNIP stronghold. Over time, however, the 'Bemba bias' within the higher ranks of the party has eased (see table 23). Even though Nyanja-speakers remain underrepresented, the MMD party leadership now reflects a broadly national outlook.

---

[763] Chikulo 2000: 171; Osei-Hwedie 1998: 235p.; Burnell 2001: 99.
[764] Interview, Rueben Lifuka.
[765] Interview, Mulima Kufekisa-Akapelwa.
[766] Compiled and calculated based on CSO 2003; Hulterström 2004: 103; MMD 2008.
[767] Bartlett 2000: 433.
[768] Ibid.

Figure 35: Linguistic distribution of permanent secretaries in Zambia, 1992-2008[769]



A national outlook was also retained in the civil service where permanent secretary appointments continued to be distributed more or less proportionally among the country's major language groups, the more recent overrepresentation of Tonga-speakers notwithstanding (see figures 35a and 35b). This contradicts earlier claims by Mphaisha that all senior civil servants were fired and replaced by Chiluba's financiers and supporters, mostly from his Bemba-speaking group.[770] Interestingly, the MMD government struggled hard to avoid cuts in the size of the civil service. Accordingly, the politically most demanding component of a Public Sector Reform Programme – to cut civil service personnel by 25% within three years – was never implemented.[771] This means that an important bastion of Zambia's elite bargain remained largely untouched, suggesting that the MMD government, like its predecessor, lacked autonomy from powerful vested interests in the bureaucracy.

[769] Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 2003; GOZ Various Years b, d.
[770] Mphaisha 1996: 81.
[771] Erdmann & Simutanyi 2003: 63.

Figure 36: Linguistic composition of government in Zambia, 1992-1998[772]



Most importantly, my data show that 'tribal balancing' was also informally retained in government, albeit to a lesser extent than under Kaunda. In absolute terms, Chiluba's governments were on average dominated by Bemba-speakers (see figure 36a). In terms of population share, however, the Bemba-speaking group was only very marginally overrepresented (see figure 36b). All other language groups received relatively proportional representation, even though some of them were at times slightly better or worse off (see figure 36c). The only exception was the Nyanja-speaking group that was underrepresented from the beginning – a situation that initially reflected the fact that UNIP had won all parliamentary seats in Eastern Province during the 1991 elections. Nonetheless, Chiluba subsequently used his right of appointment (eight MPs from

[772] Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 2003; GOZ Various Years a. Data for 2000 are missing.

outside Parliament) to bring Nyanja-speakers on board. The key appointment in this respect was clearly that of Brig.-Gen. G. Miyanda who first served as the powerful Minister without Portfolio (3rd in the hierarchy) and later became Vice-President (2nd in the hierarchy). After the 1996 elections, Miyanda was replaced by Gen. Chr. Tembo – another Nyanja-speaker from the Tumbuka tribe. Even though Nyanja-speakers remained underrepresented, they were – in sharp contrast to the Acholi in Museveni's Uganda – continuously represented in the 'inner core' of political power. Last but not least, Chiluba also maintained the tradition of racial inclusiveness in government by appointing a significant number of ministers of White or Asian background.[773]

Table 24: Tribal composition of government in Zambia, Index of Representation, 1992-2008 (in percent)[774]

Tribe	Population (2000)	1992	1994	1996	1998	2002	2004	2006	2008
Bemba	18,1	12,8	9,5	15,8	16,2	16,6	18,2	2,3	5,3
Tonga	12,7	7,4	8,7	8,9	17,5	1,9	7,4	6,7	6,6
Chewa	7,2	0,0	0,8	0,8	0,8	1,0	2,4	8,1	7,1
Lozi	5,6	5,1	6,4	8,7	8,2	11,6	7,4	9,0	7,2
Nsenga	5,5	3,9	4,9	6,0	2,1	1,5	0,0	3,2	4,5
Tumbuka	4,2	5,2	3,5	5,8	5,3	1,5	2,5	2,3	0,9
Ngoni	4,0	5,0	1,6	0,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	6,3	2,7
Lala	3,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,8	8,3	8,3	2,3	6,2
Kaonde	3,0	5,2	5,7	2,2	0,0	4,9	2,5	4,6	8,4
Namwanga	2,7	1,1	4,9	2,9	5,3	1,0	0,0	1,4	1,3
Lunda (N/W)	2,5	1,1	2,1	2,2	2,9	2,9	3,3	3,2	6,2
Ushi	2,4	6,0	3,3	2,3	2,4	2,5	0,8	1,9	1,8
Mambwe	2,3	6,0	4,9	0,0	0,8	2,9	3,3	2,3	2,2
Lamba	2,2	1,3	4,6	4,5	4,5	9,2	6,6	8,6	8,8
Luvale	2,1	0,0	0,8	0,8	1,6	1,0	0,8	6,7	3,6
Bisa	1,8	3,9	1,3	2,2	4,9	1,5	1,7	1,9	0,0
Lenje	1,7	6,0	6,6	2,3	2,9	9,7	10,0	8,8	9,6
Lunda	1,4	7,8	8,2	8,8	6,2	8,7	6,6	5,3	5,3
Mbunda	1,4	1,1	1,3	1,4	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,3	1,3
Other	15,9	21,1	20,7	23,6	17,3	13,5	18,2	12,5	11,1
Total	99,9	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

In terms of tribal cleavages, some of the larger groups were clearly underrepresented in Chiluba's governments, including the Chewa, the Tonga and – interestingly – even the Bemba (see table 24). The reverse was true for some of the smaller groups, in particular the Bemba-speaking Lunda from Luapula Province, the President's own group. Yet, none of the country's 19 largest tribes were fully excluded from government between 1992 and 1998. Moreover, even many of the numerous smaller tribes with less than 1% of the population (subsumed under 'Other') were prominently represented.

[773] Examples included, among others, S. Zukas, G. Scott, D. Patel and S. Desai.
[774] Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 2003; GOZ Various Years a.

The broad-based nature of the Chiluba regime limited the prospects of political mobilisation based on linguistic or tribal cleavages. This is not to deny that MMD was affected by factional struggles, which resulted in the departure of more than half of the original MMD cabinet ministers and the emergence of 35 opposition parties until the mid-1990s.[775] Political fragmentation became more serious towards the end of Chiluba's second term, especially in 2000 and 2001 when the President unsuccessfully tried to extend his second term of office into a third term.[776] Most of these parties were however off-shoots of the ruling party and typically rooted in personal ambitions rather than in cohesive group grievances. One exception was the Lozi-based National Party (NP), which was created in 1993 to protest the alleged marginalisation of Barotse-speaking leaders in party and government.[777] However, the NP failed to gain lasting ground, not least since Chiluba improved the representation of Barotse-speakers from the mid-1990s (see figure 36c). A second exception was the creation of the United Party for National Development (UPND) in late 1998. UPND – led by A. Mazoka (a Tonga) – was commonly seen as an 'anti-Bemba formation' that expressed latent feelings of neglect among the North-Western-, Barotse- and especially Tonga-speaking groups.[778] Interestingly, this neglect was clearly more perceived than real since all of these three groups were rather well represented in party and government (see above). The perception of neglect allowed UPND to establish itself as the main opposition party by winning a number of by-elections in the late 1990s. According to political insiders, the widespread fear of Bemba domination ultimately forced Chiluba to pick a non-Bemba as his successor.[779] In this sense, L. Mwanawasa – a Tonga-speaking Lenje from Central Province – was regarded as a suitable candidate to defuse anti-Bemba sentiment.[780]

---

[775] Baylies & Szeftel 1997: 115.
[776] Erdmann & Simutanyi 2003: 29pp. For details on the 'third term debate' see Phiri 2006: 202pp.
[777] Sichone & Simutanyi 1996: 188p; Bartlett 2000: 441p.
[778] Since the early 1990s, feelings of marginalisation had been especially pronounced among leaders from the Tonga tribe in Southern Province (Ihonvbere 1995: 9pp.). Such feelings of neglect culminated in the rise of UPND and earned the party a 'Tonga' label. Phiri (2006: 219) reports that UPND's 'tribal tag' was confirmed by the activities of the Tonga Traditional Association, which openly urged all Tonga and Lozi to vote for Mazoka in the 2001 elections. Interestingly, the UPDN leadership did little to distance itself from such 'tribal' campaigning. Nevertheless, the 'Tonga label' was not entirely justified since the UPND leadership was, at least initially, fairly national in character (Hulterström 2004: 102).
[779] Interview, Njekwa Anamela.
[780] Note that Mwanawasa's father is a Lenje from Central Province (Tonga-speakers), while his mother is a Lamba from Copperbelt Province (Bemba-speakers). This made him a suitable candidate to bridge the divide between two of the country's key language groups.

After Mwanawasa took over as President in 2001, the need for a tribally balanced government continued to be recognised. Accordingly, Mike Mulongoti – formerly Minister of Information and one of the President's closest confidants – argued that

> '[i]t would be naive for any political leadership to ignore the sensitivity to the issue of tribal balancing. If you are building a nation, everybody must think they are part and parcel and you must carry them along deliberately'.[781]

In line with such statements, there were indeed signs that that Mwanawasa sought to forge another 'maximum coalition'. After the 2001 elections, this was a difficult undertaking since the ruling party had almost no MPs outside its strongholds in the northern and central parts of the country. As a consequence, the President chose to co-opt several prominent opposition MPs and appointed them as ministers or deputy ministers.[782] This not only helped MMD to regain a parliamentary majority but was also meant to create support in the opposition areas. Moreover, the President used his appointment prerogatives to nominate prominent individuals from opposition areas as ministers.[783] This conciliatory attitude towards opposition areas ensured that the Barotse and North-Western language groups were prominently represented (see figure 37c). Nyanja-speakers, by contrast, were initially almost entirely excluded, which gave rise to mounting complaints about marginalisation.[784] To rebuild support in the East, the President appointed R. Banda, a Chewa, who successfully campaigned for MMD before the 2006 elections and was subsequently made Vice-President. The re-emergence of MMD as a 'national' party during the 2006 elections facilitated the establishment of a more balanced government during Mwanawasa's second term (see figure 37c). Altogether, the Mwanawasa governments on average retained a broadly national outlook (see figures 37a and 37b).

Signs of continuity notwithstanding, the MMD elite bargain came to suffer from a number of serious cracks. First, efforts for 'tribal balancing' under Mwanawasa were at least partially contradicted by the existence of the so-called 'family tree'. The latter consisted of the President's Lamba and especially Lenje relatives who were appointed to key positions not only in government but also in the administration and the Foreign

---

[781] Interview, Mike Mulongoti. See also 'Cabinet Size - Mulongoti Versus Everyone?', *Zambian Economist*, 11 December 2007.
[782] Erdmann & Simutanyi 2003: 31pp. The co-opted MPs included members of FDD (3), HP (2) and UNIP (2).
[783] Examples included the Minister of Agriculture M. Sikatana (Lozi), the Minister of Information N. Zimba (Tumbuka) and the Minister of Works & Supply L. Sondashi (Kaonde).
[784] Interview, Haswell Mwale.

Service.[785] Key members of the 'family tree' in government included – among others – the former Minster of Home Affairs L. Mapushi, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Lt.-Gen. R. Shikapwasha, the former Deputy Minister of Finance J. Shakafuswa (all Lenje) and the former Minister of Defence G. Mpombo (Lamba). While the importance of the family should not be exaggerated, its existence is underlined by the considerable overrepresentation of the Lenje and Lamba tribes between 2002 and 2008 (see table 24).

Figure 37: Linguistic composition of government in Zambia, 2002-2008[786]



Second, there was a progressive fall-out between the President's faction and the Bemba-speaking bloc. While Mwanawasa and his MMD had received massive support in the

[785] Various interviews; 'Mwanawasa hacks at State House 'family tree', *Times of Zambia*, 17 June 2004.
[786] Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 2003; GOZ Various Years a. Data for 2000 are missing.

Bemba-speaking areas during the 2001 elections, Bemba-speaking leaders soon complained about the appointment of opposition politicians[787] and the growing influence of the 'family tree'. Moreover, Bemba-speakers were alienated by Mwanawasa's decisive anti-corruption stance that not only targeted the former President Chiluba but also some of his close associates, many of them Bemba.[788] As Chiluba and influential Bemba politicians like the former ZCCM chairman F. Kaunda were taken to court, this was perceived as selective justice targeted at the Bemba. This favoured the rise of Michael Sata and his PF who had broken away from MMD in 2001 but retained close contact with the Chiluba group within MMD, openly claiming that the Anti-Corruption Task Force had specifically targeted Bemba politicians.[789] The fallout between Mwanawasa's MMD and the Bemba-speaking bloc became apparent during the 2006 elections when most of the Bemba-speaking North voted for Sata (except the Namwanga/ Mambwe areas). At the same time, Bemba representation in government declined for the Bemba-speaking group as a whole (see figure 37) and, even more so, for the Bemba tribe (see table 24). By 2006, the latter did not have even a single senior minister in Cabinet. Most political insiders, including the PF Vice-President G. Scott himself[790], agree that the current strength of PF is first and foremost a 'response to Mwanawasa's fallout with the Bemba'.[791]

Third, MMD has also failed to rebuild support in the South. After the death of UPND leader Mazoka before the 2006 elections, the party's Tonga leadership insisted that his successor had to be a Tonga whereby the young H. Hichilema became party President, at the expense of two influential Lozi politicians.[792] This greatly reinforced popular perceptions of UPND as a 'Tonga party', provoked a mass exodus of non-Tonga party members and affected UPND's electoral performance in Western and North-Western Province, which returned into the MMD camp. Yet, UPND retained control over Southern Province and became entrenched as a regional party. On the whole, the Tonga

---

[787] Over time, many key positions were distributed to individuals who had originally not been part of Chiluba's MMD. Prominent examples include the former Minister of Finance N. Magande, the former Minister of Defence G. Mpombo (both former UPND), the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Lt.-Gen. R. Shikapwasha (former HP), or current President R. Banda (former UNIP) – none of whom is a Bemba-speaker. At the same time, influential party stalwarts like the MMD National Secretary K. Kalumba – a Bemba-speaking Tabwa – were not even included in Cabinet during Mwanawasa's second term.
[788] On Mwanawasa's anti-corruption drive see Erdmann & Simutanyi 2003: 67pp.; van Donge 2009.
[789] Larmer & Fraser 2007: 631p.
[790] Interview, Guy Scott.
[791] Interview, Mbita Chitala.
[792] Interview, Sakwiba Sikota. Note that S. Sikota himself was one of the two Lozi politicians who were sidelined after Mazoka's death.

as a tribe have largely remained outside the ruling coalition. While Tonga-speakers have on average been overrepresented in government (see figure 37), the bulk of these appointments has gone to Mwanawasa's small Lenje group (see table 24). And even those few Tonga that have been appointed typically lack a political support base in Southern Province. The best example in this respect is the former Minister of Finance, N. Magande, who – after losing the elections on a MMD ticket – was nominated by the President but is commonly said to have no constituency among the Tonga.[793]

Figure 38: The representation of Copperbelt Province in Zambia's government, 1992-2008[794]



Finally, MMD also lost political control over the urban areas, especially over the Copperbelt. Initially, the Copperbelt had been the ruling party's major stronghold, evident in the prominent position of Copperbelt politicians in government during the early 1990s (see figure 38). Moreover, the powerful trade unions initially viewed Chiluba as one of 'theirs' and did little to oppose formerly controversial policies.[795] Over time, however, the importance of Copperbelt politicians within MMD declined dramatically, while the unions were 'paralysed' by their initial symbiosis with MMD

[793] Interview, Dr. Webby S. Kalikiti.

[794] Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 2003; GOZ Various Years a. Data for 2000 are missing. Note that figure 38 considers how many ministers and deputies were elected in Copperbelt constituencies rather than how many members of government were of Copperbelt descent.

[795] Significantly, and in sharp contrast to the 1980s, even the drastic cuts in maize subsidies in 1992 caused no major reaction among the trade unions (Erdmann & Simutanyi 2003: 65p.). G. Scott, a former minister under Chiluba and current Vice-President of PF, explains: 'Low meali meal prices were part of Kaunda's social contract. Once you had a new party in power, there was no longer a social contract. We never promised cheap meali meal' (Interview, Guy Scott).

and the combined effects of economic and political liberalisation.[796] MMD's increasing failure to accommodate class cleavages in urban areas created a political void, which was skilfully filled by Sata's PF. Accordingly, PF does not only express Bemba grievances but also mobilises along class lines by articulating urban discontent – a strategy that won the party many votes and seats not only on the Copperbelt but also in Lusaka.[797]

Altogether, political competition during the Third Republic has brought about a constellation, which is strikingly similar to that of the First Republic. In both periods, the ruling parties started out with largely 'national' appeal that was especially strong among Bemba-speakers in the North. The main opposition parties – ANC and UP during the First Republic and NP and UPND during the Third Republic – had their organisational and electoral strength among the Lozi- and Tonga-speaking groups of Western and Southern provinces. Over time, both ruling parties lost ground in the 'Bembaphone' North, especially in urban areas of the Copperbelt, where strong opposition parties emerged (UPP and PF).

ECONOMIC POWER-SHARING

In the economic sector, Zambia has undergone comprehensive liberalisation since the return to multi-party politics in 1991.[798] A key aspect of economic reform during the 1990s was the privatisation of the country's bloated parastatal sector, which had been a key bastion of UNIP's elite bargain during the First and Second Republic (see chapter 6). In 1992, a comprehensive privatisation programme was introduced but initially failed to deliver results, not least due to fierce resistance by ZIMCO, the powerful holding company.[799] After the dissolution of ZIMCO in July 1995, the process gathered momentum whereby 262 companies out of a total working portfolio of 285 had been privatised by 2006, most of them in the late second half of the 1990s.[800] Of particular significance was the extremely controversial privatisation of the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) between 1992 and 2000 – Zambia's largest commercial

---

[796] Political and economic liberalisation culminated in declining union membership, splits in the movement and organisational decay. For details see Rakner 2003; Larmer 2005.
[797] Larmer & Fraser 2007; Gould 2007. The 2008 presidential elections confirmed that Sata's PF draws support from both Bemba-speakers and the urban poor (see Cheeseman & Hinfelaar 2010).
[798] For details see Rakner 2003: 67pp.
[799] For details on privatisation in Zambia see Craig 2000, 2002; Rakner 2003.
[800] ZPA 2006a.

enterprise, which not only generated most of the country's foreign exchange earnings but was also of enormous strategic and symbolic importance.[801]

The rapid – many say precipitous – privatisation of the parastatal sector reduced the scope for patronage distribution outside party and government and resulted in the layoff of thousands of former parastatal employees. Yet, it soon became apparent that privatisation – and the liberalisation of the economy more generally – opened new avenues for rent-seeking and increased rather than decreased the scale of corruption.[802] Accordingly, office holders in politics and administration used the often intransparent privatisation process to acquire public assets cheaply, especially small-scale companies, and enrich themselves. In many cases, the cheaply acquired companies were simply stripped off their assets rather than recapitalized or fully relocated to other countries in the Southern African region – a process that resulted in an enormous loss of wealth.[803] Listing a number of examples where MMD politicians had bought buildings and other assets at undervalued prices, one independent newspaper commented:

> 'Where then have they suddenly found the money to become full-fledged capitalists? There is something fishy somewhere and the situation is looking bad. To paraphrase the lyrics of one famous song: How long shall they plunder our economy while we stand aside and look?'[804]

Who benefitted from this looting of state assets? There is no doubt that the main beneficiaries were Chiluba, his relatives and his closest friends, some of whom were later targeted during Mwanawasa's anti-corruption drive and taken to court.[805] D. Patel, at the time Minister for Commerce, Trade and Industry and therefore responsible for the privatisation programme, recalls that Chiluba repeatedly pressured him to 'sell properties to his cronies'.[806] Beyond nepotism, there were also claims that privatisation generally benefitted the Bemba-speaking group, the sale of state farms to R. Penza and E. Kasonde (two former Ministers of Finance from the Bemba tribe) being prominent examples. Such accusations of 'tribalism' can however not be confirmed. Taking into account all companies sold to political leaders, Zambian individuals and Zambian corporate bodies, there is no evidence for a generalised 'Bemba bias' in the distribution of privatised assets (see figures 39a and 39b). While Bemba-speakers did indeed receive

---

[801] For details on the privatisation of ZCCM see Craig 2001; Larmer 2005.
[802] Chikulo 2000: 165pp.; Szeftel 2000: 217pp. See also van Donge 2009.
[803] Interview, Rueben Lifuka.
[804] Cited after Szeftel 2000: 219.
[805] See van Donge 2009.
[806] Interview, Dipak Patel.

the largest share of privatised companies, they were even slightly underrepresented in terms of their population share. The only clearly discernible bias was in favour of Zambians of Asian background who acquired a highly disproportional share of the privatised companies. This confirms public perceptions that privatisation really benefitted foreign investors and 'non-Zambian' citizens.

Altogether, the example of privatisation shows that – unlike in Museveni's Uganda (see chapter 5) – the spoils of economic reform were not monopolised by members of specific ethnic groups. The same can be said for the distribution of key appointments in the remaining parastatal companies. While comprehensive data are not available, anecdotal evidence suggests that important positions in key parastatal companies such as the Bank of Zambia or the Zambia Revenue Authority were distributed relatively equitably between the country's major groupings throughout the Third Republic.[807]

Figure 39: Linguistic distribution of privatised companies in Zambia, 1992-2006 average[808]



MILITARY POWER-SHARING

In the army, the end of the one-party state meant that the civilian and military spheres had to be de-linked. In general, the MMD government held the view that the military

[807] Interview, Wilfrid Mwamba.

[808] Own data compiled and calculated based on CSO 2003; ZPA 2006b. In the case of companies sold to political leaders and Zambian individuals, I have established the language group affiliation of the purchaser. In the case of companies sold to Zambian corporate bodies, I have established the language group affiliation of the buying company's director/chairman.

should be politically neutral and therefore moved to professionalise the ZDF.[809] As a result, party structures and political education in the army were abolished and alleged UNIP loyalists were retrenched. Yet, the Chiluba government did not fully abandon UNIP's strategy of promoting civil-military integration by appointing former military personnel into high political office. Accordingly, two out of three Vice-Presidents were of military background, including Brig. Miyanda and Lt.-Gen. Tembo. Even under Mwanawasa former military officers like Lt.-Gen. Shikapwasha (Minister of Home Affairs) or Brig.-Gen. Chituwo (Minister of Health) occupied key cabinet positions, while many others were given lucrative posts as ambassadors. This indicates that careers still do not end with retirement from the army.

Table 25: Linguistic distribution of army commanders in Zambia, 1991-2008[810]

Lt. –Gen. R. Shikapwasha (Tonga)	Gen. N. M. Simbeye (Bemba)	Lt.-Gen. W. G. Funjika (North-Western)
Lt.-Gen. S. Kayumba (North-Western)	Lt.-Gen. S. L. Mumbi (Nyanja)	Maj.-Gen. M. Mbao (Nyanja)
Lt.-Gen. Ch. Singogo (Bemba)	Lt.-Gen. G. R. Musengule (Bemba)	
Lt. Gen. S. Mapala (Nyanja)	Lt.-Gen. I. Chisuzi (Tonga)	Maj.-Gen. R. Chisheta (Bemba)

More importantly, MMD deliberately retained UNIP's tradition of inclusive recruitment and appointment policies. According to Mbita Chitala, member of the Defence Council under Chiluba, 'tribal balancing' was continued at all levels of the armed forces to ensure 'that the whole country is represented'.[811] Similarly, G. Mpombo, Minister of Defence under Mwanawasa, used the 2007 debate on the military budget to emphasise the enduringly national character of the Zambian army and re-affirmed that no district was disadvantaged in terms of recruitment.[812] Such claims are confirmed when analysing the composition of the officer corps during the Third Republic. While comprehensive information is again not available, my data suggest that the top command positions in the army are still distributed fairly equitably among the country's major language groups (see table 25).

Moreover, 'new' forms of patronage help 'buy off' the top army leadership and ensure that the army remains part of the MMD elite bargain. Under Chiluba, the military leadership was known to be heavily implicated in the proliferating corruption scandals, which involved considerable material benefits. Such allegations have now been

[809] Phiri 2002: 12; Haantobolo 2008: 203p.
[810] Own data compiled based on Wele 1995: 158; Interview, Gen. Malimba Masheke; Interview, Geofroy Haantolobo.
[811] Interview, Mbita Chitala.
[812] GOZ 2007.

confirmed by the fact that several of Chiluba's high-ranking army officers were prosecuted and convicted in civil courts after Mwanawasa took over in 2001, including, among others, Lt.-Gen Funjika, Lt.-Gen. Kayumba, Lt.-Gen. Singogo and Lt.-Gen. Musengule.[813] More recently, the MMD government has managed to keep the army busy by sending large numbers of military officers to participate in lucrative peace-keeping missions. By now, the country is involved in a total of nine peace-keeping missions worldwide whereby the number of Zambian observers has grown from 8 in 1994 to 108 in 2008.[814] This has left behind a rather small number of officers who can be more easily monitored.

TERRITORIAL POWER-SHARING

While the Third Republic continued to exhibit relatively high levels of political, economic and military power-sharing, territorial power-sharing was more limited. After the transition to multi-party rule, the 1991 Local Government Act revoked the UNIP-engineered fusion of party and government and provided the now 72 local authorities (4 City Councils, 12 Municipal Councils, 56 District Councils) with wide-ranging functions, including responsibility for the provision of services such as water supply, sewerage, health, feeder and district roads, education and housing.[815] Yet, the formally empowered local government structures have remained largely dysfunctional for a number of reasons.

Administratively, the local councils still coexist with deconcentrated sector ministries, which report to parent ministries of the central government in Lusaka through provincial officials.[816] The latter have far more power than local government elected councillors and therefore continue to dominate decision-making at the local level. This can be illustrated at the example of the District Development Coordination Committees (DDCCs) that were created in 1993 as forums for planning and implementation of development activities, as well as for community participation. Yet, as the majority of the DDCC members are civil servants representing deconcentrated central government

---

[813] 'Colonel arrested for theft of ZAF Funds', *The Post*; 'Former military commander arrested in Zambia' *Saturday Star*, 10 March 2004; 7 April 2003; 'Zambia ex-airforce commander arrested for corruption', *Agence France Presse*, 30 December 2006; 'Former army commander jailed for corruption', *Times of Zambia*, 3 March 2009.
[814] IISS Various Years.
[815] See Saasa 2002: 118pp.; Chikulo 2009: 101pp.
[816] Erdmann & Simutanyi 2003: 47; Chikulo 2009: 104.

departments, there is no coordinating mechanism for integrated planning and management under the direct control of the council. Also, the effectiveness of district councils is severely undermined by a lack of competent staff.

Figure 40: Local revenue in Zambia, 1994-2005[817]



The financial situation of the local councils is even worse. While formally given considerable powers to raise their own revenues, few councils are able to take advantage of this provision due to their limited resource base. As shown in figure 40a, local revenue has more than tripled between 1994 and 2005 and is mainly composed of local taxes and diverse administrative fees (subsumed under 'other'). Yet, real local revenue has declined, not least since local governments have been deprived of many former powers to mobilise resources since the mid-1990s (e.g. motor vehicle licensing, beer surtax, rent from council housing, exemptions from property rates, etc.).[818] Moreover, district councils receive only small and erratic shares of their declining revenues from central government (see figure 40a), and even these meagre transfers often come late. The extremely limited extent of fiscal decentralisation is illustrated by the fact that local revenue represents only a marginal share of central government revenue – a share that has fallen from 4.8% in 1994 to only 1.2% in 2005 (see figure 40b).[819] The lack of adequate financial resources despite the imposition of new responsibilities has had a

[817] Compiled and calculated based on Saasa et al. 1999; IMF 2009. Data for the years 1998-2000 are not available. In general, information on local government accounts is still not included in the national budget and therefore remains inadequate (World Bank 2003: 43).
[818] Erdmann & Simutanyi 2003: 47; Hampwaye 2008: 350p.
[819] This share is negligible when compared with fiscal decentralisation in Museveni's Uganda (see chapter 5).

very negative impact on the councils' capacity to deliver essential social services.[820] By now, many local authorities have accumulated huge debt burdens and face enduring financial crisis.

Altogether, local autonomy has remained minimal throughout the Third Republic. In the words of Erdmann & Simutanyi, this is 'partly the result of sheer incompetence and disregard for local government, and partly a deliberate policy to weaken local autonomy while strengthening central control; not for development but for maintaining political power'.[821] The unabated 'centralism' of the MMD administration became apparent in 2000 when President Chiluba installed 'district administrators' (DAs) as political appointees that were only responsible to himself and ensured centralised control over the districts. While many district councils can hardly perform their functions, the DAs have been finically well-equipped for patronage purposes. To give an example, the Constituency Development Funds – originally intended for local authorities – have been placed under the control of the DAs. After 2001, President Mwanawasa withstood pressures to abolish the DAs. This means that Kaunda's old idea of 'decentralisation in centralism' is still firmly entrenched:

> 'What has passed for decentralisation in Zambia is not creating centres of power at the local level but sending delegates to different corners of the country. So you would have an authority in a district made up of people appointed from Lusaka, and accountable to Lusaka, and afraid of Lusaka, and representing Lusaka, but being projected to manifest decentralisation. So it is a decentralisation without a devolution of power'.[822]

Interestingly, the Zambian government has on several occasions recognised the poor state of local government and even introduced a National Decentralisation Policy, which was formally launched in August 2004.[823] Yet, to the great frustration of the involved donor organisations[824], this policy had still not reached the stage of implementation in late 2008. It remains to be seen whether the government's 'Decentralisation Implementation Plan 2009-2013' will provide new impetus in this respect.[825] As long as this is not the case, local government is only of limited interest for competing groups whereby the inclusive distribution of access to central state power remains of great importance.[826]

---

[820] For case studies see Saasa et al 1999; Hampwaye 2008.
[821] Erdmann & Simutanyi 2003: 49.
[822] Interview, Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika.
[823] GOZ 2002.
[824] Interview, Birgit Pickel.
[825] GOZ 2009.
[826] Interview, Prof. Jotham Momba.

7.3 MMD's inclusive elite bargain and civil war avoidance

In the previous section, I have shown that the Chiluba and Mwanawasa regimes continued to ensure a relatively inclusive distribution of access to positions of political, economic and military power, the re-emergence of some familiar cracks in the Zambian elite bargain notwithstanding. In what follows, I will argue that the persistence of an inclusive elite bargain under MMD has remained a key driver behind civil war avoidance during the Third Republic, even though the overall importance of 'tribal balancing' may have declined. The enduring importance of inclusive inter-group access to central state power can again be illustrated by looking at distinct moments of crisis between 1991 and 2008.

A first moment of crisis occurred during and after the transition to multi-party politics in 1991. Both protagonists and observers generally agree that this transition was peaceful mainly because the MMD was an extremely broad-based movement whose leadership cultivated a national image through the trade unions.[827] If MMD had come to be dominated by one language group or even a single tribe, this would almost certainly have caused alienation and conflict. This can be shown by the example of the Barotse-speaking group. The latter had originally played an important role within MMD, evident in the prominence of Lozi-speaking leaders such as A. Wina or A. Lewanika. After Chiluba captured power, Barotse-speaking leaders were however sidelined in party and government (see above) – a situation that culminated not only in the creation of the Lozi-based NP but also in renewed claims for the restoration of regional autonomy under the Barotseland Agreement.[828] In mid-1993, representatives of the Barotse Royal Establishment even made open secessionist demands, which were vehemently rejected by the Chiluba government.[829] Two years later, secessionist demands in Barotseland resurfaced over the passage in parliament of a bill that withdrew the power to allocate

---

[827] Various interviews.

[828] Sichone & Simutanyi 1996: 188p. Officially attacking the government over corruption, A. Lewanika's resignation in 1992 also reflected the Lozi's dissatisfaction with the manner in which their demands were handled by the MMD government. A. Wina was dismissed as Minister of Education in 1993.

[829] 'Zambia's second-biggest province seeks secession', *Agence France Presse*, 22 July 1993; 'Zambia: Government warns against secession', *IPS-Inter Press Service*, 20 July 1993. When rumours spread that the Litunga was about to be arrested over the secessionist demands, the traditional war drum was sounded in Barotseland and up to 2500 men congregated at the Litunga's palace to offer him protection. Realising how sensitive the situation was, the MMD government decided to back down (Sichone & Simutanyi 1996: 188p.).

land from traditional rulers and transferred it to the President.[830] Tellingly, protests in Western Province eased with the improved representation of Barotse-speakers in party and government from the mid-1990s. While secessionist talk did not entirely disappear, especially in the context of the Namibian Lozi Caprivi rebel movement[831], it had clearly lost momentum by the late 1990s.[832]

A second moment of crisis occurred in the context of the controversies surrounding the 'third term' debate, which caused considerable conflict within the ruling party and ultimately resulted in its loss of a parliamentary majority during the 2001 elections. As discussed above, tribal sentiments were of minor importance during the 'third term' debate, evident in the fact that even some of Chiluba's tribesmen resigned in order to protest against the President's bid for constitutional changes.[833] Nevertheless, there is reason to argue that the broader debate over Chiluba's succession did involve tribal connotations in that there was a widespread *perception* of Bemba dominance, which found expression in the growing strength of UPND. If the President had picked a Bemba-speaker as his successor in this kind of a situation, the succession crisis might have led to lasting alienation in other parts of the country. Instead, the choice of Mwanawasa – a Tonga-speaker who subsequently tried to rebuild MMD support in the non-Bemba-speaking areas – can be considered a shrewd example of 'tribal balancing', which prevented the consolidation of cohesive grievances along language group lines.

A final moment of crisis occurred after Mwanawasa's unexpected death in mid-2008. While the country remained remarkably stable even during this uncertain succession period, the ruling party came to be characterised by intense factional struggles, which proceeded along both personal and tribal lines. According to political insiders, there were three main contending groups within MMD at the time.[834] One group was led by K. Kalumba, the MMD National Secretary, who not only enjoyed strong support among the lower party cadres but also maintained close links with the Chiluba faction.[835] A

---

[830] 'Zambia-politics: Western Region threatens to secede', *IPS-Inter Press Service*, 6 November 1995.
[831] 'Govt advised to take Lozi secession call seriously', The Post, 19 November 1998; 'Barotses threaten secession', *The New African*, March 1999.
[832] 'Zambian MPs condemn idea of Barotseland's breakaway', *Xinhua News Agency*, 18 November 1998; 'Mbikusita-Lewanika's politics rather ridiculous', *Times of Zambia*, 18 November 1998; 'Barotse secessionists' dilemma', *Africa News*, 17 February 1999; 'I don't believe in secession of Barotseland – Aka', *Africa News*, 30 October 2002.
[833] Interview, Emily Sikazwe.
[834] Various interviews.
[835] Kalumba himself served as a Minister under Chiluba and later faced corruption charges in court ('Court Wants Katele, Others' Charges Specified', *Times of Zambia*, 13 October 2004).

second group included influential members of the 'family tree' who supported the candidature of N. Magande, the Minister of Finance, but had limited support within the party. A third faction grouped around R. Banda, the Vice-President, who was however commonly regarded as an 'outsider' within the party. The choice of Kalumba as the MMD presidential candidate would have angered the non-Bemba, whereas a 'family tree' candidate might have further alienated the Bemba bloc. As a consequence, the former UNIPist and party outsider Banda was elected as MMD candidate and subsequently replaced Mwanawasa. This can be interpreted as another shrewd choice of 'tribal balancing'. On the one hand, the election of Banda ended the relative underrepresentation of the Nyanja-speaking group within MMD. On the other hand, Banda is said – through Kalumba as his 'kingmaker' – to enjoy close connections with the Chiluba faction, which may help to reintegrate the Bemba-speaking bloc (albeit at the expense of Mwanawasa's anti-corruption drive).[836]

Altogether, there is reason to argue that the inclusive inter-group distribution of access to positions of state power remains important to preserve Zambia's peace and stability. This view was widely shared by the great majority of my interviewees. D. Patel, for example, explained:

> 'It is not possible to govern this country if you don't deal with balancing. The day you remove balancing, the country will disintegrate into civil war'.[837]

Similarly, the political veteran V. Mwaanga considered 'tribal balancing' to be without alternative even more than 40 years after independence and labelled the absence thereof as 'a recipe for violent conflict'.[838] Admittedly, such statements may be somewhat exaggerated. Nation-building policies under Kaunda's motto of 'One Zambia, One Nation' have undoubtedly left deep traces in the political culture of a country where open tribal campaigning is now widely considered a 'no-go'.[839] As tribal sentiment is less pronounced today than in the post-independence period, the exclusion of certain groups from access to positions of state power is less likely – after decade-long efforts to promote national unity – to become an *immediate* trigger of violent conflict.

---

[836] Evidence of this is that corruption charges against Chiluba were suddenly dropped after years of investigation ('Chiluba Acquitted', *Times of Zambia*, 18 August 2009).
[837] Interview, Dipak Patel.
[838] Interview, Vernon Mwaanga.
[839] Burnell 2005: 122; various interviews. The best example to illustrate the dangers of tribal campaigning in Zambia would be UPND. As the party leadership openly insisted that Mazoka's successor had to be a Tonga, the party now finds it impossible to wash off the 'Tonga label', which in turn makes it difficult for UPND to establish itself outside 'Tongaland'.

While 'tribal balancing' may therefore have become less important over time, it seems equally exaggerated to claim that national unity is by now so firmly entrenched that it can no longer be reversed. One of my interviewees, for instance, vehemently argued that

> '[n]o politician can ever divide Zambians. It is too late, One Zambia, One Nation has succeeded (...). It is a good thing that Kaunda overstayed in politics because this gave him enough time to forge a nation'.[840]

Such assessments are however contradicted by the recent 're-tribalisation' of political competition, which is at least reminiscent of developments during the First Republic. Linguistic and tribal cleavages clearly continue to matter for voter alignment and even more so for party affiliation[841], not least evident in the enduring strength of PF and UPND. The enduring salience of sectarian cleavages becomes also evident in contemporary political debates[842] or the recent proliferation of tribal associations.[843] Dr. Neo Simutanyi, one of the country's foremost intellectuals, describes the phenomenon in the following terms:

> 'Tribe is a taboo subject in public but is actually canvassed privately. When like-minded people meet, they look around the table, make sure they are all from the same place and then ask: Now, how do we deal with those Bemba?'[844]

Against this background, it should be kept in mind that the political culture of 'One Zambia, One Nation' is a result of deliberate political action and can be undone if such an approach is no longer deemed necessary.

7.4 Competing explanations

Which other factors account for the enduring peace and stability of Zambia's Third Republic? Beyond inclusive elite politics, there is reason to believe that the decline of socioeconomic inter-group inequalities at the level of the masses has also facilitated civil war avoidance. As detailed in section 6.4, socioeconomic inter-group inequalities were initially quite pronounced in post-independence Zambia. More recently, however, these inequalities have diminished. While the urban areas in Lusaka and on the Copperbelt are still better off, the rural provinces now exhibit strikingly similar trends in poverty incidence (see figure 41) and other social indicators.[845] Combined with the

---

[840] Interview, Reverend Foston Sakala.
[841] See Erdmann 2007.
[842] 'GBM's tribal remarks slammed', *Times of Zambia*, 23 September 2009; 'NEC member accuses Levy of open tribalism', *The Post*, 2 April 2008; 'Tribal politics will divide Zambia, warns Mangani', The Post, 15 January 2008; 'It's time to try Tongas for presidency – Shalya', *The Post*, 24 September 2007; 'Lozi tribalists must be opposed', *The Post*, 18 June 2007.
[843] Interview, Mbita Chitala.
[844] Interview, Dr. Neo Simutanyi.
[845] For details see CSO 2006.

persistence of 'tribal balancing' at the level of elites, declining socioeconomic disparities between provinces have arguably helped to further entrench the country's peace and stability.

Figure 41: Incidence of poverty in Zambia, 1991-2006[846]



Finally, there is the urban factor. Even though urbanisation rates have declined since the early 1980s and are now even below Sub-Saharan African average (see section 6.4), the influence of urban areas – especially those in Lusaka and on the Copperbelt – on the rest of the country is immense.[847] Most importantly, the process of urbanisation has blurred linguistic and tribal cleavages. First, urban migration has reduced language barriers in that there are Bemba-speakers on the Copperbelt who do not come from one of the Bemba-speaking tribes in Northern and Luapula Provinces, just as there are Nyanja-speakers in Lusaka who do not come from the Nyanja-speaking tribes in Eastern Province. Second, urbanisation has resulted in high levels of inter-tribal marriages whose off-springs are considered 'proper' Zambians. Posner calculates that about 46% of all married Zambians in urban districts and 32% of those living in rural areas haves spouses from different tribes.[848] This striking figure is supported by anecdotal evidence from my own fieldwork. Accordingly, the great majority of my interviewees emphasised that they were themselves married to someone from a different tribe, while

[846] Compiled based on ibid.
[847] Phiri 2006: 199.
[848] Posner 2005: 92. Not that these calculations are based on the 1990 census. Current levels of inter-tribal marriages were not available but are likely to be even higher.

most of their children also have spouses from a tribe other than their own. In the words of Patricia Palale, Public Sector Management Specialist at the World Bank,

> '[y]ou cannot really say I am fully Bemba or Tonga. There are very few whose parents are from the same village or from the same tribe. Most of us are a mixture of regions, a mixture of tribes'.[849]

Many of those who I interviewed argued that high levels of urbanisation and inter-tribal marriages make inter-group violence impossible. As many Zambians owe allegiance to several language groups or tribes, collective action based on linguistic or tribal identities is said to be 'almost unthinkable'.[850] This is convincing, albeit only partially. First, I have shown that language and tribe remain salient social cleavages even in times of high urbanisation, evident in the enduring strength of PF and UPND. Second, a brief glance at other African countries suggests that urbanisation alone is not sufficient to prevent civil war. In 2009, countries that were more urbanised than Zambia included, among others, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, Sudan, Central African Republic, Nigeria and Somalia – countries that have all experienced recurrent civil war.[851] Moreover, the case of Kenya underlines that even high levels of inter-tribal marriages do not guarantee the absence of inter-tribal political violence.[852]

7.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that Zambia's enduring peace and stability during the Third Republic is mainly due to the persistence of an inclusive elite bargain. After the transition to multi-party politics in 1991, both the Chiluba and Mwanawasa governments have made a continued attempt to form a 'maximum coalition', evident in the largely inclusive distribution of access to positions of political, economic and military power between the country's major language groups. This has again helped to prevent the emergence of cohesive group grievances and thereby cemented Zambia's lasting peace. At the same time, the decline of socioeconomic inter-group inequalities as well as high levels of urbanisation have made violent conflict even less likely.

---

[849] Interview, Patricia Palale.
[850] Interview, Marc Chona.
[851] World Bank 2009. At the same time, other peaceful countries such as Tanzania or Malawi exhibit significantly lower rates of urbanisation than Zambia.
[852] 'Kenya violence takes toll on intertribal marriages', *Deseret News (Kenya)*, 27 January 2008.

While Zambia's peace and stability seems solidly entrenched, it should not be taken for granted. Signs of continuity notwithstanding, the Mwanawasa elite bargain came to exhibit a number of serious cracks, which were strikingly similar to those of the First Republic. On the one hand, the Mwanawasa administration witnessed a certain 're-tribalisation' of political competition, evident in the strength of PF in the Bemba-speaking North and UPND in the Tonga-speaking South. On the other hand, the ruling party has lost ground in the urban centres where Sata's PF has emerged as a serious contender. Most of the people I interviewed agreed that a PF victory in the upcoming 2011 general elections might further polarise Zambia along both tribal and class lines. This underlines that the political culture of 'One Zambia, One Nation' should not be taken for granted.

8 Conclusion

> 'It is not a matter of having an equal number of each ethnic group, region, class, gender, etc. represented, or following the 'proportionality principle' (...). The real solution concerns the question of which candidates are to be (...) selected (...), and to what post? More often than not, it is personalities without political clout in the ethnic group or region who are hand-picked and factored into the equation. Or should he have clout, he is not given any post near power. In these circumstances the equation does not balance. The problem of power is not arithmetic: it is often algebraic, geometric – a matter of calculus'.[853]

This PhD thesis started from the puzzle of striking differences in civil war occurrence across Sub-Saharan Africa, exemplified by the two countries of Uganda and Zambia. While Uganda has been among the most conflict-intensive countries on the African continent with 15 cases of civil war since independence in 1962, Zambia has been characterised by enduring peace and stability with no instance of civil war since the end of colonial rule in 1964. In order to explain this extreme variation in the two countries' vulnerability to civil war, I first reviewed the five most influential theoretical approaches in the civil war literature. I found that while most of these approaches fall short of resolving my puzzle, several arguments that emphasise the need for elite power-sharing offer a promising starting point. Against this backdrop, I went on to develop a theoretical approach that focuses on the inclusiveness of elite politics. I expected that a country's propensity for conflict or peace is determined by the inclusiveness of the '*elite bargain*', which I defined as the distribution of access to positions of state power (political, military, economic and territorial) between contending social groups. This led me to hypothesise that inclusive elite bargains facilitate civil war avoidance, whereas exclusionary elite bargains favour the onset of civil war.

This initial hypothesis was largely confirmed by the empirical findings from my two case studies. In Uganda, recurrent civil war can be traced back to the persistence of exclusionary elite bargains under all post-colonial governments, which have – albeit to different degrees – produced enduring antagonism between the country's major tribal groups and thereby become a key driving force behind the various insurgencies since 1962. Obote's initial failure to fully accommodate the colonial legacy of high social fragmentation was replicated not only by the Amin, UNLF and Obote II regimes but also by the Museveni government that is still to deliver the promised 'fundamental change'. By contrast, Zambia has been able to contain the spectre of civil war between

---

[853] Sithole 1994: 162.

its major linguistic and tribal groups by forging and maintaining an inclusive elite bargain. The foundations of Zambia's lasting peace and stability were laid by Kaunda's practise of 'tribal balancing' and further entrenched by subsequent post-colonial governments who have all exhibited a tendency to form another 'maximum coalition'. Altogether, post-colonial differences in civil war occurrence in Uganda and Zambia reflect first and foremost distinct differences in the inclusiveness of elite politics.

In this concluding chapter, I will first refine my argument by drawing ten main lessons from my research (section 8.1). In a second step, I will discuss three avenues for future research (section 8.2).

8.1 Refining the argument

Which overarching lessons can be drawn from my research? While my hypothesis of a link between a country's vulnerability to civil war and the inclusiveness of its elite bargain is generally confirmed, it can be further refined and complemented by competing explanatory factors. In what follows, I will therefore first detail five lessons on the impact of the elite bargain. I argue that Uganda and Zambia's varying vulnerability to civil war reflects differences in the (1) relative trend; (2) depth; (3) scope; (4) authenticity; and (5) perception of the elite bargain. Afterwards, I will go on to outline five lessons on competing – yet complementary – explanations. I argue that varying propensities for peace or conflict also depend on (1) violent state repression; (2) socioeconomic inter-group inequalities; (3) political leadership; (4) levels of urbanisation; and (5) regional spillover effects.

THE IMPACT OF THE ELITE BARGAIN RECONSIDERED

(1) Relative changes in the elite bargain

First, and maybe most importantly, the Uganda-Zambia comparison provides strong evidence that civil war onset is especially likely in the wake of important relative changes in the elite bargain, i.e. if a group has recently experienced a *relative loss of power*. Significantly, this is also confirmed by recent quantitative research where

'downgraded power status' is found to have a significant impact on why ethnic groups rebel.[854]

The importance of relative power losses as a determinant of civil war becomes strikingly evident when looking at the history of violent conflict in Uganda. The Baganda, to begin with, had assumed a dominant position under colonial rule and were therefore reluctant to accept a relative decline in influence under Obote I – a situation that culminated in the 1966 'Battle of Mengo'. Similarly, the Acholi and Langi had occupied many key positions under Obote I but were then purged from all positions of influence under Amin, which explains their prominent role in the anti-Amin rebellions. Relative losses of power are also key to understanding the various anti-UNLF/Obote II insurgencies. The FUNA and UNRF insurgencies reflected the extreme loss of power by West Nilers who had monopolised power under Idi Amin but were then fully excluded from the UNLF elite bargain. Baganda monarchists had been influential during the early days of UNLF, especially under Lule, but were then progressively marginalised by the pro-Obote forces, which provided a fertile breeding ground for UFM and FEDEMO. In a similar vein, the NRA insurgency clearly originated in the fact that Museveni and his FRONASA forces had initially occupied key positions in the post-Amin coalition but were then systematically sidelined by Obote loyalists. A final example for the link between relative losses of power and civil war onset are the anti-Museveni insurgencies since 1986. The insurgencies in Acholiland seem closely related to the fact that the Acholi had held political and military power after the 1985 military coup by the Okellos but found themselves marginalised once the NRM took over. A similar argument can be made for the UPA rebellion by the Itesot who had been prominently represented in the 'inner circles' of the Obote II regime but were sidelined with the regime change of 1986. Groups that have always had little more than a marginal role, by contrast, have not been motivated to fight to regain something they never had. This is especially true for the Karamojong in the North-East who have always been on the periphery of the colonial and post-colonial state.[855]

In Zambia, some groups have also suffered from relative losses of power, which have – in line with the overall thrust of the argument – at times caused hefty factional struggles. Bemba-speakers, for instance, had played a leading role during the

[854] Cederman et al. 2010b: 108.
[855] Mirzeler & Young 2000.

independence struggle but were then somewhat underrepresented in party and government during the early post-colonial days – a situation that culminated in the upheavals surrounding the 1967 party elections. Similarly, Barotse-speakers found their influence declining by the late 1960s and reacted by setting up the Lozi-based UP. More recently, Bemba-speakers were prominently represented under Chiluba but lost influence after Mwanawasa became President, which became a key driver behind the rise of Michael Sata's PF. On the whole, however, relative changes in the inter-group distribution of access to positions of state power were less frequent and extreme. Unlike in Uganda, there was never a situation where one group monopolised state power and was then abruptly chased from all positions of influence. Instead, the downgraded groups always retained a considerable stake in the ruling coalition. This has arguably helped to prevent the typically strong emotions surrounding the sudden loss of power and prestige and explains why the mentioned factional struggles did not escalate into open violent conflict.

(2) The depth of the elite bargain

Second, it has become clear that a country's propensity for peace or conflict depends on the depth of the elite bargain, i.e. the extent to which the *'inner core' of state power* is shared between competing social groups. This confirms my initial suspicion that it is not enough – as it is often done – to analyse the overall distribution of appointments but instead to focus on what are arguably the positions of real power and influence, not least to uncover strategies of 'window dressing'. In the words of the above-cited Zimbabwean scholar Masipula Sithole, groups are often 'not given any post near power'.

This becomes evident when looking at conflict-ridden Uganda. Here, the 'inner core' of political power has mostly been dominated by certain tribal groups, including the 'Nubian-Kakwa' core group under Amin, the Baganda under Lule and Binaisa, and the Banyankole and Baganda under Museveni. The only partial exceptions were the two Obote regimes, in particular the Obote I administration – tellingly the most peaceful period in Uganda's history. Even more importantly, the top command positions in the Ugandan army – arguably the real locus of power since the mutiny of 1964 – have always been monopolised by small minorities, including the Acholi, Langi and West Nilers under Obote I, the 'Nubian-Kakwa' core under Amin, the Acholi and Langi

under Obote II, and the Banyankole (especially from the Bahima subgroup) under Museveni. This extreme bias in the distribution of 'real' power and influence has been a prominent concern in many of Uganda's post-colonial violent conflicts (see chapters 4 and 5). In post-1986 Acholiland, for example, allegations of neglect are almost exclusively framed in terms of missing access to the 'juicy positions'.[856]

In peaceful Zambia, by contrast, access to the 'inner core' of state power has always been shared more equitably. This was especially true under Kaunda where all five major language groups enjoyed enduring access not only to the 'inner core' of political power but also to key positions in the ruling party, the major parastatals and the army. After the return to multi-party politics, this overall pattern remained largely unchanged. Even the generally underrepresented Nyanja-speaking group continued to be – in sharp contrast to Northerners in post-1986 Uganda – represented in the 'inner core' of political power, evident in the fact that three out of six Vice-Presidents since 1991 were Nyanja-speakers.

(3) The scope of the elite bargain

Third, there is reason to argue that the likelihood of civil war depends on the scope of the elite bargain, i.e. the extent to which all of the *different spheres of state power* (political, economic, military, territorial) are shared between competing social groups.

The Zambian elite bargains have been large in scope since independence in 1964. While levels of territorial power-sharing have remained low, access to all three spheres of central state power (political, economic, and military) has on average been shared equitably between the country's five major language groups. This is not to deny that some groups have at times been underrepresented in one sphere of state power. But this lack of power-sharing in one area has typically been compensated for by high levels of power-sharing in another area. North-Westerners, for instance, were underrepresented in the parastatal sector throughout the Second Republic but played a prominent role in party and government. During the Third Republic, Nyanja-speakers were underrepresented in government but received largely proportional representation in the civil service and the army. The fact that patterns of exclusion have never been

[856] Various interviews.

consistent across all dimensions of state power has arguably prevented the emergence of cohesive group grievances and thereby undermined the risk of violent conflict.

The Ugandan elite bargains, by contrast, have been limited in scope with more thorough patterns of inter-group exclusion. Under Obote I, the powerful Baganda monarchists were not only excluded from military power but also suffered from declining influence in national government and the abrogation of constitutional provisions for territorial power-sharing. Under Amin, the Acholi and Langi were systematically purged from all spheres of state power, whereas the same happened to West Nilers under UNLF. Under Museveni, the Acholi and Itesot were not only deprived of their positions in the security forces but also fobbed off with little more than 'token' representation in government. These cases of consistent exclusion across all dimensions of state power have given rise to feelings of total disempowerment and marginalisation and thereby provided a fertile breeding ground for violent rebellion. More recently, however, violent conflict over imbalances at the centre has been eased by increased territorial power-sharing since the mid-1990s, which has provided the local leadership in all parts of the country with access to jobs and resources and thereby integrated them into the elite bargain. This indicates that patterns of exclusion at the central state level can be compensated for by patterns of inclusion at the local level.

(4) The authenticity of the elite bargain

Fourth, my research suggests that a country's vulnerability to civil war depends on the authenticity of the elite bargain, i.e. the degree to which the included elites are really *considered as legitimate representatives* of the social groups they belong to. This draws attention to the fact that many of the ethnic, regional or religious groups we are dealing with are by no means coherent, unitary actors but typically characterised by internal divisions and contradictions.[857] In this sense, it is simply not sufficient to share power with any representative of a particular social group. Instead, it is crucial to prioritise the representativity of the included actors by ensuring that they have sufficient political clout among 'their' groups.

In the case of Uganda, the importance of 'truly' representative elite bargains for maintaining peace and stability has become evident on several occasions. In the early

[857] Brubaker 2004.

post-colonial days, Obote used the end of the UPC-KY alliance in 1964 to dismiss all Baganda monarchists – the dominant faction among the Baganda – from his government and replaced them with those Baganda who had previously crossed the floor to UPC. As the latter were regarded as traitors by the monarchists and the majority of the population, the Buganda Kingdom was effectively fully excluded from political power from the mid-1960s – a constellation that contributed to the violent clash of 1966. Similar problems occurred under Obote II. While the President again made sure to include a proportional number of Baganda ministers in his government, the latter were all long-standing UPC members and therefore lacked political clout among the alienated Baganda monarchist and DP centrist factions. Similarly, the fact that Obote II had many Banyankole in his government could hardly appease Museveni and his Bahima followers since the Banyankole ministers were all from the rivalling Bairu subgroup. Under Museveni, finally, many of the few ministers from the North actually lack a substantial constituency in their home areas and are therefore not regarded as 'true' representatives of their tribal groups, which means that the widespread feelings of marginalisation and alienation persist. In the words of a Ugandan academic:

> 'When they [NRM] pick somebody from there [the North], they pick somebody who does not have the social and political base. They actually pick somebody who does not have a following. So he is perceived as not representing them'.[858]

Problems surrounding the authenticity of the elite bargain can also be observed in the case of Zambia. While Barotse-speakers were clearly over-represented in Kaunda's post-independence government, this did not ensure support in Western Province due to the deep divisions in the Lozi ruling class. As most Lozi ministers in government belonged to the 'nationalist' faction, the powerful faction of Lozi 'traditionalists' – at the time still the key player in Western Province – remained largely outside the ruling coalition. In a similar vein, many of the Tonga-speaking UNIP leaders during the 1960s lacked a substantial power base in their home areas, especially when compared with their ANC counterparts who retained a mass following in Southern Province. This situation improved only with the one-party state of the 1970s and 1980s when Kaunda made sustained efforts to integrate both Lozi traditionalist and former ANC stalwarts into the elite bargain.

It is however important to recognise that the need to integrate 'truly' representative elites is largely confined to the sphere of political power-sharing. While political leaders

[858] Interview, Mwambutsya Ndebesa.

are really only leaders if they represent a certain constituency, civil servants, parastatal directors, army officers[859], or ambassadors can hardly be considered to be immediate and accountable representatives of certain ethnic, regional, or religious groups. Here, the challenge is more to ensure an 'ethnic, regional or religious arithmetic', which demonstrates that competing social groups are provided with largely proportional access to positions of administrative, economic and military power.

(5) The perception of the elite bargain

Finally, there is reason to believe that a country's propensity for war or peace depends on the dominant perception of the elite bargain, i.e. the degree to which an elite bargain *is perceived* to be either as inclusive or as exclusionary. This means that it does not only matter what the 'objective facts' are – that is, whether a certain group is in fact discriminated against by the government – but also how people 'subjectively' interpret the situation. Even though it is plausible to assume that there will always be some link between subjective perceptions and objectively observable realities, the two will by no means always be entirely congruent.

In the case of Uganda, the importance of subjective perceptions has become most evident in the Museveni period. In the context of the entrenched 'North-South divide' and unabated distrust for Museveni in the North, the NRM elite bargain is certainly commonly perceived to be even more exclusionary than it actually is. As a consequence, any attempt to bridge the 'North-South divide' is often immediately dismissed as negligible or dishonest, especially among the Acholi.[860] Accordingly, most NRM ministers from the North are branded as 'sell-outs' and lose popular support once they are appointed to government, while Northern appointees in the civil service or government are dismissed as powerless figureheads. Such extreme perceptions of full-blown neglect seem strikingly entrenched and make it rather difficult for the government to build support in the North.

In Zambia, the post-colonial elite bargains are – in line with my figures – widely perceived as inclusive. Accordingly, the country's elites make continuous reference to the motto of 'One Zambia, One Nation' and Kaunda's practise of 'tribal balancing',

---

[859] The case is different for former rebel leaders who also tend to represent more or less clearly defined groups.
[860] Various interviews.

which is commonly said to be an integral part of the country's political culture. Nonetheless, there is evidence for discrepancies between subjective perceptions and objective realities. Under Chiluba, for instance, both Tonga- and Barotse-speakers were overrepresented in government, party and administration. This did, however, not put an end to perceptions of Bemba-domination among the two groups, which ultimately favoured the rise of UPND. Under Mwanawasa, Bemba-speakers continued to be well-represented but often perceived themselves as losing out, which facilitated the rise of Sata's PF. This underlines that the actual shape of the elite bargain may be overshadowed by conflicting perceptions and interpretations.

The above five lessons show that power-sharing is a highly complex undertaking: Differences in civil war occurrence depend not only on the relative trend, depth, scope and authenticity of the elite bargain but also on how the latter is perceived by the involved actors.

COMPLEMENTARY EXPLANATIONS

(1) Violent state repression

First, the Uganda-Zambia comparison shows that civil war is driven not only by the existence of exclusionary elite bargains but also by concurrent *violent state repression* against marginalised groups. The occurrence or non-occurrence of violent state repression has clearly emerged as the single most important competing – yet complementary – explanatory factor.

In Uganda, all civil wars involved violent state repression against marginalised tribal groups, the ADF insurgency in Western Uganda being the only exception. In some cases, violent state repression against both former combatants and civilians was possibly even the more immediate trigger of violent conflict. This is true not only for the two anti-Amin rebellions but also for the FUNA, UNRF, UPDA and UPA insurgencies, which are all often portrayed as defensive wars of survival. In other cases, the exclusion aspect seems to have been paramount, including the 'Battle of Mengo' as well as the NRA, UFM, FEDEMO, LRA, UNRF II and WNBF civil wars. In the end, however, it was arguably the combination of both exclusion and repression along tribal lines that was behind the seemingly endless cycles of civil war in post-colonial Uganda.

Zambia, by contrast, has not only been characterised by the persistence of inclusive elite bargains but also by the absence of violent state repression against any of its linguistic or tribal groups. This is not to deny that the one-party state of the Second Republic was autocratic in nature and did not hesitate to victimise those individuals who challenged its authority. Yet, there is no evidence that any group as a whole was ever persecuted and repressed. Known or suspected UPP members, for example, were prevented from re-joining politics or even imprisoned throughout much of the 1970s. Yet, there was never any sign of state-directed violence against the Bemba as a group (neither as a language group nor as a tribe). As a result, group-specific concerns of self-preservation and survival that prompted so many of Uganda's civil wars could never arise.

(2) Socioeconomic inter-group inequalities

Second, differences in civil war occurrence in Uganda and Zambia depend not only on political inequalities at the elite level but also on socioeconomic inequalities at the mass level. While the former were clearly more decisive, the latter have also played a role in both countries.

Uganda has a long history of inter-group inequalities at the mass level, evident in the enduring socioeconomic marginalisation of tribal groups from Northern and parts of Eastern Region. For the period between 1962 and 1986, these inequalities can hardly be directly related to recurrent civil war since all insurgencies originated among tribal groups that did not suffer from relative socioeconomic deprivation. The post-1986 rebellions, by contrast, were clearly facilitated by the socioeconomic neglect of the North-East. As tribal groups from the North and parts of the East were disadvantaged at both the elite and mass levels, Northern and Eastern rebel leaders found it easier to recruit mass followers. This supports Stewart et al's hypothesis that consistent horizontal inequalities facilitate violent political mobilisation.[861]

In Zambia. inter-group inequalities at the mass level have always been less pronounced than in Uganda, yet not entirely absent. The relative socioeconomic deprivation of Western, North-Western and Luapula Provinces after independence did however not translate into violent conflict, especially because the affected groups were always

[861] Stewart 2008.

included in political terms. More recently, declining socioeconomic disparities between provinces have arguably helped to further entrench Zambia's peace and stability. This can be interpreted as evidence that civil war is especially unlikely if there are no horizontal inequalities at both the elite and mass levels.

(3) Political leadership

Third, there is evidence that a country's propensity for peace or conflict depends not only on the inclusiveness of the elite bargain but also on the presence or absence of political leadership that is perceived as a *credible mediator* between competing social groups.

In Zambia, political leadership in the form of a credible mediator has always been present since independence. The most prominent example would be the first President Kenneth Kaunda who was essentially a political outsider considered 'above tribe' due to his Nyasaland parentage. The Bemba could respect him because he had grown up among them, while the other tribes could accept him because he was not a 'real' Bemba – a constellation that earned him the status of a unifier and enabled him to hold the fragile elite bargain together even during the hefty factional struggles of the late 1960s. The second President Frederick Chiluba, while more controversial than Kaunda, was strongly rooted in the urban, non-tribal trade unions and therefore also qualified as a mediator. Moreover, he was a Bemba-speaker but from the small Lunda tribe in Luapula Province, which may have eased old fears of Bemba domination. Levy Mwanawasa, the country's third President, was essentially a compromise candidate who had been Vice-President in the early 1990s but had largely stayed away from the intra-MMD struggles surrounding the 'third term' debate. Also, his parentage from the small Lenje and Lamba tribes allowed him to defuse unabated fears of Bemba domination. Unsurprisingly, the current President Rupiah Banda is also a political outsider within MMD in that he is a former UNIP member from the so far underrepresented Nyanja-speaking East. As such, he is again a credible mediator between the different parts of the country.

Uganda's post-colonial leaders, by contrast, have never been credible mediators between competing tribal groups. The country's first President, Edward Mutesa, was at the same time the King of the much-resented Baganda, while the First Prime Minister

Milton Obote belonged to the largest Northern tribe (the Langi) and headed a political party (the UPC) with distinct anti-Baganda roots. As a consequence, both post-independence leaders were – unlike Kaunda in Zambia – hardly credible mediators 'above tribe'. Idi Amin belonged to a small tribe on the periphery of the Ugandan state (the Kakwa). Yet, his potential as a mediator was undermined by a number of factors, including his military background, his personal involvement in the 1966 attack on the Kabaka's palace, and his leading role in the tribal struggles within the military that led to the 1971 coup. Yusuf Lule, the first UNLF President, was initially regarded a compromise candidate between the various UNLF factions but soon discredited as a mediator by his obvious association with the Baganda monarchists, which heighted long-standing fears of Baganda domination. The current President Yoweri Museveni, finally, could never be considered a credible mediator due to his long-standing conflict with the pro-Obote forces and his status as the protagonist of the NRA war – the country's major incidence of civil war that was rooted in a Bantu-alliance with the Baganda and for the first time deprived the North of political and military power.

(4) Levels of urbanisation

Fourth, my research suggests that the likelihood of civil war depends not only on the inclusiveness of the elite bargain but also on *levels of urbanisation.*

In peaceful Zambia, the salience of language and tribe as the predominant social cleavages has been blurred by high levels of urbanisation, which go back to the growth of the mining industry on the Copperbelt from the 1930s. Urban migration has reduced language barriers in that many Bemba- speakers on the Copperbelt and Nyanja-speakers in Lusaka are no longer from one of the Bemba- or Nyanja-speaking tribes. Moreover, it has resulted in high levels of inter-tribal marriages (about 50% of all Zambians in urban areas) who have less of a tribal outlook and whose off-springs are considered 'proper' Zambians. At the same time, PF's successful populist campaign around issues of urban poverty in Lusaka and on the Copperbelt shows that cross-cutting class cleavages have become more important. This is not to deny that language and tribe remain very relevant social cleavages – evident in recent patterns of electoral competition – and therefore continue to require political accommodation. Yet, it seems safe to claim that high levels of urbanisation and inter-tribal marriages have made extreme collective action based on language or tribe less likely.

In conflict-ridden Uganda, levels of urbanisation have been much lower whereby tribe as the main social cleavage is less blurred than in Zambia. At the same time, cross-cutting class cleavages seem also less developed. The largely unmitigated salience of tribal divides by itself does of course not explain recurrent violent conflict. But in the context of persistently exclusionary elite bargains, low levels of urbanisation and underdeveloped cross-cutting class cleavages may have further facilitated violent mobilisation along tribal lines.

(5) Regional spillover effects

Finally, there is reason to expect that a country's vulnerability to civil war depends not only on the inclusiveness of the elite bargain but also on *regional spillover effects*. This is in line with findings from the quantitative civil war literature.[862]

In Uganda, four out of the seven anti-Museveni insurgencies – namely the LRA, WNBF, UNRF II and ADF – also involved important regional spillover effects in that they were part of a 'proxy war' between Uganda and Sudan where the Sudanese government provided Ugandan rebel groups with financial and military aid, while the NRM backed John Garang's SPLA. The extreme case of the ADF apart, it is however important to recognise that the regional spillover effects did not by themselves cause the anti-Museveni rebellions. Instead, the Sudanese destabilisation attempts were only successful in combination with Museveni's exclusionary elite bargain, which made it rather easy for the Sudanese regime to identify disgruntled groups and help them to take up arms against the NRM government. Conversely, Sudan would have found it much harder to destabilise Uganda if Museveni had forged a truly inclusive elite bargain. Altogether, regional conflict complexes in combination with exclusionary elite bargains make civil war onset especially likely.

In Zambia, by contrast, the regional spillover effects of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s did not lead to civil war. Accordingly, the liberation wars in many of Zambia's neighbouring countries (Southern Rhodesia, Angola, and Mozambique) and especially recurrent destabilisation attempts from apartheid South Africa could not undermine the country's remarkable peace and stability, most evident in the failure of the South

[862] Wallensteen & Sollenberg 1998.

Africa-supported Mushala rebellion. This confirms the above claim that regional spillover effects by themselves are not sufficient to cause violent conflict. Instead, the persistence of inclusive elite bargains has not only insulated Zambia against the effects of regional instability but even proved to be an integrating factor: Rather than causing internal conflict, the presence of an external threat strengthened UNIP's domestic authority and ultimately helped to further unify the country. Altogether, there is reason to argue that regional conflict complexes in combination with inclusive elite bargains make civil war avoidance especially likely.

The above four lessons show that differences in civil war occurrence depend not only on the inclusiveness of the elite bargain but also on violent state repression, socioeconomic inter-group inequalities, political leadership, levels of urbanisation and regional spillover effects.

8.2 Three avenues for future research

What are avenues for future research? In what follows, I will briefly outline three different possible approaches, which focus on (1) extending the number of cases; (2) explaining the inclusiveness of the elite bargain; and (3) theorising the link between the elite bargain and economic development.

EXTENDING THE NUMBER OF CASES

A first avenue for future research would be to extend the number of cases in order to see whether variation in the inclusiveness of the elite bargain can also account for differences in civil war occurrence *beyond* Uganda and Zambia.

A brief glance at the Africanist literature suggests that my findings may indeed be transferable to a larger number of cases. Accordingly, many of the civil war 'immune' African countries listed in chapter 1 seem to be characterised by sustained attempts for power-sharing between competing social groups. In Tanzania, to begin with, the ruling party Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) (later Chama cha Mapinduzi – CCM) has resisted any form of sectarian favouritism and forged an elite bargain that is

broadly representative of the country's tribal, regional and religious divisions.[863] In Cameroon, the 'politics of regional and ethnic balance' have been an important feature of both the Ahidjo and Biya administrations.[864] In Ghana, the informal convention of ethno-regional balancing in government has ensured high levels of political power-sharing since independence, which in turn meant that group leaders had few incentives to mobilise their constituents along ethno-regional lines.[865] Similar balancing policies in the distribution of government appointments became also evident in Gnassingbé Eyadema's Togo and Sékou Touré's Guinea.[866] Many of Africa's civil war prone countries, by contrast, seem to be characterised by extremely exclusionary elite bargains. In Sudan, successive Northern-based governments have resisted fully providing genuine Southern leaders with access to the inner circles of state power[867] – a situation that seems to have changed only with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005.[868] Similarly, conflict-ridden Chad has since independence been plagued by a pronounced ethno-regional bias in government and the army, first in favour of the South (under Tombalbaye),[869] and later in favour of the North (under Habré and Déby).[870] In Burundi, the minority Tutsi have – at least until the power-sharing attempts from the mid-1990s[871] – monopolised positions of political and military power at the expense of the majority Hutu,[872] while the regionally confined civil wars in Senegal and Mali seem to be related to the political and economic marginalisation of the Casamancais (especially the Diola) and the nomadic groups in Azawad.[873] In Côte d'Ivoire, finally, Houphouet-Boigny's inclusive post-colonial coalition based on a system of ethnic quotas broke down after his death in 1993 and was followed by the progressive political marginalisation of Northern groups, which became a key driver behind violent conflict from the late 1990s.[874]

---

[863] Lindemann & Putzel 2010. More recently, there have however been signs that the ruling party's inclusive nationalist coalition may be unravelling (Kelsall 2002; Cameron & Dorman 2009).
[864] Bayart 1979; Nyamnjoh 1999.
[865] Langer 2007.
[866] Rothchild & Foley 1988.
[867] Rothchild 1997: 64p.
[868] Raftopoulos & Alexander 2006.
[869] Decalo 1980; Lemarchand 1986.
[870] Lemarchand 2005.
[871] Vandeginste 2006; Lemarchand 2007.
[872] Lemarchand 1994; Ngaruko & Nkurunziza 2005.
[873] Humphreys & Mohamed 2005.
[874] Langer 2005.

Nevertheless, there is also clear evidence that exclusionary elite bargains do not always lead to violent conflict. A closer look at Andreas Wimmer's Ethno-Power-Relations (EPR) dataset, for example, reveals that not all politically relevant ethnic groups who are excluded from executive level state power actually engage in armed insurgency against the central government. To give a few examples, the indigenous peoples in Ecuador, the Berbers in Morocco, the Luba-Kasai in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Sunni Kurds in Syria or the Uyghurs in China were all powerless for long periods of time but nonetheless refrained from violence. Other ethnic groups like the Roma in Slovakia, the Hindus in Bangladesh, the Bataks in Indonesia, the Mapuche in Chile or the Ndebele in Zimbabwe have even peacefully endured open discrimination and violent repression. Again other groups like the Igbo in Nigeria or the Fur in Sudan have repeatedly suffered from exclusion and repression, yet violent rebellion has remained the exception rather than the norm. In the light of these contradictions, there is need to better understand the conditions that are likely to favour peace despite the odds, i.e. in situations when ethnicity has been politicised and politics is perceived as a matter of unequal power relations between ethnic communities and their leaders.

This is the aim of a research project at the *Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity* in which I am involved.[875] Here, we will compare pairs of ethnic groups that suffer from similar degrees of exclusion and can therefore be expected to display the same propensity for armed rebellion, yet display strikingly different behaviours: One group travels down the road of violence, while the other one maintains peace. To account for these different outcomes, we rely on a theoretical framework that draws on the often overlapping literatures on 'contentious politics'[876], social revolutions[877] and civil war[878]. We focus on two sets of factors. One is related to differences in group-specific endowments, including political leadership, social networks, economic resources and geographical concentration. The other one is related to the broader political opportunity structure in which the ethnic groups operate, including the territorial reach of the state, state repression, elite divisions and regularity of leader entry. On the whole, we hypothesise that the effects of ethnic exclusion are conditioned on both group-specific endowments and the capacity of the state.

---

[875] http://www.mmg.mpg.de/research/all-projects/conditions-of-conviviality-and-conflict/.
[876] E.g. McAdam et al. 2001; Tilly 2003; Tilly & Tarrow 2007.
[877] E.g. Skocpol 1979; Tilly 1978; Goodwin 2001.
[878] E.g. Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2007; Wood 2003.

EXPLAINING THE INCLUSIVENESS OF THE ELITE BARGAIN

A second avenue for future research would be to try to explain variation in the inclusiveness of the elite bargain. Why did Zambia's post-colonial leaders forge and maintain inclusive elite bargains? Why did Ugandan leaders rely on more or less extreme minority regimes? And why did Houphouet-Boigny in Côte d'Ivoire establish an inclusive coalition based on ethnic quotas, while his successors did not?

These are arguably important questions that have so far received surprisingly little academic attention. A first possible approach when trying to explain variation in the inclusiveness of the elite bargain would be to theorise the pivotal role of *personal agency*. Here, one could – in line with the 'Great Men of History' approach – focus on personal character traits of political leaders such as sanity, fear or greed. With a view to the role of a leader's sanity, one could build on Decalo's[879] work on the 'psychoses of power', which may help to shed light on the genesis of Idi Amin's extreme minority regime. As for the role of fear, one could draw on Joel Migdal's work on the 'politics of survival', which suggests that rulers may fear to share access to state structures as this could help potential opponents to gain leverage or create competing power centres.[880] According to interview evidence, this may be one of the reasons why Museveni has been hesitant to establish a truly broad-based government and army.[881] With respect to the role of greed, one could hypothesise that some leaders are simply greedier than others and therefore refuse to share access to state resources. This may again help to explain the absence of broadbasedness in Museveni's Uganda. As Museveni and his cronies draw considerable material benefits from the civil wars in the North,[882] they may have little interest in an inclusive and peaceful political order.

While a focus on sanity, fear and greed could yield pertinent answers, such personal character traits are inherently difficult to measure. As a consequence, there may be reason to theorise the role of personal agency not in terms of personal character traits but rather in terms of a leader's geographical, social, professional and politico-ideological background. This is precisely what Sean Fox and I are currently trying to do in the context of a small project on 'Leadership and political stability in post-

[879] Decalo 1989.
[880] Migdal 1988.
[881] Various interviews.
[882] For details see Tangri & Mwenda 2001; Dolan 2009.

independence Africa' where we compile a basic set of biographic data on Sub-Saharan Africa's post-independence leaders.[883] We hope to identify those individual background characteristics that predict which leaders will seek out inclusive political coalitions and thereby reduce the probability of political instability or outright civil war.

A first focus is to determine the geographical background of a political leader, which means that we collect information on weather he/she was born and raised inside or outside the country and in rural or urban areas. The hypothesis is that leaders who are born and raised outside the country or in urban areas may be more suitable as credible mediators between competing social groups. A second focus is to establish the social background of a leader, including information not only on the individual's ethnicity and religion but also on how many of the country's official languages he/she speaks, his/her place in the age hierarchy and the social background of his/her parents. The idea is that political leaders who do not belong to the country's main ethnic or religious group, speak all official languages and come from an economic-administrative rather than traditional elite family may be more likely to forge inclusive coalitions. A third focus is to shed light on the leader's professional background by compiling information on his/her level of education and major prior occupations. Our hunch is that leaders with a high level of formal education and a non-military professional background may facilitate the emergence of inclusive elite bargains. A final focus of our project is to determine the politico-ideological background of Africa's leaders, which means that we look for prior membership in labour unions, cooperative unions, civil service associations or tribal associations. The hypothesis is that elected leaders with a background in labour unions, cooperative unions or civil service associations are more likely to seek out inclusive political coalitions.

A second possible approach when trying to explain variation in the inclusiveness of the elite bargain would be to focus on *structural constraints*, especially on the role of historical path dependency. Again using the examples of Uganda and Zambia, Obote inherited a colonial army heavily dominated by Northerners, whereas Kaunda found himself with a colonial army that was more balanced in composition. Similarly, Museveni came to power with the help of a rebel force almost entirely composed of Westerners and Baganda, while Chiluba and Mwanawasa in Zambia could build on

[883] http://csrcafricanleadershipproject.wikispaces.com/. Note that we define leaders as the de facto holders of state power, which is typically the President or the Prime Minister.

UNIP's achievement of a non-tribal military. Moreover, Uganda has suffered from an especially pronounced historical North-South divide with huge discrepancies in educational indicators, which may have hampered the recruitment of sufficiently skilled Northerners in both the civil service and the parastatal sector. In Zambia, the Lozi were also favoured in terms of early access to education but these discrepancies were clearly less pronounced than in Uganda. This is not to claim that history has predetermined different outcomes, which are always contingent on subsequent political agency. Yet, varying historical path dependency may have influenced the prospect of forging inclusive elite bargains, at least in the short- and medium term.

THEORISING THE LINK BETWEEN THE ELITE BARGAIN AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

A third avenue for future research would be to theorise the link between a country's elite bargain and its level of economic development. What are the economic consequences of inclusive versus exclusionary elite bargains?

While there is abundant research on the link between power-sharing and violent conflict, we know a lot less about the relationship between power-sharing and economic development. There is of course a large literature on how ethnic fractionalisation affects economic development.[884] Yet, this literature mainly relies on demographic measures of ethnic fractionalisation that tell us little about whether power is shared between competing groups. I argue that the absence of power-sharing is likely to hamper economic development both indirectly and directly. First, a lack of power-sharing is likely to lead to violent conflict, which will in turn undermine economic activity. Second, there is also reason to assume a more direct relationship. Regimes based on an exclusionary elite bargain lack an 'encompassing interest' in society and therefore resemble Mancur Olson's 'roving bandit' who prefers predation and consumption over public goods provision and productive investment – a constellation that is prone to economic decline.[885] As mentioned in chapter 1, such unproductive forms of rent-seeking and the corresponding political and economic collapse became most evident in Idi Amin's Uganda. Yet, the relationship between exclusionary elite bargains and economic decline is by no means entirely straightforward. Instead, Museveni's exclusionary elite bargain was accompanied by an internationally acclaimed record of

[884] See, among others, Easterly & Levine 1997; Alesina & La Ferrara 2005.
[885] Olson 1993.

economic recovery.[886] Against this background, there is need to better understand under which conditions exclusionary elite bargains and the related violent conflict may lead to developmental outcomes. This is especially the case since processes of economic transformation have historically been extremely violent in nature.[887]

Inversely, one is intuitively inclined to think that inclusive elite bargains are conducive to economic development. As broad-based regimes have a large stake in society, they could be expected to develop an 'encompassing interest' and assume the role of Olson's 'stationary bandit' who engages in public goods provision and the promotion of productive economic activities. In reality, however, the case of Zambia underscores the fact that all good things do not go together. While the country's inclusive elite bargain has clearly helped to avoid civil war, it has at the same time constrained the prospects of economic development. In this sense, there has been a trade-off between enduring peace and economic stagnation – a dilemma of unproductive peace.[888] This is explicitly recognised by Zambian intellectuals who deplore the fact that their country's peace and stability has been largely unproductive in nature and benefitted only competing elites rather than the population as a whole.[889] The political quest for an inclusive elite bargain is of course not the only driver behind Zambia's economic stagnation. Nevertheless, the Zambian case shows that there is an important distinction between a resilient state[890] and a developmental state – inclusive elite bargains and the corresponding peace and stability do not automatically lead to higher state effectiveness and developmental outcomes. Instead, inclusive rent-sharing policies follow a logic of politics, not of economic efficiency – redistributive consumption dominates productive investment. This means that economic performance will tend to remain constrained by the unproductive imperatives of building and maintaining inclusive elite bargains, at least in the short- and medium term.[891]

Altogether, the lens of the elite bargain offers many different avenues for the study of the broader issues of war, peace and economic development. In relation to this ambitious agenda, my PhD thesis has hopefully made a modest contribution.

---

[886] Reinikka & Collier 2001.
[887] See Cramer 2006.
[888] For a detailed version of this argument see Lindemann 2010.
[889] Interview, Dr. Gilbert Mudenda; Interview, Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika.
[890] DiJohn & Putzel 2009.
[891] For a similar argument on Tanzania see Khan & Gray 2006.

9 Bibliography

Abu-Lughod, Janet. 2007. 'The Challenge of Comparative Case Studies', *City* 11(3): 399-404.

ACR – Africa Contemporary Record. Various Years. *Annual Survey and Documents*. New York: Holmes & Meier.

Agyeman-Duah, B. 1992. 'Civilian Control of the Military in Africa: The Case of Zambia', in C. P. Danopoulos (ed), *Civilian Rule in the Developing World: Democracy on the March?* Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 141-159.

Ahmad, Ehtisham, Brosio, Giorgio and Gonzalez, Maria. 2006. 'Uganda: Managing More Effective Decentralisation', *IMF Working Paper* 06/279, Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.

Alesina, Alberto F. and La Ferrara, Eliana. 2005. 'Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance', *Journal of Economic Literature* 43(3): 762-800.

Ali, Taisier M. and Matthews, Robert O. 2000. *Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution*. Ontario: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Allen, Chris. 1995. 'Understanding African Politics', *Review of African Political Economy* 22(65): 301-320.

Allen, Tim. 1991. 'Understanding Alice: Uganda's Holy Spirit Movement in Context', *Africa* 61(3): 370-399.

Amaza, Oondoga O. 1998. *Museveni's Long March: From Guerrilla to Statesman*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

Amselle, Jean-Loup and M'Bokolo, Elikia (eds). 1999. *Au Cœur de l'Ethnie. Ethnies, Tribalisme et État en Afrique*. Paris: Éditions La Découverte.

Anderson, Benedict. 1983. *Imagined Communities*. London: Verso.

Anderson, Per-Ake, Bigsten, Arne and Persson, Hakan. 2000. 'Foreign Aid, Debt and Growth in Zambia', *Research Report* 112, Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.

Anguria, Omongole (ed). 2006. *Apollo Milton Obote: What Others Say*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

Avirgan, Tony and Honey, Martha. 1982. *War in Uganda: The Legacy of Idi Amin*. London: Zed Books.

Baechler, Günther, Böge, Volker, Klötzli, Stefan, Libiszewski, Stephan and Spillmann, Kurt (eds). 1996. *Kriegsursache Umweltzerstörung – Ökologische Konflikte in der Dritten Welt und Wege ihrer friedlichen Bearbeitung*. Zurich: Ruegger.

Bardhan, Pranab. 2000. 'Institutional Impediments to Development', in Mancur Olson and Satu Kähkönen (eds), *A Not-So-Dismal Science: A Broader View of Economies and Societies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 245-267.

Barkan, Joel, Kayunga, Sallie S., Ng'ethe, Njuguna and Titsworth, Jack. 2005. 'The Political Economy of Uganda: The Art of Managing a Donor-Financed Neo-Patrimonial State', Kampala: The World Bank.

Barongo, Yoramu. 1989. 'Ethnic Pluralism and Political Centralization: The Basis of Political Conflict', in Kumar Rupesinghe (ed), *Conflict Resolution in Uganda*. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 65-90.

Bartlett, Daniel M. 2000. 'Civil Society and Democracy: A Zambian Case Study', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26(3): 429-446.

Bates, Robert H. and Collier, Paul. 1995. 'The Politics and Economics of Policy Reform in Zambia', *Journal of African Economies* 4(1): 115-143.

Bayart, Jean-Francois. 1979. *L'Etat au Cameroun*. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques.

Bayart, Jean-François. 1981. 'Le Politique par le Bas en Afrique Noire: Questions de Méthode', *Politique Africaine* 1(1): 53-82.

Bayart, Jean-François. 1989. *L'Etat en Afrique. La Politique du Ventre*. Paris: Fayard.

Bayart, Jean-François, Ellis, Stephen and Hibou, Béatrice. 1999. *The Criminalisation of the State in Africa*. Oxford: James Currey.

Baylies, Carolyn. 1984. 'Luapula Province: Economic Decline and Political Alienation in a Rural UNIP Stronghold', in Cherry Gertzel, Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel (eds), *The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 163-205.

Baylies, Carolyn and Szeftel, Morris. 1984. 'Elections in the One-Party State', in Cherry Gertzel, Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel (eds), *The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 29-57.

Baylies, Carolyn and Szeftel, Morris, 1992. 'The Fall and Rise of Multi-Party Politics in Zambia', *Review of African Political Economy* 19(54): 75-91.

Baylies, Carolyn and Szeftel, Morris. 1997. 'The 1996 Zambian Elections: Still Awaiting Democratic Consolidation', *Review of African Political Economy* 24(71): 113-128.

Beblawi, Hazem. 1990. 'The Rentier State in the Arab World', in Giacomo Luciani (ed.), *The Arab State*. London: Routledge, 85-98.

Behrend, Heike. 1999. *Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirits*. Oxford: James Currey.

Berman, Bruce. 1984. 'Structure and Process in the Bureaucratic States of Colonial Africa', *Development and Change* 15(2): 161-202.

Berman, Bruce. 1998. 'Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism', *African Affairs* 97(388): 305-342.

Berry, Sara. 1993. *No Condition is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Subsaharan Africa.* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Blattman, Christopher and Miguel, Edward. 2010. 'Civil War', *Journal of Economic Literature* 48(1): 3-57.

Boas, Morten and Dunn, Kevin C. (eds). 2007. *African Guerrillas. Raging Against the Machine.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Boone, Catherine. 1994. 'States and Ruling Classes in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Enduring Contradictions of Power', in Joel Migdal, Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue (eds), *State Power and Social Forces*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 108-142.

Boone, Catherine. 2004. *Political Topographies of the African State. Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Branch, Adam. 2005. 'Neither Peace nor Justice: Political Violence and the Peasantry in Northern Uganda, 1986-1998', *African Studies Quarterly* 8(2): 1-31.

Brett, Edward A. 1995. 'Neutralising the Use of Force in Uganda: The Role of the Military in Politics', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 33(1): 129-152.

Brown, Graham K. 2008. 'Horizontal Inequalities and Separatism in Southeast Asia: A Comparative Perspective', in Frances Stewart (ed), *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 252-281.

Brubaker, Rogers. 2004. *Ethnicity without Groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Buckley-Zistel, Susanne. 2008. *Conflict Transformation and Social Change in Uganda Remembering after Violence.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Burdette, Marcia. 1988. *Zambia: Between Two Worlds*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Burnell Peter. 2001. 'The First Two MMD Administrations in Zambia: Millennium Dawn or Millennium Sunset?', *Contemporary Politics* 7(2): 95-111.

Burnell, Peter. 2002. 'Zambia's 2001 Elections: The Tyranny of Small Decisions, Non-Decisions and Not Decisions', *Third World Quarterly* 23(6): 1103-1120.

Burnell, Peter. 2003. 'The Tripartite Elections in Zambia, December 2001', *Electoral Studies* 22(2): 388-395.

Burnell Peter. 2005. 'From Low-Conflict Polity to Democratic Civil Peace: Explaining Zambian Exceptionalism', *African Studies* 64(2): 107-133.

Burton, Michael G. and Higley, John. 1987. 'Elite Settlements', *American Sociological Review* 52(3): 295-307.

Burton, Michael G. and Higley, John. 1998. 'Political Crises and Elite Settlements', in Mattei Dogan and John Higley (eds), *Elites, Crises, and the Origins of Regimes.* Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 47-70.

Bussmann, Margit, Hasenclever, Andreas und Schneider, Gerald. 2009. 'Identität, Institutionen und Ökonomie: Ursachen und Scheinursachen innenpolitischer Gewalt', in Margit Bussmann, Andreas Hasenclever und Gerald Schneider (eds), *Identität, Institutionen und Ökonomie. Ursachen innenpolitischer Gewalt.* Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 9-38.

Bwengye, Francis A. 1985. *The Agony of Uganda: From Idi Amin to Obote.* London: Regency Press.

Cameron, Greg and Dorman, Sara. 2009. 'Problems of Nationalism and Democracy in Zimbabwe and Tanzania', Paper Prepared for the Conference 'Democratization in Africa: Retrospective and Future Prospects', 4-5 December 2009, Leeds.

Cammack, Diana, Golooba-Mutebi, Frederick, Kanyongolo, Fidelis and O'Neil, Tam. 2007. 'Neopatrimonial Politics, Decentralisation and Local Government: Uganda and Malawi in 2006', *Good Governance, Aid Modalities and Poverty Reduction Working Paper Series* 2, London: Overseas Development Institute.

Caplan, Gerald C. 1968. 'Barotseland: The Secessionist Challenge to Zambia', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 6(3): 343-360.

Carbone, Giovanni M. 2008. *No-Party Democracy?: Ugandan Politics in Comparative Perspective.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Carr, Edward H. 1961. *What Is History?* London: Penguin.

Caumartin, Corinne, Molina, George G. and Thorp, Rosemary. 2008. 'Inequality, Ethnicity and Political Violence in Latin America: The Cases of Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru', in Frances Stewart (ed), *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 227-251.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Gleditsch, Kristian S. and Weidmann, Nils B. 2010a. 'Horizontal Inequalities and Ethno-Nationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison', Unpublished Manuscript, Zurich: Center for Comparative and International Studies.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Wimmer, Andreas and Min, Brian. 2010b. 'Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis', *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal. 1999. *Africa Works. Disorder as Political Instrument*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Chandra, Kanchan. 2006. 'What is Ethnic Identity and Does it Matter?', *Annual Review of Political Science* 9(1): 397-424.

Cheeseman, Nic and Hinfelaar, Marja. 2010. 'Parties, Platforms and Political Mobilization: The Zambian Presidential Elections of 2008', *African Affairs* 109(434): 51-76.

Chikulo, Bornwell C. 1981. 'The Zambian Administrative Reforms: An Alternative View', *Public Administration and Development* 1(1): 55-65.

Chikulo, Bornwell C. 1985. 'Reorganization for Local Administration in Zambia: An Analysis of the Local Administration Act, 1980', *Public Administration and Development* 5(1): 73-81.

Chikulo, Bornwell. 1996. 'Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in the Third Republic, 1991-1994', in Owen Sichone and Bornwell Chikulo (eds), *Democracy in Zambia: Challenges for the Third Republic*. Harare: Sapes Books, 25-52.

Chikulo, Bornwell C. 2000. 'Corruption and Accumulation in Zambia', in Hope R. Kempe and Bornwell C. Chikulo (eds), *Corruption and Development in Africa. Lessons from Country Case-Studies*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 161-182.

Chikulo, Bornwell C. 2009. 'Local Governance Reforms in Zambia: A Review', *Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance* 2: 98-106.

Chisala, Victoria, Geda, Alemayehu, Dagdeviren, Hulya, McKinley, Terry, Saad-Filho, Alfredo, Oya, Carlos and Weeks, John. 2006. 'Economic Policies for Growth, Employment and Power Reduction: Case Study of Zambia', Lusaka: UNDP.

Chodak, Szymon. 1964. 'The Societal Functions of Party Systems in Subsaharan Africa', in Erik Allardt and Yrjo Littunen (eds), *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems*. Helsinki: Academic Bookstore, 256-261.

Clapham, Christopher. 1985. *Third World Politics*. London: Helm.

Clapham, Christopher. 1996. *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Clapham, Christopher (ed). 1998. *African Guerrillas*. Oxford: James Currey.

CMB – Coffee Marketing Board. 1973. 'Annual Report 1969', Kampala: CMB.

Coleman, James S. 1975. 'Tradition and Nationalism in Tropical Africa', in Martin Kilson (ed), *New States in the Modern World.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 3-36.

Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke. 2002. 'On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(1): 13-28.

Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke. 2004. 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War', *Oxford Economic Papers* 56(4): 563-595.

Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke. 2007. 'Civil War', in Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley (eds), *Handbook of Defense Economics. Volume 2: Defense in in a Globalized World.* Amsterdam: Elsevier, 711-740.

Collier, Paul and Sambanis, Nicholas (eds). 2005. *Understanding Civil War. Volume 1: Africa.* Washington DC: The World Bank.

Cramer, Christopher. 2005. 'Inequality and Conflict. A Review of an Age-Old Concern', *Identities, Conflict and Cohesion Paper* 11, Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Cramer, Christopher. 2006. *Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing. Accounting for Violence in Developing Countries.* London: Hurst & Company.

Craig, John R. 2000. 'Evaluating Privatisation in Zambia: A Tale of Two Processes', *Review of African Political Economy* 27(85): 357-366.

Craig, John R. 2001. 'Putting Privatisation into Practise: The Case of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Limited', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 39(3): 389-410.

Craig, John R. 2002. 'Privatisation and Indigenous Ownership: Evidence from Africa', *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics* 73(4): 559-576.

CSO – Central Statistical Office. 1973. 'Census of Population and Housing 1969: Final Report Volume I – Total Zambia', Lusaka: CSO.

CSO – Central Statistical Office. 1985. '1980 Population and Housing Census of Zambia: Analytical Report Volume III', Lusaka: CSO.

CSO – Central Statistical Office. 2003. 'Zambia 2000 Census Report: Volume 10', Lusaka: CSO.

CSO – Central Statistical Office. 2006. 'Living Conditions Monitoring Survey V', Lusaka: CSO.

CSRC – Crisis States Research Centre. 2006. 'War, State Collapse and Reconstruction: Phase 2 of the Crisis States Programme', *Crisis States Working Papers Series 2* 1, London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics.

Decalo, Samuel. 1980. 'Regionalism, Political Decay and Civil Strife in Chad', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 18(1): 23-56.

Decalo, Samuel. 1989. *Psychoses Of Power: African Personal Dictatorships*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Delavignette, Robert. 1950. *Freedom and Authority in French West Africa*. New York: Columbia University Press.

De Soysa, Indra. 2002a. 'Ecoviolence: Shrinking Pie or Honey Pot?', *Global Environmental Politics* 2(4): 1-34.

De Soysa, Indra. 2002b. 'Paradise Is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil War, 1989-99', *Journal of Peace Research* 39(4): 395-416.

De Soysa, Indra and Neumayer, Eric. 2007. 'Resource Wealth and the Risk of Civil War Onset: Results from a New Dataset of Natural Resource Rents, 1970-1999', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 24(3): 201-218.

DiJohn, Jonathan. 2002. 'Mineral Resource Abundance and Violent Political Conflict: A Critical Assessment of the Rentier State Model', *Crisis States Working Papers Series 1* 20, London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics.

DiJohn, Jonathan and Putzel, James. 2009. 'Political Settlements', *GSDRC Issues Paper*, Birmingham: University of Birmingham, International Development Department.

Dolan, Chris. 2009. *Social Torture: The Case of Northern Uganda, 1986-2006*. Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Dresang, Dennis. 1974. 'Ethnic Politics, Representative Bureaucracy and Development Administration: The Zambian Case', *American Political Science Review* 68(4): 1605-1617.

Dresang, Dennis and Young, Ralph. 1980. 'The Public Service', in William Tordoff (ed), *Administration in Zambia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 68-103.

Duverger, Maurice. 1959. *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. London: Methuen.

East African Statistical Department. 1960. 'Uganda General African Census 1959: Tribal Analysis for Protectorate Province – District & Counties', Entebbe: East African Statistical Department, Uganda Unit.

Easterly, William and Levine, Ross. 1997. 'Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions', *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112(4): 1203-1250.

Elbadawi, Ibrahim and Sambanis, Nicholas. 2000. 'Why Are There So Many Civil Wars in Africa? Understanding and Preventing Violent Conflict', *Journal of African Economies* 9(3): 244-269.

Elbadawi, Ibrahim and Sambanis, Nicholas. 2002. 'How Much War Will We See? Estimating the Prevalence of Civil War in 161 Countries, 1960-1999', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(3): 307-334.

Englebert, Pierre. 2000. *State Legitimacy and Development in Africa.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Englebert, Pierre. 2005. 'Compliance and Defiance to National Integration in Barotseland and Casamance', *Africa Spectrum* 39(1): 29-59.

Englebert, Pierre. 2007. 'Whither the Separatist Motive', in Morten Boas and Kevin C. Dunn (eds), *African Guerrillas. Raging Against the Machine.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 55-68.

Erdmann, Gero. 2007. 'Ethnicity, Voter Alignment and Political Party Affiliation – an African Case: Zambia', *GIGA Working Paper* 45, Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies.

Erdmann, Gero and Engel, Ulf. 2006. 'Neopatrimonialism Revisited – Beyond a Catch-All Concept', *GIGA Working Paper* 16, Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies.

Erdmann, Gero and Simutanyi, Neo. 2003. 'Transition in Zambia: The Hybridisation of the Third Republic', *Konrad Adenauer Foundation Occasional Papers*, Lilongwe: Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

Fearon, James D. 2003. 'Ethnic Structure and Cultural Diversity around the World: A Cross-National Data Set on Ethnic Groups', Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 29 August – 1 September 2002, Boston.

Fearon, James. 2005. 'Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 483-507.

Fearon, James. 2010. 'Governance and Civil War Onset', Background Paper Prepared for the World Bank's 2011 World Development Report, Washington DC: World Bank.

Fearon, James and Laitin, David. 2000. 'Ordinary Language and External Validity: Specifying Concepts in the Study of Ethnicity', Paper Presented at the Second Laboratory in Comparative Ethnic Processes Meeting, Philadelphia.

Fearon, James and Laitin, David. 2003. 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War', *American Political Science Review* 97(1): 75-90.

Ferguson, Niall. 2000. *Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals*. New York: Basic Books.

Finnström, Sverker. 2008. *Living with Bad Surroundings: War, History, and Everyday Moments in Uganda*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Flint, Julie and De Waal, Alex. 2008. *Darfur: A Short History of a Long War*. London: Zed Books.

Francis, Paul and James, Robert. 2003. 'Balancing Rural Poverty Reduction and Citizen Participation: The Contradictions of Uganda's Decentralisation Program', *World Development* 31(2): 325-337.

Gellner, Ernest. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

George, Alexander L. and Bennett, Andrew. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Gerring, John. 2007. *Case Study Research. Principles and Practices*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gersony, Robert. 1997. 'The Anguish of Northern Uganda. Results of a Field-Based Assessment of the Civil Conflicts in Northern Uganda', Kampala: United States Embassy/ USAID.

Gertzel, Cherry. 1980. 'Uganda after Amin: The Continuing Search for Leadership and Control', *African Affairs* 79(317): 461-489.

Gertzel, Cherry. 1984a. 'Dissent and Authority in the Zambian One-Party State', in Cherry Gertzel, Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel (eds), *The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 79-118.

Gertzel, Cherry. 1984b. 'Western Province: Tradition, Economic Deprivation and Political Alienation', in Cherry Gertzel, Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel (eds), *The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 206-236.

Gertzel, Cherry and Szeftel, Morris. 1984. 'Politics in an African Urban Setting: The Role of the Copperbelt in the Transition to the One-Party State, 1964-1973', in Cherry Gertzel, Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel (eds), *The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 118-162.

Gertzel, Cherry, Baylies, Carolyn and Szeftel, Morris. 1984. 'Introduction: The Making of the One-Party State', in Cherry Gertzel, Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel

(eds), *The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1-28.

Ginywera-Pinchwa, A. G. 1989. 'Is there a Northern Question', in Kumar Rupesinghe (ed), *Conflict Resolution in Uganda*. Oslo: International Peace. Research Institute: 44-64.

Goldstone, Jack, Bates, Robert H., Epstein, David L., Gurr, Ted R., Lustik, Michael B., Marshall, Monty G., Ulfelder, Jay and Woodward, Mark. 2010. 'A Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability', *American Journal of Political Science* 54(1): 190-208.

Golooba-Mutebi, Frederick. 1999. Decentralisation, Democracy, and Development Administration in Uganda, 1986-1996: Limits to Popular Participation. London: University of London, unpublished PhD thesis.

Golooba-Mutebi, Frederick. 2005. 'Reassessing Popular Participation in Uganda', *Public Administration and Development* 24(4): 289-304.

Golooba-Mutebi, Frederick. 2008. 'Collapse, War and Reconstruction in Uganda: An Analytical Narrative in State-Making', *Crisis States Working Papers Series 2* 27, London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics.

Goodwin, Jeff. 2001. *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gordon, David. 2008. 'Rebellion or massacre? The UNIP-Lumpa Conflict Revisited', in Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar and Giacomo Macola (eds), *One Zambia, Many Histories. Towards a History of Post-Colonial Zambia*. Leiden: Brill, 45-76.

GOU – Government of Uganda. 1991. 'Uganda Government Directory', Entebbe: GOU.

GOU – Government of Uganda. 1994a. 'The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights: Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations', Kampala: GOU.

GOU – Government of Uganda. 1994b. 'Decentralisation in Uganda: The Policy and its Implications', Kampala: Ministry of Local Government, Decentralisation Secretariat, GOU.

GOU – Government of Uganda. 2005. 'The Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces Act 2005, Acts Supplement No. 5 to the Uganda Gazette No. 56 Volume XCVIII dated 2 September 2005', Entebbe: GOU.

GOU – Government of Uganda. 2008a. 'List of Permanent Secretaries, 2008', Kampala: Office of the President, GOU, unpublished.

GOU – Government of Uganda. 2008b. 'List of Chiefs and Directors of UPDF', Kampala: GOU, unpublished.

GOU – Government of Uganda. 2008c. 'Statutory Report of the Privatisation and Utility Sector Reform Project for the Periods July to December 2004, 2005, 2006', Kampala: Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, GOU.

GOU – Government of Uganda. 2009a. 'The Official Report of the Parliament of Uganda (Hansard), 12 May 2009', Kampala: GOU.

GOU – Government of Uganda. 2009b. 'The Official Report of the Parliament of Uganda (Hansard), 29 April 2009', Kampala: GOU.

GOU – Government of Uganda. Various Years. 'The Official Report of the Parliament of Uganda (Hansard)', Kampala: GOU.

GOZ – Government of Zambia. 2002. 'The National Decentralisation Policy: Towards Empowering the People', Lusaka: Office of the President, GOZ.

GOZ – Government of Zambia. 2007. 'Official Verbatim Report of the Parliamentary Debates, 30 March 2007', Lusaka: GOZ.

GOZ – Government of Zambia. 2009. 'Decentralisation Implementation Plan, 2009-2013', Lusaka: Decentralisation Secretariat, Ministry of Local Government and Housing, GOZ.

GOZ – Government of Zambia. Various Years a. 'Official Verbatim Report of the Parliamentary Debates', Lusaka: GOZ.

GOZ – Government of Zambia. Various Years b. 'Zambian Government Gazette', Lusaka: GOZ.

GOZ – Government of Zambia. Various Years c. 'Economic Report', Lusaka: Ministry of Finance, GOZ.

GOZ – Government of Zambia. Various Years d. 'List of Permanent Secretaries', Lusaka: Cabinet Office, GOZ, unpublished.

Gould, Jeremy. 2007. 'Zambia's 2006 Elections: The Ethnicization of Politics?', *News from the Nordic Africa Institute,* Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.

Green, Elliot D. 2006. 'Ethnicity and the Politics of Land Tenure Reform in Central Uganda', *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 44(3): 370-388.

Green, Elliott D. 2008. 'Decentralization and Conflict in Uganda', *Conflict, Security and Development* 8(4): 436-448.

Green, Elliott D. 2010. 'Patronage, District Creation and Reform in Uganda', *Studies in Comparative International Development* 45(1): 83-103.

Gurr, Ted R. 1993a. *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict.* Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Gurr, Ted R. 1993b. 'Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945', *International Political Science Review* 14(2): 161-201.

Gurr, Ted R. 2000. *Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century.* Washington DC : United States Institute of Peace Press.

Haantobolo, Godfrey. 2008. Civil Control of the Military in Zambia. Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand, unpublished PhD thesis.

Hall, Richard 1976. *Zambia 1890-1964: The Colonial Period.* London: Longman.

Hampwaye, Godfrey. 2008. 'The Limits of Decentralisation in Urban Zambia', *Urban Forum* 19(4): 347-361.

Hansen, Holger B. 1977. 'Ethnicity and Military Rule in Uganda: A Study of Ethnicity as a Political Factor in Uganda', *Research Report* 43, Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.

Harden, Blaine. *Dispatches from a Fragile Continent.* New York: Norton.

Hartzell, Caroline and Hoddie, Matthew. 2003. 'Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management', *American Journal of Political Science* 47(2): 318-332.

Hartzell, Caroline and Hoddie, Matthew. 2007. *Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars.* Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Hauge, Wenche and Ellingsen, Tanja. 1998. 'Beyond Environmental Scarcity: Causal Pathways to Conflict', *Journal of Peace Research* 35(3): 299-317.

Hawthorn, Geoffrey. 1993. *Plausible Worlds: Possibility and Understanding in History and the Social Sciences.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hegre, Havard, Ellingsen, Tanja, Gates, Scott and Gleditsch, Nils Petter. 2001. 'Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992', *American Political Science Review* 95(1): 33-48.

Hegre, Havard and Sambanis, Nicholas. 2006. 'Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(4): 508-535.

Higley, John and Burton, Michael G. 2006. *Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy.* Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Hinfelaar, Marja. 2008. 'Legitimizing Powers: The Political Role of the Roman Catholic Church, 1972-1991', in Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar and Giacomo

Macola (eds), *One Zambia, Many Histories. Towards a History of Post-Colonial Zambia*. Leiden: Brill, 129-143.

Hoddie, Matthew and Hartzell, Caroline. 2005. 'Power Sharing in Peace Settlements: Initiating the Transition from Civil War', in Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild (eds), *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars*. Ithaka, NY: Cornell University Press, 83-106.

Homer-Dixon, Thomas. 1994. 'Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from the Cases', *International Security* 19(1): 5–40.

Homer-Dixon, Thomas. 1999. *Environment, Scarcity and Violence*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hovil, Lucy and Werker, Eric. 2004. 'Portrait of a Failed Rebellion: An Account of Rational, Sub-Optimal Violence in Uganda', *Rationality and Society* 17(1): 5-34.

Hulterstrom, Karolina. 2004. *In Pursuit Of Ethnic Politics: Voters, Parties and Policies in Kenya and Zambia*. Uppsala: Uppsala University.

Humphreys, Macartan. 2005. 'Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 508-537.

Humphreys, Macartan and Mohamed, Habaye ag. 2005. 'Senegal and Mali', in Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (eds), *Understanding Civil War. Volume 1: Africa*. Washington DC: The World Bank, 247-302.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Orde*r. New York: Simon and Shuster.

ICG – International Crisis Group. 2004. 'Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict', *ICG Africa Report* 77, Nairobi/Brussels: ICG.

ICG – International Crisis Group. 2007. 'Northern Uganda: Seizing the Opportunity for Peace', *ICG Africa Report* 124, Kampala/Nairobi/Brussels: ICG.

ICG – International Crisis Group. 2008. 'Northern Uganda: The Road to Peace, With or Without Kony', *ICG Africa Report* 148, Nairobi/Kampala/Juba/Brussels: ICG.

Ihonvbere, Julius O. 1995. 'From Movement to Government: The Movement for Multi-Party Democracy and the Crisis of Democratic Consolidation in Zambia', *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 29(1): 1-25.

IISS – International Institute for Strategic Studies. Various Years. *The Military Balance.* London: Routledge.

IMF – International Monetary Fund. 2009. Government Finance Statistics. Manchester: ESDS International, University of Manchester.

INDECO – Industrial Development Corporation. Various Years. 'Annual Report', Lusaka: INDECO.

Jackson, Robert H. and Rosberg, Carl G. 1982. *Personal Rule in Black Africa.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Jarstad, Anna K. and Nilsson, Desirée. 2008. 'From Words to Deeds: The Implementation of Power-Sharing Pacts in Peace Accords', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25(3): 206-223.

Johns, Sheridan. 1980. 'The Parastatal Sector', in William Tordoff (ed), *Administration in Zambia.* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 104-129.

Jorgensen, Jan J. 1981. *Uganda: A Modern History.* London: Croom Helm.

Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2007. 'Civil Wars', in Charles Boix and Susan C. Stokes (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 416-434.

Kaplan, Robert D. 1994. 'The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism, and Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet', *The Atlantic Monthly* 73(2): 44-76.

Karl, Terry L. 1997. *The Paradox of the Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro States.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kasfir, Nelson. 1976. *The Shrinking Political Arena: Participation and Ethnicity in African Politics, with a Case Study of Uganda.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kasfir, Nelson. 1998. 'No Party Democracy in Uganda', *Journal of Democracy* 9(2): 49-63.

Kasfir, Nelson. 2000. 'Movement Democracy, Legitimacy and Power in Uganda', in Justus Mugaja and Joe Oloka-Onyango (eds), *No-Party Democracy in Uganda: Myths and Realities.* Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 60-78.

Kasfir, Nelson. 2005. 'Guerrillas and Civilian Participation: The National Resistance Army in Uganda, 1981-86', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 43(2): 271-296.

Kasozi, Abdu B. 1994. *The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, 1964-1985.* Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Kayunga, Sallie S. 2000. 'The Impact of Armed Opposition on the Movement System in Uganda', in Justus Mugaja and Joe Oloka-Onyango (eds), *No-Party Democracy in Uganda: Myths and Realities*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 109-126.

Kelsall, Tim. 2002. 'Shop Windows and Smoke-Filled Rooms: Governance and the Re-politicisation of Tanzania', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 40(4): 597-619.

Khan, Mushtaq H. 2000a. 'Rents, Efficiency and Growth', in Mushtaq H. Khan and Jomo Kwame Sundaram (eds), *Rents, Rent-seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 21-69.

Khan, Mushtaq H. 2000b. 'Rent-Seeking as Process', in Mushtaq H. Khan and Jomo Kwame Sundaram (eds), *Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 70-144.

Khan, Mushtaq and Gray, Hazel. 2006. 'State Weakness in Developing Countries and Strategies of Institutional Reform – Operational Implications for Anti-Corruption Policy and a Case Study of Tanzania', London: DFID.

King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O. and Verba, Sidney. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kirunda-Kivejinja, A. M. 1995. *Uganda: The Crisis of Confidence*. Kampala: Progressive Publishing House.

Kiiza, Julius, Makara, Sabiti and Rakner, Lise (eds). 2008. *Electoral Democracy in Uganda. Understanding the Institutional Processes and Outcomes of the 2006 Multiparty Elections*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

Klugman, Jeni, Neyapti, Bilin, and Stewart, Frances. 1999. *Conflict and Growth in Africa, Vol. 2: Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda*. Paris: OECD.

Kohli, Athul. 2004. *State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kyemba, Henry. 1997. *A State of Blood: The Inside Story of Idi Amin*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

Lamb, David. 1982. *The Africans*. New York: Random House.

Lamwaka, Caroline C. 1998. 'Civil War and the Peace Process in Uganda, 1986-1997', *East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights* 4(2):139-169.

Langer, Arnim. 2005. 'Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Group Mobilization in Côte d'Ivoire', *Oxford Development Studies* 33(1): 25-45.

Langer, Arnim. 2009. 'Living with Diversity: The Peaceful Management of Horizontal Inequalities in Ghana', *Journal of International Development* 21(4): 534–546.

Langer, Arnim, Mustapha, Abdul M. and Stewart, Frances. 2007. 'Horizontal Inequalities in Nigeria, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire: Issues and Policies', *CRISE Working Paper* 45, Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford.

Larmer, Miles. 2005. 'Reaction & Resistance to Neo-Liberalism in Zambia', *Review of African Political Economy* 32(103): 29-45.

Larmer, Miles. 2006a. 'Zambia's Mineworkers and the Labour Movement's Resistance to the One-Party State, 1973-1981', *South African Historical Journal* 56(1): 154-176.

Larmer, Miles. 2006b. 'The Hour Has Come at the Pit: The Mineworkers' Union of Zambia and the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy, 1982-1991', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 32(2): 293-312.

Larmer, Miles. 2008. 'Enemies Within? Opposition to the Zambian One-Party State, 1972-1980', in Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar and Giacomo Macola (eds), *One Zambia, Many Histories. Towards a History of Post-Colonial Zambia.* Leiden: Brill, 98-128.

Larmer, Miles and Fraser, Alastair. 2007. 'Of Cabbages and King Cobra: Populist Politics and Zambia's 2006 Election', *African Affairs* 106(425): 611-637.

Larmer, Miles and Macola, Giacomo. 2007. 'The Origins, Context and Political Significance of the Mushala Rebellion against the Zambian One-Party State', *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 40(3): 471-496.

Lehmbruch, Gerhard. 1967. *Proporzdemokratie: Politisches System und politische Kultur in der Schweiz und in Österreich.* Tübingen: Mohr.

Lemarchand, René. 1986. 'Chad: The Misadventures of the North-South Dialectic', *African Studies Review* 29(3): 27-41.

Lemarchand, René. 1994. *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lemarchand, René. 2005. 'Où va le Tchad?', *Afrique contemporaine* 215(3): 117-128.

Lemarchand, René. 2007. 'Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo', *African Affairs* 106(422): 1-20.

Lewis, Arthur W. 1965. *Politics in West Africa.* London: Allen & Unwin.

Lijphart, Arendt. 1977. *Democracy in Plural Societies.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Lijphart, Arendt. 2008. *Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice.* London: Routledge.

Lindemann, Stefan. 2010. 'Inclusive Elite Bargains and the Dilemma of Unproductive Peace: Evidence from Zambia', Paper Presented at the 60th Political Studies Association Annual Conference 'Sixty Years of Political Studies: Achievements and Futures', 29 March – 1 April 2010, Edinburgh.

Lindemann, Stefan and Putzel, James. 2010. 'Understanding Peace and Stability in Tanzania: An Analytical Narrative in State-Making', *Crisis States Working Papers Series 2* (forthcoming), London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics.

Lipset, Seymour M. and Rokkan, Stein. 1967. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives.* New York: The Free Press.

Lomo, Zachary and Hovil, Lucy. 2004a. 'Negotiating Peace: Resolution of Conflicts in Uganda's West Nile Region', *Refugee Law Project Working Paper* 12, Kampala: Refugee Law Project.

Lomo, Zachary and Hovil, Lucy. 2004b. 'Behind the Violence. Causes, Consequences and the Search for Solutions to the War in Northern Uganda', *Refugee Law Project Working Paper* 11, Kampala: Refugee Law Project.

Lonsdale, John. 1981. 'States and Social Processes in Africa: A Historiographical Survey', *African Studies Review* 24(2-3): 139-225.

Lujala, Paivi, Gleditsch, Nils Petter and Gilmore, Elisabeth. 2005. 'A Diamond Curse? Civil War and a Lootable Resource', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 538-562.

Macola, Giacomo. 2008. 'Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, UNIP and the Roots of Authoritarianism in Nationalist Zambia', in Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar and Giacomo Macola (eds), *One Zambia, Many Histories. Towards a History of Post-Colonial Zambia.* Leiden: Brill, 17-44.

Malthus, Thomas R. 1803/ 1992. *An Essay on the Principle of Population.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mamdani, Mahmood. 1976. *Politics and Class Formation in Uganda.* London: Heinemann.

Mamdani, Mahmood. 1983. *Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda.* Nairobi: Heinemann.

Mamdani, Mahmood. 1996. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. London: James Currey.

Mamdani, Mahmood. 2001. *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda.* Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press.

Marchal, Ronald. 2002. 'Liberia, Sierra Leone et Guinée: Une Guerre Sans Frontières?', *Politique Africaine* 88: 5-13.

Marnham, Patrick. 1979. *Fantastic Invasion: Dispatches from Africa.* New York: Penguin.

Marshall, Monty G. and Jaggers, Keith. 2005. *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2004. Dataset Users' Manual.* Arlington, VA: George Mason University.

Matovu, John M. and Stewart, Frances. 2001. 'Uganda: The Social and Economic Costs of Conflict', in Frances Stewart and Valpy Fitzgerald (eds), *The Economic and Social Consequences of Conflict.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 240-288.

McAdam, Doug, Tarrow, Sidney and Tilly, Charles. 2001. *Dynamics of Contention.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

McGarry, John and O'Leary, Brendan. 2004. *The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational Engagements*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Médard, Jean-François. 1982. 'The Underdeveloped State in Tropical Africa: Political Clientelism or Neo-Patrimonialism', in Christopher Clapham (ed.), *Private Patronage and Public Power: Political Clientelism in the Modern State.* London: Frances Pinter, 162-192.

Mehler, Andreas. 2009. 'Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A not so Obvious Relationship', *African Affairs* 108(432): 453-473.

Migdal, Joel. 1988. *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Milanovic, Branko. 2005. *Worlds Apart: Measuring International and Global Inequality*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

MINDECO – Mining Development Corporation. Various Years. 'MINDECO Mining Yearbook', Lusaka: MINDECO.

Mirzeler, Mustafa and Young, Crawford. 2000. 'Pastoral Politics in the Northeast Periphery in Uganda: AK-47 as Change Agent', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 38(3): 407-429.

Mkandawire, Thandika. 2001. 'Thinking About Development States in Africa', *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 25(3): 289-313.

MMD – Movement for Multiparty Democracy. 2008. 'National Executive Committee Members', Lusaka: MMD Secretariat, unpublished.

Molteno, Robert. 1974. 'Cleavage and Conflict in Zambian Politics: A Study in Sectionalism', in William Tordoff (ed), *Politics in Zambia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 62-106.

Momba, Jotham C. 1989. 'The State, Rural Class Formation and Peasant Political Participation in Zambia: The Case of Southern Province', *African Affairs* 88(352): 331-357.

Montalvo, José G. and Reynal-Querol, Marta. 2005. 'Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars', *The American Economic Review* 95(3): 796-816.

Moore, Mick. 2004. 'Revenues, State Formation, and the Quality of Governance in Developing Countries', *International Political Science Review* 25(3): 297-319.

Morris, Nsamba A. 2009. 'Breeding Fragmentation? Issues in the Policy and Practise of Decentralisation in Uganda', *Issue Paper* 1, Kampala: Beyond Juba Project.

Mphaisha, Chisepo. 1996. 'Retreat From Democracy in Post One-Party State Zambia', *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 34*(2): 65-84.

Mudoola, Dan M. 1991. 'Institution-Building: The Case of the NRM and the Military, 1986-1989', in Holger B. Hansen and Michael Twaddle (eds), *Changing Uganda: The Dilemmas of Structural Adjustment & Revolutionary Change*. London: James Currey, 230-246.

Mudoola, Dan M. 1993. *Religion, Ethnicity, and Politics in Uganda*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

Muhereza, Frank E. and Omurangi Otim, Peter. 1998. 'Neutralizing Ethnicity in Uganda', in Mohamed M. Salih and John Markakis (eds), *Ethnicity and the State in Eastern Africa*. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 190-203.

Muhumuza, William. 2008. 'Pitfalls of Decentralisation Reforms in Transitional Societies: The Case of Uganda', *Africa Development* 33(4): 59-81.

Mukwena, Royson M. 2001. 'Situating Decentralization in Zambia in a Political Context', Tangier: African Training and Research Center in Administration for Development.

Murshed, Mansoob S. and Gates, Scott. 2005. 'Spatial–Horizontal Inequality and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal', *Review of Development Economics* 9(1): 121-134.

Museveni, Yoweri K. 1997. *Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Uganda*. Oxford: Macmillan.

Museveni, Yoweri K. 2000. *What is Africa's Problem?* Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota University Press.

Mutesa, Edward. 1967. *The Desecration of My Kingdom.* London: Constable.

Mutibwa, Phares. 1992. *Uganda since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes.* London: Hurst & Company.

Mutibwa, Phares. 2008. *The Buganda Factor in Uganda Politics.* Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

Mwenda, Andrew. 2007. 'Personalising Power in Uganda', *Journal of Democracy* 18(3): 23-37.

Mwenda, Andrew and Tangri, Roger. 2005. 'Patronage Politics, Donor Reform and Regime Consolidation in Uganda', *African Affairs* 104(416): 449-467.

Nabudere, Dan. 2003. 'The Hidden War, The Forgotten People: War in Acholiland and its Ramifications for Peace and Security in Uganda', Kampala/ Vancouver: Human Rights & Peace Centre, Faculty of Law, Makerere University/ Liu Institute for Global Issues.

Nafziger, Wayne and Auvinen, Juha. 2002. 'Economic Development, Inequality, War, and State Violence', *World Development* 30(2): 153-163.

Nathan, Laurie. 2003. 'The Frightful Inadequacy of Most of the Statistics: A Critique of Collier and Hoeffler on Causes of Civil War', *Crisis States Working Papers Series 1* 11, London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics.

Ngaruko, Floribert and Nkurunziza, Janvier D. 2005. 'Civil War and Its Duration in Burundi', in Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (eds), *Understanding Civil War. Volume 1: Africa.* Washington DC: The World Bank, 35-62.

Ngoga, Pascal. 1998. 'Uganda: The National Resistance Army', in Christopher Clapham (ed), *African Guerrillas.* Oxford: James Curry, 91-106.

Nordlinger, Eric A. 1972. 'Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies', *Occasional Papers in International Affairs* 29, Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.

North, Douglas C., Wallis, John J. and Weingast, Barry R. 2009. *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Norris, Pippa. 2008. *Driving Democracy. Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work?* Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.

NRM – National Resistance Movement. 2008. 'Members of the NRM Central Executive Committee, 2008', Kampala: NRM Secretariat, unpublished.

Nyamnjoh, Francis B. 1999. 'Cameroon: A Country United by Ethnic Ambition and Difference', *African Affairs* 98(390): 101-118.

Obote, Milton A. 1962. 'A Plan for Nationhood'. *Transition* 6/7: 15-18.

Okuku, James. 2002. 'Ethnicity, State Power and the Democratisation Process in Uganda', *Discussion Paper* 17, Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.

Oloka-Onyango, Joe. 2000. 'New Wine Or New Bottles? Movement Politics and One-Partyism in Uganda', in Justus Mugaja and Joe Oloka-Onyango (eds), *No-Party Democracy in Uganda: Myths and Realities*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 40-59.

O'Leary, Brendan. 2005. 'Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments', in Sid Noel (ed), *From Power-Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 3-43.

Olson, Mancur. 1993. 'Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development', *American Political Science Review* 87(3): 567-576.

Olzak, Susan. 2006. *The Global Dynamics of Racial and Ethnic Mobilization*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Omara-Otunnu, Amii. 1987. *Politics and the Military in Uganda, 1890-1985*. London: Macmillan Press.

Omara-Otunnu, Amii. 1992. 'The Struggle for Democracy in Uganda', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 30(3): 443-463.

Osei-Hwedie, Bertha. 1998. 'The Role of Ethnicity in Multi-Party Politics in Malawi and Zambia', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 16(2): 227-247.

Østby, Gudrun. 2008a. 'Inequalities, the Political Environment and Civil Conflict: Evidence from 55 Developing Countries', in Frances Stewart (ed), *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 136-159.

Østby, Gudrun. 2008b. 'Polarization, Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Civil Conflict', *Journal of Peace Research* 45(2): 143-162.

Østby, Gudrun, Nordas, Ragnhild and Rød, Jan K. 2009. 'Regional Inequalities and Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa', *International Studies Quarterly* 53(2): 301-324.

Parker, Richard B. 1993. *The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East*. Bloomfield, IN: Indiana University Press.

Pettman, Jan. 1974. 'Zambia's Second Republic – The Establishment of a One-Party State', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 12(2): 231-244.

Phillips, Anne. 1989. *The Enigma of Colonialism: British Policy in West Africa.* London: James Currey.

Phiri, Bizeck J. 2002. 'Civil Control of the Zambian Military since Independence and its Implication for Democracy', in Rocky Williams, Gavin Cawthra and Diane Abrahams (eds), *Ourselves to Know: Civil-Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa.* Pretoria: Institute for Strategic Studies, 3-16.

Phiri, Bizeck J. 2006. *A Political History of Zambia: From the Colonial Period to the 3rd Republic.* Trenton, NJ: Africa Research & Publications.

Posner, Daniel N. 2005. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Project Ploughshares. 2009. 'Armed Conflicts Report 2009', Waterloo: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Conrad Grebel College.

Prunier, Gérard. 2004. 'Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare: Uganda, Sudan and the Congo', *African Affairs* 103(412): 359-383.

Prunier, Gérard. 2009. *Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Raftopoulos, Brian and Alexander, Karin (eds). 2006. *Peace in the Balance: The Crisis in Sudan.* Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation.

Ragin, Charles C. 1987. *The Comparative Method.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Ragin, Charles C. 2004. 'Turning the Tables: How Case-Oriented Research Challenges Variable-Oriented Research', in Henry E. Brady and David Collier (eds), *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards.* Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 123-138.

Rakner, Lise. 2003. *Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia, 1991-2001.* Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.

Randall, Vicky. 2001. 'Party Systems and Voter Alignments in the New Democracies of the Third World', in Lauri Karvonen (ed), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments Revisited.* London: Routledge, 238-260.

Ranger, Terence. 1983. 'The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa', in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), *The Invention of Tradition.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 211-262.

Rasmussen, Thomas. 1969. 'Political Competition and One-Party Dominance in Zambia', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 7(3): 407-424.

Ravenhill, F. J. 1974. 'Military Rule in Uganda: The Politics of Survival', *African Studies* Review 17(1): 229-260.

Regan, Patrick and Norton, Daniel. 2005. 'Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(3): 319-36.

Reinikka, Ritva and Collier, Paul (eds). 2001. *Uganda's Recovery: The Role of Farms, Firms, and Government.* Washington DC: The World Bank.

Reno, William. 1998. *Warlord Politics and African States.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Richards, Paul. 1996. *Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth, & Resources in Sierra Leone.* Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Riker, William H. 1964. *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance.* Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Company.

Roberts, Andrew D. 1976. *A History of Zambia.* London: Heinemann.

Ron, James. 2005. 'Paradigm in Distress? Primary Commodities and Civil War', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 443-450.

Ross, Michael L. 2004a. 'What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?', *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 337-356.

Ross, Michael L. 2004b. 'How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases', *International Organisation* 58(1): 35-67.

Ross, Michael L. 2006. 'A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War', *Annual Review of Political Science* 9(1): 265-300.

Rotberg, Robert L. 1967. 'Tribalism and Politics in Zambia', *Africa Report* 12(9): 29-35.

Rothchild, Donald. 1997. *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation.* Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Rothchild, Donald. 2005. 'Reassuring Weaker Parties after Civil Wars: The Benefits and Costs of Executive Power-Sharing Systems in Africa', *Ethnopolitics* 4(3): 247-267.

Rothchild, Donald and Foley, Michael W. 1988. 'African States and the Politics of Inclusive Coalitions', in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (eds), *The Precarious Balance: State & Society in Africa. Boulder*, CO: Westview Press, 233-264.

Rubogoya, Joshua B. 2007. *Regime Hegemony in Museveni's Uganda: Pax Musevenica.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Saasa, Oliver S. 2002. *Aid and Poverty Reduction in Zambia: Mission Unaccomplished.* Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.

Saasa, Oliver S., Steffensen, Jesper, Trollegaard, Svend, Mwanawina, Inyambo and Likulunga, Mwikisa. 1999. 'Fiscal Decentralization and Sub-National Government Finances in Relation to Infrastructure and Service Provision in Zambia', Washington DC: The World Bank.

Saito, Fumihiko. 2003. *Decentralization and Development Partnership: Lessons from Uganda.* Tokyo: Springer.

Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004a. 'What Is Civil War?: Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(6): 814-858.

Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004b. 'Poverty and the Organization of Political Violence: A Review and Some Conjectures', in Susan M. Collins and Carol Graham (eds), *Brookings Trade Forum 2004.* Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 165-211.

Sambanis, Nicholas. 2005. 'Conclusion: Using Case Studies to Refine and Expand the Theory of Civil War', in Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (eds), *Understanding Civil War. Volume 1: Africa*, Washington DC: The World Bank, 303-334.

Sandbrook, Richard. 1985. *The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sathyamurthy, Tennalur V. 1982. 'Central-Local Relations: The Case of Uganda', *Manchester Papers on Development* 5, Manchester: Department of Administrative Studies, University of Manchester.

Scarritt, James R. and Mozaffar, Shaheen. 1999. 'The Specification of Ethnic Cleavages and Ethnopolitical Groups for the Analysis of Democratic Competition in Contemporary Africa', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 5(1): 82-117.

Schneider, Gerald and Wiesehomeier, Nina. 2006. 'Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars: Comment', unpublished manuscript.

Scott, Ian. 1978. 'Middle Class Politics in Zambia', *African Affairs* 77(308): 321-334.

Scott, Ian. 1980. 'Party and Administration under the One-Party State', in William Tordoff (ed), *Administration in Zambia.* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 139-161.

Sichone, Owen and Simutanyi, Neo. 1996. 'The Ethnic and Regional Questions, Ethnic Nationalism and the State in Zambia: The Case of Barotseland, 1964-1994', in Owen Sichone and Bornwell C. Chikulo (eds), *Democracy in Zambia: Challenges for the Third Republic*. Harare: Sapes Books, 173-196.

Simutanyi, Neo. 1996. 'The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Zambia', *Third World Quarterly* 17(4): 825-839.

Sithole, Masipula. 1994. 'Is Multi-Party Democracy Possible in Multi-Ethnic African States?: The Case of Zimbabwe', in Ulf Himmelstrand, Kabiru Kinyanjui, and Edward Mburugu (eds), *African Perspectives on Development: Controversies, Dilemmas and Openings*. London: James Curry, 152-165.

Skocpol, Theda. 1979. *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Small, Melvin and Singer, David J. 1982. *Resort to Arms: International and Civil War, 1816-1980*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Smith, Anthony D. 1986. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Smith, Benjamin. 2004. 'Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960-1999', *American Journal of Political Science* 48(2): 232-246.

Snyder, Richard. 2006. 'Does Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder?: A Political Economy of Extraction Framework', *Comparative Political Studies* 39(8): 943-968.

Snyder, Richard and Bhavnani, Ravi. 2005. 'Diamonds, Blood, and Taxes: A Revenue-Centred Framework for Explaining Political Order', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 563-597.

Southall, Aiden W. 1970. 'The Illusion of Tribe', *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 5(1-2): 28-50.

Spears, Ian S. 2002. 'Africa: The Limits of Power-Sharing', *Journal of Democracy* 13(3): 123-136.

Sriram, Chandra L. 2008. *Peace as Governance: Power-sharing, Armed Groups and Contemporary Peace Negotiations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ssewankambo, Emmanuel, Steffensen, Jesper and Tidemand, Per. 2008. 'Local Level Service Delivery, Decentralisation and Governance: Uganda Case Report', Tokyo: Institute for International Cooperation/ Japan International Cooperation Agency.

Steffensen, Jesper, Tidemand, Per, and Ssewankambo, Emmanuel. 2004. 'A Comparative Analysis of Decentralisation in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda: Country Report Uganda', Washington DC: The World Bank.

Steiner, Susan. 2007. 'Decentralisation and Poverty: Conceptual Framework and Application to Uganda', *Public Administration and Development* 27(2): 175-185.

Stewart, Frances. 2000. 'Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities', *Oxford Development Studies* 28(3): 245-262.

Stewart, Frances. 2002. 'Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development', *CRISE Working Paper* 1, Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford.

Stewart, Frances (ed). 2008. *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Stewart, Frances. 2010. 'Horizontal Inequalities in Kenya and the Political Disturbances of 2008: Some Implications for Aid Policy', *Conflict, Security & Development* 10(1): 133-159.

Stewart, Frances and Fitzgerald, Valpy (eds). 2001. *The Economic and Social Consequences of Conflict*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Szeftel, Morris. 1982. 'Political Graft and the Spoils System in Zambia – the State as a Resource in Itself', *Review of African Political Economy* 9(24): 4-21.

Szeftel, Morris. 2000. 'Eat With Us: Managing Corruption and Patronage under Zambia's Three Republics, 1964-99', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 18(2): 207-224.

Tangri, Roger. 1999. *The Politics of Patronage in Africa: Parastatals, Privatization and Private Enterprise*. Oxford: James Currey.

Tangri, Roger and Mwenda, Andrew. 2001. 'Corruption and Cronyism in Uganda's Privatisation in the 1990s', *African Affairs* 100(398): 117-133.

Taylor, Charles L. and Hudson, Michael C. 1972. *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Therkildsen, Ole and Tidemand, Per. 2007. 'Staff Management and Organisational Performance in Tanzania and Uganda: Public Servants Perspectives', Copenhagen: Danish Institute For International Studies.

Tilly, Charles. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution.* Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Tilly, Charles. 1990. *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Tilly, Charles. 2003. *The Politics of Collective Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tilly, Charles and Tarrow, Sidney. 2007. *Contentious Politics*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.

Tindigarukayo, Jimmy K. 1988. 'Uganda, 1979-85: Leadership in Transition', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 26(4): 607-622.

Tordoff, William. 1980a. 'Introduction', in William Tordoff (ed), *Administration in Zambia.* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1-42.

Tordoff, William. 1980b. 'Rural Administration', in William Tordoff (ed), *Administration in Zambia.* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 185-214.

Tordoff, William and Molteno, Robert. 1974a. 'Introduction', in William Tordoff (ed), *Politics in Zambia.* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1-39.

Tordoff, William and Molteno, Robert. 1974b. 'Government and Administration', in William Tordoff (ed), *Politics in Zambia.* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 242-287.

Tordoff, William and Scott, Ian. 1974. 'Political Parties: Structures and Policies', in William Tordoff (ed), *Politics in Zambia.* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 107-154.

Tosh, John. 1978. *Clan Leaders and Colonial Chiefs in Lango: The Political History of an East African Stateless Society, c.1800-1939.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Treisman, Daniel. 2007. *The Architecture of Government.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tuchman, Barbara W. 1984. *The March of Folly.* New York: Knopf

Tull, Denis and Mehler, Andreas. 2005. 'The hidden costs of power-sharing: Reproducing insurgent violence in Africa', *African Affairs* 104 (416): 375-398.

UBOS – Uganda Bureau of Statistics. 2006a. 'Uganda National Household Survey 2005/2006', Kampala: UBOS.

UBOS – Uganda Bureau of Statistics. 2006b. '2002 Uganda Population and Housing Census: Analytical Report Population Composition', Kampala: UBOS.

UCDA – Uganda Coffee Development Authority. Various Years. 'Annual Report', Kampala: UCDA.

UCDP – Uppsala Conflict Data Program. 2009. Uppsala: Uppsala University, available at: http://www.ucdp.uu.se.

Uganda Districts Information Handbook. 2007. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme. 2007. 'Uganda Human Development Report 2007. Rediscovering Agriculture for Human Development', Kampala: UNDP.

UNIP – United National Independence Party. Various Years. 'Annual Report', Lusaka: UNIP.

UNU-WIDER – World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University. 2008. World Income Inequality Database, Version 2.0c. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER, available at http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en GB/database/.

UPC – Uganda People's Congress. 2008. 'List of UPC Party Cabinet, 1964-1971 & 1980-1985', Kampala: UPC Party Secretariat, unpublished.

Urdal, Henrik. 2005. 'People vs. Malthus: Population Pressure, Environmental Degradation, and Armed Conflict Revisited', *Journal of Peace Research* 42(4): 417-434.

USAID – United States Agency for International Development. 2005. 'Conflict Baseline Study Report Conducted in the Karamajong Cluster of Kenya and Uganda', Washington DC: USAID.

Van Acker, Frank. 2004. 'Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army: The New Order No One Ordered', *African Affairs* 103(412): 335-357.

Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2001. *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Vandeginste, Stef. 2006. 'Théorie Consociative et Partage du Pouvoir au Burundi', *Cahier (Anvers)* 4, Anvers: Institut de Politique et de Gestion du Développement, Université d'Anvers.

Van Donge, Jan K. 1995. 'Zambia: Kaunda and Chiluba. Enduring patterns of Political Culture', in John A. Wiseman (ed), *Democracy and Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa.* London: Routledge, 193-219.

Van Donge, Jan K. 2009. 'The Plundering of Zambian Resources by Frederick Chiluba and his Friends: A Case Study of the Interaction between National Politics and the International Drive towards Good Governance', *African Affairs* 108(430): 69-90.

Von Soest, Christian. 2007. 'How Does Neopatrimonialism Affect the African State? The Case of Tax Collection in Zambia', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 45(4): 621-645.

Vreeland, James R. 2008. 'The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War: Unpacking Anocracy', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(3): 401-435.

Wallensteen, Peter and Margareta Sollenberg. 1998. 'Armed Conflict and Regional Conflict Complexes, 1989-97', *Journal of Peace Research* 35(5): 621-634.

Walter, Barbara F. 2002. *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Weber, Max. 1978. *Economy and Society: An outline in Interpretive Sociology.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Wele, Patrick. 1987. *Kaunda and the Mushala Rebellion: The Untold Story.* Lusaka: Multimedia Publications.

Wele, Patrick. 1995. *Zambia's Most Famous Dissidents: From Mushala to Luchembe.* Solwezi: PMW.

Weinstein, Jeremy M. *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Willets, Peter. 1975. 'The Politics of Uganda as a One-Party State', *African Affairs* 74(296): 278-299.

Wimmer, Andreas, Cederman, Lars-Erik and Min, Brian. 2009. 'Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set', *American Sociological Review* 74(2): 316-337.

Wood, Elisabeth J. 2003. *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

World Bank. 2003. 'Zambia Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review', *Report* 26162-ZA, Washington DC: The World Bank.

World Bank. 2009. World Development Indicators. Manchester: ESDS International, University of Manchester.

Zartman, William I. 2005a. 'Comparative Case Studies', *International Negotiation* 10(1): 3-15.

Zartman, William I. 2005b. *Cowardly Lions: Missed Opportunities to Prevent Deadly Conflict and State Collapse.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

ZCCM – Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines. Various Years. 'Annual Report', Lusaka: ZCCM.

ZIMCO – Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation. Various Years. 'Annual Report', Lusaka: ZIMCO.

ZPA – Zambia Privatisation Agency. 2006a. 'Zambia Privatisation Agency Status Report as at 30th November, 2006', Lusaka: ZPA.

ZPA – Zambia Privatisation Agency. 2006b. 'Privatisation Transaction Summary Sheets, 1992-2005', Lusaka: ZPA.

10 List of Interview Partners

10.1 Uganda

Name & Function of interviewee	Location & date of interview
(1) Hussein Kyanjo ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), Justice Forum (JEEMA)	Kampala, 25 November 2008
(2) John Baptist Kawanga ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), Democratic Party (DP)	Kampala, 26 November 2008
(3) Prof. Tarsis Kabwegyere ▪ NRM Minister of Relief and Disaster Preparedness ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), National Resistance Movement (NRM) ▪ Former NRM Minister at the Prime Minister's Office ▪ Former NRM Minister of Local Government ▪ Former UNLF Minister of Land & Natural Resources (under Lule, Binaisa & the Military Commission)	Kampala, 27 November 2008
(4) Jaberi Bidandi Ssali ▪ President, People's Progressive Party (PPP) ▪ Former NRM Minister of Local Government	Kampala, 28 November 2008
(5) Kintu Musoke ▪ Senior Presidential Advisor/Presidential Affairs ▪ Former NRM Prime Minister ▪ Former NRM Minister of Presidential Affairs ▪ Former NRM Minister of Information & Broadcasting ▪ Former UNLF Minister of Transport (under the Military Commission)	Kampala, 2 December 2008
(6) Mwambutsya Ndebesa ▪ University Lecturer, Department of History, Makerere University	Kampala, 2 December 2008
(7) Paul Ssemogerere ▪ Former President, Democratic Party (DP) ▪ Former NRM Second Deputy Prime Minister ▪ Former NRM Minister of Foreign Affairs & Regional Cooperation ▪ Former NRM Minister of Internal Affairs ▪ Former UNLF Minister of Labour (under Binaisa)	Kampala, 3 December 2008
(8) Dr. Sallie Simba Kayunga ▪ University Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Makerere University	Kampala, 3 December 2008
(9) Imam Idi Kasozi ▪ Chairperson, Uganda Muslim Youth Assembly	Kampala, 4 December 2008
(10) Jimmy Akena ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), Uganda People's Congress (UPC)	Kampala, 5 December 2008
(11) Maj. Gen. Mugisha Muntu ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) ▪ Former commander of the National Resistance Army (NRA)/	Kampala, 9 December 2008

Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF)	
(12) Betty Ocan ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	Kampala, 9 December 2008
(13) Sam Njuba ▪ Deputy President, Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) ▪ Former NRM Deputy Minister of Justice ▪ Former NRM Minister of Constitutional Affairs ▪ Former NRM Deputy Minister in the President's Office	Kampala, 10 December 2008
(14) David Mafabi ▪ Secretary to President Museveni in charge of Political Affairs	Kampala, 12 December 2008
(15) Livingstone Sewanyana ▪ Director, Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI)	Kampala, 15 December 2008
(16) Brian Kalenge ▪ Executive Director, Law and Human Rights Foundation (LHRF)	Kampala, 15 December 2008
(17) Ben Wacha ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), Independent	Kampala, 17 December 2008
(18) Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda ▪ Ugandan Permanent Representative at the United Nations ▪ Member, NRM Central Executive Committee (CEC), Chairperson, NRM Electoral Commission ▪ Former NRM Minister of Internal Affairs ▪ Former NRM Minister of Water, Lands, and the Environment ▪ Former NRM Minister in charge of the Presidency ▪ Former NRM Minister of Information ▪ Former NRM Minister of Transport & Communications ▪ Former NRM Minister of Health	Kampala, 17 December 2008
(19) Cecilia Ogwal ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), Independent	Kampala, 18 December 2008
(20) Peter Walubiri ▪ Secretary General, Uganda People's Congress (UPC)	Kampala, 18 December 2008
(21) Kasirye Mayanja ▪ Secretary for Districts & Constituency Affairs, Uganda People's Congress (UPC)	Kampala, 19 December 2008
(22) Prof. Joe Oloka Onyango ▪ Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Makerere University ▪ Director, Makerere University Human Rights and Peace Centre (HURIPEC)	Kampala, 12 January 2009
(23) Omar Kalinge Nnyago ▪ Secretary for Information, Justice Forum (JEEMA) Dr. Frank Nabwiso (FDC) ▪ Secretary General, Inter Party Cooperation (IPC) ▪ Former Member of Parliament (MP), Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	Kampala, 13 January 2009
(24) Sallamu Musamba ▪ Deputy President, Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) ▪ Former Member of Parliament (MP), Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	Kampala, 14 January 2009

(25) Jim Muhwezi ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), National Resistance Movement (NRM) ▪ Member, NRM Central Executive Committee (CEC), Chairperson, NRM Veterans' League ▪ Former NRM Minister of Health ▪ Former NRM Deputy Minister of Education & Sports	Kampala, 15 January 2009
(26) Dr. Fredrick Golooba-Mutebi ▪ Researcher, Makerere Institute of Social Research (MISR), Makerere University	Kampala, 15 January 2009
(27) James Atoh ▪ Executive Director, Human Rights Focus	Gulu, 17 January 2009
(28) Kitara McMot ▪ LC-V Vice-Chairman, Gulu District	Gulu, 17 January 2009
(29) Richard Todwong ▪ Special Presidential Advisor for Northern Uganda	Gulu, 18 January 2009
(30) Santa Oketa ▪ Secretary for Gender, Gulu District	Gulu, 19 January 2009
(31) Martin Ojara ▪ Speaker, Gulu District	Gulu, 19 January 2009
(32) Margaret Odong ▪ Grassroots Women Association for Development	Gulu, 20 January 2009
(33) Michael Lakony ▪ Speaker, Amuru District	Gulu, 20 January 2009
(34) Alex Otim ▪ Secretary for Works & Technical Services, Gulu District	Gulu, 21 January 2009
(35) Fabius Akumu-Alya ▪ Director, Institute of Peace and Strategic Studies, Gulu University	Gulu, 21 January 2009
(36) Michael Otim ▪ Director, Gulu District NGO Forum	Gulu, 21 January 2009
(37) Archbishop John Baptist Odama ▪ Archdiocese of Gulu	Gulu, 22 January 2009
(38) Walter Ochora ▪ Resident District Commissioner, Gulu District	Gulu, 22 January 2009
(39) Norbert Mao ▪ LC-V Chairman, Gulu District ▪ President, Democratic Party (DP) ▪ Former Member of Parliament (MP), Democratic Party (DP)	Gulu, 23 January 2009
(40) Charles Mwanguhya ▪ Political Editor, The Monitor	Kampala, 28 January 2009
(41) Beti Kamya ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) ▪ Leader, Uganda Federal Alliance (UFA)	Kampala, 28 January 2009
(42) David Mpanga ▪ Minister of State for Research, Buganda Kingdom	Kampala, 29 January 2009

(43) Dr. Chris Dolan ▪ Director, Refugee Law Project, Faculty of Law, Makerere University	Kampala, 3 February 2009
(44) John Ken Lukyamuzi ▪ President, Conservative Party (CP)	Kampala, 3 February 2009
(45) Yonasani Kanyomozi ▪ Former UPC Minister of Cooperatives & Marketing (under Obote II) ▪ Former UNLF Minister of Cooperatives & Marketing (under Binaisa)	Kampala, 9 February 2009
(46) Amanya Mushega ▪ Former NRM Minster of Public Service ▪ Former NRM Minister of Education & Sports ▪ Former NRM Minister of Education ▪ Former NRM Minister of Local Government ▪ Former NRM Deputy Minister of Defence ▪ Former Member of Parliament (MP), National Resistance Movement (NRM) ▪ Former Chief Political Commissar, National Resistance Army (NRA)	Kampala, 11 February 2009
(47) Chango Macho ▪ Senior Presidential Advisor ▪ Former NRM Minister for Mineral & Water Development	Kampala, 11 February 2009
(48) Prof. Jean Barya ▪ Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Makerere University	Kampala, 11 February 2009
(49) Rose Othieno ▪ Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE)	Kampala, 12 February 2009

10.2 Zambia

Name & Function of interviewee	**Location & date of interview**
(1) Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika ▪ Former MMD Minister of Science, Technical Education & Vocational Training (under Chiluba) ▪ Former Member, MMD National Executive Committee (NEC) ▪ Founding Member, Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD)	Lusaka, 4 July 2008
(2) Dr. Katele Kalumba ▪ National Secretary, Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) ▪ Member, MMD National Executive Committee (NEC) ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) ▪ Former MMD Minister of Health (under Chiluba) ▪ Former MMD Deputy Minister of Health (under Chiluba)	Lusaka, 10 July 2008
(3) Wilfrid Kupelelwa Mwamba ▪ Governance Advisor, Department for International Development (DFID), British High Commission, Lusaka	Lusaka, 14 July 2008
(4) Guy Scott ▪ Vice-President, Patriotic Front (PF)	Lusaka, 15 July 2008

▪ Former MMD Minister of Agriculture, Food & Fisheries (under Chiluba)	
(5) Mike Mulongoti ▪ MMD Minister of Works & Supply ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) ▪ Former MMD Minister of Information & Broadcasting Services (under Mwanawasa) ▪ Former MMD Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (under Mwanawasa) ▪ Former MMD Deputy Minister of Defence (under Chiluba)	Lusaka, 15 July 2008
(6) Vernon Mwaanga ▪ Former MMD Minister of Information & Broadcasting Services (under Mwanawasa) ▪ Former MMD Minister of Foreign Affairs (under Chiluba) ▪ Former UNIP Minister of Foreign Affairs	Lusaka, 15 July 2008
(7) Prof. Bizeck J. Phiri ▪ Professor of History, Department of History, University of Zambia	Lusaka, 16 July 2008
(8) Dr. Peter Matoka ▪ Senior Lecturer, Department of Sociology, University of Zambia ▪ Former UNIP Minister of Economic & Technical Cooperation ▪ Former UNIP Minister of Development Planning ▪ Former UNIP Minister of Local Government & Housing ▪ Former UNIP Minister of Works ▪ Former UNIP Minister of Health ▪ Former UNIP Minister of Information & Postal Services ▪ Former Member, UNIP Central Committee (CC)	Lusaka, 16 July 2008
(9) Mulima Kufekisa-Akapelwa ▪ Executive Director, Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR)	Lusaka, 16 July 2008
(10) Prof. Jotham C. Momba ▪ Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, University of Zambia	Lusaka, 18 July 2008
(11) Dr. Bright Chungu ▪ Former Advisor to President Kaunda	Lusaka, 18 July 2008
(12) Tienf Kahenya ▪ Secretary General, United Party for National Development (UPND)	Lusaka, 21 July 2008
(13) Dr. Webby S. Kalikiti ▪ Lecturer, Department of History, University of Zambia	Lusaka, 22 July 2008
(14) Lee M. Habasonda ▪ Executive Director, Southern African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD)	Lusaka, 24 July 2008
(15) Mark C. Chona ▪ Former Advisor to President Kaunda	Lusaka, 25 July 2008
(16) Mbambo M. Sianga ▪ Lecturer, Department of Law, University of Zambia ▪ Former UNIP Deputy Minister of General Education, Youth & Sports ▪ Former UNIP Deputy Minister of Development Planning	Lusaka 25 July 2008

▪ Former UNIP Deputy Minister of Higher Education ▪ Former UNIP Deputy Minister of Legal Affairs ▪ Former UNIP Deputy Minister of Tourism ▪ Former Member, UNIP Central Committee (CC)	
(17) Dr. Patrick Manda ▪ Research Officer, House of Chiefs	Lusaka, 29 July 2008
(18) Dr. Mabel Milimo ▪ Gender Advisor, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Lusaka	Lusaka, 29 July 2008
(19) Mbita Chitala ▪ Former MMD Deputy Minister of Finance & National Planning (under Mwanawasa) ▪ Former MMD Deputy Minister of Local Government & Housing (under Mwanawasa) ▪ Former MMD Deputy Minister at the Vice President's Office (under Chiluba) ▪ Former MMD Deputy Minister of Finance (under Chiluba) ▪ Former Member, MMD National Executive Committee (NEC) ▪ Founding Member, Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD)	Lusaka, 29 July 2008
(20) Njekwa Anamela ▪ Vice-President, United National Independence Party (UNIP) ▪ Former UNIP Deputy Minister at the Prime Minister's Office	Lusaka, 30 July 2008
(21) Tentani Mwanza ▪ Former President, National Democratic Party (NDP) ▪ Founding Member, Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD)	Lusaka, 30 July 2008
(22) Grieve Sibale ▪ Former Managing Director, National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBOARD)	Lusaka, 31 July 2008
(23) Dr. Godfrey H. Haantobolo ▪ Deputy Chief Research Officer, National Assembly	Lusaka, 31 July 2008
(24) Reverend Foston Sakala ▪ Reformed Church of Zambia ▪ Former President, Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP)	Lusaka, 1 August 2008
(25) Rueben Lifuka ▪ President, Transparency International Zambia	Lusaka, 1 August 2008
(26) Samuel Mulafulafu ▪ Director, Caritas Zambia, Zambia Episcopal Conference	Lusaka, 2 August 2008
(27) Sakwiba Sikota ▪ President, United Liberal Party (ULP) ▪ Member of Parliament (MP), United Liberal Party (ULP)	Lusaka, 6 August 2008
(28) Hakainde Hichilema ▪ President, United Party for National Development (UPND)	Lusaka, 6 August 2008
(29) Dr. Markus Nuding ▪ Senior Advisor, German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Lusaka	Lusaka, 7 August 2008
(30) Gen. Malimba Masheke ▪ Former UNIP Prime Minister	Lusaka, 7 August 2008

▪ Former UNIP Minister of Defence ▪ Former Zambia Army Commander (under Kaunda) ▪ Former Member, UNIP Central Committee (CC) ▪ Former Board Member, Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO)	
(31) Robert Liebenthal ▪ National Coordinator, Millennium Challenge Account-Zambia (MCAZ) ▪ Former World Bank Economist	Lusaka, 12 August 2008
(32) Peter J. Henriot ▪ Director, Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR)	Lusaka, 12 August 2008
(33) Newton Isaiah Ng'uni ▪ Deputy Secretary, National Constitutional Conference (NCC) ▪ Secretary General, Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) ▪ Former MMD Deputy Minister of Science, Technical Education & Vocational Training (under Chiluba) ▪ Former MMD Deputy Minister of Education (under Chiluba)	Lusaka, 13 August 2008
(34) Simon Zukas ▪ Former MMD Minister of Works & Supply (under Chiluba) ▪ Former MMD Minister of Agriculture, Food & Fisheries (under Chiluba) ▪ Former MMD Deputy Minister at the Vice President's Office (under Chiluba) ▪ Former Board Member, Industrial and Development Corporation (INDECO)	Lusaka, 13 August 2008
(35) Emily Sikazwe ▪ Executive Director, Women for Change Vincent Akamandisa ▪ Field Animator, Women for Change	Lusaka, 15 August 2008
(36) Roger Chongwe ▪ Former MMD Minister of Legal Affairs (under Chiluba)	Lusaka, 9 September 2008
(37) Dipak Patel ▪ Former MMD Minister of Commerce, Trade & Industry (under Mwanawasa) ▪ Former MMD Minister of Commerce, Trade & Industry (under Chiluba)	Lusaka, 9 September 2008
(38) Philip Chilimo ▪ Chairperson, Zambia Indigenous Business Association (ZIBA)	Lusaka, 10 September 2008
(39) Reverend Suzanne Matale ▪ General Secretary, Council of Churches in Zambia	Lusaka, 11 September 2008
(40) Gerd Botterweck ▪ Resident Director, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Lusaka Kathy Banda Sikombe ▪ Programme Coordinator, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Lusaka	Lusaka, 11 September 2008
(41) Birgit Pickel ▪ Counsellor, Development Cooperation, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Lusaka	Lusaka, 12 September 2008
(42) Haswell Mwale ▪ Former UNIP Minister of Works & Supply ▪ Former UNIP Minister of Public Works	Lusaka, 15 September 2008

▪ Former UNIP Deputy Minister at the Prime Minister's Office ▪ Former UNIP Deputy Minister for Power, Transport & Works ▪ Former UNIP Deputy Minister for Central Province ▪ Former UNIP Deputy Minister of Works ▪ Former Member, UNIP Central Committee (CC) ▪ Former Board Member, Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO)	
(43) Dr. Chileshe Mulenga ▪ Researcher, Institute of Economic and Social Research (INESOR)	Lusaka, 16 September 2008
(44) Kaputo M. Chenga ▪ Senior Expert, German Technical Corporation (GTZ), Lusaka	Lusaka, 18 September 2008
(45) Bob Sichinga ▪ Former MMD Deputy Minister of Local Government and Housing (under Chiluba) ▪ Founding Member, Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD)	Lusaka, 18 September 2008
(46) Dr. Neo Simutanyi ▪ Executive Director, Centre for Policy Dialogue	Lusaka, 22 September 2008
(47) Patricia Palale ▪ Public Sector Management Specialist, The World Bank, Lusaka	Lusaka, 23 September 2008
(48) Dr. Cosmas Musumali ▪ Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research	Lusaka, 23 September 2008
(49) Dr. Gilbert Mudenda ▪ Director, Institute for Policy Studies	Lusaka, 24 September 2008
(50) Murray & Eva Sanderson ▪ Zambia Institute for Public Policy Analysis	Kitwe, 29 September 2008
(51) Austin C. Muneku ▪ Director of Research, Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)	Kitwe, 30 September 2008
(52) 'Mama' Kankasa ▪ Former Member, UNIP Central Committee (CC)	Lusaka, 2 October 2008
(53) Sikota Wina ▪ Founding Member, Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) ▪ Former UNIP Minister of Information, Broadcasting & Tourism ▪ Former UNIP Minister of Local Government & Housing ▪ Former UNIP Minister of Local Government ▪ Former Member, UNIP Central Committee (CC)	Lusaka, 4 October 2008
(54) Dr. Siteke Mwale ▪ Special Envoy and National Co-ordinator for Great Lakes Region ▪ Former UNIP Minister of Foreign Affairs	Lusaka, 6 October 2008

11 Annex

11.1 Dataset

11.1.1 Uganda

DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENT, 1962-2008

'Inner core' of political power
Ministers[892]
Ministers of State/Deputy Ministers[893]

Year: 1962 (OBOTE I)

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
Prime Minister	A. M. Obote	Langi	Northern	Protestant
	G. B. Magezi	Munyoro	Western	Protestant
	A. A. Ojera	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
Justice	G. S. Ibingira	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Finance	A. K. Sempa	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	S. N. Odaka	Musamia	Eastern	Protestant
Economic affairs	J. T. Simpson	English		
	J. S. Mayanja-Nkangi	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	S. K. Nkutu	Musoga	Eastern	Muslim
Regional Administrations	C. J. Obwangor	Iteso	Eastern	Catholic
	C. B. Katiti	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Animal Industry, Game & Fisheries	J. K. Babiiha	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
	K. K. Karegyesa	Muhororo	Western	Protestant
Health	Dr. E. B. Lumu	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	J. N. Wakholi	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
Agriculture & Cooperatives	M. M. Ngobi	Musoga	Eastern	Catholic
	L. Lubowa	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Works & Labour	F. K. Onama	Madi	Northern	Catholic
	S. K. Masembe-Kabali	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Minerals & Water Resources	J. W. Lwamafa	Mukiga	Western	Protestant

[892] Note that the members of the 'inner core' of political power are also included as ministers.
[893] Including Parliamentary Secretaries in 1962, 1964 and 1966.

Education	Dr. J. S. Zake	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	W. Kalema	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Without Portfolio	B. K. Kirya	Mugwere	Eastern	Protestant
Community Development	L. Kalule-Settala	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Mrs. F. Lubega	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Information, Broadcasting & Tourism	A. A. Nekyan	Langi	Northern	Muslim
	P. Munyagwa-Nsibirwa	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Internal Affairs	N. M. Patel	Indian		

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.

Year: 1964

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs, Defence	A. M. Obote	Langi	Northern	Protestant
	G. B. Magezi	Munyoro	Western	Protestant
	S. N. Odaka	Musamia	Eastern	Protestant
	S. K. Nkutu	Musoga	Eastern	Muslim
Justice	G. S. Ibingira	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Finance	A. K. Sempa	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Regional Administrations	C. J. Obwangor	Iteso	Eastern	Catholic
	C. B. Katiti	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Animal Industry, Game & Fisheries	J. K. Babiiha	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
	K. K. Karegyesa	Muhororo	Western	Protestant
Health	Dr. E. B. Lumu	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	J. N. Wakholi	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
Works	B. K. Kirya	Mugwere	Eastern	Protestant
Minerals & Water Resources	J. W. Lwamafa	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
Agriculture & Cooperatives	M. M. Ngobi	Musoga	Eastern	Catholic
	L. Lubowa	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Industry & Communications	L. Kalule-Settala	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Education	Dr. J. S. Zake	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	W. W. Kalema	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Internal Affairs	F. K. Onama	Madi	Northern	Catholic
	M. L. Choudry	Karamajong	Eastern	Catholic

Commerce	J. S. Mayanja-Nkangi	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	E. B. Bwambale	Mukonzo	Western	Protestant
Community Development & Labour	A. A. Ojera	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
	Mrs. F. Lubega	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Information, Broadcasting & Tourism	A. A. Nekyan	Langi	Northern	Muslim
	P. Munyagwa-Nsibirwa	Muganda	Central	Protestant

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.

Year: 1966

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
Prime Minister	A. M. Obote	Langi	Northern	Protestant
	G. S. Ibingira	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	E. Y. Lakidi	Acholi	Northern	Protestant
Foreign Affairs	S. N. Odaka	Musamia	Eastern	Protestant
	V. K. Rwamwaro	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
Defence	F. K. Onama	Madi	Northern	Catholic
Animal Industry, Game & Fisheries	J. K. Babiiha	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
	K. K. Karegyesa	Muhororo	Western	Protestant
Internal Affairs	B. K. Bataringaya	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
	S. E. Isiagi	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Works & Communications	W. W. Kalema	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	S. K. Okurut	Iteso	Eastern	Catholic
Finance	L. Kalule-Settala	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Minerals & Water Resources	B. K. Kirya	Mugwere	Eastern	Protestant
Commerce & Industry	L. Lubowa	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	E. B. Bwambale	Mukonzo	Western	Protestant
Health	Dr. E. B. Lumu	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	S. W. Uringi	Alur	Northern	Protestant
Education	Dr. J. S. Zake	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	S. K. Nkutu	Musoga	Eastern	Muslim
Regional Administrations	J. W. Lwamafa	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
	C. B. Katiti	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Housing & Labour	G. B. Magezi	Munyoro	Western	Protestant

	A. Y. Lobidra	Lugbara	Northern	Catholic
Planning & Community Dev°	A. A. Nekyan	Langi	Northern	Muslim
	M. L. Choudry	Karamajong	Northern	Catholic
Agriculture & Cooperatives	M. M. Ngobi	Musoga	Eastern	Catholic
	J. N. Wakholi	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
	A. K. Balinda	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
Justice	C. J. Obwangor	Iteso	Eastern	Catholic
Information, Broadcasting & Tourism	A. A. Ojera	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
	J. S. Ochola	Japadhola	Eastern	Protestant
	P. Munyagwa-Nsibirwa	Muganda	Central	Protestant

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.

Year: 1968

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
President	A. M. Obote	Langi	Northern	Protestant
Vice-President, Animal Industry, Game & Fisheries	J. K. Babiiha	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
	K. K. Karegyesa	Muhororo	Western	Protestant
Foreign Affairs	S. N. Odaka	Musamia	Eastern	Protestant
	Dr. E. Babumba	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	V. K. Rwamwaro	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
Internal Affairs	B. K. Bataringaya	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
Mineral & Water Resources	M. L. Choudry	Karamajong	Northern	Catholic
Agriculture, Forestry & Cooperatives	J. B. Kakonge	Munyoro	Western	Protestant
	A. K. Balinda	Mutoro	Western	Muslim
Commerce & Industry	W. W. Kalema	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Finance	L. Kalule-Settala	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Culture & Community Development	C. B. Katiti	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	E. B. Bwambale	Mukonzo	Western	Protestant
Labour	L. Lubowa	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	A. Y. Lobidra	Lugbara	Northern	Catholic
Education	Dr. J. S. Zake	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Health	J. W. Lwamafa	Mukiga	Western	Protestant

	S. W. Uringi	Alur	Northern	Protestant
Works, Communications & Housing	S. K. Nkutu	Musoga	Eastern	Muslim
	S. K. Okurut	Iteso	Eastern	Catholic
Regional Administrations	J. S. Ochola	Japadhola	Eastern	Protestant
	S. E. Isiagi	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Information, Broadcasting & Tourism	A. A. Ojera	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
	P. Munyagwa-Nsibirwa	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Planning & Economic Development	J. M. Okae	Langi	Northern	Protestant
Defence	F. K. Onama	Madi	Northern	Catholic
Public Service & Cabinet Affairs	J. N. Wakholi	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
	E. Y. Lakidi	Acholi	Northern	Protestant

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.

Year: 1970

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
President, National Service	A. M. Obote	Langi	Northern	Protestant
	J. O Anyoti	Iteso (Kumam)	Eastern	Protestant
Vice-President, Animal Industry, Game & Fisheries	J. K. Babiiha	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
	K. K. Karegyesa	Muhororo	Western	Protestant
Marketing & Cooperatives	Dr. E. Babumba	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Internal Affairs	B. K. Bataringaya	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
Mineral & Water Resources	M. L. Choudry	Karamajong	Northern	Catholic
Agriculture & Forestry	J. B. Kakonge	Munyoro	Western	Protestant
	A. K. Balinda	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
Commerce & Industry	W. W. Kalema	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Finance	L. Kalule-Settala	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Culture & Community Dev°	C. B. Katiti	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	E. B. Bwambale	Mukonzo	Western	Protestant
Labour	E. Y. Lakidi	Acholi	Northern	Protestant
	A. Y. Lobidra	Lugbara	Northern	Catholic

Justice	L. Lubowa	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Education	Dr. J. S. Zake	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Health	J. W. Lwamafa	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
	S. W. Uringi	Alur	Northern	Protestant
Works, Communi° & Housing	S. K. Nkutu	Musoga	Eastern	Muslim
	S. K. Okurut	Iteso	Eastern	Catholic
Regional Administrations	J. S. Ochola	Japadhola	Eastern	Protestant
	S. E. Isiagi	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Foreign Affairs	S. N. Odaka	Musamia	Eastern	Protestant
	V. K. Rwamwaro	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
Information, Broadcasting & Tourism	A. A. Ojera	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
	P. Munyagwa-Nsibirwa	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Planning & Economic Dev°	J. M. Okae	Langi	Northern	Protestant
Defence	F. K. Onama	Madi	Northern	Catholic
Public Service & Cabinet Affairs	J. N. Wakholi	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.

Year: 1971 (AMIN)

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
President	Maj.-Gen. Idi Amin	Kakwa	Northern	Muslim
Finance	E. B. Wakhweya	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
Planning & Economic Development	Apolo Kironde	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Internal Affairs	Lt.-Col. E. A. Obitre Gama	Lugbara	Northern	Protestant
Foreign Affairs	Wanume Kibedi	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Defence	A. C. Oboth-Ofumi	Japadhola	Eastern	Protestant
Public Service & Local Administration	A. V. Ovonji	Alur	Northern	Catholic
Agriculture, Forestry & Cooperatives	F. L. Okwaare	Iteso	Eastern	Catholic
Animal Industry, Game & Fisheries	W. B. Banage	Mutoro	Western	Protestant
Commerce, Industry &	Wilson Lutara	Acholi	Northern	Protestant

Tourism				
Information & Broadcasting	William Naburi	Karamajong	Northern	Protestant
Works, Communications & Housing	J. M. Zikusoka	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Culture & Community Development	Yekosofati Engura	Langi	Northern	Protestant
Minerals & Water Resources	Wilson Oryema	Acholi	Northern	Protestant
Education	Abu Manyanja	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Health	Dr. J. M. Gessa	Mugwere	Eastern	Protestant
Labour	J. M. Byagagaire	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
Justice/ Attorney-General	P. J. Nkambo Mugerwa	Muganda	Central	Protestant

Source: Compiled based on government lists in Jorgensen 1981: 280.

Year: 1973

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
President, Internal Affairs	Maj.-Gen. Idi Amin	Kakwa	Northern	Muslim
Finance, Planning & Economic Development	E. B. Wakhweya	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
Foreign Affairs	Wanume Kibedi	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Defence	A. C. Oboth-Ofumi	Japadhola	Eastern	Protestant
Public Service & Local Administration	J. M. Byagagaire	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
Agriculture, Forestry & Cooperatives	F. L. Okwaare	Iteso	Eastern	Catholic
Animal Industry, Game & Fisheries	W. B. Banage	Mutoro	Western	Protestant
Commerce & Industry	Wilson Lutara	Acholi	Northern	Protestant
Tourism	Apolo Kironde	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Information & Broadcasting	William Naburi	Karamajong	Northern	Protestant
Works & Housing	J. M. Zikusoka	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Transport & Communications	Lt.-Col. E. A. Obitre Gama	Lugbara	Northern	Protestant
Culture & Community Development	Yekosofati Engura	Langi	Northern	Protestant
Minerals & Water	Wilson Oryema	Acholi	Northern	Protestant

Resources				
Education	E. B. Rugumayo	Mutoro	Western	Protestant
Health	Dr. J. M. Gessa	Gwere	Eastern	Protestant
Labour	Abu Manyanja	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Justice/ Attorney-General	P. J. Nkambo Mugerwa	Muganda	Central	Protestant

Source: Compiled based on government lists in Jorgensen 1981: 280.

Year: 1975

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
President, Defence	Maj.-Gen. Idi Amin	Kakwa	Northern	Muslim
	P. O. Etiang	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Army Chief of Staff, MOS Defence	M. Adrisi	Lugbara	Northern	Muslim
Air Force Commander	S. Guweddeko	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Finance, Internal Affairs	A. C. Oboth-Ofumi	Japadhola	Eastern	Protestant
	M. S. Kiingi	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Planning & Economic Development	E. B. Wakhweya	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
Foreign Affairs	Juma A. Oris	Madi	Northern	Muslim
Provincial Administration	Moses Ali	Madi	Northern	Muslim
Public Affairs & Cabinet	R. Nshekanabo	Mukiga	Western	Catholic
Cooperatives & Marketing	M. Ramathan	Nubian	Northern	Muslim
Agriculture & Animal Industry	J. M. Byagagaire	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
Commerce	Noah Mohammed	Alur	Northern	Muslim
Industry & Power	Dusman Sabuni	Sudanese	Northern	Muslim
Tourism	John D. Onaah	Lugbara	Northern	Protestant
Information & Broadcasting	E. L. Athiyo	Karamajong	Northern	Protestant
Works & Housing	S. Lukakamwa	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Transport & Communications	M. L. Obado	Iteso	Eastern	Catholic
Culture & Community Development	F. Nyangweso	Samia	Eastern	Catholic
Land & Water Resources	Wilson Oryema	Acholi	Northern	Protestant
Education	Barnabas Kili	Lugbara	Northern	Catholic

Health	H. Kyemba	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Labour	L. Katagyira	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Justice/ Attorney-General	G. S. Lule	Muganda	Central	Protestant

Source: Compiled based on government lists in Jorgensen 1981: 280.

Year: 1977

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
President	Maj.-Gen. Idi Amin	Kakwa	Northern	Muslim
	P. O. Etiang	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Vice-President, Defence, Army Chief of Staff	M. Adrisi	Lugbara	Northern	Muslim
Air Force Commander	S. Guweddeko	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Finance, Internal Affairs	Moses Ali	Madi	Northern	Muslim
	M. S. Kiingi	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Planning & Economic Development	I. K. Kabanda	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Foreign Affairs	Juma A. Oris	Madi	Northern	Muslim
Provincial Administration	W. Ali Fadhul	Sudanese	Northern	Muslim
Public Affairs & Cabinet	R. Nshekanabo	Mukiga	Western	Catholic
Cooperatives & Marketing	M. Ramathan	Nubian	Northern	Muslim
Agriculture & Animal Industry	J. M. Byagagaire	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
Commerce	Noah Mohammed	Alur	Northern	Muslim
Industry & Power	Dusman Sabuni	Sudanese	Northern	Muslim
Tourism	John D. Onaah	Lugbara	Northern	Protestant
Information & Broadcasting	E. L. Athiyo	Karamajong	Northern	Protestant
Works & Housing	S. Lukakamwa	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Transport & Communications	M. L. Obado	Iteso	Eastern	Catholic
Culture & Community Development	F. Nyangweso	Samia	Eastern	Catholic
Education	Barnabas Kili	Lugbara	Northern	Catholic
Labour	L. Katagyira	Munyankole	Western	Protestant

Source: Compiled based on government lists in Jorgensen 1981: 280.

Year: 1979

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
President, Foreign Affairs, Tourism, Information & Broadcasting, Health	Maj.-Gen. Idi Amin	Kakwa	Northern	Muslim
Vice-President	M. Adrisi	Lugbara	Northern	Muslim
Air Force Commander, Army Chief of Staff	Yusuf Gowon	Kakwa	Northern	Muslim
Finance, Planning & Economic Development	J. Masagazi	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Internal Affairs	Farouk Minawa	Sudanese	Northern	Muslim
Defence	Demiro Mondo	Madi	Northern	Catholic
Provincial Administration	W. Ali Fadhul	Sudanese	Northern	Muslim
Public Affairs & Cabinet	R. Nshekanabo	Mukiga	Western	Catholic
Cooperatives & Marketing	M. Ramathan	Nubian	Northern	Muslim
Agriculture	Ibrahim Garandi	Musoga	Eastern	Muslim
Animal Industry	Ismail Sebi	Lugbara	Northern	Muslim
Commerce	Bakhiti	Alur	Northern	Muslim
Industry & Power	Dusman Sabuni	Sudanese	Northern	Muslim
Works & Housing	S. Lukakamwa	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Transport & Communications, MOS Office of the President	P. O. Etiang	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Culture & Community Development	Mary Astles Senkatuka	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Land & Water Resources	Juma A. Oris	Madi	Northern	Muslim
Education	Barnabas Kili	Lugbara	Northern	Catholic
Labour	L. Katagyira	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Justice	M. B. Matovu	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Without Portfolio	Hussein Marijan	Nubian	Northern	Muslim

Source: Compiled based on government lists in Jorgensen 1981: 280.

Year: 11 April 1979 (UNLF – Lule)

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
President, Defence	Yusuf K. Lule	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Yoweri Museveni	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	William Omaria	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant

Finance, Planning & Economic Development	Sam Sebagereka	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Internal Affairs	Paulo Muwanga	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Andrew Kayiira	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Foreign Affairs	Otema Allimadi	Acholi	Northern	Protestant
	Sam Karugire	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Local government	Mathias Ngobi	Musoga	Eastern	Catholic
Reconstruction & Rehabilitation	Andrew Adimola	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries & Animal Industry	J. Dungu	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Commerce & Industry	A. Byararuha	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Power, Posts & Communications	Akena P'Ojok	Acholi	Northern	Protestant
Information & Broadcasting	Ateker Ejalu	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Land & Natural Resources	T. Kabwegyere	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
Education	A. Wandira	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Health	Arnold Bisase	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	P. Senabulya	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Justice	Dan Nabudere	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
Attorney General	G. Kanyeihamba	Mukiga	Western	Protestant

Source: Compiled based on government lists in Jorgensen 1981: 338p.

Year: 25 June 1979 (UNLF – Binaisa)

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
President, Foreign Affairs	Godfrey Binaisa	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Sam Karugire	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Finance	Jack Ssentongo	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Planning & Economic Development	Anthony Ocaya	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
Internal Affairs	Paulo Muwanga	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Regional Cooperation	Ateker Ejalu	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Defence	Yoweri Museveni	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	William Omaria	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Local government	Bidandi Ssali	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Cabinet & Public Service	Wilson Okwenje	Musamia	Eastern	Protestant

Reconstruction & Rehabilitation	Andrew Adimola	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
Cooperatives & Marketing	Yona Kanyomozi	Muhororo	Western	Protestant
Culture & Community Development	Dan Nabudere	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
Agriculture	Mathias Ngobi	Musoga	Eastern	Catholic
Animal Industry	H. S. Nsubuga	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Sam Mugwisa	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Commerce	P. Kaboha	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
Industry	Y. Kyersimira	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Power, Posts & Communications	Akena P'Ojok	Acholi	Northern	Protestant
Information & Broadcasting	A. Picho Owinyi	Alur	Northern	Protestant
Housing, Urban Development & Works	Abraham Waligo	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Land & Natural Resources	T. Kabwegyere	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
Tourism & Wildlife	J. Obua-Otua	Langi	Northern	Protestant
Education	G. N. Bitamazire	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Health	Arnold Bisase	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	R. Rugunda	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
Labour	Paul Ssemogerere	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Justice	Stephen O. Ariko	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant

Source: Compiled based on government lists in Jorgensen 1981: 338p.

Year: 18 May 1980 (UNLF – Military Commission)

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
Military Commission (President, Defence)	Paulo Muwanga (Chairma)	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Yoweri Museveni (Vive-Chairman)	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Tito Okello	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
	Oyite-Ojok	Langi	Northern	Protestant
	William Omaria	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
	Zeddi Maruru	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Raphael Bitamazire	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
Finance	Lawrence Sebalu	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Planning &	Anthony Ocaya	Acholi	Northern	Catholic

Economic Development				
Internal Affairs	Sam Tewungwa	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
	Christopher Okoth	Japadhola	Eastern	Catholic
Foreign Affairs	Otema Allimadi	Acholi	Northern	Protestant
	Sam Karugire	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Regional Cooperation	A. Pincho Owinyi	Alur	Northern	Protestant
Local government	Bidandi Ssali	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Cabinet & Public Service	Wilson Okwenje	Musamia	Eastern	Protestant
Reconstruction & Rehabilitation	Masete Kuuya	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
Cooperatives & Marketing	J. Obua-Otua	Langi	Northern	Protestant
Culture & Community Development	A. Tiberondwa	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Agriculture	Mathias Ngobi	Musoga	Eastern	Catholic
Animal Industry	E. R. Nkwasibwe	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
Commerce	Eriya Kategaya	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Industry	Obonyo	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
Power, Posts & Communications	Akena P'Ojok	Acholi	Northern	Protestant
Information & Broadcasting	David Anyoti	Iteso (Kumam)	Eastern	Protestant
Housing, Urban Development & Works	Abraham Waligo	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Transport	Kintu Musoke	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Supply	Moses Apiliga	Madi	Northern	Catholic
Land & Natural Resources	T. Kabwegyere	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
Tourism & Wildlife	Ephraim Kamuntu	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Education	G. N. Bitamazire	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Max Choudry	Karamajong	Northern	Catholic
Health	Ntege Lubwama	Muganda	Central	Muslim
	R. Rugunda	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
Labour	J. Luwuliza-Kirunda	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
	Matiya Kasaija	Munyoro	Western	Catholic
Justice	Stephen O. Ariko	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant

Source: Compiled based on government lists in Jorgensen 1981: 338p.

Year: 1981 (OBOTE II)

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
President, Foreign Affairs, Finance	Apollo Milton Obote	Langi	Northern	Protestant
	C. Rwakasisi	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Dr. Picho Owiny	Alur	Northern	Protestant
	H. Makmot	Langi	Northern	Protestant
Vice-President, Defence	Paulo Muwanga	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	P. Otai	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Prime Minister	Erifasi Otema Alimadi	Acholi	Northern	Protestant
	E. Rurangarange	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	W. A. Osindek Wangwor	Japadhola	Eastern	Catholic
Agriculture & Forestry	Samuel Mugwisa	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Dr. P. Rubaihayo	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Animal Industry & Fisheries	Dr. John J. Otim	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
	I. O. Okwakol	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Commerce	Joel M. Aliro-Omara	Langi	Northern	Protestant
Culture & Community Development	Dr. James M. Rwanyayare	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
	A. O. Olanya-Olenge	Acholi	Northern	Protestant
Cooperatives & Marketing	Yona Kanyomozi	Muhororo	Western	Protestant
Education	Prof. Isaac N. Ojok	Langi	Northern	Protestant
	Dr. P. Mateke	Mufumbira	Western	Protestant
Health	Dr. Ezra R. Nkwasibwe	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
	Mrs. T. Odongo-Oduka	Langi	Northern	Catholic
Industry	Dr. Adonia Tiberondwa	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	R. Bandanyanya	Lugbara	Northern	Protestant
Information & Broadcasting	Dr. David O. Anyoti	Iteso (Kumam)	Eastern	Protestant
	M. Kisembo	Munyoro	Western	Catholic
Internal Affairs	Dr. John M. Luwuliza-Kirunda	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
	Col. W. Omaria	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant

Justice	Stephen O. Ariko	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Labour	Anthony Butele	Lugbara	Northern	Catholic
	H. Tungakwo	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
Housing & Urban Development	Abraham P. Waligo	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	B. Etonu	Iteso	Eastern	Catholic
Local Government	Lawrence Kulele-Settala	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	P. Mwondha	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Lands, Mineral & Water Resources	Max Choudry	Karamajong	Northern	Catholic
	A. Bazira	Mukonzo	Western	Protestant
Planning & Economic Development	Sam N. Odaka	Musamia	Eastern	Protestant
Power & Telecommunications	Akena P'Ojok	Acholi	Northern	Protestant
Regional Cooperation	Sam Tewunga	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Rehabilitation	Peter Masette-Kuuya	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
Public Service & Cabinet Affairs	Wilson Okwenje	Musamia	Eastern	Protestant
Transport	Yosamu Mugenyi	Munyoro	Western	Protestant
	J. Akol	Karamajong	Northern	Protestant
Tourism & Wildlife	Mohammed Ntege-Lubwana	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Supplies	Dr. Moses T. Apiliga	Madi	Northern	Catholic
Works	A. Nan'gwale	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
Without Portfolio	Shafiq Arain	Indian (Muslim)		

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.

Year: 1983

Position	**Name**	**Tribe**	**Region**	**Religion**
President, Foreign Affairs, Finance	Apollo Milton Obote	Langi	Northern	Protestant
	C. Rwakasisi	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Dr. Picho Owiny	Alur	Northern	Protestant
	H. Makmot	Langi	Northern	Protestant
Vice-President, Defence	Paulo Muwanga	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	P. Otai	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Prime Minister	Erifasi Otema Alimadi	Acholi	Northern	Protestant

	E. Rurangarange	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	W. A. Osindek Wangwor	Japadhola	Eastern	Catholic
Agriculture & Forestry	Samuel Mugwisa	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Dr. P. Rubaihayo	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Animal Industry & Fisheries	Dr. John J. Otim	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
	I. O. Okwakol	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Commerce	Joel M. Aliro-Omara	Langi	Northern	Protestant
Culture & Community Development	Dr. James M. Rwanyayare	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
	A. O. Olanya-Olenge	Acholi	Northern	Protestant
Cooperatives & Marketing	Yona Kanyomozi	Muhororo	Western	Protestant
Education	Prof. Isaac N. Ojok	Langi	Northern	Protestant
	Dr. P. Mateke	Mufumbira	Western	Protestant
Health	Dr. Ezra R. Nkwasibwe	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
	Mrs. T. Odongo-Oduka	Langi	Northern	Catholic
Industry	Dr. Adonia Tiberondwa	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	R. Bandanyanya	Lugbara	Northern	Protestant
Information & Broadcasting	Dr. David O. Anyoti	Iteso (Kumam)	Eastern	Protestant
	M. Kisembo	Munyoro	Western	Catholic
Internal Affairs	Dr. John M. Luwuliza-Kirunda	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
	Col. W. Omaria	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Justice	Stephen O. Ariko	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Labour	Anthony Butele	Lugbara	Northern	Catholic
	H. Tungakwo	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
Housing & Urban Development	Abraham P. Waligo	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	B. Etonu	Iteso	Eastern	Catholic
Local Government	Lawrence Kulele-Settala	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	P. Mwondha	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Lands, Mineral & Water Resources	Max Choudry	Karamajong	Northern	Catholic
	A. Bazira	Mukonzo	Western	Protestant

Planning & Economic Development	Sam N. Odaka	Musamia	Eastern	Protestant
Power & Telecommunications	Akena P'Ojok	Acholi	Northern	Protestant
Regional Cooperation	Sam Tewunga	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Rehabilitation	Peter Masette-Kuuya	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
Public Service & Cabinet Affairs	Wilson Okwenje	Musamia	Eastern	Protestant
Transport	Yosamu Mugenyi	Munyoro	Western	Protestant
	J. Akol	Karamajong	Northern	Protestant
Tourism & Wildlife	Mohammed Ntege-Lubwana	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Supplies	Dr. Moses T. Apiliga	Madi	Northern	Catholic
Works	A. Nan'gwale	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
Without Portfolio	Shafiq Arain	Indian (Muslim)		

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.

Year: 1985

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
President, Foreign Affairs, Finance	Apollo Milton Obote	Langi	Northern	Protestant
	C. Rwakasisi	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Dr. Picho Owiny	Alur	Northern	Protestant
	H. Makmot	Langi	Northern	Protestant
Vice-President, Defence	Paulo Muwanga	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	P. Otai	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Prime Minister	Erifasi Otema Alimadi	Acholi	Northern	Protestant
	E. Rurangarange	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	W. A. Osindek Wangwor	Japadhola	Eastern	Catholic
Agriculture & Forestry	Samuel Mugwisa	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Dr. P. Rubaihayo	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Animal Industry & Fisheries	Dr. John J. Otim	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
	I. O. Okwakol	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Commerce	Joel M. Aliro-Omara	Langi	Northern	Protestant
Culture & Community Development	Dr. James M. Rwanyayare	Mukiga	Western	Protestant

	A. O. Olanya-Olenge	Acholi	Northern	Protestant
Cooperatives & Marketing	Yona Kanyomozi	Muhororo	Western	Protestant
Education	Prof. Isaac N. Ojok	Langi	Northern	Protestant
	Dr. P. Mateke	Mufumbira	Western	Protestant
Health	Dr. Ezra R. Nkwasibwe	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
	Mrs. T. Odongo-Oduka	Langi	Northern	Catholic
Industry	Dr. Adonia Tiberondwa	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	R. Bandanyanya	Lugbara	Northern	Protestant
Information & Broadcasting	Dr. David O. Anyoti	Iteso (Kumam)	Eastern	Protestant
	M. Kisembo	Munyoro	Western	Catholic
Internal Affairs	Dr. John M. Luwuliza-Kirunda	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
	Col. W. Omaria	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Justice	Stephen O. Ariko	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Labour	Anthony Butele	Lugbara	Northern	Catholic
	H. Tungakwo	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
Housing & Urban Development	Abraham P. Waligo	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	B. Etonu	Iteso	Eastern	Catholic
Local Government	Lawrence Kulele-Settala	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	P. Mwondha	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Lands, Mineral & Water Resources	Max Choudry	Karamajong	Northern	Catholic
	A. Bazira	Mukonzo	Western	Protestant
Planning & Economic Development	Sam N. Odaka	Musamia	Eastern	Protestant
Power & Telecommunications	Akena P'Ojok	Acholi	Northern	Protestant
Regional Cooperation	Sam Tewunga	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Rehabilitation	Peter Masette-Kuuya	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
Public Service & Cabinet Affairs	Wilson Okwenje	Musamia	Eastern	Protestant
Transport	Yosamu Mugenyi	Munyoro	Western	Protestant
	J. Akol	Karamajong	Northern	Protestant
Tourism & Wildlife	Mohammed	Muganda	Central	Muslim

	Ntege-Lubwana			
Supplies	Dr. Moses T. Apiliga	Madi	Northern	Catholic
Works	A. Nan'gwale	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
Without Portfolio	Shafiq Arain	Indian (Muslim)		

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.

Year: 1986 (MUSEVENI)

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
President, Defence	Yoweri K. Museveni	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	B. K. Kirya	Mugwere	Eastern	Protestant
	S. Njuba	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Defence	Dr. R. Bata	Madi	Northern	Catholic
	Amanya Mushega	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Vice-Chairman NRM/NRC	Haji M. Kigongo	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Prime Minister	Dr. S. B. Kisekka	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Eriya Kategaya	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Mrs. Betty Bigombe	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
Rehabilitation	Mrs. C. Njuba	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Finance	Dr. C. Kiyonga	Munyabindi	Western	Protestant
	A. Kafumbe Mukasa	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Agriculture & Forestry	R. Kitariko	Mukiga	Western	Catholic
	Mrs. V. Ssekitoleko	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Animal Industry & Fisheries	Dr. S. Masaba	Mugisu	Eastern	Catholic
	W. Nyakatura	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
Commerce	Dr. G. Kanyeihamba	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
Youth, Culture & Sport	S. K. Okurut	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Cooperatives & Marketing	J. Ssebaana Kizito	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Education	J. S. Mayanja Nkangi	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	J. Ntimba	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
Health	Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
	Dr. J. Batwala	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Information & Broadcasting	A. K. Mayanja	Muganda	Central	Muslim

	J. Maumbe Mukwana	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
Energy, Labour	J. Bidandi Sali	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Environment	J. Okune	Langi	Northern	Catholic
Internal Affairs	Paul K. Ssemogerere	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Kiiza Besigye	Muhororo	Western	Protestant
Housing & Urban Development	J. Wapakabulo	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
Local Government	Dr. E. Kakonge	Munyoro	Western	Protestant
	Kahinda Otafiire	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
Industry & Technology	Prof. S. Tumwine	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Y. Sabiiti	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Lands & Survey	Ben Okello Luwum	Acholi	Northern	Protestant
Mineral & Water Development	B. Chango Macho	Musamia	Eastern	Protestant
Planning & Economic Development	Prof. Y. Kyesimira	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Public Service & Cabinet Affairs	D. Kibirango	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Foreign Affairs	I. Mukiibi	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Transport & Communications	A. Kirunda Kivejinja	Musoga	Eastern	Muslim
	R. Ekinu	Munyankole	Central	Protestant
Regional Cooperation	Prof. P. S. Mulema	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Tourism & Wildlife	Moses Ali	Madi	Northern	Muslim
Justice	J. Mulenga	Mufumbira/ Munyarwanda	Western	Catholic
Works	D. Kigozi	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Without Portfolio	A. Butele	Lugbara	Northern	Catholic
Without Portfolio	T. Rubale	Mutoro	Western	Protestant

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.

Year: 1988

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
President, Defence	Yoweri K. Museveni	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	B. K. Kirya	Mugwere	Eastern	Protestant
	S. Njuba	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Defence	Dr. R. Bata	Madi	Northern	Catholic
	Amanya Mushega	Munyankole	Western	Protestant

Vice-Chairman NRM/NRC	Haji M. Kigongo	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Prime Minister	Dr. S. B. Kisekka	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Eriya Kategaya	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Mrs. Betty Bigombe	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
Finance	Dr. C. Kiyonga	Munyabindi	Western	Protestant
	A. Kafumbe Mukasa	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Agriculture & Forestry	R. Kitariko	Mukiga	Western	Catholic
	Mrs. V. Ssekitoleko	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Animal Industry & Fisheries	Dr. S. Masaba	Mugisu	Eastern	Catholic
	W. Nyakatura	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
Commerce	Dr. G. Kanyeihamba	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
Youth, Culture & Sport	S. K. Okurut	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Cooperatives & Marketing	J. Ssebaana Kizito	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Education	J. S. Mayanja Nkangi	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	J. Ntimba	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
Health	Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
	Dr. J. Batwala	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Information & Broadcasting	A. K. Mayanja	Muganda	Central	Muslim
	J. Maumbe Mukwana	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
Energy, Labour	J. Bidandi Sali	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Environment	J. Okune	Langi	Northern	Catholic
Internal Affairs	Paul K. Ssemogerere	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Kiiza Besigye	Muhororo	Western	Protestant
Housing & Urban Development	J. Wapakabulo	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
Local Government	Dr. E. Kakonge	Munyoro	Western	Protestant
	Kahinda Otafiire	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
Industry & Technology	Prof. S. Tumwine	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Y. Sabiiti	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Lands & Survey	Ben Okello Luwum	Acholi	Northern	Protestant

Mineral & Water Development	B. Chango Macho	Musamia	Eastern	Protestant
Planning & Economic Development	Prof. Y. Kyesimira	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Public Service & Cabinet Affairs	D. Kibirango	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Foreign Affairs	I. Mukiibi	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Transport & Communications	A. Kirunda Kivejinja	Musoga	Eastern	Muslim
	R. Ekinu	Munyankole	Central	Protestant
Regional Cooperation	Prof. P. S. Mulema	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Tourism & Wildlife	Moses Ali	Madi	Northern	Muslim
Justice	J. Mulenga	Mufumbira/ Munyarwanda	Western	Catholic
Works	D. Kigozi	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Rehabilitation	Dr. A. Ofumbi	Japadhola	Eastern	Catholic
	Mrs. C. Njuba	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Without Portfolio	A. Butele	Lugbara	Northern	Catholic
Without Portfolio	T. Rubale	Mutoro	Western	Protestant

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.

Year: 1990

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
President, Defence	Yoweri K. Museveni	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Chief Political Commissar	Kiiza Besigye	Muhororo	Western	Protestant
Karamoja Affairs	A. Butele	Lugbara	Northern	Catholic
Security	Balaki Kirya	Mugwere	Eastern	Protestant
Women	Mrs. Byekwaso Lubega	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Special Duties	Ateker Ejalu	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Defence	David Tinyefuza	Munyankole	Central	Protestant
	Fred Rwigyema	Munyarwanda	Western	Catholic
Vice-Chairman NRM/NRC	Haji M. Kigongo	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Prime Minister	Dr. S. B. Kisekka	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Mrs. Betty Bigombe	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
	Mrs. Gertrude Njuba	Muganda	Central	Protestant
First Deputy Prime Minister	Eriya Kategaya	Munyankole	Western	Protestant

Second Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs & Regional Cooperation	Paul K. Ssemogerere	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Prof. Tarsis Kabwegyere	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
	Omara Atubo	Langi	Northern	Protestant
	Argad Didi	Madi	Northern	Catholic
Third Deputy Prime Minister	A. K. Mayanja	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Finance	Dr. C. Kiyonga	Munyabindi	Western	Protestant
	A. Kafumbe Mukasa	Muganda	Central	Muslim
	S. Kavuma	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Agriculture	Mrs. V. Ssekitoleko	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
	Yafesi Sabiiti	Munyankole	Central	Protestant
Animal Industry & Fisheries	Prof. Gorge M. Kagonyera	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
	Henry Kyemba	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
	Dr. Aporu Okol	Iteso	Eastern	Catholic
	Dr. Oteng	Langi	Northern	Catholic
Commerce	Paul Etiang	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
	I. Kayonde	Munyarwanda	Central	Protestant
	Charles Alai	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
Youth, Culture & Sport	Brig. Moses Ali	Madi	Northern	Muslim
	Mrs. Betty Okwir	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
Cooperatives & Marketing	J. Wapakabulo	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
	S. Kiingi	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Peter Akure	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Education	Amanya Mushega	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	J. Ntimba	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
	Mrs. J. Npanga	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Health	Z. Kaheru	Munyoro	Western	Protestant
	Dr. Ronald Bata	Madi	Northern	Catholic
Information & Broadcasting	Kintu Musoke	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Energy	Richard Kaijuka	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Salim Bachou	Jonam	Northern	Muslim
Environment Protection & Forestry	Moses Kintu	Musoga	Eastern	Muslim

Internal Affairs	Ibrahim Mukiibi	Muganda	Central	Muslim
	Tom Butime	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
Housing & Urban Development	John Ssebaana Kizito	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Mutebi Mulwanira	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Local Government	Bidandi Ssali	Muganda	Central	Muslim
	Dr. S. Chebrot	Sabiny	Eastern	Catholic
	Mrs. F. K. Nkurukenda	Munyoro	Western	Catholic
Industry & Technology	Dr. E. T. Adriko	Lugbara	Northern	Protestant
	Dr. W. S. Kazibwe	Musoga	Eastern	Catholic
	A. Kiiza Amooti	Munyoro	Western	Catholic
Lands & Survey	Ben Okello Luwum	Acholi	Northern	Protestant
	Isoke Baguma	Munyoro	Western	Catholic
Minerals & Water Development	Henry Kajura	Munyoro	Western	Protestant
	David Pulkol	Karamajong	Northern	Catholic
Planning & Economic Development	J. S. Mayanja Nkangi	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Matthew Rukikaire	Muhororo	Western	Protestant
Public Service & Cabinet Affairs	Tom Rubale	Mutoro	Western	Protestant
	Rhoda Kalema	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Transport & Communications	Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
	John Kawanga	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Tourism & Wildlife	Sam Sebagereka	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Prof. W. Nadiope	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Labour	S. K. Okurut	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
	C. Karusoke	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
Justice	Dr. G. Kanyeihamba	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
Works	D. Kigozi	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	John Nasasira	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Constitutional Affairs	Sam Njuba	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Relief & Social Rehabilitation	Adoko Nekyon	Langi	Northern	Muslim
	Deo Rwabiita	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
Without Portfolio	David Kibirango	Muganda	Central	Catholic

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.

Year: 1992

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
President, Defence	Yoweri K. Museveni	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Karamoja Affairs	A. Butele	Lugbara	Northern	Catholic
Security	Balaki Kirya	Mugwere	Eastern	Protestant
Presidential Affairs	Kintu Musoke	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Defence	David Tinyefuza	Munyankole	Central	Protestant
Vice-Chairman NRM/NRC	Haji M. Kigongo	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Vice-President, Internal Affairs	Dr. S. B. Kisekka	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Tom Butime	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
Prime Minister	Cosmas Adyebo	Langi	Northern	Catholic
	Mrs. Betty Bigombe	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
	Moses Kintu	Musoga	Eastern	Muslim
First Deputy Prime Minister, National Political Commissar	Eriya Kategaya	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Second Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs	Paul K. Ssemogerere	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Kirunda Kivejinja	Musoga	Eastern	Muslim
	Argad Didi	Madi	Northern	Catholic
Third Deputy Prime Minister, Justice	A. K. Mayanja	Muganda	Central	Muslim
	Sam Njuba	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Finance	Dr. C. Kiyonga	Munyabindi	Western	Protestant
	A. Kafumbe Mukasa	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Agriculture, Animal Industry & Fisheries	Mrs. V. Ssekitoleko	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
	Ojok O'Bwangamoi	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
Commerce, Cooperatives & Marketing	Richard Kaijuka	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Gerald Sendaula	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Education & Sports	Amanya Mushega	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	David Pulkol	Karamajong	Northern	Catholic
Health	Dr. James Makumbi	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Information	Paul Etiang	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant

Energy, Minerals & Environment Protection	Henry Kajura	Munyoro	Western	Protestant
Land, Housing & Urban Development	Dr. E. T. Adriko	Lugbara	Northern	Protestant
	Besweri Mulondo	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Local Government	Bidandi Ssali	Muganda	Central	Muslim
	Dr. S. Chebrot	Sabiny	Eastern	Catholic
Industry & Technology	James F. Wapakabulo	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
	Bart Katureebe	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
Planning & Economic Development	J. S. Mayanja Nkangi	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Matthew Rukikaire	Muhororo	Western	Protestant
Public Service	Tome Rubale	Mutoro	Western	Protestant
	Charles Alai	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
Women in Development, Culture & Youth	Dr. Speciosa Wandira Kazibwe	Musoga	Eastern	Catholic
Works, Transport & Communications	Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
Labour & Social Welfare	Ateker Ejalu	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
	Betty Okwir	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
Tourism, Wildlife & Antiquities	Sam Sebagereka	Muganda	Central	Protestant

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.

Year: 1994

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
President, Defence	Yoweri K. Museveni	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Karamoja Affairs	A. Butele	Lugbara	Northern	Catholic
Security	Balaki Kirya	Mugwere	Eastern	Protestant
Presidential Affairs	Kintu Musoke	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Luwero Affairs	Kisamba Mugerwa	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Defence	David Tinyefuza	Munyankole	Central	Protestant
Vice-Chairman NRM/NRC	Haji M. Kigongo	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Vice-President, Internal Affairs	Dr. S. B. Kisekka	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Tom Butime	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
Prime Minister	Cosmas Adyebo	Langi	Northern	Catholic

	Mrs. Betty Bigombe	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
	Moses Kintu	Musoga	Eastern	Muslim
First Deputy Prime Minister, National Political Commissar	Eriya Kategaya	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Second Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs	Paul K. Ssemogerere	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Kirunda Kivejinja	Musoga	Eastern	Muslim
	Argad Didi	Madi	Northern	Catholic
Third Deputy Prime Minister, Justice	A. K. Mayanja	Muganda	Central	Muslim
	Sam Njuba	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Finance	Dr. C. Kiyonga	Munyabindi	Western	Protestant
	A. Kafumbe Mukasa	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Agriculture, Animal Industry & Fisheries	Mrs. V. Ssekitoleko	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
	Ojok O'Bwangamoi	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
Commerce, Cooperatives & Marketing	Richard Kaijuka	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Gerald Sendaula	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Education & Sports	Amanya Mushega	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	David Pulkol	Karamajong	Northern	Catholic
Health	Dr. James Makumbi	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Information	Paul Etiang	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Energy, Minerals & Environment Protection	Henry Kajura	Munyoro	Western	Protestant
Land, Housing & Urban Development	Dr. E. T. Adriko	Lugbara	Northern	Protestant
	Besweri Mulondo	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Local Government	Bidandi Ssali	Muganda	Central	Muslim
	Dr. S. Chebrot	Sabiny	Eastern	Catholic
Industry & Technology	James F. Wapakabulo	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
	Bart Katureebe	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
Planning & Economic Development	J. S. Mayanja Nkangi	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Matthew	Muhororo	Western	Protestant

	Rukikaire			
Public Service	Tome Rubale	Mutoro	Western	Protestant
	Charles Alai	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
Women in Development, Culture & Youth	Dr. Speciosa Wandira Kazibwe	Musoga	Eastern	Catholic
Works, Transport & Communications	Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
Labour & Social Welfare	Ateker Ejalu	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
	Betty Okwir	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
Tourism, Wildlife & Antiquities	Sam Sebagereka	Muganda	Central	Protestant

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.

Year: 1996

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
President	Yoweri K. Museveni	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Economic Monitoring	Syda Bbumba	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Security	Wilson M. Mukasa	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Luwero	Edward K. Makubuya	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Karamoja	Peter Lokeris	Karamajong	Northern	Catholic
Political Affairs	Med Kaggwa	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Defence (General)	Amama Mbabazi	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
Defence (Training)	Col. Odongo Jeje	Iteso	Eastern	Muslim
Vice-President, Agriculture, Animal Industry & Fisheries	Dr. Speciosa Wandira Kazibwe	Musoga	Eastern	Catholic
	Dr. Sebunya Kibirige	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Dr. Kezimbira Miyingo	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Prime Minister	Kintu Musoke	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Dr. Kisamba Mugerwa	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Owiny-Dollo Chigamoy	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
First Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs	Eriya Kategaya	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Alitwala K. Rebecca	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant

	Dr. Martin Aliker	Acholi	Northern	Protestant
Second Deputy Prime Minister, Tourism & Wildlife	Moses Ali	Madi	Northern	Muslim
	Otim O. Yafest	Lango	Northern	Protestant
Third Deputy Prime Minister, Labour & Social Services	Paul O. Etiang	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Finance	J. S. Mayanja Nkangi	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Matthew Rukikaire	Muhororo	Western	Protestant
	Basoga Nsadhu	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
	Tomasi S. Kiryapawo	Mugwere	Eastern	Catholic
Trade & Industry	Henry Kajura	Munyoro	Western	Protestant
	Dr. Abel Rwendeire	Mukiga	Western	Catholic
Education & Sports	Amanya Mushega	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Francis E. Babu	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Brig. Jim K. Muhwezi	Muhororo	Western	Protestant
Health	Dr. C. Kiyonga	Munyabindi	Western	Protestant
Information	Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
	Philip Byaruhanga	Munyoro	Western	Catholic
Natural Resources	Gerald Ssendawula	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Matiya B. Isoke	Munyoro	Western	Catholic
Internal Affairs	Tom Butime	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
	Col. William Omaria	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Lands, Housing & Urban Development	Francis Ayume	Kakwa	Northern	Protestant
	Jovino A. Akaki	Langi	Northern	Catholic
Local Government	Bidandi Ssali	Muganda	Central	Muslim
	Col. Kahinda Otafiire	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
	Andraule Awuzu	Lugbara	Northern	Catholic
Gender & Community Development	Janat B. Mukwaya	Muganda	Central	Muslim
	Jane F. Kuka	Sabiny	Eastern	Catholic
Planning & Economic Development	Richard Kaijukai	Munyankole	Western	Protestant

	Sam Kutesa	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Public Service	Prof. Apolo Nsibambi	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Mavenjana Akumu	Alur	Northern	Catholic
Works, Transport & Communications	John Nasasira	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Sylvester W. Wasieba	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
Justice	Bart Katureebe	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
	Emmanuel Kirenga	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Without Portfolio	Kirunda Kivijinja	Musoga	Eastern	Muslim

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.

Year: 1998

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
President	Yoweri K. Museveni	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Economic Monitoring	Syda Bbumba	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Security	Wilson M. Mukasa	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Luwero	Edward K. Makubuya	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Karamoja	Peter Lokeris	Karamajong	Northern	Catholic
Political Affairs	Amama Mbabazi	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
Vice-President; Agriculture, Animal Industry & Fisheries	Dr. Speciosa Wandira Kazibwe	Musoga	Eastern	Catholic
	Dr. Sebunya Kibirige	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Dr. Kezimbira Miyingo	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Prime Minister	Kintu Musoke	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Dr. Kisamba Mugerwa	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Owiny-Dollo Chigamoy	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
First Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs	Eriya Kategaya	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Alitwala K. Rebecca	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
	Dr. Martin Aliker	Acholi	Northern	Protestant
Second Deputy Prime Minister,	Moses Ali	Madi	Northern	Muslim

Tourism & Wildlife				
	Otim O. Yafest	Lango	Northern	Protestant
Third Deputy Prime Minister, Labour & Social Services	Paul O. Etiang	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Finance	J. S. Mayanja Nkangi	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Matthew Rukikaire	Muhororo	Western	Protestant
	Basoga Nsadhu	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
	Tomasi S. Kiryapawo	Mugwere	Eastern	Catholic
Trade & Industry	Henry Kajura	Munyoro	Western	Protestant
	Dr. Abel Rwendeire	Mukiga	Western	Catholic
Education & Sports	Amanya Mushega	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Francis E. Babu	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Brig. Jim K. Muhwezi	Muhororo	Western	Protestant
Health	Dr. C. Kiyonga	Munyabindi	Western	Protestant
Information	Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
	Philip Byaruhanga	Munyoro	Western	Catholic
Natural Resources	Gerald Ssendawula	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Matiya B. Isoke	Munyoro	Western	Catholic
Internal Affairs	Tom Butime	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
	Col. William Omaria	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Lands, Housing & Urban Development	Francis Ayume	Kakwa	Northern	Protestant
	Jovino A. Akaki	Langi	Northern	Catholic
Local Government	Bidandi Ssali	Muganda	Central	Muslim
	Col. Kahinda Otafiire	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
	Andraule Awuzu	Lugbara	Northern	Catholic
Gender & Community Development	Janat B. Mukwaya	Muganda	Central	Muslim
	Jane F. Kuka	Sabiny	Eastern	Catholic
Planning & Economic Development	Richard Kaijukai	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Sam Kutesa	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Public Service	Prof. Apolo Nsibambi	Muganda	Central	Protestant

	Mavenjana Akumu	Alur	Northern	Catholic
Works, Transport & Communications	John Nasasira	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Sylvester W. Wasieba	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
Justice	Bart Katureebe	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
	Emmanuel Kirenga	Muganda	Central	Catholic

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.

Year: 2000

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
President	Yoweri K. Museveni	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Minister in charge of the Presidency	Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
Minister in charge of Information	Basoga Nsadhu	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Minister in charge of security	Wilson M. Mukasa	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Minister in charge of Economic Monitoring	Kweronda Ruhemba	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Defence	Stephen Kavuma	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Vice-President	Dr. Speciosa Wandira Kazibwe	Musoga	Eastern	Catholic
	Betty Okwir	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
Prime Minister	Prof. Apolo Nsibambi	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Prof. Mondo Kagonyera	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
	Omwony Ojwok	Karamajong	Northern	Catholic
	Peter Lokeris	Karamajong	Northern	Catholic
	Ruth Nankabirwa Sentamu	Muganda	Central	Catholic
First Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs	Eriya Kategaya	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Amama Mbabazi	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
	Dr. Alfred Mubanda	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Second Deputy Prime Minister, Tourism, Trade & Industry	Moses Ali	Madi	Northern	Muslim
	Jovino A. Akaki	Langi	Northern	Catholic
	Vincent Nyanzi	Muganda	Central	Catholic

Disaster Preparedness & Refugees	Maj. Tom Butime	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
	Jane F. Kuka	Sabiny	Eastern	Catholic
Finance, Planning & Economic Development	Gerald Ssendawula	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Privatisation	Manzi Tumubweinee	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
	Gabriel Opio	Musamia	Eastern	Protestant
Education & Sports	Prof. Edward K. Makubuya	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Namirembe Bitamazire	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Dr. Abel Rwendeire	Mukiga	Western	Catholic
	Alfred O. Ogaba	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
Agriculture, Animal Industry & Fisheries	Dr. Kisamba Mugerwa	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Dr. Sebunya Kibirige	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Dr. Fabius Byaruhanga	Mutagwenda (Munyankole)	Western	Catholic
	Fred Mukisa	Musamia	Eastern	Catholic
Health	Dr. Crispus Kiyonga	Munyabindi	Western	Protestant
	Phillip Byaruhanga	Munyoro	Western	Catholic
	Beatrice W. Mukaye	Mugisu	Eastern	Catholic
Internal Affairs	Prof. Edward Rugumayo	Mutoro	Western	Protestant
	Sarah S. Namusoke	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Water, Lands & Environment	Henry M. Kajura	Munyoro	Western	Protestant
	Matiya B. Isoke	Munyoro	Western	Catholic
	Dr. Kezimbira Miyingo	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Local Government	Bidandi Ssali	Muganda	Central	Muslim
	Betty A. Okullu	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
Gender, Labour & Social Development	Janat B. Mukwaya	Muganda	Central	Muslim
	Tomasi S. Kiryapawo	Mugwere	Eastern	Catholic
	Dr. Philemon	Mufumbira	Western	Protestant

	Mateke			
	Mary N. Kakembo	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Nayiga Florence	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Grace Akello	Iteso	Eastern	Catholic
Energy & Minerals	Syda Bbumba	Muganda	Central	Muslim
	Francis E. Babu	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Public Service	Amanya Mushega	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Mavenjima Akumu	Alur	Northern	Catholic
	Benigna Mukiibi	Munyoro	West	Catholic
Works, Housing & Communications	John Nasasira	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Michael W. Kafabusa	Mugisu	Eastern	Catholic
	Omax Omeda	Iteso	Eastern	Catholic
	Andruale Awuzu	Lugbara	Northern	Catholic
Justice & Constitutional Affairs	J. S. Mayanja Nkangi	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Attorney General	Bart Katureebe	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
Ethics & Integrity	Miria Matembe	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Parliamentary Affairs	Rebecca K. Alitwala	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.

Year: 2002

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
President	Yoweri K. Museveni	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Minister in charge of the Presidency	Dr. Gilbert Bukenya	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Vice-President	Dr. Speciosa Wandira Kazibwe	Musoga	Eastern	Catholic
Prime Minister	Prof. Apolo Nsibambi	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Prof. Mondo Kagonyera	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
	Felix Okot Ogong	Langi	Northern	Catholic
	Miria Matembe	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Omwony Ojwok	Karamajong	Northern	Catholic
Northern Uganda	Agard Didi	Madi	Northern	Catholic
Karamoja	Peter Lokeris	Karamajong	Northern	Catholic
Luwero	Tim Lwanga	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Information	Basoga Nsadhu	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Security	Muruli Mukasa	Muganda	Central	Protestant

First Deputy Prime Minister, Internal Affairs	Eriya Kategaya	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Sarah K. Namusoke	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Second Deputy Prime Minister, Disaster Preparedness & Refugees	Moses Ali	Madi	Northern	Muslim
	Christine A. Aporu	Iteso	Eastern	Catholic
Third Deputy Prime Minster, Foreign Affairs	James Wapakabulo	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
	Col. Kahinda Otafiire	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
	Tom Butime	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
Finance, Planning & Economic Development	Gerald Ssendawula	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Rukutuna Mwesigwa	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Sam Kutesa	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Issac Musumba	Musoga	Eastern	Muslim
	Prof. Peter Kasenene	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
Defence	Amama Mbabazi	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
	Ruth Nankabirwa Sentamu	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Education & Sports	Prof. Edward K. Makubuya	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Namirembe Bitamazire	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Betty Akech Okullu	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
	Henry Oryem Okello	Acholi	Northern	Protestant
Agriculture, Animal Industry & Fisheries	Dr. Kisamba Mugerwa	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Dr. Sebunya Kibirige	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Mary R. Mugyenyi	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Dr. Fabius Byaruhanga	Munyoro	Western	Catholic
Health	Brig. Jim Muhwezi	Muhororo	Western	Protestant

	Mike Mukula	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
	Beatrice W. Mukaye	Mugisu	Eastern	Catholic
Tourism, Trade & Industry	Prof. Edward Rugumayo	Mutoro	Western	Protestant
	Jovino A. Akaki	Langi	Northern	Catholic
	Richard Nduhuura	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Dr. Abel Rwendeire	Mukiga	Western	Catholic
Water, Lands & Environment	Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
	Matiya B. Isoke	Munyoro	Western	Catholic
	Dr. Kezimbira Miyingo	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Maria Mutagamba	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Local Government	Bidandi Ssali	Muganda	Central	Muslim
	Phillip Byaruhanga	Munyoro	Western	Catholic
Gender, Labour & Social Development	Bakoko B. Zoe	Lugbara	Northern	Catholic
	Sam Bitangaro	Mufumbira	Western	Protestant
	Henry Obbo	Japadhola	Eastern	Catholic
	Alex Kamugisha	Muhororo	Western	Catholic
	Florence Nayiga	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Grace Akello	Iteso	Eastern	Catholic
Energy & Minerals	Syda Bbumba	Muganda	Central	Muslim
	Daudi Migereko	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
	Kamanda Bataringaya	Mwamba	Western	Catholic
Public Service	Henry M. Kajura	Munyoro	Western	Protestant
	Okumu Ringa Aloysius	Alur	Northern	Catholic
	Benigna Mukiibi	Munyoro	Western	Catholic
Works, Housing & Communications	John Nasasira	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Michael W. Kafabusa	Mugisu	Eastern	Catholic
	Francis E. Babu	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Andruale Awuzu	Lugbara	Northern	Catholic
Justice & Constitutional Affairs	Janat B. Mukwaya	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Attorney General	Francis J. Ayume	Kakwa	Northern	Protestant
Without Portfolio	Dr. Crispus	Munyabindi	Western	Protestant

	Kiyonga			

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.

Year: 2004

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
President	Yoweri K. Museveni	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Minister in charge of the Presidency	Kirunda Kivejinja	Musoga	Eastern	Muslim
Vice-President	Dr. Gilbert Bukenya	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Adolf Mwesige	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
Prime Minister	Prof. Apolo Nsibambi	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Prof. Mondo Kagonyera	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
Parliamentary Affairs	Hope Mwesigye	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
Ethics & Integrity	Tim Lwanga	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Northern Uganda	Grace Akello	Iteso	Eastern	Catholic
Karamoja	Peter Lokeris	Karamajong	Northern	Catholic
Luwero	Prof. Semakula Kiwanuka	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Agard Didi	Madi	Northern	Catholic
Information	Nsaba Buturo	Mufumbira	Western	Protestant
Security	Betty A. Okullu	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
First Deputy Prime Minister, Disaster Preparedness & Refugees	Lt.-Gen. Moses Ali	Madi	Northern	Muslim
	Christine A. Aporu	Iteso	Eastern	Catholic
Second Deputy Prime Minster, Foreign Affairs	James Wapakabulo	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
	Nshimye Sebutulo	Munyarwanda	Central	Catholic
	Tom Butime	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
Third Deputy Prime Minister, Public Service	Henry M. Kajura	Munyoro	Western	Protestant
	Okumu Ringa Aloysius	Alur	Northern	Catholic
	Benigna Mukiibi	Munyoro	Western	Catholic
Finance, Planning & Economic Development	Gerald Ssendawula	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Omwony Ojwok	Karamajong	Northern	Catholic

	Rukutuna Mwesigwa	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Sam Kutesa	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Issac Musumba	Musoga	Eastern	Muslim
	Prof. Peter Kasenene	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
Defence	Amama Mbabazi	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
	Ruth Nankabirwa Sentamu	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Internal Affairs	Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
	Dr. Kezimbira Miyingo	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Education & Sports	Prof. Edward K. Makubuya	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Namirembe Bitamazire	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Beatrice W. Mukaye	Mugisu	Eastern	Catholic
	Henry Oryem Okello	Acholi	Northern	Protestant
Agriculture, Animal Industry & Fisheries	Dr. Kisamba Mugerwa	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Dr. Sebunya Kibirige	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Mary R. Mugyenyi	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Dr. Fabius Byaruhanga	Munyoro	Western	Catholic
Health	Brig. Jim Muhwezi	Muhororo	Western	Protestant
	Mike Mukula	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
	Dr. Alex Kamugisha	Muhororo	Western	Catholic
Tourism, Trade & Industry	Prof. Edward Rugumayo	Mutoro	Western	Protestant
	Jovino A. Akaki	Langi	Northern	Catholic
	Richard Nduhuura	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Jennipher Namuyangu	Mugwere	Eastern	Protestant
Water, Lands & Environment	Col. Kahinda Otafiire	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
	Matiya B. Isoke	Munyoro	Western	Catholic
	Lt.-Gem. Jeje Odongo	Iteso	Eastern	Muslim
	Maria Mutagamba	Muganda	Central	Catholic

Local Government	Prof. Tarsis Kabwegyere	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
	Phillip Byaruhanga	Munyoro	Western	Catholic
Gender, Labour & Social Development	Bakoko B. Zoe	Lugbara	Northern	Catholic
	Sam Bitangaro	Mufumbira	Western	Protestant
	Henry Obbo	Japadhola	Eastern	Catholic
	Felix Okot Ogong	Langi	Northern	Catholic
	Florence Nayiga	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Energy & Minerals	Syda Bbumba	Muganda	Central	Muslim
	Daudi Migereko	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
	Kamanda Bataringaya	Mwamba	Western	Catholic
Works, Housing & Communications	John Nasasira	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Michael W. Kafabusa	Mugisu	Eastern	Catholic
	Francis E. Babu	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Andruale Awuzu	Lugbara	Northern	Catholic
Justice & Constitutional Affairs	Janat B. Mukwaya	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Attorney General	Francis J. Ayume	Kakwa	Northern	Protestant
Without Portfolio	Dr. Crispus Kiyonga	Munyabindi	Western	Protestant

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.

Year: 2006

Position	**Name**	**Tribe**	**Region**	**Religion**
President	Yoweri K. Museveni	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Minister in charge of the Presidency	Beatrice Wabudeya	Mugisu	Eastern	Catholic
Vice-President	Dr. Gilbert Bukenya	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Phillip Byaruhanga	Munyoro	Western	Catholic
Prime Minister	Prof. Apolo Nsibambi	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Prof. Mondo Kagonyera	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
Parliamentary Affairs	Hope Mwesigye	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
Ethics & Integrity	Tim Lwanga	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Northern Uganda	Grace Akello	Iteso	Eastern	Catholic

Karamoja	Peter Lokeris	Karamajong	Northern	Catholic
Luwero	Beatrice Z. Magoola	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
	Agard Didi	Madi	Northern	Catholic
Information	Nsaba Buturo	Mufumbira	Western	Protestant
Security	Betty A. Okullu	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
First Deputy Prime Minister, Disaster Preparedness & Refugees	Lt.-Gen. Moses Ali	Madi	Northern	Muslim
	Christine A. Aporu	Iteso	Eastern	Catholic
Third Deputy Prime Minister, Public Service	Henry M. Kajura	Munyoro	Western	Protestant
	Okumu Ringa Aloysius	Alur	Northern	Catholic
	Benigna Mukiibi	Munyoro	Western	Catholic
Foreign Affairs	Sam Kutesa	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Nshimye Sebutulo	Munyarwanda	Central	Catholic
	Henry Oryem Okello	Acholi	Northern	Protestant
Finance, Planning & Economic Development	Dr. Ezra Suruma	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
	Omwony Ojwok	Karamajong	Northern	Catholic
	Rukutuna Mwesigwa	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Prof. Semakula Kiwanuka	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Issac Musumba	Musoga	Eastern	Muslim
	Prof. Peter Kasenene	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
Defence	Amama Mbabazi	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
	Ruth Nankabirwa Sentamu	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Internal Affairs	Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
	Dr. Kezimbira Miyingo	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Education & Sports	Namirembe Bitamazire	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Nyombi Thembo	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Simon Mayende	Samia	Eastern	Protestant
	Charles Bakkabulindi	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Agriculture, Animal	Janat B. Mukwaya	Muganda	Central	Muslim

Industry & Fisheries				
	Dr. Sebunya Kibirige	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Mary R. Mugyenyi	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Health	Brig. Jim Muhwezi	Muhororo	Western	Protestant
	Mike Mukula	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
	Dr. Alex Kamugisha	Muhororo	Western	Catholic
Tourism, Trade & Industry	Daudi Migereko	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
	Jovino A. Akaki	Langi	Northern	Catholic
	Jennipher Namuyangu	Mugwere	Eastern	Protestant
	Igeme Nabeta	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Water, Lands & Environment	Col. Kahinda Otafiire	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
	Matiya B. Isoke	Munyoro	Western	Catholic
	Lt.-Gem. Jeje Odongo	Iteso	Eastern	Muslim
	Maria Mutagamba	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Local Government	Prof. Tarsis Kabwegyere	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
	Richard Nduhuura	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Gender, Labour & Social Development	Bakoko B. Zoe	Lugbara	Northern	Catholic
	Sam Bitangaro	Mufumbira	Western	Protestant
	Henry Obbo	Japadhola	Eastern	Catholic
	Felix Okot Ogong	Langi	Northern	Catholic
	Florence Nayiga	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Energy & Minerals	Syda Bbumba	Muganda	Central	Muslim
	Michael W. Kafabusa	Mugisu	Eastern	Catholic
	Kamanda Bataringaya	Mwamba	Western	Catholic
Works, Housing & Communications	John Nasasira	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Francis E. Babu	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Andruale Awuzu	Lugbara	Northern	Catholic
	Tom Butime	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
Justice & Constitutional Affairs	Dr. Edward K. Makubuya	Muganda	Central	Protestant

	Adolf Mwesige	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
Without Portfolio	Dr. Crispus Kiyonga	Munyabindi	Western	Protestant

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.

Year: 2008

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
President	Yoweri K. Museveni	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
The Minister, Office of the President	Beatrice Wabudeya	Mugisu	Eastern	Catholic
The Minister, Office of the President (Security)	Amama Mbabazi	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
Vice-President	Dr. Gilbert Bukenya	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	James Baba	Kakwa	Northern	Protestant
Prime Minister	Prof. Apolo Nsibambi	Muganda	Central	Protestant
The Minister, Office of the Prime Minister	Prof. Tarsis Kabwegyere	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
	Musa Ecweru	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
The Minister, Office of the Prime Minister	Adolf Mwesige	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
Ethics & Integrity	Nsaba Buturo	Mufumbira	Western	Protestant
Northern Uganda	David Wakikona	Mugisu	Eastern	Catholic
Karamoja	Aston Kajara	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
Luwero	Nyombi Thembo	Muganda	Central	Protestant
First Deputy Prime Minister, East African Affairs	Eriya Kategaya	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Second Deputy Prime Minister, Public Service	Henry M. Kajura	Munyoro	Western	Protestant
	Prisca B. Mbaguta Sezi	Muhororo	Western	Catholic
Third Deputy Prime Minister, Information & National Guidance	Kirunda Kivijinja	Musoga	Eastern	Muslim
Foreign Affairs	Sam Kutesa	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Issac Musumba	Musoga	Eastern	Muslim
	Henry Oryem Okello	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
Finance, Planning	Dr. Ezra Suruma	Mukiga	Western	Protestant

& Economic Development				
	Caleb Akandwanaho	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Kagimu Kiwanuka	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Fred Omach	Alur	Northern	Catholic
	Prof. Semakula Kiwanuka	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Omwony Ojwok	Karamajong	Northern	Catholic
	Rukiya Chekamondo Kulany	Sabiny	Eastern	Muslim
Defence	Dr. Crispus Kiyonga	Munyabindi	Western	Protestant
	Ruth Nankabirwa Sentamu	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Internal Affairs	Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
	Matia Kasaija	Munyoro	Western	Catholic
Education & Sports	Namirembe Bitamazire	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Peter Lokeris	Karamajong	Northern	Catholic
	Gabriel Opio	Musamia	Eastern	Protestant
	Charles Bakkabulindi	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Agriculture, Animal Industry & Fisheries	Hilary Onek	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
	Dr. Sebunya Kibirige	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Maj. Bright Rwamirama	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Fred Mukisa	Musamia	Eastern	Catholic
Health	Dr. Stephen Mallinga	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
	Richard Nduhuura	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Emmanuel O. Otaala	Jopadhola	Eastern	Catholic
Tourism, Trade & Industry	Janat B. Mukwaya	Muganda	Central	Muslim
	Serapio Rukundo	Mukiga	Western	Catholic
	Ephraim Kamuntu	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Nelson Gagawala Wambuzi	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Lands, Housing & Urban Development	Omara Atubo	Langi	Northern	Catholic

	Dr. Kasirivu Atwoki	Munyoro	Western	Catholic
	Urban Tibamanya	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
	Michael W. Kafabusa	Mugisu	Eastern	Catholic
Water & Environment	Maria Mutagamba	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Jessica Eriyo	Madi	Northern	Catholic
	Jennipher Namuyangu	Mugwere	Eastern	Protestant
Local Government	Col. Kahinda Otafiire	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
	Hope Mwesigye	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
Gender, Labour & Social Development	Syda Bbumba	Muganda	Central	Muslim
	Rukia Isanga	Busoga	Eastern	Muslim
	Rukutuna Mwesigwa	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Maj. James Kinobe	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Sulaimani Madada	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Energy & Mineral Development	Daudi Migereko	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
	Simon d'Ujanga	Alur	Northern	Catholic
	Kamanda Bataringaya	Mwamba	Western	Catholic
Works & Transport	John Nasasira	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
	Simon Ejua	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
	John Byabagambi	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
Justice & Constitutional Affairs	Dr. Edward K. Makubuya	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Fred Ruhindi	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Information Communication Technology	Dr. Ham Mukasa Mulira	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Alintuma Nsambu	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Without Portfolio	Dorothy Hyuha	Mugwere	Eastern	Protestant

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOU Various Years a.

DISTRIBUTION OF UPC PARTY CABINET, 1964-71

Year: 1964-1971

Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
Dr. A. M. Obote (President)	Langi	Northern	Protestant
Dr. John Babiiha (Vice-President)	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
Felix Onama (Secretary General)	Madi	Northern	Catholic
E. Y. Lakidi (Assistant Secretary General)	Acholi	Northern	Protestant
William W. Kalema (National Treasurer)	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Joshua N. Wakholi (Assistant Treasurer)	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
Shaban K. Nkutu (National Chairman)	Musoga	Eastern	Muslim

Source: Compiled based on UPC 2008.

DISTRIBUTION OF NRM CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (CEC), 2008[894]

Year: 2008

Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
Yoweri Museveni (National Chairman)	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Al Hajji Moses Kigongo (1st National Vice Chairma)	Muganda	Central	Muslim
Rebecca Kadaga (2nd National Vice Chairman)	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Gilbert Bukenya (Vice Chairman - Central Region)	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Lt. Gen. (rtd.) Moses Ali (Vice Chairman - Northern Region)	Madi	Northern	Muslim
Brig. (rtd.) Matayo Kyaligonza (Vice Chairman - Western Region)	Munyoro	Western	Catholic
Flt. Capt. Michael Mukula	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant

[894] Note that the religious affiliation of some CEC members could not be established.

(Vice Chairman - Eastern Region)			
Amama Mbabazi (Secretary General)	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
Dorothy Hyuha (Deputy Secretary General)	Mugwere	Eastern	Protestant
Ndawula Kawesa (National Treasurer)	Muganda	Central	
Parminder Singh Katongole (Deputy National Treasurer)	Indian		
Ruhakana Rugunda (Chairperson, NRM Electoral Commission)	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
Kabakumba Masiko (Chairperson, NRM Parliamentary Caucus)	Munyoro	Western	Protestant
Kirunda Kivejinja (Chairperson, NRM Historical Leaders' Forum)	Musoga	Eastern	Muslim
Namirembe Bitamazire (Chairperson, NRM Women League)	Muganda	Central	
Jim Muhwezi (Chairperson, NRM Veterans' League)	Muhororo	Western	Protestant
Fred Mukisa (Chairperson, NRM Elders' League)	Musamia	Eastern	Catholic
Florence Naiga Sekabira (Chairperson, NRM People With Disability League)	Muganda	Central	
Charles Bakabulindi (Chairperson, NRM Veterans' League)	Muganda	Central	
Hassan Basajabalaba (Chairperson, NRM Entrepreneurs' League)	Munyankole	Western	Muslim
Abbas Agaba (Chairperson, NRM Youth League)	Mutagwenda (Munyankole)	Western	Muslim

Source: Compiled based on NRM 2008.

DISTRIBUTION OF PERMANENT SECRETARIES, 1991 & 2007[895]

Year: 1991

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
Office of the President	H. J. Obbo	Japadhola	Eastern	Catholic
	Azaria J. Kigge	Muganda	Central	Protestant
	Mrs. J. Magezi	Munyoro	Western	
Vice President's Office	Nyanzi Musoke	Muganda	Central	
Office of the Prime Minister	Emmanuel L. Sendawula	Muganda	Central	Catholic
	Nathan Obore	Iteso	Eastern	Protestant
Agriculture	T. E. Ogwal	Langi	Northern	
	J. K. Mukiibi	Muganda	Central	
Animal Industry & Fisheries	John B. Bushara	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Commerce	N. Odol		Northern	
Constitutional Affairs	Thecla Kinalwa	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Cooperatives & Marketing	Sam Rutega	Muhororo	Western	Protestant
Defence	Maj. Oketcho	Japadhola	Eastern	Protestant
Education	Rev. Fr. Pius Tibanyendera	Mutoro	Western	Catholic
	Chris M. Kassami	Mutoro	Western	Protestant
Energy	Ben Dramadri	Lugbara	Northern	Catholic
Environment Protection	Opika-Opoka	Acholi	Northern	
Finance	James Kahoza	Muhororo	Western	Protestant
	L. Lukwago	Muganda	Central	
Foreign & Regional Affairs	Ernest Rusita	Muhororo	Western	Protestant
	J. R. Kyalimpa	Mutoro	Western	Protestant
Health	Nangodi Gubi	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
Housing & Urban Development	M. A. N. Lwanga	Muganda	Central	
Industry & Technology	George E. L. Okutu	Teso	Eastern	Protestant
Information & Broadcasting	John Baptist Walusimbi	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Internal Affairs	Mrs. E. Mugasha	Munyankole	Western	
Justice	O. M. J. Ndawula	Muganda	Central	

[895] Note that the religious affiliation of some permanent secretaries could not be established.

Labour	Alphonse Oseku	Iteso	Eastern	Catholic
Lands & Survey	Paul Bakashabaruhanga	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Local Government	Francis K. Gasasira	Mufumbira	Western	Catholic
Planning & Economic Development	Emmanuel Tumusiime Mutebile	Mukiga	Western	Catholic
Public Service & Cabinet Affairs	Martin Orech	Langi	Northern	Protestant
	Erima Baingana	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Relief & Social Rehabilitation	E. R. Kagazi	Munyankole	Western	
Tourism & Wildlife	Ben Otto	Langi	Northern	Protestant
Transport & Communications	Wilson O. Wanyama	Musamia	Eastern	Protestant
Water & Mineral Development	Mrs. Ocaya Lakidi	Langi	Northern	Protestant
Works	P. Ssebbowa	Muganda	Central	
Youth, Culture & Sports	Augistine Karugaba	Mukiga	Western	Catholic

Source: Compiled based on GOU 1991.

Year: 2007

Position	**Name**	**Tribe**	**Region**	**Religion**
Office of the President	Mrs. Thecla Kinalwa	Muganda	Central	Catholic
State House	Richard Muhinda	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Office of the Prime Minister	Mr. Martin John Odwedo	Acholi	Northern	Catholic
Defence	Ms. Rosettie Byengoma	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Public Service	Mr. Jimmy R. Lwamafa	Mukiga	Western	Protestant
Foreign Affairs	Amb. James Mugume	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Justice & Constitutional Affairs	Mrs. Kiggundu Jane F. B.	Munyankole	Western	Catholic
Finance, Planning & Economic Development	Ms. Betty Kasimbazi	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Internal Affairs	Dr. Kagoda Samuel Paulo	Musoga	Eastern	Protestant
Agriculture, Animal Industry & Fisheries	Mr. Vincent R. Rubarema	Mufumbira	Western	Catholic
Local Government	Mr. V. Ssekono	Muganda	Central	Catholic

Lands, Housing & Urban Development	Mr. Gabindadde-Musoke	Muganda	Central	Protestant
Education and Sports	Mr. Francis Xavier Lubanga	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Health	Ms. Mary L. Nannono	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Tourism, Trade & Industry	Dr. Sam G. Nahamya	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Works and Transport	Mr. Muganzi Amooti Charles	Mutoro	Western	Protestant
Energy & Mineral Development	Mr. F. A. Kabagambe-Kaliisa	Munyankole	Western	Protestant
Gender, Labour and Social Development	Ms. Christine Guwatudde Kintu	Muganda	Central	Catholic
Water and Environment	Mr. David O. O. Obong	Lango	Northern	Protestant
Information & Communication Technology	Dr. Jimmy Pat Saamanya	Mugisu	Eastern	Protestant
East African Community Affairs	Mrs. Edith N Mwanje	Muganda	Central	Protestant

Source: Compiled based on GOU 2008a.

DISTRIBUTION OF COFFEE MARKETING BOARD (CMB) MEMBERS, 1969[896]

Year: 1969

Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
Roger J. Mukasa (Chairman)	Muganda	Central	
F. Kayemba (Masaka)	Muganda	Central	
K. Kabakyenga (Banyankole-Kweterana)	Munyankole	Western	
T. Nangalama (Bugisu)	Mugisu	Eastern	
Y. Bigirwa (Bunyoro)	Munyoro	Western	
S. Kaisa (Busoga)	Musoga	Eastern	
J. Nyondo (West Nile)	Lugbara	Northern	
A. Ekule	Mukonzo	Western	

[896] Note that the religious affiliation of CMB members could not be established.

(Bwamba-Rwenzori)			
B. S. Lubwago (Secretary)	Muganda	Central	

Source: Compiled based on CMB 1969.

DISTRIBUTION OF UGANDA COFFEE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (UCDA) POSITIONS, 1996-2005[897]

Year: 1996

Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
F. W. Nagimesi (Chairman)	Mugisu	Eastern	
John Kanakulya	Muganda	Central	
H. Karuhanga	Munyankole	Western	
P. Muyiyi	Mutoro	Western	
L. B. Mubiru	Muganda	Central	
Jack Bigirwa	Munyankole	Western	
S. Banya	West Nile	Northern	
Fred Mwesigye	Mutoro	Western	
Sam Semanda	Muganda	Central	
C. Karamagi	Mutoro	Western	
T. N. Bucyanayandi (Managing Director)	Mufumbira	Western	
W. G. Naigaga (Board Secretary	Musoga	Eastern	

Source: Compiled based on UCDA Various Years.

Year: 1999

Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
J. B. Muganga (Chairman)	Muganda	Central	
H. Karuhanga	Munyankole	Western	
Gregory Stough			
Ms. Olivia Wonekha	Mugisu	Eastern	
Hajj Elias Kisutut	Muganda	Central	
Mr. B. A. Mungu-Acel	West Nile/ Acholi	Northern	
Jack Bigirwa	Munyankole/ Munyoro	Western	
Dr. Peter Ngetegize	Mukiga/ Munyankole	Western	
Fred Mwesigye	Mutoro	Western	
Keith Muhakanizi	Munyankole	Western	
T. N. Bucyanayandi	Mufumbira	Western	

[897] Note that the religious affiliation of UCDA members could not be established.

(Managing Director)			
William G. Naigaga (Board Secretary)	Musoga	Eastern	

Source: Compiled based on UCDA Various Years.

Year: 2002

Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
Paul Sempa Mugambwa (Chairman)	Muganda	Central	
Rev. Fr. Dr. Joseph Kiseeka	Muganda	Central	
Hajji Eng. Ishak Lukenge	Muganda	Central	
Mrs. Jane Frances Kuka	Sabiny	Western	
Mrs. Robina Sabano	Musoga	Eastern	
Keith Muhakanizi	Munyankole	Western	
Dr. Denis T. Kyetere	Munyankole	Western	
Mrs. Faith J. Mutebi	Muganda	Central	
Mr. B. A. Mungu-Acel	West Nile/ Acholi	Northern	
Yorokamu Abainenamar	Munyankole	Western	
Henry Ngabirano (Managing Director)	Munyarwanda	Western	
William G. Naigaga (Board Secretary)	Musoga	Eastern	

Source: Compiled based on UCDA Various Years.

Year: 2005

Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
Paul Sempa Mugambwa (Chairman)	Muganda	Central	
Mrs. Faith J. Mutebi	Muganda	Central	
Mrs. Robina Sabano	Musoga	Eastern	
Joseph Apell	Iteso	Eastern	
Zadok Ekirapa	Iteso	Eastern	
Hajji Eng. Ishak Lukenge	Muganda	Central	
Dr. James Ogwang	Langi	Northern	
Kenneth Mugamba	Mutoro	Western	
Dr. Hussein A. Shire	Karamajong	Northern	
Rev. Fr. Dr. Joseph Kiseeka	Muganda	Central	
Yorokamu Abainenamar	Munyankole (Bahima)	Western	
Heny Ngabirano	Munyankole (Bahima)	Western	

(Managing Director)			
Fred Luzinda (Board Secretary)	Muganda	Central	

Source: Compiled based on UCDA Various Years.

DISTRIBUTION OF UPDF TOP COMMAND, 2007[898]

Year: 2007

Position	Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
Commander of Defence Forces (CDF)	Gen. Aronda Nyakarima	Munyankole	Western	
Deputy Commander of Defence Forces (DCDF)	Lt. Gen. Ivan Koreta	Munyankole	Western	
Joint Chief of Staff (JCOS)	Brig. Robert Rusoke	Mutoro	Western	
Commander Land Forces (CLF)	Lt. Gen. Katumba Wamala	Muganda	Central	
Commander Air Forces (CAF)	Maj. Gen. Jim Owoyesigire	Munyankole	Western	
Chief of Staff Land Forces (COS-LF)	Brig. Geoffrey Muheesi	Munyankole	Western	
Chief of Staff Air Forces (COS-AF)	Brig. Sam Turyagenda	Mukiga	Western	
Chief of Medical Services (CMS)	Brig. Dr. James Mukumbi	Muganda	Central	
Chief Political Commissar (CPC)	Brig. Francis Okello	Acholi	Northern	
Chief of Operations and Training (COT)	Brig. Silver Kayemba	Muganda	Central	
Chief of Logistics and Engineering (CLE)	Col. Jacob Musajjawaza	Muganda	Central	
Chief of Personnel and Administration (CPA)	Col. Phinehas Katirima	Munyankole	Western	
Chief of Military Intelligence (CMI)	Col. Leo Kyanda	Munyoro	Western	
Chief of Legal Services (CLS)	Col. Ramadhan Kyamulesire	Munyankole	Western	
CSO	Col Y. Kizza	Munyankole	Western	
Chief of Construction (COC)	Col. Timothy Sabiiti	Mukiga	Western	

[898] Note that the religious affiliation of army officers could not be established.

Chief of Finance (CCF)	Lt. Col. Musanyufu	Munyankole	Western	
Chief of Pensions (COP)	Lt. Col. Kyomukama Kasula	Muganda	Central	
1st Division Commander	Col. Burundi Nyamunywanisa	Munyankole	Western	
2nd Division Commander	Brig. Hudson Mukasa	Muganda	Central	
3rd Division Commander	Brig. Patrick Kankiriho	Munyankole	Western	
4th Division Commander	Brig. George Etyang	Iteso	Eastern	
5th Division Commander	Col. Lucky Kidega	Acholi	Northern	

Source: Compiled based on GOU 2008b.

DISTRIBUTION OF UPDF TOP FIVE RANKS, 2007[899]

Year: 2007

Name	Tribe	Region	Religion
Gen. Aronda Nyakarima	Munyankole	Western	
Lt. Gen. Ivan Koreta	Munyankole	Western	
Lt. Gen. Katumba Wamala	Muganda	Central	
Maj. Gen. Jim Owoyesigire	Mukiga	Western	
Maj. Gen. Fredrick Oketcho	Jopadhola	Eastern	
Maj. Gen. James Kazini	Musongora	Western	
Maj. Gen. Julius Oketta	Acholi	Northern	
Maj. Gen. Ali Bamuze	Aringa (Lugbara)	Northern	
Maj. Gen. (Rtd) Samuel Nanyumba	Musoga	Eastern	
Maj. Gen. (Rtd) Emilio Mondo	Madi	Northern	
Brig. Robert Rusoke	Mutoro	Western	
Brig. Geoffrey Muheesi	Munyankole	Western	
Brig. Sam Turyagenda	Mukiga	Western	
Brig. Hussein Adda	Kakwa	Northern	
Brig. Hudson Mukasa	Muganda	Central	
Brig. James Makumbi	Muganda	Central	
Brig. George Etyang	Iteso	Eastern	

[899] Note that the religious affiliation of army officers could not be established.

Brig. Francis Okello	Acholi	Northern	
Brig. Silver Kayemba	Muganda	Central	
Brig. Sam Lwanga	Muganda	Central	
Brig. Andrew Guti	Karamajong	Northern	
Brig. Kasirye Gwanga	Muganda	Central	
Brig. David Wakalo	Muganda	Central	
Brig. Sam Wasswa	Muganda	Central	
Brig. James Ssebagala	Muganda	Central	
Brig. Fred Mugisha	Munyankole	Western	
Brig. Nakibus Lakara	Karamajong	Northern	
Brig. Sam Kawagga	Muganda	Central	
Brig. Geoffrey Taban	Munyankole	Western	
Brig. Peter Kerim	Alur	Northern	
Brig. Pecos Kutesa.	Munyankole	Western	
Brig. Elly Kayanja	Muganda	Central	
Brig. Nelson Katagara	Mukiga	Western	
Brig. Sam Kolo	Acholi	Northern	
Brig. Kenneth Banya	Acholi	Northern	
Col. Gavas Mugyeny	Munyankole	Western	
Col. Fred Mugisha	Munyankole	Western	
Col. Jacob Musajjawaza	Muganda	Central	
Col. Phinehas Katirima	Munyankole	Western	
Col. Leo Kyanda	Munyoro	Western	
Col. James Mugira	Munyankole	Western	
Col. Charles Otema Awany	Acholi	Northern	
Col. Burundi Nyamunywanisa	Munyankole	Western	
Col. Jacob Asiimwe	Munyankole	Western	
Col. Eric Mukasa	Mutoro	Western	
Col. Ramadhan Kyamulesire	Munyankole	Western	
Col Y. Kizza	Munyankole	Western	
Col. M. Lukyamuzi	Muganda	Central	
Col. Mark Kodil	Madi	Northern	
Col. S. Othieno	Jopadhola	Eastern	
Col. John Mateeka	Munyankole	Western	
Col. Ambrose Musinguzi	Mukiga	Western	
Col. Sam Kiwanuka	Muganda	Central	
Col. Livingstone Katerega	Muganda	Central	

Col. Timothy Sabiiti	Mukiga	Western	
Col. Stephen Rwabantu	Munyankole	Western	
Col. Potel Kivuna	Munyankole	Western	
Col. Dr. F. Ochen	Acholi	Northern	
Col. Albert Kareeba	Munyankole	Western	
Col. Kasiita Gowa	Muganda	Central	
Col. Nelson Ssemwezi	Muganda	Central	
Col. J. K. Anywar	Acholi	Northern	
Col. J. W. Byarugaba	Munyoro	Western	
Col. Mbuga Kojja	Muganda	Central	
Col. (Rtd) Fred Mwesigye	Munyankole	Western	
Col. Diiba Sentongo	Muganda	Central	
Col. John Baptist Mulindwa	Muganda	Central	
Col. Patrick Kankiriho	Munyankole	Western	
Col. Joseph Arocha	Iteso	Eastern	
Col. Lucky Kidega	Acholi	Northern	
Col. John Lorot	Karamajong	Northern	
Col. Fred Bogere	Muganda	Central	
Col. George Olanya Ojara	Acholi	Northern	
Col. (Rtd) William Omaria	Iteso	Eastern	
Col. Onen Kamdulu	Acholi	Northern	
Lt. Col. Musanyufu	Munyankole	Western	
Lt. Col. Kyomukama Kasula	Muganda	Central	

Source: Compiled based on GOU 2008b.

11.1.2 Zambia

DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENT, 1964-2008[900]

'Inner core' of political power
Ministers[901]
Ministers of State/Deputy Ministers[902]

Year: 1964 (KAUNDA)

Position	Name	Tribe	Language	Province
President	K. D. Kaunda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	L. Changufu	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Vice-President	R. C. Kamanga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	A. M. Milner	White		
Foreign Affairs	S. M. Kapwepwe	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Home affairs	M. M. Chona	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	F. Chitambala	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Finance	Arthur L. Wina	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	U. G. Mwila	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Housing & Social Development	H. D. Banda	Senga	Tumbuka	Eastern
Labour & Mines	M. J. Chimba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	M. Nalilungwe	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Lands & Natural Resources	S. Kalulu	Soli	Tonga	Central
	S. C. Mbilishi	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
Agriculture	E. H. Mudenda	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	M. S. Chisembele	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Commerce & Industry	N. Mundia	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	Z. A. Banda	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Education	J. M. Mwanakatwe	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
	W. Nkanza	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
	C. H. Thornicroft	White		
Health	M. Sipalo	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	J. K. Chivunga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Local Government	S. Wina	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	N. Tembo	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
Transport &	A. G. Zulu	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern

[900] Note that government lists for 1988 and 2000 were not available.
[901] Note that the members of the 'inner core' of political power are also included as ministers.
[902] Including Parliamentary Secretaries in 1964, 1966 and 1968.

Works				
	J. Chisata	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Information & Postal Services	P. W. Matoka	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
	H. B. Kalanga	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Justice	J. J. Skinner	White		
Luapula	A. S. Kaunda	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
North Western	H. Kikombe	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Northern	R. S. Maskasa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Barotse	J.H. Monga	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Western	A. B. Mutemba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Southern	M. M. Sakubita	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Central	H. Shamabanse	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Eastern	A. J. Soko	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.

Year: 1966

Position	Name	Tribe	Language	Province
President	K. D. Kaunda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Vice President	R. C. Kamanga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	J. J. Skinner	White		
	A. M. Milner	White		
	J. K. Chivunga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	D. C. Mwiinga	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	M. Sipalo	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	H. B. Kalanga	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Foreign Affairs	S. M. Kapwepwe	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	T. R. Sikasula	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
Home Affairs	M. M Chona	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	F. Chitambala	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Finance	A. L. Wina	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	U. G. Mwila	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Transport & Works	H. D. Banda	Senga	Tumbuka	Eastern
	S. C. Mbilishi	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
Commerce & Industry	M. J. Chimba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	J. Chisata	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Lands & Natural Resources	S. Kalulu	Soli	Tonga	Central
	S. Sikombe	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
Health	P. W. Matoka	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western

	J. C. Ngoma	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Agriculture	E. H. Mudenda	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	M. S. Chisembele	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Ministry of Education	J. M. Mwanakatwe	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
	W. Nkanza	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
	C. H. Thornicroft	White		
Local Government & Housing	S. Wina	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Mines & Cooperatives	A. G. Zulu	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
	N. Tembo	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
	Mukwae Nakatindi Yeta Nganga	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Information & Postal Services	L. Changufu	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	J. M. Mutti	Nkoya	Barotse	Western
Justice	K. D. Konoso	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	P. M. Kapika	Swaka	Bemba	Central
Luapula	A. S. Kaunda	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
North Western	H. Kikombe	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Northern	R. S. Masaka	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Barotseland	J.H. Monga	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Western	A. B. Mutemba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Southern	M. M. Sakubita	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Central	H. Shamabanse	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Eastern	A. J. Soko	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.

Year: 1968

Position	Name	Tribe	Language	Province
President	K. D. Kaunda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Vice President	S. M. Kapwepwe	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	A. M. Milner	White		
	H. Mulemba	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
	S. C. Mbilishi	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
	A. J. Soko	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
	T. R. Sikasula	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
Foreign Affairs	R. C. Kamanga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	R. S. Makasa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Without Portfolio	M. M Chona	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Finance	E. H. Mudenda	Tonga	Tonga	Southern

	U. G. Mwila	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Home affairs	A. G. Zulu	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Education	A. N. Wina	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	C. H. Thornicroft	White		
Cooperatives, Youth & Social Development	H. D. Banda	Senga	Tumbuka	Eastern
	A. B. Mutemba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	M. S. Chisembele	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
	Mukwae Nakatindi Yeta Nganga	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Labour	L. Changufu	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	M. P. Kapika	Swaka	Bemba	Central
Commerce, Industry & Foreign Trade	M. J. Chimba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	J. Chisata	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Transport, Power & Communications	S. Kalulu	Soli	Tonga	Central
	H. M. Kikombe	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
	H. B. Kalanga	Lenje	Tonga	Central
	Z. A. Banda	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Lands & Mines	J. M. Mwanakatwe	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
	M. Nalilungwe	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	J. K. Chivunga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Local Government & Housing	S. Wina	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	S. Sikombe	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
Works	P. W. Matoka	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
	H. Y. Mwale	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Legal Affairs	J. J. Skinner	White		
Natural Resources & Tourism	D. K. Konoso	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	N. S. Mulenga	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Agriculture	M. Sipalo	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	J. C. Ngoma	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Health	D. C. Mwiinga	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	M. J. Chapoloko	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Luapula	N. Ngalande	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
North Western	N. Tembo	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
Northern	M. M. Sakubita	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Barotse	F. Chitambala	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt

Western	P. Chanda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Southern	H. Shamabanse	Lenje	Tonga	Southern
Central	J. H. Monga	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Eastern	A. K. Shapi	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.

Year: 1970

Position	Name	Tribe	Language	Province
President	K. D. Kaunda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Vice President	S. M. Kapwepwe	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	J. M. Mwanakatwe	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
	F. Chuula	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	J. K. Chivunga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	C. H. Thornicroft	White		
	P. Chanda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	M. Ngalande	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
	M. Nkama	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	J. B. Siyomunji	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Rural Development	R. C. Kamanga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	J. M. Mutti	Nkoya	Barotse	Western
	N. S. Mulenga	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Development & Finance	E. H. Mudenda	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	K. H. Nkwabilo	Soli	Tonga	Central
Defence	A. G. Zulu	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Home Affairs	L. Changufu	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	C. M. Mwananshiku	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
National Guidance	M. J. Chimba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	M. J. Banda	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Lands & Natural Resources	S. Kalulu	Soli	Tonga	Tonga
	T. J. Kankasa	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Information, Broadcasting & Tourism	S. Wina	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	A. I. Phiri	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Trade	H. Mulemba	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Labour & Social Services	F. M. Mulikita	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	J. Chisata	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	M. J. Chapoloko	Bemba	Bemba	Northern

Education	W. P. Nyirenda	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
	U. G. Mwila	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	V. S. Musakanya	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Power, Transport & Works	A. M. Milner	White		
	I. W. Masaiti	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	J. Mambwe	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Western Province	S. M. Chisembele	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
	F. Liboma	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Eastern Province	W. Nkanza	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
	J. C. Sinyangwe	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
Copperbelt	A. J. Soko	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
	F. N. Bulawayo	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Northern	S. C. Mibilishi	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
	P. M. Kapika	Swaka	Bemba	Central
Southern	H. D. Banda	Senga	Tumbuka	Eastern
	J. H. Monga	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Luapula Province	R. S. Makasa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	N. Tembo	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
North- Western Province	H. Shamabanse	Lenje	Tonga	Southern
	J. C. Ngoma	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Central	A. K. Shapi	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
	H. Y. Mwale	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.

Year: 1972

Position	**Name**	**Tribe**	**Language**	**Province**
President	K. D. Kaunda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Vice-President	M. M. Chona	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	A. M. Milner	White		
	F. Liboma	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	F. N. Bulawayo	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
	B. F. Kapulu	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	A. M. Simbule	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
	J. C. Ngoma	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
	S. Soko	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
	S. M. Chisembele	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Rural Development	R. C. Kamanga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	O. T. Vibetti	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt

	M. Nkholoma	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Foreign Affairs	E. H. Mudenda	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	T. J. Kankasa	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Defence	A. G. Zulu	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
	C. Mwananshiku	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
Home Affairs	L. Changufu	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Finance	J. Mwanakatwe	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
Lands & Natural Resources	S. Kalulu	Soli	Tonga	Southern
	W. K. Sikalumbi	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
Information, Broadcasting & Tourism	S. Wina	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	J. B. Litana	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Local Government & Housing	P. W. Matoka	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
	J. H. Monga	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Mines & Mining Development	H. Mulemba	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Power, Transport & Works	F. M. Mulikita	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	H. Y. Mwale	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	N. S. Mulenga	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Education & Culture	W. P. Nyirenda	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Tumbuka
	C. H. Thornicroft	White		
	M. J. Banda	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Trade & Industry	A. J. Soko	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
	S. Tembo	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Legal Affairs	F. Chuula	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Labour & Social Services	W. M. Chakulya	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
	S. Sikombe	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
Health	A. B. Chikwanda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	S. K. Loloma	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Central Province	P. M. Kapika	Swaka	Bemba	Central
	J. B. Kanyuka	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
Western	J. B. Siyomunji	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	M. Silumesii	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Eastern	W. Nkanza	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
	J. C. Sinyangwe	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
Northern	P. K. Kasutu	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	J. Mambwe	Bemba	Bemba	Northern

Southern	A. B. Mutemba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	A. Z. Banda	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
North-Western	J. M. Mutti	Nkoya	Barotse	Western
	M. M. Lumande	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Copperbelt	A. K. Shapi	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
	J. C. Mutale	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Luapula	S. C. Mbilishi	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
	B. K. Mumba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.

Year: 1974

Position	Name	Tribe	Language	Province
President	K. D. Kaunda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Prime Minister	M. M. Chona	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	Major-General G. K. Chinkuli	Lenje	Tonga	Central
	Air Commodore P. Zuze	Chikunda	Nyanja	Eastern
	A. K. Simuchimba	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
Local Government & Housing	P. W. Matoka	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Home Affairs	A. M. Milner	White		
	F. Chela	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Power, Transport & Works	A. J. Soko	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
	H. Y. Mwale	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	T. J. Kankasa	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Education	F. M. Mulikita	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Planning & Finance	A. B. Chikwanda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	L. Monze	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Foreign Affairs	V. J. Mwaanga	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Labour & Social Services	H. D. Banda	Senga	Tumbuka	Eastern
Lands, Natural Resources & Tourism	N. S. Mulenga	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	A. Z. Banda	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Rural Development	P. J. Lusaka	Soli	Tonga	Central
	M. Silumesii	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	M. J. Lumina	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Health	M. M. Bull	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Mines & Industry	E. A. Kashita	Bemba	Bemba	Northern

Commerce	R. Kunda	Lala	Bemba	Central
	S. K. Tembo	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
Information & Broadcasting	C. Mwananshiku	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
Legal Affairs	A. M. Silungwe	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
	P. L. Chibesakunda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Northern	U. G. Mwila	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Eastern	W. Nkanza	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Central	F. M. Liboma	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Copperbelt	A. Chalikulima	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
Southern	W. R. Mwondela	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
North-Western	A. I. Phiri	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Luapula	B. Kabwe	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
Western	J. B. Siyomunji	Lozi	Barotse	Western

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.

Year: 1976

Position	Name	Tribe	Language	Province
President	K. D. Kaunda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Prime Minister	E. H. Mudenda	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	H. Y. Mwale	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	Major-General G. K. Chinkuli	Lenje	Tonga	Central
	Air Commondore P. Zuze	Chikunda	Nyanja	Eastern
	L. A. Monze	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	A. K. Simuchimba	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
Legal Affairs	M. M. Chona	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Development Planning	P. W. Matoka	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Home Affairs	A. M. Milner	White		
	F. Chela	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Mines & Industry	A. J. Soko	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
	R. Chisupa	Ng'umbo	Bemba	Luapula
	M. M. Tambatamba	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Education	F. M. Mulikita	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	M. Mumbuna	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Local Government & Housing	A. B. Chikwanda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	M. J. Lumina	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Labour & Social	H. D. Banda	Senga	Tumbuka	Eastern

Services				
	J. B. Mwemba	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Lands, Natural Resources & Tourism	N. S. Mulenga	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	J. T. Kankasa	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Information & Broadcasting	U. G. Mwila	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Rural Development	P. J. Lusaka	Soli	Tonga	Central
	M. Silumesii	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	N. Tembo	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
Health	M. M. Bull	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	J. C. Mumpanshya	Soli	Tonga	Central
Commerce	C. M. Mwananshiku	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
	H. K. Matipa	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
Power, Transport & Communications	J. C. Mapoma	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
	Z. A. Banda	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	J. B. Kanyuka	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
Foreign Affairs	R. B. Banda	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	G. B. Silwizya	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
Finance	L. J. Mwananshiku	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
Northern	M. Ngalande	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Eastern	S. M. Chisembele	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Central	J. B. Siyomunji	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Copperbelt	J. C. Mutale	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Southern	S. K. Tembo	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
North-Western	N. Mundia	Soli	Barotse	Western
Luapula	W. R. Mwondela	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
Lusaka	R. Kunda	Lala	Bemba	Central
Western	W. Nkanza	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.

Year: 1978

Position	Name	Tribe	Language	Province
President	K. D. Kaunda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Prime Minister	M. M. Chona	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	M. J. Lumina	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	Lieutenant-General P. D. Zuze	Chikunda	Nyanja	Eastern
	A. K. Simuchimba	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern

Legal Affairs	D. M. Lisulo	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Economic & Technical Cooperation	P. W. Matoka	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
	L. Monze	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Finance	J. Mwanakatwe	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
Local Government & Housing	J. B. Siyomunji	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	N. Tembo	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
Lands & Agriculture	A. B. Chikwanda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	H. K. Matipa	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
Labour & Social Services	H. D. Banda	Senga	Tumbuka	Eastern
	J. B. Mwemba	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Information, Broadcasting & Tourism	U. G. Mwila	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	M. M. Tambatamba	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Power, Transport & Communications	P. J. Lusaka	Soli	Tonga	Central
	J. B. Kanyuka	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
	J. C. Mumpanshya	Soli	Tonga	Central/Lusaka
Ministry of Health	C. M. Mwananshiku	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
	M. Silumesii	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Commerce & Foreign Trade	J. C. Mapoma	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
Education	L. K. Goma	Senga	Tumbuka	Eastern
	A. D. Chilimboyi	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
Foreign Affairs	S. G. Mwale	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	G. B. Silwizya	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
Public Works	H. Y. Mwale	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Mines	Major-General G. K. Chinkuli	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Industry	R. Chisupa	Ng'umbo	Bemba	Luapula
Water & Natural Resources	K. S. Musokotwane	Toka-Leya	Tonga	Southern
Home Affairs	W. J. Phiri	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Central	M. Mumbuna	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Copperbelt	S. M. Chisembele	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Eastern	J. C. Mutale	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Northern	N. Ngalande	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
North-Western	N. Munida	Lozi	Barotse	Western

Luapula	R.C. Sakuhuka	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
Lusaka	R. Kunda	Lala	Bemba	Central
Southern	W. R. Mwondela	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
Western	S. K. Tembo	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.

Year: 1980

Position	Name	Tribe	Language	Province
President	K. D. Kaunda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Prime Minister	D. M. Lisulo	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	B. R. Kabwe	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
	P. Chuula	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Defence	A. G. Zulu	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
	O. Musuka	Lala	Bemba	Central
Health	R. Kunda	Lala	Bemba	Central
	J. Mwondela	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
Lands & Natural Resources	C. M. Mwananshiku	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
	N. Tembo	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
Education & Culture	L. K. Goma	Senga	Tumbuka	Tumbuka
	A. D. Chilimboyi	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
	A. Chibanda	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Works & Supply	H. Y. Mwale	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	M. S. Beyani	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Tourism	R. C. Sakuhuka	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
	M. M. Sianga	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Power, Transport & Communications	Gen. G. K. Chinkuli	Lenje	Tonga	Central
	M. K. Lufoma	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	F. B. Chembe	Lala	Bemba	Central
Commerce & Industry	R. Chisupa	Ng'umbo	Bemba	Luapula
	L. S. Subulwa	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Mines	M. Mumbuna	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	F. Kalimaposo	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Finance	K. S. Musokotwane	Toka-Leya	Tonga	Southern
	J. K. Kalaluka	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Home Affairs	W. J. Phiri	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	E. Mulenje	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
Legal Affairs	F. M. Chomba	Bisa	Bemba	Central

	G. G. Chigaga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	L. S. Sondashi	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Labour & Social Services	M. J. Lumina	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	J. P. Chafwa	Swaka	Bemba	Central
Information, Broadcasting & Tourism	M. M. Tambatamba	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
	C. J. Banda	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Foreign Affairs	W. M. Chakulya	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
	M. M. Bull	Lozi	Barotse	Western
National Guidance	A. K. Simuchimba	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
Agriculture & Water Development	U. G. Mwila	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	J. J. Mukando	Swaka	Bemba	Central
	N. S. Dilamonu	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Youth & Sport	B. C. Kakoma	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
	Z. Ndhlovu	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.

Year: 1982

Position	Name	Tribe	Language	Province
President	K. D. Kaunda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Prime Minister	N. Mundia	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	M. M. Bull	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	F. Chuula	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Secretary of State for Defence & Security	A. G. Zulu	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Defence	W. M. Chakulya	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
Health	B. C. Kakoma	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
	J. Mwondela	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
Lands & Natural Resources	C. M. Mwananshiku	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
	B. Ng'andu	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Education & Culture	F. S. Hapunda	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	A. D. Chilimboyi	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
	C. Chibanda	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Works & Supply	H. Y. Mwale	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	E. Muonga	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
Tourism	R. C. Sakuhuka	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
	A. Nkumbula	Bemba	Bemba	Northern

Power, Transport & Communication	R. Kunda	Lala	Bemba	Central
	M. K. Lufoma	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	F. B. Chembe	Lala	Bemba	Central
Commerce & Industry	R. Chisupa	Ng'umbo	Bemba	Luapula
	L. S. Subulwa	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Mines	M. Mumbuna	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	M. Makayi	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
Finance	K. S. Musokotwane	Toka-Leya	Tonga	Southern
	J. K. Kalaluka	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Home Affairs	F. M. Chomba	Bisa	Bemba	Central
	E. Mulenje	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
Legal Affairs	G. G. Chigaga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	M. M. Sianga	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Labour & Social Services	B. R. Kabwe	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
	C. Masongo	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
	L. S. Sondashi	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Information & Broadcasting Services	M. Tambatamba	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
	C. J. Banda	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
National Commission for Development Planning	H. M. Mcebelo	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	Z. Ndhlovu	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Foreign Affairs	L. K. Goma	Senga	Tumbuka	Tumbuka
	O. S. Musuka	Lala	Bemba	Central
National Guidance	A. K. Simuchimba	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
Agriculture & Water Development	U. G. Mwila	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	J. J. Mukando	Swaka	Bemba	Central
	N. S. Dilamonu	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Youth & Sport	General G. K. Chinkuli	Lenje	Tonga	Central
	A. R. Phiri	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.

Year: 1984

Position	Name	Tribe	Language	Province
President	K. D. Kaunda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Prime Minister	N. Mundia	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	J. Mwondela	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
	L. Mulimba	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
	U. G. Mwila	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Secretary of State for Defence & Security	A. G. Zulu	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Defence	C. M. Mwananshiku	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
Health	M. Tambatamba	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
	P. R. Chanshi	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
Commerce & Industry	L. S. Subulwa	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	R. S. Zimba	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
National Commission for Development Planning	H. S. Meebelo	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	M. L. Muyunda	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Works & Supply	H. Y. Mwale	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	N. S. Dilamonu	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Tourism	R. C. Sakuhuka	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
	Brigadier-General E. M. Haimbe	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Higher Education	R. Kunda	Lala	Bemba	Central
	M. M. Sianga	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Power, Transport & Communications	F. Chuula	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	S. C. Kalaba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	K. K. Musangu	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Lands & Natural Resources	F. Chela	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	C. Masongo	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
General Education & Culture	K. S. Musokotwane	Toka-Leya	Tonga	Southern
	R. V. Chota	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	K. M. Shepande	Sala	Tonga	Central
Finance	L. J. Mwananshiku	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
	J. K. Kalaluka	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Home Affairs	F. M. Chomba	Bisa	Bemba	Central
	E. Mulenje	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka

Mines	B. R. Kabwe	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
	N. D. Siafwa	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Legal Affairs	G. G. Chigaga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Cooperatives	J. J. Mukando	Swaka	Bemba	Central
	R. K. Banda	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Labour & Social Services	F. S. Hapunda	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	L. S. Sondashi	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Information & Broadcasting Services	C. Chibanda	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Foreign Affairs	L. K. Goma	Senga	Tumbuka	Tumbuka
	O. S. Musuka	Lala	Bemba	Central
National Guidance	A. K. Simuchimba	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
Agriculture & Water Development	General G. K. Chinkuli	Lenje	Tonga	Central
	D. Munkombwe	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Youth & Sport	B. C. Kakoma	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
	J. C. Kasongo	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.

Year: 1986

Position	**Name**	**Tribe**	**Language**	**Province**
President	K. D. Kaunda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Prime Minister	K. S. Musokotwane	Toka-Leya	Tonga	Southern
	J. Mwondela	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
	C. Masongo	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
	U. G. Mwila	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Secretary of State for Defence & Security	A. K. Shapi	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Defence	General M. M. Masheke	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Health	P. S. Chitambala	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	P. R. Chanshi	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
Commerce & Industry	L. S. Subulwa	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	R. S. Zimba	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
Decentralisation	H. S. Mecbelo	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	M. L. Muyunda	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Works & Supply	H. Y. Mwale	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	N. S. Dilamonu	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western

Tourism	R. C. Sakuhuka	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
	Brigadier-General E. M. Haimbe	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Higher Education	R. Kunda	Lala	Bemba	Central
Power, Transport & Communications	F. Chuula	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	S. C. Kalaba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	K. K. Musangu	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
General Education & Culture	B. R. Kabwe	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
	R. V. Chota	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	K. M. Shepande	Sala	Tonga	Central
Finance & National Commission for Development Planning	L. J. Mwananshiku	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
	M. M. Sianga	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	L. Mulimba	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
Home Affairs	F. M. Chomba	Bisa	Bemba	Central
	E. Mulenje	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
Mines	J. K. Kalaluka	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	N. D. Siafwa	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Legal Affairs	G. G. Chigaga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Cooperatives	J. J. Mukando	Swaka	Bemba	Central
Labour & Social Services	F. S. Hapunda	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	R. K. Banda	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Information & Broadcasting Services	C. Chibanda	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	S. C. Mukando	Lala	Bemba	Central
Foreign Affairs	L. K. Goma	Senga	Tumbuka	Tumbuka
	O. S. Musuka	Lala	Bemba	Central
National Guidance	A. K. Simuchimba	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
Agriculture & Water Development	General G. K. Chinkuli	Lenje	Tonga	Central
	D. Munkombwe	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Youth & Sport	B. C. Kakoma	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
	J. C. Kasongo	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.

Year: 1990

Position	Name	Tribe	Language	Province
President	K. D. Kaunda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Prime Minister	General M. M. Masheke	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	N. E. Anamela	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	S. C. Kalaba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	M. C. Sata	Bisa	Bemba	Northern
	E. Mulenje	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
	M. Sipalo	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	O. S. Musuka	Lala	Bemba	Central
	S. L. Banda	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	N. J. Mvula	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
	I. Yeta	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	A. B. Katotobwe	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Secretary of State for Defence & Security	A. K. Shapi	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
	E. L. Muwowo	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
Agriculture	J. J. Mukando	Swaka	Bemba	Central
	B. C. Nkumbula	Ila	Tonga	Southern
Commerce & Industry	R. M. Chongo	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	C. U. Sibetta	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Defence	Lieutenant-General H. B. Lungu	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
	D. C. Syatalimi	Ila	Tonga	Central
Finance & National Commission for Development Planning	G. G. Chigaga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	J. K. Miyato	Mbunda	Barotse	Western
	J. C. Chizu	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
Foreign Affairs	L. J. Mwananshiku	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
	W. C. Wonani	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
General Education, Youth & Sport	E. H. Mwanang'onze	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	M. M. Sianga	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	B. L. Zulu	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Health	M. L. Muyunda	Lenje	Tonga	Central
	J. B. Chijikwa	Ila	Tonga	Southern
Higher Education, Science & Technology	L. K. Goma	Senga	Tumbuka	Tumbuka

	J. C. Kasongo	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
Home Affairs	G. K. Chinkuli	Lenje	Tonga	Central
	Major W. Kaunda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Information & Broadcasting Services	A. K. Simuchimba	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
	D. T. Nkhata	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Labour, Social Development & Culture	L. Mulimba	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
	L. Tembo	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	R. K. Banda	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Legal Affairs	F. M. Chomba	Bisa	Bemba	Central
Mines	M. K. Muzungu	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
	P. R. Chanshi	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
Power, Transport & Communications	Brigadier-General E. M. Haimbe	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	C. Masongo	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
	B. N. Fumbelo	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
Tourism	P. S. Chitambala	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	K. K. Musangu	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Water, Lands & Natural Resources	P. Malukutila	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	A. D. Ndalama	Lala	Bemba	Central
	B. Munkombwe	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Works & Supply	H. Y. Mwale	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	F. T. Kapansa	Swaka	Bemba	Central
Eastern	N. Tembo	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
North-Western	B. M. Mukumbi	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.

Year: 1992 (CHILUBA)

Position	Name	Tribe	Language	Province
President	F. T. Chiluba	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
Vice-President	L. P. Mwanawasa	Lenje	Tonga	Central
	D. N. Mung'omba	Lungu	Bemba	Northern
	S. B. Zukas	White		
Without Portfolio	Brigadier-General G. Miyanda	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
Agriculture, Food & Fisheries	G. L. Scott	White		
	C. L. Kalima	Ila	Tonga	Southern

	G. Nkausu	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
Commerce, Trade & Industry	R. D. Penza	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
	D. K. Patel	Asian		
Communications & Transport	A. E. Kashita	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	G. K. Mululu	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Community Development & Social Welfare	G. K. Maka	Swaka	Bemba	Central
	C. M. Sampa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Defence	B. Y. Mwila	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
	Major C. K. Chibamba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Education	A. N. Wina	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	K. Kayongo	Mbunda	Barotse	Western
Energy & Water Development	A. S. Hambayi	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	E. Z. Nawakwi	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
Environment & Natural Resources	K. S. Walubita	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Finance	E. G. Kasonde	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	D. Chitala	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
Foreign Affairs	V. J. Mwaanga	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	R. G. Mushota	Chishinga	Bemba	Luapula
Health	B. M. Kawimbe	Lungu	Bemba	Northern
	K. Kalumba	Tabwa	Bemba	Northern
Home Affairs	N. L. Zimba	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
	Lieutenant-Colonel E. C. Sosala	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Information & Broadcasting Services	Reverend H. S. Kristafor	White		
	Reverend D. C. Pule	Ushi (Kabende)	Bemba	Luapula
Labour & Social Security	L. S. Sondashi	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
	P. D. Machungwa	Twa	Bemba	Luapula
Lands	D. L. Lupunga	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	E. N. Shimwandwe	Soli	Tonga	Central
Legal Affairs	R. M. Chongwe	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Local Government & Housing	M. C. Sata	Bisa	Bemba	Northern

	V. W. Kayope	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Mines & Mineral Development	H. Mulemba	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
	M. M. Mpande	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Science, Technical Education & Vocational Training	A. Mbikusita-Lewanika	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	S. M. Desai	Indian		
Tourism	C. S. Tembo	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
	Princess Nakatindi Wina	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Works & Supply	E. C. Chibwe	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
	S. P. Madyenkuku	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Youth, Sport & Child Development	M. B. Nkumbula	Ila	Tonga	Southern
	K. M. Maine	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Central	W. W. Sinkala	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
Copperbelt	K. Nsuluka	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Eastern	H. J. Soko	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Luapula	E. Muonga	Lungu	Bemba	Northern
Lusaka	E. M. Chipimo	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Northern	D. V. Kapapa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
North-Western	P. K. Kaping'a	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Southern	P. H. Muunga	Tonga	Tonga	Southern

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.

Year: 1994

Position	**Name**	**Tribe**	**Language**	**Province**
President	F. T. Chiluba	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
Vice-President	L. P. Mwanawasa	Lenje	Tonga	Central
	C. S. Tembo	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
	D. Chitala	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
	E. B. Chisha	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
	P. D. Machungwa	Twa	Bemba	Luapula
Without Portfolio	Brigadier-General G. Miyanda	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
Agriculture, Food & Fisheries	S. B. Zukas	White		
	G. Nkausu	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
	A. Sejani	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Commerce, Trade & Industry	D. K. Patel	Asian		
	L. J. Shimaponda	Ila	Tonga	Southern

	H. M. Kabika	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Communications & Transport	W. J. Harrington	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	G. K. Mululu	Lenje	Tonga	Central
	M. Ngalande	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Community Development & Social Welfare	K. Kayongo	Mbunda	Barotse	Western
	S. M. Manjata	Luvale	North-Western	Western
Defence	B. Y. Mwila	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
	D. Buumba	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Education	A. S. Hambayi	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	N. K. Mangilashi	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	D. C. Matutu	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Energy & Water Development	E. Z. Nawakwi	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
	Lieutenant-Colonel P. Kafumakache	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Environment & Natural Resources	D. L. Lupunga	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	S. M. Desai	Indian		
Finance	R. D. Penza	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
	Reverend D. C. Pule	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
	K. G. Shengamo	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Foreign Affairs	R. G. Mushota	Chishinga	Bemba	Luapula
	W. W. Membe	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Health	M. C. Sata	Bisa	Bemba	Northern
	K. Kalumba	Tabwa	Bemba	Northern
Home Affairs	C. M. Sampa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	H. J. Soko	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Information & Broadcasting Services	S. K. Walubita	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	E. S. Silwamba	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
Labour & Social Security	N. L. Zimba	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
	G. K. Mandandi	Nkoya	Barotse	Western
Lands	C. L. Kalima	Ila	Tonga	Southern
	E. N. Shimwandwe	Soli	Tonga	Central
Legal Affairs	L. S. Sondashi	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Local Government & Housing	B. H. Mwiinga	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	V. W. Kayope	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula

	B. Sichinga	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Mines & Mineral Development	P. K. Kaping'a	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
	M. M. Mpande	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Science, Technical Education & Vocational Training	G. K. Maka	Swaka	Bemba	Central
	S. C. Ngombo	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Sport, Youth & Child Development	A. K. Mwanamwambwa	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	Reverend P. Chintala	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Tourism	C. S. Tembo	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
	S. P. Madyenkuku	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Works & Supply	A. E. Kashita	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	Major C. K. Chibamba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	S. M. Kunyanda	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Central	S. D. Mpamba	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Copperbelt	K. Nsuluka	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Eastern	Z. P. Mumba	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
Luapula	N. K. Chibamba	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Lusaka	E. M. Chipimo	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Northern	D. V. Kapapa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
North-Western	Reverend A. Chipawa	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Southern	P. H. Muunga	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Western	L. S. Subulwa	Lozi	Barotse	Western

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.

Year: 1996

Position	Name	Tribe	Language	Province
President	F. T. Chiluba	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
Vice-President	Brigadier-General G. Miyanda	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
	E. S. Silwamba	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
	H. M. Kabika	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	B. S. Sikanyika	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
	Rev. D. C. Pule	Ushi (Kabende)	Bemba	Luapula
	M. Ngalande	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Agriculture, Food & Fisheries	S. M. Desai	Asian		
	M. M. Mpande	Lenje	Tonga	Central

	D. C. Matutu	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Commerce, Trade & Industry	D. K. Patel	Asian		
	S. K. Syamujaye	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	A. K. Lienda	Nkoya	Barotse	Western
Communications & Transport	D. L. Lupunga	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	G. K. Mululu	Lenje	Tonga	Central
	Z. P. Mumba	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
Community Development & Social Welfare	P. K. Kaping'a	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
	S. M. Manjata	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
	Lieutenant-Colonel S. Ngoma	Chikunda	Nyanja	Eastern
Defence	B. Y. Mwila	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
	D. Buumba	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Education	A. S. Hambayi	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	N. I. Ng'uni	Bisa	Bemba	Northern
	S. Miyanda	Soli	Tonga	Central
Energy & Water Development	E. Z. Nawakwi	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
	E. C. Mwansa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Environment & Natural Resources	W. J. Harrington	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	G. Nkausu	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
Finance	R. D. Penza	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	P. S. Tembo	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
	K. G. Shengamo	Lamba	Bemba	North-Western
Foreign Affairs	Lieutenant-General C. S. Tembo	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Easton
	P. D. Machungwa	Twa	Bemba	Northern
Health	M. C. Sata	Bisa	Bemba	Northern
	K. Kalumba	Tabwa	Bemba	Northern
Home Affairs	C. M. Sampa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	P. H. Muunga	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Information & Broadcasting Services	A. K. Mwanamwambwa	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	V. W. Kayope	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Labour & Social Security	N. L. Zimba	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
	S. P. Madyenkuku	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Lands	L. J. Shimaponda	Ila	Tonga	Southern

	E. N. Shimwandwe	Soli	Tonga	Central
Legal Affairs	R. G. Mutosha	Chishinga	Bemba	Luapula
Local Government & Housing	B. H. Mwiinga	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	W. W. Membe	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	B. Sichinga	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Mines & Mineral Development	S. K. Walubita	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	A. Nkole	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Science, Technical Education & Vocational Training	K. Kayongo	Mbunda	Barotse	Western
	K. Nsuluka	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Sport, Youth & Child Development	Lieutenant-Colonel P. Kafumakache	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
	Rev. P. Chintala	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Tourism	G. K. Maka	Swaka	Bemba	Central
	N. K. Mangilashi	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Works & Supply	S. B. Zukas	White		
	Major C. K. Chibamba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	G. K. Mandandi	Nkoya	Barotse	Western
Central	S. D. Mpamba	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Copperbelt	C. C. Museba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Eastern	H. J. Soko	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Luapula	N. K. Chibamba	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Lusaka	E. M. Chipimo	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Northern	D. V. Kapapa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
North-Western	Rev. A. Chipawa	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Southern	E. M. Miyanda	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Western	L. S. Subulwa	Lozi	Barotse	Western

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.

Year: 1998

Position	Name	Tribe	Language	Province
President	F. T. Chiluba	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
Vice-President	Lieutenant-General C. S. Tembo	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
	E. S. Silwamba	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
	P. L. Chintala	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	J. C. Chishala	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
	D.C. Saviye	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western

Without Portfolio	M. C. Sata	Bisa	Bemba	Northern
Agriculture, Food & Fisheries	E. Z. Nawakwi	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
	A. Sejani	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	Lieutenant-Colonel Y. J. Ngulube	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
Commerce, Trade & Industry	E. P. Kavindele	Luchazi	North-Western	North-Western
	A. Nkole	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	J. Chikwakwa	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Communications & Transport	D. L. Lupunga	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	D. C. Matutu	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	D. K. Kalingeme	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Community Development & Social Welfare	S. S. Miyanda	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
	S. M. Manjata	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
	J. Chikwata	Ila	Tonga	Southern
Defence	C. M. Sampa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	M. I. Mulongoti	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Education	Brigadier-General G. Miyanda	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
	M. M. Mpande	Lenje	Tonga	Central
	B. Membe	Mambwe	Mambwe	Eastern
Energy & Water Development	B. Y. Mwila	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
	Major C. K. Chibamba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Environment & Natural Resources	A. S. Hambayi	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	G. Nkausu	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
Finance	R. D. Penza	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	Rev. D. C. Pule	Ushi (Kabende)	Bemba	Luapula
	G. Simasiku	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Foreign Affairs	S. K. Walubita	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	V. W. Kayope	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Health	K. Kalumba	Tabwa	Bemba	Northern
	N. P. Luo	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Home Affairs	P. D. Machungwa	Twa	Bemba	Luapula
	P. H. Muunga	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Information & Broadcasting Services	S. D. Mpamba	Lenje	Tonga	Central

	E. C. Mwansa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Labour & Social Security	N. L. Zimba	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
	S. P. Madyenkuku	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Lands	Rev. A. Chipawa	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
	G. K. Mululu	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Legal Affairs	V. Malambo	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Local Government & Housing	B. H. Mwiinga	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	B. Mpundu	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	E. Kalenga	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Mines & Mineral Development	S. K. Syamujaye	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	K. R. Lembalemba	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
Science, Technical Education & Vocational Training	L. S. Shimba	Swaka	Bemba	Central
	N. I. Ng'uni	Bisa	Bemba	Northern
Sport, Youth & Child Development	W. J. Harrington	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	E. K. Chitika	Chishinga	Bemba	Luapula
Tourism	A. K. Mwanamwambwa	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	F. Mando	Chikunda	Nyanja	Lusaka
Works & Supply	S. M. Desai	Asian		
	M. H. Muyuni	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	G. K. Mandandi	Nkoya	Barotse	Western
Central	A. M. Chambeshi	Lala	Bemba	Central
Copperbelt	M. S. Mulanda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Eastern	C. T. Banda	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Luapula	N. K. Chibamba	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Lusaka	S. P. Mulenga	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Northern	D. V. Kapapa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
North-Western	D. S. Kambilumbilu	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Southern	E. M. Miyanda	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Western	M. M. Mabenga	Lozi	Barotse	Western

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.

Year: 2002 (MWANAWASA)

Position	Name	Tribe	Language	Province
President	L. P. Mwanawasa	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Vice-President	E. P. Kavindele	Luchazi	North-Western	North-Western
	K. N. Simbao	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
	S. C. Mukuka	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Agriculture & Cooperatives	M. Sikatana	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	W. D. Kamwendo	Lala	Bemba	Central
Commerce, Trade & Industry	B. Namuyamba	Ila	Tonga	Southern
	E. B. Appel	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	A. M. Musanya	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Communications & Transport	A. F. Mwape	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	W. Nsanda	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
Community Development & Social Welfare	N. K. Chibamba	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
	G. C. Chola	Lala	Bemba	Central
Defence	Vacant			
	W. Muliokela	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Education	A. Mulenga	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	R. Chipampe	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
	E. C. Kasukumya	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Energy & Water Development	R. K. Lembalemba	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
	S. M. Manjata	Luvale	North-Western	Western
Finance & National Planning	E. G. Kasonde	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	F. K. Kalifungwa	Ng'umbo	Bemba	Luapula
	F. C. Mutati	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Foreign Affairs	T. K. Mwansa	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
	C. Namugala	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
Health	B. Chituwo	Kaonde	North-Western	Central
	G. C. Chulumanda	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Home Affairs	L. M. Mapushi	Lenje	Tonga	Central
	K. M. Sakeni	Ng'umbo	Bemba	Luapula
Information & Broadcasting Services	N. L. Zimba	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
	W. Chipili	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Labour & Social Security	W. K. Nalumango	Bemba	Bemba	Northern

	J. Mwaimba	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Lands	J. M. Kapijimpanga	Bias	Bemba	Northern
	M. Sokontwe	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Legal Affairs	G. Kunda	Lala	Bemba	Northern
Local Government & Housing	M. M. Mabenga	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	M. C. Chitala	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
	S. C. Mungo	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
Mines & Mineral Development	D. Mulela	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	R. Kazala-Lazki	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Science, Technology & Vocational Training	A. M. Chambeshi	Lala	Bemba	Central
	H. W. Mazimba	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Sport, Youth & Child Development	L. A. Mumba	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
	J. C. Chisupa	Ng'umbo	Bemba	Luapula
Tourism	M. M. Nsingo	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	C. C. Silavwe	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
Works & Supply	L. S. Sondashi	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
	P. C. Katema	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Central	A. Banda	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Copperbelt	Lieutenant-Colonel P. Kafumakache	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Eastern	N. Sambwa	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Luapula	A. M. Chama	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
Lusaka	P. A. Ngoma	Chikunda	Nyanja	Lusaka
Northern	P. H. Filamba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
North-Western	B. M. Mushala	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Southern	G. W. Mpombo	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Western	S. Namakando	Lozi	Barotse	Western

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.

Year: 2004

Position	Name	Tribe	Language	Province
President	L. P. Mwanawasa	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Vice-President	A. F. Mwape	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	W. Chipili	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	R. C. Banda	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Agriculture &	M. Sikatana	Lozi	Barotse	Western

Cooperatives				
	M. K. Mubanga	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
	J. Katoka	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Commerce, Trade & Industry	D. K. Patel	Asian		
	E. B. Appel	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	G. M. Samukonga	Luchazi	North-Western	North-Western
Communications & Transport	A. M. Chambeshi	Lala	Bemba	Central
	A. M. Chama	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
	H. W. Mazimba	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Community Development & Social Services	Vacant			
	S. Namakando	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	R. J. Banda	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Defence	Vacant			
	W. Muliokela	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Education	A. Mulenga	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	E. C. Kasukumya	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
	G. C. Chola	Lala	Bemba	Central
Energy & Water Development	G. W. Mpombo	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	S. M. Manjata	Luvale	North-Western	Western
	S. K. Mukuka	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Finance & National Planning	P. N. Magande	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	M. C. Chitala	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
	F. C. Mutati	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Foreign Affairs	Lieutenant-General Shikapwasha	Lenje	Tonga	Central
	D. Mulela	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Health	B. Chituwo	Kaonde	North-Western	Central
	K. N. Simbao	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
Home Affairs	T. K. Mwansa	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
	J. S. Chilufya	Chishinga	Bemba	Luapula
Information & Broadcasting Services	W. K. Nalumango	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	G. F. Sichilima	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
Justice	G. Kunda	Lala	Bemba	Central
Labour & Social Services	Vacant			

	J. C. Ng'uni	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
Lands	J. M. Kapijimpanga	Bisa	Bemba	Northern
	A. M. Musanya	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Local Government & Housing	S. T. Masebo	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
	N. K. Chibamba	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
	J. Mwaimba	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Mines & Mineral Development	K. Lembalemba	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
	S. C. Mukuka	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	A. Banda	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Science, Technology & Vocational Training	B. Namuyamba	Ila	Tonga	Southern
	J. C. Chisupa	Ng'umbo	Bemba	Luapula
Sport, Youth & Child Development	Rev. G. Z. Nyirongo	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
	G. C. Chulumanda	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	R. Kazala-Laski	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Tourism, Environment & Natural Resources	P. K. Kalifungwa	Ng'umbo	Bemba	Luapula
	P. H. Filamba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	N. Nzowa	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Works & Supply	M. M. Nsingo	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	K. M. Shepande	Sala	Tonga	Central
Central	W. D. Kamwendo	Lala	Bemba	Central
Eastern	P. C. Katema	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Luapula	K. M. Sakeni	Ng'umbo	Bemba	Luapula
Lusaka	P. A. Ngoma	Chikunda	Nyanja	Lusaka
Northern	C. C. Silavwe	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
North-Western	B. M. Mushala	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Southern	S. C. Kazenene	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Western	S. Kabanje	Lozi	Barotse	Western

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.

Year: 2006

Position	Name	Tribe	Language	Province
President	L. P. Mwanawasa	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Vice-President	Mr. Rupiah Banda	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	Ms. Lundwe	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	Mr. Taima	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western

Agriculture & Cooperatives	Mr. Kapita	Swaka	Bemba	Central
	Mr. Kalenga	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
	Mr. Mulonga	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Commerce, Trade & Industry	Mr. Konga	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
	Ms. Siliya	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
Communications & Transport	Mr. Daka	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
	Mr. Mubika	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Community Development & Social Services	Ms. Namugala	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
	Mr. Nicholas Banda	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	Mr. Muchima	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Defence	Mr. Mpombo	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	Mr. Akakandelwa	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Education	Prof. Lungwangwa	Mbunda	Barotse	Western
	Ms. Changwe	Lala	Bemba	Central
Energy & Water Development	Mr. Mutati	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	Mr. G. F. Sichilima	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
	Mr. Malwa	Swaka	Bemba	Central
Finance & National Planning	Mr. Magande	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	Mr. Shakafuswa	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Foreign Affairs	Mr. Sikatana	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	Mr. Mulongoti	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Gender-in-Development	Ms. Sayifwanda	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Health	Ms. Cifire	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
	Dr. Puma	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Home Affairs	Lieutenant-General Shikapwasha	Lenje	Tonga	Central
	Mr. Musosha	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
	Ms. Njapau	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
Information & Broadcasting Services	Mr. Mwaanga	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	Mr. David Phiri	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
Justice	Mr. G. Kunda	Lala	Bemba	Central
	Mr. Machila	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Labour & Social Security	Mr. Mukama	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western

	Mr. Liato	Nkoya	Barotse	Western
Lands	Rev. Nyirongo	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
	Mr. Muteteka	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Local Government & Housing	Mrs. S. T. Masebo	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
	Mr. Kazonga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Mines & Mineral Development	Dr. Mwansa	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
	Mr. Maxell Mwale	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	Mr. Mangani	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Science, Technology & Vocational Training	Dr. Chituwo	Kaonde	North-Western	Central
Sport, Youth & Child Development	Mr. Namulambe	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	Ms. Mulasikwanda	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Tourism, Environment & Natural Resources	Mr. Pande	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
	Ms. Tembo	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
	Mr. Kaingu	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Works & Supply	Mr. Simbao	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
	Mr. Tetamashimba	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Copperbelt	Mr. Mbulakulima	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Eastern	Mr. Nkhata	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
Luapula	Mr. Chinyanta	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
Lusaka	Mr. Shawa	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Northern	Mr. Chibombamilimo	Lungu	Bemba	Northern
North-Western	Mr. Chipungu	Chikunda	Nyanja	Lusaka
Southern	Mr. Mulyata	Mbunda	Barotse	North-Western
Western	Mr. Mufalali	Lozi	Barotse	Western

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.

Year: 2008

Position	Name	Tribe	Language	Province
President	L. P. Mwanawasa	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Vice-President	Mr. Rupiah Banda	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	Mr. Malwa	Swaka	Bemba	Central
Presidential Affairs	Mr. Holmes	White		
Agriculture & Cooperatives	Ms. Sayifwanda	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
	Mr. Kalenga	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western

	Mr. Mulonga	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Commerce, Trade & Industry	Mr. Mutati	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Communications & Transport	Ms. Siliya	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
	Mr. Mubika	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Community Development & Social Services	Ms. Namugala	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
	Mr. Chinyanta	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
	Mr. Akakandelwa	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Defence	Mr. Mpombo	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	Mr. Muchima	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Education	Prof. Lungwangwa	Mbunda	Barotse	Western
	Mr. Sinyinda	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Energy & Water Development	Mr. Konga	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
	Mr. G. F. Sichilima	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
	Ms. Lundwe	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Finance & National Planning	Mr. Magande	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	Mr. Shakafuswa	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Foreign Affairs	Mr. Pande	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
	Prof. Fashion Phiri	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
Gender-in-Development	Ms. Mulasikwanda	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Health	Dr. Chituwo	Kaonde	North-Western	Central
	Dr. Puma	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Home Affairs	Lieutenant-General Shikapwasha	Lenje	Tonga	Central
	Ms. Njapau	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
	Mr. Bonshe	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Information & Broadcasting Services	Mr. Mulongoti	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	Mr. David Phiri	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
Justice	Mr. G. Kunda	Lala	Bemba	Central
Labour & Social Security	Mr. Mukama	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
	Mr. Liato	Nkoya	Barotse	Western
Lands	Mr. Machila	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	Mr. Hamir	Indian		
Local Government & Housing	Mrs. S. T. Masebo	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka

	Mr. Kazonga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	Mr. Tetamashimba	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Mines & Mineral Development	Dr. Mwansa	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
	Mr. Maxell Mwale	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	Mr. Nkhata	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
Science, Technology & Vocational Training	Mr. Daka	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
	Ms. Changwe	Lala	Bemba	Central
Sport, Youth & Child Development	Mr. Namulambe	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	Ms. Cifire	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
	Mr. Taima	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Tourism, Environment & Natural Resources	Mr. Kaingu	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	Ms. Tembo	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
	Mr. Chilembo	Senga	Tumbuka	Eastern
Works & Supply	Mr. Simbao	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
	Mr. Ndalamei	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Central	Mr. Ackimson Banda	Lala	Bemba	Central
Copperbelt	Mr. Mbulakulima	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Eastern	Mr. Shawa	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Luapula	Mr. Musosha	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Lusaka	Mr. Mangani	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Northern	Mr. Chibombamilimo	Lungu	Bemba	Northern
North-Western	Mr. Chipungu	Chikunda	Nyanja	Lusaka
Southern	Mr. Munkombwe	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Western	Mr. Mufalali	Lozi	Barotse	Western

Source: Compiled based on government lists in GOZ Various Years a.

DISTRIBUTION OF UNIP CENTRAL COMMITTEE (CC), 1964-1988

Year: 1964

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
K. D. Kaunda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
R. C. Kamanga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
M. M. Chona	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
A. Milner	White		
S. M. Kapwepwe	Bemba	Bemba	Northern

N. Mundia	Lozi	Barotse	Western
L. Changufu	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
H Y. Mwale	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
S. Wina	Lozi	Barotse	Western
J. B. Nkonde	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
S. Kalulu	Soli	Tonga	Central
A. G. Zulu	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
H. D. Banda	Senga	Tumbuka	Eastern
Princess N. Y. Nakatindi	Lozi	Barotse	Western

Source: Compiled based on UNIP Various Years.

Year: 1967

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
K. D. Kaunda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
S. M. Kapwepwe	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
M. M. Chona	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
M. J. Chimba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
E. H. Mudenda	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
L. Changufu	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
S. Kalulu	Soli	Tonga	Central
A. G. Zulu	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
S. Wina	Lozi	Barotse	Western
H. D. Banda	Senga	Tumbuka	Eastern

Source: Compiled based on UNIP Various Years.

Year: 1969 (Interim Executive Committee)

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
K. D. Kaunda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
S. M. Kapwepwe	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
S. Wina	Lozi	Barotse	Western
R. C. Kamanga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
M. M. Chona	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
S. Kalulu	Soli	Tonga	Central
M. J. Chimba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
W. P. Nyirenda	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
E. H. Mudenda	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
H. Mulemba	Kaonde	North-Western	Central
A. D. Chikwanda	Bemba	Bemba	Bemba
W. M. Chakulya	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula

Source: Compiled based on UNIP Various Years.

Year: 1973

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
K. D. Kaunda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
A. G. Zulu	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
M. M. Chona	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
R. C. Kamanga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
F. M. Chitambala	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
S. Wina	Lozi	Barotse	Western
E. H. Mudenda	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
S. Kalulu	Soli	Tonga	Central
H. Mulemba	Kaonde	North-Western	Central
A. B. Mutemba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
J. Mutti	Nkoya	Barotse	Western
D. M. Lisulo	Lozi	Barotse	Western
S. Sikombe	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
S. J. Soko	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
J. B. Litana	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
F. N. Bulawayo	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
B. F. Kapulu	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
S. C. Mbilishi	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
M. K. Fulano	Swaka	Bemba	Central
P. W. Nyirenda	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
A. K. Chongo	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
B. C. Kankasa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
A. K. Shapi	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
P. Kawandami	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
M. Liso	Tonga	Tonga	Southern

Source: Compiled based on UNIP Various Years.

Year: 1976

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
K. D. Kaunda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
A. G. Zulu	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
E. H. Mudenda	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
R. C. Kamanga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
S. Kalulu	Soli	Tonga	Central
H. Mulemba	Kaonde	North-Western	Central
P. W. Nyirenda	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
A. B. Mutemba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
F. M. Chitambala	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
J. B. Litana	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt

D. M. Lisulo	Lozi	Barotse	Western
S. C. Mbilishi	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
A. K. Shapi	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
S. J. Soko	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
P. Kawandami	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
B. C. Kankasa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
F. N. Bulawayo	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
M. K. Fulano	Swaka	Bemba	Central
S. Sikombe	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
B. F. Kapulu	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
E. M. Liso	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Chief Mapanza	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
F. M. Mulikita	Lozi	Barotse	Western

Source: Compiled based on UNIP Various Years.

Year: 1979

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
K. D. Kaunda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
M. M. Chona	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
D. M. Lisulo	Lozi	Barotse	Western
A. G. Zulu	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
R. C. Kamanga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
E. H. Mudenda	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
H. Mulemba	Kaonde	North-Western	Central
P. W. Nyirenda	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
J. B. Litana	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
N. Mundia	Lozi	Barotse	Western
K. Makasa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
F. Liboma	Lozi	Barotse	Western
S. C. Mbilishi	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
S. J. Soko	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
A. K. Shapi	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
B. C. Kankasa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
F. N. Bulawayo	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
M. K. Fulano	Swaka/Lala	Bemba	Central
B. F. Kapulu	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
E. M. Liso	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
J. C. Mumpanshya	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
F. J. Luputa	Chikunda	Nyanja	Lusaka
P. K. Kasutu	Bemba	Bemba	Northern

H. K. Matipa	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula

Source: Compiled based on UNIP Various Years.

Year: 1982

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
K. D. Kaunda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
H. Mulemba	Kaonde	North-Western	Central
N. Mundia	Lozi	Barotse	Western
A. G. Zulu	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
R. C. Kamanga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
E. H. Mudenda	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
D. M. Lisulo	Lozi	Barotse	Western
J. B. Litana	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
K. Makasa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
B. F. Kapulu	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
H. K. Matipa	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
F. Liboma	Lozi	Barotse	Western
S. C. Mbilishi	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
S. J. Soko	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
A. K. Shapi	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
B. C. Kankasa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
F. N. Bulawayo	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
M. K. Fulano	Swaka	Bemba	Central
E. M. Liso	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
J. C. Mumpanshya	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
F. J. Luputa	Chikunda	Nyanja	Lusaka
P. K. Kasutu	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
J. Mutale	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
M. S. Beyani	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
A. J. Soko	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern

Source: Compiled based on UNIP Various Years.

Year: 1985

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
K. D. Kaunda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
K. S. Musokotwane	Toka-Leya	Tonga	Southern
A. G. Zulu	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
R. C. Kamanga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
D. M. Lisulo	Lozi	Western	Western
B. C. Kankasa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
A. K. Shapi	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula

E. H. Mudenda	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
B. F. Kapulu	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
F. N. Bulawayo	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
A. J. Soko	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
J. C. Mutale	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
J. C. Mumpanshya	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
M. K. Fulano	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
F. J. Luputa	Chikunda	Nyanja	Lusaka
M. S. Beyani	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
B. C. Chilunga	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
J. B. Simuyandi	Lozi	Barotse	Western
C. M. Mwananshiku	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
R. T. Sikasula	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
L. M. Ng'andu	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Z. Ndhlovu	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
I. Yeta	Lozi	Barotse	Western
A. Kamalondo	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
L. S. Sondashi	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western

Source: Compiled based on UNIP Various Years.

Year: 1988

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
K. D. Kaunda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
K. S. Musokotwane	Toka-Leya	Tonga	Southern
A. G. Zulu	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
A. K. Shapi	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
R. C. Kamanga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
E. H. Mudenda	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
A. J. Soko	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
J. C. Mutale	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
M. K. Fulano	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
B. C. Chilunga	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
C. M. Mwananshiku	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
Z. Ndhlovu	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
B. Kapulu	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
R. T. Sikasula	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
A. Kamalondo	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
F. J. Luputa	Chikunda	Nyanja	Lusaka
L. M. Ng'andu	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
I. Yeta	Lozi	Barotse	Western

J. B. Simuyandi	Lozi	Barotse	Western
M. S. Beyani	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
L. S. Sondashi	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Gen. G. Kalenge	Ila	Tonga	Southern
Gen. Lungu	Nsenga	Nynaga	Eastern
H. Mtonga	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
Gen. J. Manuwele	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
E. Kavindele	Luchazi	North-Western	North-Western
E. Willima	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
F. H. Kaunda	Ng'umbo	Bemba	Luapula
M. Mwinga	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
T. Walamba	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
J. Sichone	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
B. Nalubamba	Ila	Tonga	Southern
K. Shepande	Sala	Tonga	Central
E. Mulenje (Chieftainess Nkomeshya)	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
M. M. Sianga	Lozi	Barotse	Western
L. Mulimba	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
M. Muzungu	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
F. Malawo	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
H. Shamabanse	Lenje	Tonga	Central
F. Chifunda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
M. Kanyungulu	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
C. Mulundika	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
H. Meebelo	Lozi	Barotse	Western
P. Matoka	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
J. M. Chiwela	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
A. Nyikosa	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
J. M. Nyaywa	Lozi	Barotse	Western
L. Mwananshiku	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
R. Kunda	Lala	Bemba	Central
M. Masheke	Lozi	Barotse	Western
K. Chinkuli	Lenje	Tonga	Central
L. Goma	Senga	Tumbuka	Eastern
B. Kabwe	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
H. Mwale	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
F. Chomba	Bisa	Bemba	Central
J. Mukando	Swaka	Bemba	Central
J. Kalaluka	Lozi	Barotse	Western

R. Sakuhuka	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
B. Kakoma	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
P. Malukutila	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
G. Chigaga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
F.Hapunda	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
M. Punabantu	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
A. Simuchimba	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
F. Chuula	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
B. Chipango	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western

Source: Compiled based on UNIP Various Years.

DISTRIBUTION OF MMD NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (NEC), 2008

Year: 2008

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
L. P. Mwanawasa	Lenje	Tonga	Southern
M. Mabenga	Lozi	Barotse	Western
K. Pande	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
K. Kalumba	Tabwa	Bemba	Luapula
G. J. Kaande	Lozi	Barotse	Western
S. Desai	Indian		
J. Chikwakwa	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
R. Shikapwasha	Lenje	Tonga	Central
K. Mwansa	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
B. S. Chiti	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
N. P. Magande	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
M. Mubanga	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
S. Kopulande	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
A. Nkole	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
B. Namuyamba	Ila	Tonga	Southern
B. Chituwo	Kaonde	North-Western	Central
P. Daka	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
W. M. Nalumango	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
R. K. Lembalemba	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
J. Kapijimpanga	Bias	Bemba	Northern
B. Tetamashimba	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
St. Manjata	Luvale	North-Western	Western
M. Mulongoti	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
S. Masebo	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
G. Mpombo	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt

V. T. Chiluba	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
P. B. Musonda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
B. Mutonka	Lamba	Lamba	Copperbelt
J. Chilambwe	Lala	Bemba	Northern
K. Zulu	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
W. Nsakasha	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
G. Chumbwe	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
G. C. Sikasote	Lungu	Mambwe	Northern
J. Katoka	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
S. Muzyamba	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
S. Namakando	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Rupiah Banda	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
G. Njapau	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
G. Namulambe	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
G. Mulando	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
C. Mutesha	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
M. Mulenga	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
M. S. Nkatya	Lala	Bemba	Northern
R. Zimba	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
C. Namugala	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
A. Lukanga	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
M. Mukwiza	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
M. I. Watala	Lozi	Barotse	Western
R. Phiri	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Rose Banda	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Frank Moyo	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
Sarah Siafwanda	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
J. Mwakalombe	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
H. Mbushi	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
A. M. Chungu	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
W. Lisulo	Lozi	Barotse	Western
S. Madyenkuku	Tonga	Tonga	Southern

Source: Compiled based on MMD 2008.

DISTRIBUTION OF PERMANENT SECRETARIES, 1964-2008

Year: 1964

Position	Name	Tribe	Language	Province
Office of the President	L. Bean	White		
Cabinet Office	A. W. Gaminara	White		
Foreign Affairs	P. S. Thirsk	White		
Home Affairs	P. S. Madocks	White		
Finance	K. J. Knaggs	White		
Housing & Social Development	J. B. Siyomunji	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Labour & Mines	E. W. Dunlop	White		
Lands & Natural Resources	E. L. Button	White		
Information & Postal Services	G. F. Tredwell	White		
Agriculture	G. M. Levack	White		
Commerce & Industry	L. E. Bradbury	White		
Education	W. A. Gorman	White		
Health	D. A. Rittey	White		
Justice	A. R. Porter	White		
Local Government	J. R. Brown	White		
Transport & Works	E. C. Thomson	White		

Source: Compiled based on GOZ Various Years b.

Year: 1968

Position	Name	Tribe	Language	Province
Cabinet Office and Presidential Offices	V. S. Musankanya	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	J. B. Siyomunji	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	A. S. Masiye	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	P. Ngoma	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	A. M. Phiri	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Office of the Vice-President	L. M. Lishomwa	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Foreign Affairs	F. M. Mulikata	Mbunda	Barotse	Western
Finance	E. J. Knaggs	White		
	E. G. Kasonde	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Home Affairs	B. M. Bwalya	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Education	D. C. Mulaisho	Ngoni	Nyanja	Central
Cooperatives,	K. C. Nyalugwe	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern

Youth & Social Development				
Labour & Health	J. B. Nyirongo	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
	M. M. Nalumango	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Commerce, Industry & Foreign Trade	A. S. Sardanis	White		
Transport, Power & Communications	G. H. Mutale	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Local Government	E. B. Mbozi	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Lands & Mines	J. C. Mapoma	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
Works & Housing	I. H. Muchangwe	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Legal Affairs	G. L. McLoughlin	White		
Natural Resources & Tourism	W. R. Mwondela	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Agriculture	E. A. Kashita	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula

Source: Compiled based on GOZ Various Years b.

Year: 1972

Position	**Name**	**Tribe**	**Language**	**Province**
Office of the President	C. F. Munkonge	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Central	W. K. Mayondi	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Western	H. M. Nzunga	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Eastern	D. N. Muttendango	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Northern	B. M. Situmbeko	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Southern	G. I. Yeta	Lozi	Barotse	Western
North-Western	F. N. Jere	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Copperbelt	H. D. Ngwane	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Luapula	D. R. Chlao	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
Office of the Vice-President	H. S. Meebelo	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Rural Development	E. I. Willima	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
Foreign Affairs	E. G. Sampa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Defence	D. Bowa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Home Affairs	J. K. Mulwanda	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
Finance	E. C. Chibwe	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Lands & Natural Resources	F. X. Nkhoma	Bisa	Bemba	Northern
Information, Broadcasting & Tourism	J. C. Punabantu	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Local Government	J. A. Sakala	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern

& Housing				
Mines & Mining Development	K. C. Nyalugwe	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
Power, Transport & Works	P. A. Siwo	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Education	V. M. Lavu	Chikunda	Nyanja	Central
Trade & Industry	J. C. Mapoma	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
Legal Affairs	S. S. Zulu	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Labour & Social Services	J. B. Nyirongo	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
Health	N. M. Nalumango	Lozi	Barotse	Western

Source: Compiled based on GOZ Various Years b.

Year: 1976

Position	Name	Tribe	Language	Province
Office of the President	W. J. Phiri	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	F. P. Muyawala	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Office of the Prime Minister	S. J. Kazunga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	V. M. Lavu	Chikunda	Nyanja	Central
	E. I. Willima	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
	D. A. Simonda	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
	R. K. Chinambu	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
Commerce	J. A. Sakala	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Development Planning	W. K. Nkowani	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
Education	P. A. Siwo	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Finance	F. M. Walusiku	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Foreign Affairs	P. M. Ngonda	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Health	N. N. Kalala	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
Home Affairs	D. R. Chilao	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
Labour & Social Services	S. D. Sachika	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Lands, Natural Resources & Tourism	A. D. Ndalama	Lala	Bemba	Central
Legal Affairs	R. M. Kapembwa	Lungu	Bemba	Northern
Local Government & Housing	A. J. Adamson	White		
Mines & Industry	A. L. Chitulang'oma	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Power, Transport & Communications	B. M. Monze	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Rural Development	D. D. Ngwane	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern

Northern	M. Kalaluka	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Eastern	E. G. Sampa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Central	S. K. Mutuna	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Copperbelt	J. Mutakwa	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Southern	J. H. Monga	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Luapula	A. E. Phiri	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Lusaka	G. B. Wamulume	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Western	M. Mumbwe	Mbunda	Barotse	Western

Source: Compiled based on GOZ Various Years b.

Year: 1980

Position	Name	Tribe	Language	Province
Office of the President	L. S. Chivuno	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Office of the Prime Minister	E. I. Willima	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
	F. M. Walusiku	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	V. M. Lavu	Chikunda	Nyanja	Central
	A. J. Adamson	White		
	J. Mutakwa	Lenje	Tonga	Central
	J. A. Sakala	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Central	R. K. Sambondu	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Copperbelt	J. M. Munkanta	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Eastern	W. S. Mufana	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Luapula	L. E. Kawesha	Bemba	Bemba	North-Western
Lusaka	R. K. Ching'ambu	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Northern	D. S. Chipeta	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
North-Western	B. Chabafimbi	Lala	Bemba	Central
Southern	M. V. Sivale	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
Western	S. K. Mubukwanu	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Defence & Security	I. C. Sikazwe	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
	A. K. Mbewe	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
Agriculture & Water Development	A. Hamaamba	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Commerce & Industry	K. S. Nyirenda	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
Education & Culture	P. A. Siwo	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Finance	L. C. Sichilongo	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
Foreign Affairs	P. L. Kasanda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Health	J. Kasonde	Bemba	Bemba	Northern

Home Affairs	P. K. Musukwa	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Northern
Information, Broadcasting & Tourism	E. M. Lubinda	Lozi	Lozi	Western
Labour & Social Services	R. B. Lukutati	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Lands & Natural Resources	B. M. Monze	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Legal Affairs	C. C. Manyema	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Mines	N. N. Kalala	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
National Guidance	E. P. Mumba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Power, Transport & Communications	E. S. Nebwe	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Tourism	G. C. Konie	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
Works & Supply	Y. K. Libakeni	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Youth & Sports	C. A. Lamba	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula

Source: Compiled based on GOZ Various Years b.

Year: 1985

Position	Name	Tribe	Language	Province
Office of the President	S. X. Shimabale	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Office of the Prime Minister	E. I. Willima	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
	F. M. Walusiku	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	V. M. Lavu	Chikunda	Nyanja	Central
	J. Mutakwa	Lenje	Tonga	Central
	S. J. Mudenda	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	M. V. Siwale	Namwanga	Namwanga	Northern
	P. K. Musakwa	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Northern
	J. M. Munkanta	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
	P. Malukutila	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Agriculture & Water Development	N. P. Magande	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Commerce & Industry	F. S. Kazunga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Cooperatives	Y. K. Libakeni	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Decentralisation	S. K. Mubukwanu	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Central	E. M. Lubinda	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Copperbelt	A. W. Mukelabai	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Eastern	B. Chabafimbi	Lala	Bemba	Central
Luapula	D. H. Ng'wane	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Lusaka	D. H. Kaona	Bemba	Bemba	Northern

Northern	I. R. Manda	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
North-Western	E. K. Shiaka	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
Southern	P. K. Phiri	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Western	R. K. Chinambu	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Finance	E. S. Nebwe	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	J. M. Mtonga	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
Foreign Affairs	P.L. Kasanda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
General Education & Culture	M. R. Banda	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Health	E. H. HimuNyanja	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Higher Education	C. M. Sikazwe	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
Information & Broadcasting Services	I. C. Sikazwe	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
Labour & Social Services	V. J. Malauni	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Lands & Natural Resources	N. Mukutu	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Legal Affairs	J. M. Chitundu	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Mines	K. S. Nyirenda	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
National Guidance	J. L. Masaninga	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
Power, Transport & Communications	N. B. Nyoni	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Tourism	C. A. Lamba	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Works & Supply	G. M. Pelekamoyo	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Youth & Sport	M. B. Nguvu	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western

Source: Compiled based on GOZ Various Years b.

Year: 1992

Position	Name	Tribe	Language	Province
Office of the President	S. D. Sacika	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
	S. L. Mbula	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	S. X. Shimabala	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Central	A. S. Mweemba	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Copperbelt	D. A. Kaona	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Eastern	N. E. Mumba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Luapula	C. A. Lamba	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Lusaka	D. M. Mumbe	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Northern	J. M. Ngo	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
North-Western	K. Kangwa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Southern	G. F. Lungu	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Western	C. M. Itwi	Tonga	Tonga	Southern

National Commission for Development Planning	L. Nkhata	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
	M. M. Liswaniso	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Defence	P. K. Musukwa	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Northern
Foreign Affairs	J. M. Kabinga	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Finance	J. M. Mtonga	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
	B. Mweene	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Home Affairs	N. A. Kalala	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
Local Government & Housing	N. J. Mapala	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
Health	K. Kamanga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Education	B. N. Nguvu	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Commerce, Trade & Industry	J. Nkunika	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
Community Development & Social Services	H. K. Matanda	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Labour & Social Security	E. J. Phiri	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Communication & Transport	C. M. Sikazwe	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
Energy & Water Development	R. C. Sampa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Agriculture, Food & Fisheries	N. Mukutu	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	K. M. Maimbo	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Lands	W. K. Kawana	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Legal Affairs	C. K. Banda	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
	B. M. Mwanakaoma	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Environment & Natural Resources	A. N. Chimuka	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Information & Broadcasting Services	J. C. Mapoma	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
Mines & Minerals Development	F. M. Siame	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
Science, Technical Education and Vocational Training	V. G. Nyirenda	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
Sport, Youth & Child Development	S. J. Mudenda	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Tourism	G. M. Mulapesi	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Works & Supply	M. X. Mufwaya	Lozi	Barotse	Western

Source: Compiled based on GOZ Various Years d.

Year: 1998

Position	Name	Tribe	Language	Province
Office of the Vice-President	A. S. Mweemba	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	R. C. Musenge	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Cabinet Office	K. T. Mwansa	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
	R. H. Mataka	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	G. M. Mulapesi	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	J. L. Kanganja	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
	E. C. Chiyenge	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Finance & Economic Development	Prof. B. Mweene	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	J. M. Mtonga	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
	B. Nonde	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Home Affairs	J. C. Kasongo	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Communications & Transport	X. E. Vlahakis	White		
Agriculture, Food & Fisheries	M. R. Mulele	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Defence	P. K. Musukwa	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
Sport, Youth & Child Development	H. K. Mantanda	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Science, Technology & Vocational Training	J. Mapoma	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
Environment & Natural Resources	J. M. Masinja	Lala	Bemba	Central
Education	S. M. Kasanda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Legal Affairs	E. V. Jhala	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Tourism	R. C. Sampa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Mines & Minerals Development	A. M. Kashimu	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Foreign Affairs	N. Simbyakula	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
Local Government & Housing	O. M. Banda	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Health	K. M. Bulaya	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Commerce, Trade & Industry	A. C. Sichinga	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
Community Development & Social Welfare	M. K. Nkole	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Energy & Water Development	P. L. Mwamfuli	Ng'umbo	Bemba	Luapula
Lands	B. M.	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula

	Mwanakaoma			
Information & Broadcasting Services	S. Sikaneta	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Works & Supply	G. P. Nyirenda	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
Without Portfolio	W. Mulubisha	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
Northern	S. M. Mpishi	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
Central	F. Nduna	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Eastern	W. B. Silweya	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
Southern	M. C. Chalimbana	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
Western	G. S. Akafekwa	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Luapula	R. C. Mukuma	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Copperbelt	A. Yoyo	Lozi	Barotse	Western
North-Western	M. Mubanga	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
Lusaka	H. M. Mtonga	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern

Source: Compiled based on GOZ Various Years d.

Year: 2002

Position	Name	Tribe	Language	Province
Office of the Vice-President	W. Mulubisha	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
	B. M. Simpokolwe	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
Cabinet Office	S. L. Mbula	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	R. H. Mataka	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	R. C. Musenge	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	D. C. Sadoki	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	O. M. Kalabo	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	M. N. Zimba	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
	A. B. Ponga	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	C. G. Kaluba	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Northern
Finance & National Planning	O. A. Chifungula	Lenje	Tonga	Central
	R. Chizyuka	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
	L. Nkhata	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
Defence	J. K. Chitafu	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Home Affairs	P. Mumba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Foreign Affairs	S. Akapelwa	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Agriculture & Cooperatives	M. R. Mulele	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	E. J. Phiri	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Mines & Minerals Development	S. Mpishi	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
Health	S. Miti	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern

Education	B. Chilangwa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Labour & Social Security	A. J. Chirva	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
Local Government & Housing	J. Mapoma	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
Commerce, Trade & Industry	Mbikusita W. Lewanika	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Communications & Transport	Dr. Kwendakwema	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
Tourism, Environment & Natural Resources	L. E. Kapulu	Ila	Tonga	Southern
Works & Supply	Lt. Col. B. Nkunika	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
Legal Affairs	N. Simbyakula	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
Energy & Water Development	A. C. Sichinga	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
Community Development & Social Services	P. L. Mwamfuli	Ng'umbo	Bemba	Luapula
Science & Technology	G. P. Mukala	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Information & Broadcasting Services	D. Kashweka	Mbunda	North-Western	North-Western
Sport, Youth & Child Development	M. G. Nkole	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Lands	G. Kawatu	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Western	Maswabi Maimbolwa	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Eastern	Frank Moyo	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Central	Patrick Kashinka	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Lusaka	Lameck Chibombamilimo	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Luapula	Major Chibwe Nsakasha	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Northern	Major E. S. Chisha	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
North-Western	Gabriel Namulambe	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Southern	Darious Hakayobe	Tonga	Tonga	Southern

Source: Compiled based on GOZ Various Years d.

Year: 2008

Position	**Name**	**Tribe**	**Language**	**Province**
Office of the Vice-President	A. C. Sichinga	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
	N. A. Susiku	Lozi	Barotse	Western

Cabinet Office	J. L. Kanganja	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
	R. H. Mataka	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	L. Ndalamei	Lala	Bemba	Central
	R. C. Musenge	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
	O. M. Kalabo	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	G. Kawatu	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
	I. Kashoka	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
	M. M. Yeta	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Defence	M. D. Lisati	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Home Affairs	S. Sikaneta	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Finance & National Planning	Mbikusita W. Lewanika	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	N. Ngulube	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
	J. Mulungushi	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
Foreign Affairs	T. C. Kapoma	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
Agriculture & Cooperatives	S. Mundia	Lozi	Barotse	Western
	I. K. Phiri	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Mines & Minerals Development	L. Nkhata	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
Health	S. K. Miti	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Education	L. E. Kapulu	Ila	Tonga	Southern
Labour & Social Security	N. Chisupa	Ushi	Bemba	Luapula
Commerce, Trade & Industry	D. Chilipamunshi	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Communications & Transport	Brig. Gen. P. Tembo	Chewa	Nyanja	Central
Local Government & Housing	J. Ngo	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Tourism, Environment & Natural Resources	M. R. Mulele	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Works & Supply	Lt. Col. B. Nkunika	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
Justice	G. M. Imbwae	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
	M. Malila	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Energy & Water Development	P. Mumba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Community Development & Social Services	T. Kasonso	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Science & Technology	B. G. Nsemukila	Ng'umbo	Bemba	Luapula
Information & Broadcasting	E. Nyirenda	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern

Services				
Lands	B. S. Namachila	Ila	Tonga	Southern
Sport, Youth and Child Development	B. Samakayi	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western

Source: Compiled based on GOZ Various Years d.

DISTRIBUTION OF ZAMBIA INDUSTRIAL AND MINING CORPORTAION (ZIMCO) POSITIONS, 1974-1990

Year: 1974

Position	Name	Tribe	Language
Directors			
K. D. Kaunda (Chair)	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
H. Mulemba (Vice)	Kaonde	North-Western	Central
W. M. Chakulya	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
A. B. Chikwanda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
P. J. Chisanga	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
S. B. Kafumakache	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
F. H. Kaunda	Ng'umbo	Bemba	Luapula
R. Kunda	Lala	Bemba	Central
B. R. Kuwani	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
L. M. Lishomwa	Lozi	Barotse	Western
M. Makwaya	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
J. C. Mapoma	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
J. B. Mubanga	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
I. H. Muchangwe	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
D. C. Mulaisho	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
N. S. Mulenga	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
G. M. Munkonge	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
L. S. Muuka	Lozi	Barotse	Western
J. M. Mwanza	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
J. B. Nyirongo	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
D. A. Phiri	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
A. J. Soko	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern

Source: Compiled based on ZIMCO Various Years.

Year: 1978

Position	Name	Tribe	Language
Directors			
D. M. Lisulo (Chairman)	Lozi	Barotse	Western
W. P. Nyirenda (Vice-Chairman)	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern

M. J Lumina	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
J. C. Mapoma	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
P. T. Miller	White		
D. C. Mulaisho	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
J. M. Mwanakatwe	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
L. J. Mwananshiku	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
K. H. Nkwabilo	Soli	Tonga	Central
D. A. Simonda	Lozi	Barotse	Western
F. M. Walusiku	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Management			
J. C. Mapoma	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
L. M. Chileshe	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
P. J. Chisanga	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
I. H. Muchangwe	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
T. B. Chintu	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
M. V. Muhsin	Lala	Bemba	Central

Source: Compiled based on ZIMCO Various Years.

Year: 1982

Name	**Tribe**	**Language**	**Province**
Directors			
N. Mundia (Chairman)	Lozi	Barotse	Western
E. H. Mudenda (Vice-Chairman)	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
R. Chisupa	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
R. Kunda	Lala	Bemba	Central
M. Mumbuna	Lozi	Barotse	Western
K. S. Musokotwane	Toka-Leya	Tonga	Southern
J. C. Mapoma	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
B. R. Kuwani	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
P. T. Miller	White		
D. C. Mulaisho	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
J. M. Mwanakatwe	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
D. A. Simonda	Lozi	Barotse	Western
F. M. Walusiku	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Management			
J. C. Mapoma	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
P. J. Chisanga	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
I. H. Muchangwe	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
L. S. Muuka	Lozi	Barotse	Western
M. V. Muhsin	Lala	Bemba	Central

T. B. Chintu	Bemba	Bemba	Northern

Source: Compiled based on ZIMCO Various Years.

Year: 1986

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
Directors			
K. D. Kaunda (Chairman)	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
K. S. Musokotwane (Vice-Chairman)	Toka-Leya	Tonga	Southern
A. J. Soko	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
G. G. Chigaga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Gen. G. K. Chinkuli	Lenje	Tonga	Central
F. Chuula	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
B. R. Kabwe	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
J. K. Kalaluka	Lozi	Barotse	Western
H. S. Meebelo	Lozi	Barotse	Western
H. Y. Mwale	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
U. G. Mwila	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
L. S. Subulwa	Lozi	Barotse	Western
E. I. Willima	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
H. Bweupe	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
F. T. Chiluba	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
I. S. Chivuno	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
F. H. Kaunda	Ng'umbo	Bemba	Luapula
V. M. Lavu	Chikunda	Nyanja	Central
S. B. Lungu	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
J. C. Mapoma	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
P. T. Miller	White		
C. M. Sampa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
D. A. Simonda	Lozi	Barotse	Western
N. L. Zimba	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
Management			
E. I. Willima	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
D. Bowa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
R. M. Chomba	Bisa	Bemba	Central
I. H. Muchangwe	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
L. S. Muuka	Lozi	Barotse	Western
M. V. Muhsin	Lala	Bemba	Central
R. L. Bwalya	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
E. C. Kaunga	Soli	Tonga	Central

G. M. Mumbi	Bemba	Bemba	Northern

Source: Compiled based on ZIMCO Various Years.

Year: 1990

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
Directors			
K. D. Kaunda (Chairman)	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
G. M. Masheke (Vice-Chairman)	Lozi	Barotse	Western
A. J. Soko	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
G. G. Chigaga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Gen. E. Haimbe	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
B. N. Fumbelo	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
F. M. Chomba	Bisa	Bemba	Central
O. S. Musuka	Lala	Bemba	Central
L. Mulimba	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
P. S. Chitambala	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
J. J. Mukando	Swaka	Bemba	Central
E. I. Willima	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
F. H. Kaunda	Ng'umbo	Bemba	Luapula
J. C. Mapoma	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
F. X. Nkhoma	Bisa	Bemba	Northern
F. T. Chiluba	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
N. L. Zimba	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
C. M. Sampa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
H. Bweupe	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
S. B. Lungu	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
J. M. Mwanza	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
D. A. Simonda	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Management			
E. I. Willima	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
E. C. Kaunga	Soli	Tonga	Central
A. D. Zulu	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
M. S. Mulenga	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Y. K. Libakeni	Lozi	Barotse	Western
E. D. Kasunga	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
A. J. Adamson	White		
T. V. Ramanathan	Asian		
G. W. Simukoko	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern

Source: Compiled based on ZIMCO Various Years.

DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (INDECO) POSITIONS, 1967-1991

Year: 1967

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
A. S. Sardanis (Chairman and Managing Director)	White		
P. Attala	White		
D. B. Banda	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
G. S. Cornhill	White		
M. Gersh	White		
E. A. Kashita	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
H. Malenga	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
G. H. Mutale	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
S. B. Zukas	White		
J. B. Zulu	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
C. H. Goodwin (Deputy Manager)	White		
F. K. Mwanza (Secretary)	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula

Source: Compiled based on INDECO Various Years.

Year: 1971

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
E. A. Kashita (Executive Chairman)	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
G. S. Cornhill	White		
E. G. Kasonde	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
W. L. Lewis	White		
H. Malenga	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
D. C. Mulaisho	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
V. S. Musakanya	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
A. S. Sardanis	White		
H. G. Shikopa	Lala	Bemba	Central
E. Thawe	White		
S. B. Zukas	White		
A. M. Sinyangwe (Secretary)	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern

Source: Compiled based on INDECO Various Years.

Year: 1975

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
A. J. Soko (Chairman)	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
J. B. Nyirongo (Managing Director)	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
P. K. Chiwenda	Lamba	Bemba	Central
D. A. Simonda	Lozi	Barotse	Western
G. S. Cornhill	White		
S. B. Kafumakache	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
B. R. Kuwani	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
L. S. Muuka	Lozi	Barotse	Western
P. T. Miller	White		
L. J. Mwananshiku	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
J. D. Sichone	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
D. C. Mulaisho	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
J. M. Mwanza	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
T. B. Chintu (Secretary)	Bemba	Bemba	Northern

Source: Compiled based on INDECO Various Years.

Year: 1979

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
J. C. Mapoma (Chairman)	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
D. C. Mulaisho	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
L. C. Sichilongo	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
L. S. Muuka (Managing Director)	Lozi	Barotse	Western
L. J. Mwananshiku	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
J. D. Sichone	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
P. T. Miller	White		
G. S. Cornhill	White		
N. D. Muttendango	Lozi	Barotse	Western
L. M. Chileshe	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
G. M. Mumbi (Secretary)	Bemba	Bemba	Northern

Source: Compiled based on INDECO Various Years.

Year: 1983

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
J. C. Mapoma (Chairman)	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
D. C. Mulaisho	Ngoni	Nynaga	Eastern
A. D. Zulu (Managing	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern

Director)			
D. A. Simonda	Lozi	Barotse	Western
B. H. Kuwani	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
L. A. Monze	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
K. S. Nyirenda	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
P. T. Miller	White		
H. C. Golson	White		
F. Nkhoma	Bisa	Bemba	Northern
J. D. Sichone	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
G. M. Mumbi (Secretary)	Bemba	Bemba	Northern

Source: Compiled based on INDECO Various Years.

Year: 1987

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
E. I. Willima (Chairman)	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
A. D. Zulu (Managing Director)	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
J. C. Mapoma	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
D. A. Simonda	Lozi	Barotse	Western
L. Nkhata	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
L. A. Monze	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
L. S. Chivuno	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
F. Nkhoma	Bisa	Bemba	Northern
H. C. Golson	White		
P. T. Miller	White		
J. D. Sichone	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
C. C. Musonda (Secretary)	Bemba	Bemba	Northern

Source: Compiled based on INDECO Various Years.

Year: 1991

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
E. I. Willima (Chairman)	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
M. Mwinga (Managing Director)	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
J. C. Mapoma	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
L. A. Monze	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
J. D. Sichone	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
F. Nkhoma	Bisa	Bemba	Northern
J. W. Shaw	White		
B. P. Kapota	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western

J. M. Nyaywa	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
I. M. Kamanga	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
L. Nkhata	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
D. H. Lwiindi (Secretary)	Tonga	Tonga	Southern

Source: Compiled based on INDECO Various Years.

DISTRIBUTION OF MINING PARASTATAL POSITIONS, 1970-1998

Year: 1970 (MINDECO)

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
D. C. Mulaisho (Executive Chairman)	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
E. G. Kasonde	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
I. H. Muchangwe	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
A. S. Sardanis	White		
E. A. Kashita	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
F. C. Sumbwe	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
B. Mufonka	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
P. H. Brownrigg	White		

Source: Compiled based on MINDECO Various Years.

Date: 1974 (MINDECO)

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
A. J. Soko (Chairman)	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
L. S. Muuka (Managing Director)	Lozi	Barotse	Western
P. H. Brownrigg	White		
N. Zimba	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
P. K. Chiwenda	Lamba	Bemba	Central
F. H. Kaunda	Ng'umbo	Bemba	Luapula
D. C. Mulaisho	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
J. B. Nyirongo	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
J. M. Mwanza	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
F. C. Sumbwe	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
E. G. Kasonde	Bemba	Bemba	Northern

Source: Compiled based on MINDECO Various Years.

Date: 1978 (Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines)

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
'A directors'			
J. C. Mapoma (Chairman)	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
F. H. Kaunda (Managing Director)	Ng'umbo	Bemba	Luapula
P. H. Brownrigg	White		
D. C. Mulaisho	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
L. C. Sichilongo	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
F. C. Sumbwe	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern

Source: Compiled based on MINDECO Various Years.

Date: 1982 (ZCCM)

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
'A' Directors			
F. H. Kaunda (Chairman and Chief Executive)	Ng'umbo	Bemba	Luapula
R. L. Bwalya	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
B. R. Kuwani	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
L. C. Mutakasha	Lenje	Tonga	Central
L. S. Muuka	Lozi	Barotse	Western
E. H. Mwanang'onze	Lozi	Barotse	Western
M. N. Siamwiza	Ila	Tonga	Southern

Source: Compiled based on ZCCM Various Years.

Date: 1986 (ZCCM)

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
'A' Directors			
F. H. Kaunda (Chairman and Chief Executive)	Ng'umbo	Bemba	Luapula
L. S. Chivuno	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
L. C. Mutakasha	Lenje	Tonga	Central
J. K. Ngwisha	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
K. S. Nyirenda	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
M. N. Siamwiza	Ila	Tonga	Southern
T. M. Walamba	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western

Source: Compiled based on ZCCM Various Years.

Date: 1990 (ZCCM)

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
'A' Directors			
F. H. Kaunda (Chairman and Chief Executive)	Ng'umbo	Bemba	Luapula

J. A. Bussieres	White		
P. K. Chiwenda	Lamba	Bemba	Central
L. C. Mutakasha	Lenje	Tonga	Central
J. K. Ngwisha	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
M. N. Siamwiza	Ila	Tonga	Southern
J. H. Simakuni	Toka Leya	Tonga	Southern

Source: Compiled based on ZCCM Various Years.

Date: 1994 (ZCCM)

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
'A' Directors			
R. L. Bwalya (Chairman)	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
E. K. Shamutete (Chief Executive)	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
J. M. Mtonga	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
D. C. Mulaisho	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
D. Chanda	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
F. S. Kunda	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
J. K. Phiri	Tonga	Tonga	Southern

Source: Compiled based on ZCCM Various Years.

Date: 1998 (ZCCM)

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
'A' Directors			
S. L. Shimukowa (Chairman)	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
E. K. Shamutete (Chief Executive)	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
J. M. Mwanza	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
A. M. Kashimu	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
G. G. Chabwera	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
F. H. Kaunda	Ng'umbo	Bemba	Luapula
P. K. Nkanza	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka

Source: Compiled based on ZCCM Various Years.

DISTRIBUTION OF PRIVATISED ASSETS, 1992-2005

Companies sold to political leaders & public officers

Company	Purchaser	Tribe	Language	Province
Eagle Travel Limited	Quantum Investors Mr Yoram Godwin Mumba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Hartley Farms	Gilbwest Holdings Limited Hon Gilbert Mululu	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
Nchanga - Mbala Farms	RDS Investments Limited Chibulu Jane Penza Willa D Mung'omba Ben Soko (directors)	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
La Hacienda Hotel	Mr Stanford Makosonke Hlazo	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Lake Hotels	Hon Bennie Himainza Wycliffe Mwiinga, MP	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
Consolidated Tyre Services Limited	Amon Kambole Sikazwe Chibulu Jane Penza	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
National Drug Company (NDC) Monze	Mandes Supermarket, Monze Hon Suresh Desai, MP	Asian		
National Home Stores - Sichili	Hon. Leonard Subulwa, MP Minister for Western Province	Lozi	Barotse	Western

National Home Stores - Mongu	Hon. Leonard Subulwa, MP Minister for Western Province	Lozi	Barotse	Western
National Home Stores - Kaoma	Hon. Stephen Manjata, MP Deputy Minister	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
National Home Stores - Lukulu	Hon. S C Ngombo, MP, Deputy Minister – Education	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Zambia National Wholesale & Marketing Co. - Sesheke	Tusa Security Limited Hon. Richard N'ganga, MP	Lozi	Barotse	Western
National Home Stores - Sesheke	Tusa Security Limited Hon. Richard N'ganga, MP	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Consumer Buying Corporation of Zambia - Kabompo	Hon Anoshi Chipawa, MP, Deputy Minister - N/Western Province.	Lunda	North-Western	North-Western
Consumer Buying Corporation of Zambia - Kasempa	Hon Patrick Kafumakache, MP - Cabinet Minister	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
National Home Stores - Namwala	Hon Chulu Kalima, MP	Ila	Tonga	Southern
National Home Stores - Siavonga	ZEFA Trading Limited Hon Frederick Hapunda, MP	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
National Home Stores – Sinazongwe	Hon S Madyenkuku, MP - Deputy Minister	Tonga	Tonga	Southern

Source: Compiled based on ZPA 2006b.

Companies sold to Zambian individuals

Company	Purchaser	Tribe	Language	Province
AFE Limited	Mr Friday Ndhlovu	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Coolwell System Limited	Professor Francis Yamba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Indeco Milling Limited - Luangwa Mill	Mr Goodward Mulubwa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Indeco Milling - Ndola Plant	Dr Rajan Mahtani	Asian		
Kafubu Dairy Farm	Mr Ernest Mtamboh	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
Lyambai Hotel	Mr Josiah Situmbeko Songolo Mr Mulozi Samuel Lisibani Mr Greeves Sitwala	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
Mansa Dairy Farm	Mr Protassio Chipulu	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula
Nkwazi Manufacturing Limited	Mr M K Patel	Asian		
Supa Baking Kitwe Factory	Mr Henry Bruce Rennie of Kitwe	White		
Simmental Stud Ranch	Mr Lloyd Chongo, Director of Credit ZANACO	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Crested Crane Hotel - Mpika	Mr Charles Mpundu	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
ZUVA ZAMBIA	Mr Louis C Wapamesa Mrs C M Wapamesa	Lozi	Barotse	Western

Zambia Clay Industries Limited-Kalulushi Brick Works	MR Evans Chibiliti, Chairman of the Investment Centre	Lamba	Bemba	Copperbelt
Zambia Cold Storage Corporation Limited - Kabwe Retail Outlet	Raymond G Lewis	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
Zamhort Mkushi Plant	E I Dawoodjee & Protein Food	Asian		
Zambia Pork Products Limited	Mr Webster Musukwa	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
ZCSC Fountains Farm	Moses K Nawa	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Lundazi Castle	Chifumu Banda S.C Mr Rodgers Nkunika	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Mununshi Banana Estate	Mr Terence Ian Findlay	White		
Katito Crop Farm (ZADL)	Griver Sikasote	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
Zambia Steel & Building Supplies - Lusaka Door Factory	Mr Sebastian Kopulande	Lunda	Bemba	Luapula

Source: Compiled based on ZPA 2006b.

Companies sold to Zambian corporate bodies

Company	Purchaser	Owners/ directors	Tribe	Language	Province
AutoCare Limited	Astro Holdings Limited, Lusaka	Mr. S R Patel Mr. V R Patel	Asian		
Chainda Dairy Farms	H S Limited	Mr H.G. Shikopa	Bemba	Bemba	Northern

Chilongolo Dairy Farms	ZAMDAELL Limited	Mr Murray Dewar Mr Faustin Kabwe Mr Aaron Chungu Mr Gaudenzio M Rossi (directors)	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Chipata Dairy Farm	Eastern Dairy Limited	Mr Ziyauddin Daya Mr Elyas Daya Mr Yousuf Daya Mr Mohamed Daya Mr Ayub Daya	Asian		
Cleanwell Dry Cleaners	Swan Dry Cleaners	Mr J C Chalansi Mr P L Ng'andwe	Ng'umbo	Bemba	Luapula
Dairy Produce Board – Chipata Factory	Payanjala Farms of Chipata	Mr Ziyauddin Daya Mr Elyas Daya Mr Yousuf Daya Mr Mohamed Daya Mr Ayub Daya	Asian		
Dairy Produce Board – Kabwe Factory	Kabwe Farmers Co-operative Society	Mr B P Kapota Mr D Garnie Mr O E Gondwe Mr K Moyo Mr T Kasapo	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern

		Mr R Lewis Mrs M Chatterton			
Dairy Produce Board – Ndola Depot	Northern Dairies Limited	R A B Brown Mrs M Cheelo L de la Lucia S T Jaffray M Jele B D S Kapita K Kasama G Nkhata Mrs J Phiri M Sichizya D Smail J Stephenson A M Vashee	White		
Elephant's Head Hotel	Chainama Hotel Limited	Mr. Sonny P. Mulenga	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
General Pharmaceuticals Limited	Mutashi Limited	Mr. J. M. Kasonde Mrs. (Dr.) D. K. Kasonde	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Holding Farm (ZADL)	Evergreen Farms Limited	Mr Ayub Patel (Indian national) Khalil Ahmed Patel (Zambian national) Sheft Altaf Yakub (Indian	Asian		

		national).			
Kakoma Dairy Farm (ZADL)	Yitzhak Sarig	Yitzhak Sarig (Israeli national)	White		
Kasama Dairy Farm (ZADL)	Bwikashi Properties Limited	Charles H Sichangwa Rosemary M Sichangwa Lingson Chikoti Christopher Sinyangwe	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
National Drug Company - Head Office & Factory	Nachera Holdings Limited (75%) and Patrick Chiumya (25%)	S Chiumya	Tonga	Tonga	Southern
NIEC Farms Limited	EBM Chambers	E B Mwansa	Ng'umbo	Bemba	Northern
Nkumba Piggery & Feedlot (ZADL)	R P Investments Limited	Raphael Salasini Paul Salasini	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Solwezi Dairy Farm (ZADL)	Kansanshi Dynamics Limited	General Sande Kayumba Mr Teddy Mulonga	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Zambia Cold Storage Corporation Limited - Mongu Plant	Mongu Meat Corporation Plc	Mr K Munganga (Chairman) Mr K Muteto (Vice Chairman) Mr K M Lewanika Mr V Mukelabai Dr F W D Oyat Dr D Lance	Lozi	Barotse	Western

		Mr S Mukambo Mr R M Munyinda Mr S L Kwilimba M Mukumba Mr R M Muyunda.			
Zambia Cold Storage Corporation Limited - Lusaka Plant	Kembe Estates Limited	Mr Chris Spyron G.M. Spyron A. Chronis.	White		
Zambia Cold Storage Corporation Limited - Chipata Plant	Mosali Agro Food Processors Limited	Idris Ugradar Mohamed Bilal Edrish Bhai Ugradar	Asian		
Indeco Milling Limited - Kasama Mill	GBM Trucking (Z) Limited	Mr Geoffrey Bwalya Mwamba Chama Mwenso Mwamba	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Zambia Maltings Limited	Sable Transport Limited	F A Alloo	Asian		
Zambia Steel & Building Supplies - Kitwe Sales Outlet	Spectra Oils Limited	Yuyi Lishomwa Hastings Gondwe,	Lozi	Barotse	Western
MIL Sawmilling & Joinery Limited	SGM Associates Limited	Dr Siteke Mwale (Executive Chairman) Mr Fisho P Mwale (Executive Director)	Chewa	Nyanja	Eastern
Norgroup Plastics Limited	Simba Chemicals	Dr Sharma (majority	Asian		

		shareholder)			
Zambia Cashew Company Limited	Western Cashew Industries Limited	Mbuka Sinyinda Herbert Mutandengo Nkwilimba Lubinda Kabombo Mubita Kashina Kandala and 11 other directors.	Lozi	Barotse	Western
ZAFFICO - Dola Hill Sawmill	Wood Processing Limited	R L Patel R K Patel D S Patel.	Asian		
New Savoy Hotel Limited	Integrated Hospitality Solutions Limited	Mr Christy Lumpa.	Lozi	Barotse	Western

Source: Compiled based on ZPA 2006b.

DISTRIBUTION OF ARMY COMMANDERS SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Name	Tribe	Language	Province
Zambia Army Commanders			
Gen. G. K. Chinkuli	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Lt.-Gen. B. N. Mibenge	Bemba	Bemba	Luapula
Major-Gen. C. Kabwe	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Gen. M. N. Masheke	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Lt.-Gen. C. S. Tembo	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
Lt.-Gen. G. M. Kalenge	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
Lt.-Gen. F. G. Sibamba	Lozi	Barotse	Western
Gen. N. M. Simbeye	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
Lt.-Gen. S. L. Mumbi	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
Lt.-Gen. Geojago R. Musengule	Lala	Bemba	Central
Lt.-Gen. Issac Chisuzi	Soli	Tonga	Lusaka
Zambia Air Force Commanders			
Lt.-Gen. P. D. Zuze	Chikunda	Nyanja	Eastern
Maj.-Gen. C. Kabwe	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Maj.-Gen. Simbule	Namwanga	Mambwe	Northern
Lt. Gen. A. Lungu	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
Lt.-Gen. Simutowe	Mambwe	Mambwe	Northern
Lt. –Gen. Ronnie Shikapwasha	Lenje	Tonga	Central
Lt.-Gen. Sande Kayumba	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Weston
Lt.-Gen. Christopher Singogo	Luvale	North-Western	North-Western
Lt. Gen. Samuel Mapala	Ngoni	Nyanja	Eastern
Zambia National Service Commanders			
Brig.-Gen. C. J. Nyirenda	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
Brig.-Gen. F. S. Mulenga	Bemba	Bemba	Northern
Maj.-Gen. T. Fara	Chikunda	Nyanja	Lusaka
Maj.Gen. Dickson Zulu	Nsenga	Nyanja	Eastern
Lt.-Gen. W. G. Funjika	Kaonde	North-Western	North-Western
Maj.-Gen. M. Mbao	Tumbuka	Tumbuka	Eastern
Maj.-Gen. R. Chisheta	Bemba	Bemba	Northern

Source: Compiled based on Wele 1995: 158; Interview, Gen. Malimba Masheke; Interview, Geofroy Haantolobo.

11.2 Interview Guidelines

11.2.1 Uganda

1) Uganda and recurrent civil war

Why – intuitively – do you think has Uganda been affected by recurrent civil war? What are the main driving forces behind instability and violent conflict?

Do you feel that the same factors were at play during the different civil wars over time?

2) Main cleavages in Ugandan society

What are the main cleavages/ dividing lines in Ugandan society? Tribe? Language? Region? Religion? Class?

To what extent do these different cleavages overlap? And what is ultimately the most important source of social cleavage?

Is tribal sentiment more or less pronounced than in other African countries? Why? To what extent is there intermarriage between different tribal groups? How does the low level of urbanisation play into this?

Has the importance of the various social cleavages changed over time? Have tribe and/or religion become less important? Have class issues become more important?

How are the key dividing lines in society related to recurrent civil war? Would you characterise past and current conflicts as 'tribally' or 'religiously' motivated?

3) The distribution of jobs and resources

How inclusive or exclusionary have been the Obote/ Amin/ UNLF/ Museveni governments? To what extent have the different governments practised balancing policies?

What do you understand by 'inclusive government'? Tribal/ linguistic/ regional/ religious inclusiveness? Political inclusiveness/ broad-basedness?

Where does inclusion vs. exclusion express itself? At the level of Cabinet? The administration? The ruling party? The parastatal sector? The army?

Do you feel that the distribution of government positions between competing social groups has been largely 'fair'? What is a 'fair' distribution?

How are jobs in the civil service distributed? Recruitment based on merit or tribal/ linguistic/ regional affiliation? Do certain groups dominate the civil service?

How inclusive was the UPC as a ruling party? And how inclusive has been the National Resistance Movement (NRM)?

What can you say about the distribution of jobs in the parastatal sector? What were the key parastatals under Obote and Amin? How has this changed with privatisation? Has any group benefitted disproportionally from privatisation?

How inclusive are the Ugandan armed forces? Are soldiers/ officers recruited on merit or along tribal lines? Has this changed over time? How would you describe the relationship between the political authorities and the armed forces?

4) The distribution of jobs and resources and recurrent civil war

Do you think that there is a link between the inter-group distribution of jobs and resources and civil war?

To what extent have imbalances in access to jobs and resources driven violent conflict?

...the 1966 'Battle of Mengo'?
...the anti-Amin rebellions?
...the anti-UNLF/ anti-Obote II insurgencies?
...the anti-Museveni wars in the North? The West?

5) Other relevant factors

Which other factors explain Uganda's recurrent civil war?

Colonial legacy: Colonial rule has arguably played a very negative role in Uganda (i.e. uneven regional development, Baganda dominance, etc.). To what extent was post-colonial violence inevitable? What could have been done to overcome the deep divisions in Ugandan society?

Economic performance: Uganda suffered from sharp economic decline during the first two decades of independence (especially under Idi Amin), whereas its economic record improved under Museveni. How is economic performance related to political stability?

Democracy: Some people argue that Museveni's 'Movement system' was more democratic than previous governments. If you agree, why has this not led to peace and stability? And what has been the impact of the re-introduction of multi-party politics?

Regional instability: Uganda is located in a highly unstable region. How has this affected civil war in Uganda?

Role of international donors: Uganda is still receiving large amounts of foreign aid. What has been the role of donors in recurrent civil war? How has structural adjustment affected patterns of violent conflict?

11.2.2 Zambia

1) Zambia and civil war avoidance

Why – intuitively – do you think Zambia has avoided civil war? What are the main driving forces behind the country's lasting peace and stability?

What have been the main moments of instability and crisis? Has Zambia ever been close to civil war? If so, how were these crises overcome?

Do you think that Zambia has become more/less stable over time? Why?

2) Main cleavages in Zambian society

What are the main cleavages in Zambian society? Tribe? Language? Province? Religion? Class?

To what extent do these different cleavages overlap? And what is ultimately the most important source of social cleavage?

Is tribal sentiment more or less pronounced than in other African countries? Why? To what extent is there intermarriage between different tribal groups? How does the high level of urbanisation play into this?

Has the importance of the various social cleavages changed over time? Have tribe and/or language become less important? Have class issues become more important?

3) The distribution of jobs and resources

How inclusive or exclusionary have been the Kaunda/ Chiluba/ Mwanawasa governments? To what extent have the different governments practised 'tribal balancing'?

What do you understand by 'inclusive government'? Tribal/ linguistic/ regional/ religious inclusiveness? Political inclusiveness/ broad-basedness?

Where does inclusion vs. exclusion express itself? At the level of Cabinet? The administration? The ruling party? The parastatal sector? The army?

Do you feel that the distribution of government positions between competing social groups has been largely 'fair'? What is a 'fair' distribution?

How are jobs in the civil service distributed? Recruitment based on merit or tribal/ linguistic/ provincial affiliation? Do certain groups dominate the civil service?

How inclusive was UNIP as a ruling party? And how inclusive is MMD?

What can you say about the distribution of jobs in the parastatal sector? What were the key parastatals under Kaunda? How has this changed with privatisation? Has any group benefitted disproportionally from privatisation?

How inclusive are the Zambian armed forces? Are soldiers/ officers recruited on merit or along tribal lines? Has this changed over time? How would you describe the relationship between the political authorities and the armed forces?

4) The distribution of jobs and resources and civil war avoidance

Do you think that there is a link between the inter-group distribution of jobs and resources and the absence of civil war? Does 'tribal balancing' promote peace and stability? If so, would the absence of 'tribal balancing' undermine the country's peace? Has the importance of 'tribal balancing' changed over time?

What was behind the failed Mushala rebellion? Why did it fail?

Is there a trade-off between Zambia's peace and its economic development?

5) Other relevant factors

Which other factors explain Zambia's peace and stability?

Colonial legacy: Zambia won independence after a fairly intense struggle against colonial rule and white domination. To what extent has the struggle against a common enemy (i.e. colonial rule) favoured national integration and unity?

Economic performance: Zambia has suffered from extreme economic decline and crisis from the late 1970s. Why has this not led to civil war?

Democracy: How has the Zambian one-party state affected peace and stability? And what has been the impact of the re-introduction of multi-party politics?

Regional instability: Zambia can be regarded an 'oasis of peace' in an otherwise highly unstable region. How has Zambia been able to protect itself from regional spillover effects?

Role of international donors: Zambia is still receiving large amounts of foreign aid. What has been the role of donors in maintaining peace and stability? And how has structural adjustment affected Zambia's stability?